

**A HISTORY OF
NATIONALISM IN THE EAST**



HANS KOHN

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MY WIFE AND COLLABORATOR

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PREFACE

THIS book treats of the nationalist movement in the New Orient. It does not seek to recount the history of the countries and peoples concerned, but rather, as far as is possible in relation to the immediate past, to trace the main lines of evolution in the history of political thought; for it is upon this that outward events are based and to it they owe their significance. The movement dealt with in this book is going on in all countries inhabited by other than the white races. It has proved its power in Japan and China, is already stirring in Annam and Tunis, and can be detected even among the negroes.

But this book is confined to the forms assumed by the movement in the territories stretching from Egypt to India. Not only is their history typical and in some respects an example to the movement elsewhere, but they have this in common, that British policy and British civilisation have exercised a decisive influence upon them. In the past century Europe has affected alike the political history of the Oriental peoples and their intellectual and economic development. That influence did not reach its full strength till the beginning of the twentieth century; it has brought about a profound change, not only in the external destiny and the constitutions of those peoples, but also in their economic organisation and their intellectual and spiritual outlook. It has been exercised chiefly through the agency of England, and since 1917 of revolutionary Russia, which thus continued the previous Russian Asiatic policy in a far more effective form. The most powerful factor was the World War which, like the Thirty Years War and the Napoleonic campaigns, was merely the outward expression of inward changes in man's historic consciousness. Its influence in the sphere of political geography and constitutional law was, indeed, decisive; yet that was slight in comparison with its intellectual and social effects, which will appear in their full force only in process of

time. In Europe they were displayed first and foremost in the full realisation of the principle of political nationalism which had been evolving in the West during the nineteenth century. Its realisation was, however, the first step in its supersession, as I have shown in my book on Nationalism. On the borderland of Europe and Asia, in Russia, the war resulted in the Revolution, which extended its influence both to Europe and Asia. Indeed, it was made up of both European and Asiatic elements, as I have tried to show in my book on the Significance and Destiny of the Revolution. In Asia itself and in Northern Africa the effects of the World War have assumed yet another form: the principle of political nationalism and bourgeois democracy has been adopted from Europe.

It is to the investigation of this process that the following pages are devoted, constituting an important contribution to the study of nationalism in its social aspect and of its place in the history of thought. To nationalism and its problems and historical significance I have devoted many years of study.

HANS KOHN.

LONDON,
Autumn, 1924.

JERUSALEM,
Spring, 1927.

NOTE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

IN this book I have endeavoured to portray movements in contemporary history as objectively as possible, and have tried to see the relative degree of right on both sides. I am delighted that the book is to be made accessible to the English public, thanks to the efforts of Lieutenant-Colonel C. Egerton, to whom I should like to express my heartfelt gratitude. For of all European peoples the English are most nearly concerned with the events that are running their course in the East to-day. But above the clash of peoples, races, and epochs, it is precisely the historic process now unfolding in the East that is tending more and more to unite mankind as a single whole. We must look beyond all the conflicts of to-day lest we fail to realise that evolution is moving in that direction.

HANS KOHN.

HISTORY OF NATIONALISM

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

EVERY great war produces changes and convulsions in the world outlook of the peoples involved. The World War which broke out in 1914 is unique in the territorial extent of its effects; so, too, was the Russian Revolution, in which the social convulsions brought about by the World War found their most violent expression. The effects of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars were confined to Europe. Only their remotest convulsions in Egypt touched the Orient. In the World War the conflict centred in Europe and the question at issue was between the hegemony of two European groups of Powers; but for the first time Asiatic and African peoples played a part and helped to decide the destiny of Europe. The inevitable shocks caused by the war extended, therefore, to these peoples. The masses became politically conscious, their sufferings sharpened their ability to detect cause and effect not otherwise observed in everyday life, they came in contact with alien countries and conditions, and all this roused the desire for a thorough-going change in existing conditions, as always happens under such circumstances. The events springing from this desire for a recasting of the social order acted and reacted as they have always done in history. The ruling powers were alarmed by the new movements which they themselves had set on foot by unchaining the forces of war and drawing in the masses; at first they appeared pliant and yielding, alike towards subject peoples and socially oppressed classes. Social reforms were promised, designed to ease the lot of the poorer classes and augment their share of ruling power, just as the prospect of independence was held out to subject peoples, or a gradual approach to that object of their desires. The first steps were taken

towards realisation, and hopes rose high. But in a few years it seemed that the excitement had died away and that the normal social order was restored to its firm base, and the ruling powers hastened as far as possible to withdraw, or at least restrict, the concessions already made. Yet during the short period in which the door had stood open to new possibilities a deep impression had been made and, though sometimes it seemed forgotten, it persisted and either asserted itself years afterwards with irresistible force, or frequently found expression in a long drawn out struggle for the realisation of the new ideals.

Such a struggle, with a common origin, a common aim, and likewise a common adversary, unites the peoples of Asia and Northern Africa in the fellowship of a common destiny. World history since 1918, it seems, has been dominated by the evolution and the resulting conflicts of three great fellowships of common destiny. The European Continent, excluding Russia, is one. There the social implication of the World War has been the dissolution and dispossession of the old middle class, which had been the driving force in the developments of the nineteenth century, and the emergence of a new social stratum. Politically it has involved the definitive proclamation of the democratic principle of nationality and the establishment of new European national States, probably the last of their kind. These developments seem to have left the Continent of Europe torn by incurable dissensions. But in Central and Eastern Europe ethnographical and historical conditions make the national State, carried to its logical conclusion, an impossibility, and the exaggerated deference paid to national sovereignty has led to an intolerable state of affairs so that the principle of the national State has reduced itself to absurdity. The only solution that offers is a gradual obliteration of frontiers between European States, and this solution satisfies not only political, but also financial and economic, requirements. It will mean for Europe at once the end of political nationalism as a principle of State organisation and the liquidation of a process which began in Europe with the French Revolution and reached its zenith in the World War.

The second fellowship of common destiny created by the World War is that of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. It embraces

the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. In spite of its territorial disunity, its oneness is more easily recognisable than that of the European Continent on account of its identical language and civilisation. Through its territorial disunity the Anglo-Saxon group commands the seas, and its vast extent, together with its inexhaustible wealth of raw materials and its technical development in industry, makes it economically independent. It is the most conservative of all three fellowships of common destiny. It has fertilised the other two and moulded them, partly by its example, partly by precipitating reactions against its own influence. It was the first, both in England and America, to carry out the revolution by which the new middle class entered into their rights, and which ushered in the national State, with its guiding principle of popular sovereignty, and the capitalist system. At the close of the eighteenth century Anglo-Saxon progress became the school-master of Europe and so remained for a century. At the end of that period the English conception of national organisation and constitutional democracy became the model for the Oriental peoples in their development. But the Anglo-Saxon fellowship, proud and secure in the peculiar character of its development, wished to maintain the purity of that character and not to undermine it through the influence of alien races and their ideas. The Anglo-Saxon fellowship feels and wills its unity more consciously and fervently than the others. This sentiment of unity led England to come to an agreement with the United States in 1923 regarding the payment of her war debt, thus voluntarily burdening her citizens with an unprecedented weight of taxation. The Washington Naval Convention of 1922, whereby England and the United States agreed to naval equality, sprang from the same sentiment. To this same sentiment England sacrificed her alliance with Japan, which had been a pillar of her Oriental policy for twenty years and had been largely instrumental in awakening national consciousness in the East, though here its influence was indirect. But a like tendency in America is indicated by the severe restrictions on immigration, far exceeding all economic requirements, and by Coolidge's overwhelming victory in the Presidential election of 1924. In him those classes triumphed who proudly stress their English ancestry and their ancient

English heritage of tradition, and whose predominance was to be maintained in America in the interests of Anglo-Saxon unity.

A double menace is seen to threaten the natural development of this conscious Anglo-Saxon unity: on the one hand the Russian Revolution, on the borderland between the Asiatic and European fellowships of common destiny, has not yet found its place in the new world order, but it stands for a break with the dominant political theory of nineteenth-century Europe, which may be traced to Anglo-Saxon influences; on the other hand Asiatic races are migrating, compelled to leave their homes by reason of economic developments and overpopulation. This is a problem destined in the near future to lead to a conflict between the Anglo-Saxon and Oriental fellowships, a conflict which will become keener as the peoples of Asia grow in national consciousness; and it is not confined to the United States and Canada. In the South African Union and in Kenya Indian immigration is a constant source of friction and of embittered resistance, which reinforces Indian national sentiment and stimulates the Indian resolve to attain independence. The Indian leader Gandhi was the first to feel himself the spokesman of his race in this struggle in Natal. The armament fever in Australia and New Zealand, and their clamour for a powerful British naval base at Singapore, are induced by the fear that millions of Japanese and Chinese wish to pour into the vast areas of Northern Australia, now absolutely empty and incapable of white settlement, thus rapidly overwhelming the small minority of British settlers in Southern Australia.

But we are at the moment witnessing the spectacle of a struggle between the Asiatic fellowship of common destiny and the two other groups of Powers. The ancient struggle between West and East is, it seems, breaking out anew. At the close of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era the East was still the aggressor. The Arabs in Spain, the Mongols in Russia, the Turks in Hungary formed the outposts of a victorious Asia. Just as in the former ages ancient Oriental religious conceptions, learning, and art were taken over by the Greeks, assimilated, and superseded, and just as later, during the dissolution of the Roman Empire, influences from Western Asia penetrated and transformed it,

so in the later Middle Ages Arabian philosophy and science formed one of the most important forces ushering in the Renaissance and modern Europe.

But this seemed to exhaust the vigour of the Orient. Not in Islam alone, but in India and China the great creative eras of civilisation seemed to have ended long ago. Their intellectual life stagnated and gave no promise of new developments in the future. Intellectually and socially Europe was completely transformed in the course of five centuries; in those same centuries the Orient sank into timeless immobility. Political changes and the rise and fall of dynasties did nothing to recast its social order, its political forms, and its economic system. In the war between East and West, Europe assumed the rôle of aggressor. By the end of the nineteenth century it seemed assured that, with negligible exceptions, Asia and Africa were to fall under the dominion of the white race. Christian missionaries brought not only the religious conceptions of the West to the Orient, but wherever they succeeded in establishing schools they brought European political and social doctrines. And this fresh contact between East and West brought new life to the East, as centuries before Arabian influences had helped to shape modern Europe. True, the vitalising influences were not all on one side. The philosophy and the mystic theology of the ancient East were revealed to Europe, and effected changes in European philosophy and in popular tendencies in religious thought. Japanese art stood beside the cradle of expressionism. But Europe's influence on the East was beyond all comparison greater. Oriental consciousness was fired by European ascendancy, to which it submitted without resistance. Memories of the glorious past were revived. Europe became not merely the adversary but the schoolmaster. Western ideas concerning manners and customs, the principles of statecraft, religion, democracy, and industry began slowly to penetrate to the East. This process began in the earliest decades of the nineteenth century. At first it was confined to border regions and a few pioneer individuals. It spread rapidly downwards, embracing wider and wider sections of the population, and outwards, so that soon no province of Asia or Northern Africa was left unaffected.

The twentieth century witnessed an unforeseen intensifica-

tion and acceleration of this process. Two external events contributed to it. First and foremost Japan's triumphant campaign against Russia in 1905. This victory of Asiatics over a great European empire appeared to many people as the hopeful turning-point in the struggle between East and West. It is of importance that Japan's victory was made possible by the mutual quarrels of European Powers. It was due to Great Britain's alliance with Japan, which was directed against the eastward penetration of her rival, Russia, but which contributed indirectly to reinforce the struggle for independence of England's own Asiatic possessions. Hardly less important was the participation of Asiatic and African peoples in the European War of 1914, barely ten years later. Once again they witnessed a conflict of European Powers one against another. The dominating position of small European settlements in the East, based upon respect and fear, was made possible by the fact that there the whites faced the millions of other races as a united ruling caste, with no poor or outlawed or ill-used members. Not only the educated classes but the great mass of the people now saw this legend destroyed as they watched the European spectacle in amazement. Just as in the past the first successes against the Turks had inspired the Europeans with fresh confidence, so the great European War gave assurance to the people of the East. A new epoch had dawned in the struggle between East and West.

In this struggle the peoples of Asia and Northern Africa are beginning to feel themselves linked by a common destiny. That sentiment of unity is, indeed, only in process of formation. It is less consciously felt than in either the Anglo-Saxon or the European fellowship. Differences of race, religion, civilisation, and language seem too great to be overcome; the means of communication and the mutual cultural interaction within the vast territory involved seem too little developed. Nevertheless, the consciousness of a common destiny is evolving through the defensive struggle against Europe, which is everywhere the same, and through the influence of English civilisation on the one hand and the Russian Revolution on the other, which is everywhere perceptible.

But this Oriental fellowship of common destiny coheres

not only in virtue of a common struggle and the simultaneous entry of all Asia into a new era; its coherence is also due to the fact that the new era is rooted in a uniform principle which is recasting systems and dominating the whole evolution of outward institutions. For what is happening now in the East is not merely a regrouping of political units or the introduction of parliamentary constitutions, but a far more fundamental process. Not only is it trenching upon every tradition and custom that has hitherto ruled men's lives, but it is beginning to change the whole intellectual and emotional outlook of the Oriental and the conceptions on which he has based them. Under European influence the same transfiguring process is being repeated that evolved the Europe of the nineteenth century from that of the seventeenth by means of rationalist thinking and the revolutions in England and France. That transfiguration wholly changed the intellectual and social outlook and the framework of human society. Each epoch has a guiding idea which moulds the whole life of the time to what is, for the time being, a world complete in itself and dominated by an unmistakable general principle. This guiding idea at once shapes men's lives and is itself the goal of life. It operates in daily life, in law, in industry, in art and philosophy, as well as in the sphere of politics and statecraft. It is the mystic faith of the age inscribed upon its banners, a thing for which men will die.

Right into the eighteenth century that faith had been religious in Europe. It bound and it loosed, it shaped history, and human endeavour found in it a guide and an aim. The nations varied in temperament and character, but religion was the supreme ruling principle, forming inwardly a web of experience and tradition, outwardly a bond of morals, manners, and common policy. The language of religion, Latin, served as a common link, and scientific investigation rested upon a common axiomatic base, that of religion. The Bible explained all that is; everything must be deduced and proved from the Holy Scriptures. They formed the unquestioned basis of all justice. Even kingship by divine right derived its justification thence. Atheism was the deadly sin in this society, denial of religious authority the great scandal which shook society at its very base and shut

out the sceptic from human society, as something sinister and incomprehensible.

From the eighteenth century onwards nationalism supplanted religion as the governing principle in Europe. A gradual process, culminating in the World War, made the political nation, striving to develop its power, the principle that was henceforth to loose and to bind, to shape history, to be the guide and aim of human endeavour. The variety of religions continued to exercise their manifold influences upon the character and traditions of the peoples, but the supreme ruling principle in the organisation of Europe was citizenship of a nation, which henceforward constituted the decisive inner experience as well as the conscious outward bond of union in manners, morals, and policy. Everywhere the language of religion was replaced by the vernacular, which was moulded and stimulated in its development almost everywhere by the translation of the Holy Scriptures into the national language. Science and research were freed from the fetters of religious dogma. Religion ceased to be the unquestioned basis and source of public law; its place was taken by national sovereignty. "The authority of the State emanates from the people," the new constitutions declared. The deadly sin in society now becomes anti-nationalism, lack of patriotism; denial of the authority of the nation over men's consciences becomes the great scandal which shakes society at its very base and shuts out the sceptic from human society, as something sinister and incomprehensible.

A similar process has been going on in the East in recent decades, and particularly in the immediate past. Nationalism takes the place of religion as the principle governing all social and intellectual life. The Orient was not a religious unit, but everywhere its fundamental attitude towards religious questions was the same. And throughout the whole vast area there were only two important groups. These two circles intersected in India, which in the recent history of the Orient has often been a focal point in more senses than one. The western circle was Islam, with all its sects united through the Arabian language, in which the Holy Scriptures were written, and through the common pilgrimage to the sacred city of Mecca. Its sphere of influence stretched from the

western coast of Africa eastwards as far as India, China, Java, and the Malay Peninsula. The eastern circle embraced India and Ceylon, Tibet, China, and Japan. In spite of the differences distinguishing Hinduism, Confucianism, and Shintoism, all three have, nevertheless, a kindred attitude towards life; all had been subject to Buddhist influence, which, despite all transformations and distortions, still bore traces of the original doctrine.

And now these systems which had survived the centuries were violently shaken by the penetration of the national idea from Europe. No sphere of social or intellectual life remained unaffected. Family life and the position of women, education and the schools, were changed as fundamentally as political life. The movement exercised its influence most markedly in those parts where contact with Europe was closest. There it was that religion and traditional moral codes first lost their sway over the more progressive sections of society, and thence the new movement rapidly spread downwards and outwards. Nationalism frequently clashed with religion, but frequently it made use of religion as an ally. It divided where formerly religion had united, and so was responsible for the fall of the Turkish Empire which had been held together by the Islamic religion. But, on the other hand, it united where formerly religion had divided. In Egypt national consciousness threw a bridge across the gulf dividing Mohammedans and Copts, and in India it sought to weld together Mohammedans and Hindus.

Nationalism, as it penetrated the East, was accompanied by the same changes that Europe had experienced in modern times. All the romanticism, cultural and sentimental, that had attended European nationalist movements, blossomed forth in the East as well. National languages were fostered, the Holy Scriptures were translated into them, literature and art were encouraged, brilliant eras of the past were recalled in which national qualities and characteristics had found expression. Intellectual and political life was secularised. Democracy, the inherent form of political organisation characteristic of nationalism, was adopted. Parliaments were created on the European model, constitutions drawn up, and the ancient monarchies rooted in religious conceptions were replaced by republics based upon the will of the people.

Corresponding to the rise of nationalism in Europe was a

parallel change in the economic grouping of society. The feudal system and the dominance of the great landed proprietors made way for industrialism and the dominance of the middle classes, who attained their new and preponderating influence, economic and political, through the revolutions in England, America, and France, and particularly through the English Reform Act of 1832 and the citizen monarchy in France. Along with this shifting of the social centre of gravity, new cultural conditions arose. Protagonists of historical materialism might say that the middle classes brought with them their own myth, the myth of nationalism. Side by side with the representatives of large-scale finance and industry, the intellectuals, the professional classes, erected the theoretical superstructure of the new economic system. In a sense they took the place of the priesthood of earlier days. Formerly the first and second estates had ruled: the warriors, who were also the great landed nobles, and the priests. The wars that were waged in those days were, in conception, wars of religion; socially they were dynastic wars and feuds of the nobility. In actual fact, the first and second estates were one; they were frequently united by family ties; the younger sons of noble houses became priests. But the priesthood also offered the opportunity of social ascent to gifted members of the lower ranks. The situation is not essentially different after the rise of the third estate, but it is governed by a different principle. The wars that were now waged were, in conception, national wars of liberation; socially they were competitive struggles for monopoly in exploiting a certain territory or labour supply or certain natural resources. Again, the great financiers and industrialists were closely united by family ties with the professional classes, lawyers, journalists, and civil servants. And at the same time the professions offered certain opportunities of ascent to members of the fourth estate.

A similar process is repeating itself in the East. Ancient economic systems are falling into decay, modern industrialism, wholesale trade, and finance capital are beginning to penetrate everywhere. The old ruling caste of landed nobility, warriors, and priests is being slowly ousted by a rising class of merchants, lawyers, and men of letters. Professional men, especially lawyers and students, are protagonists of the new nationalist

movements, their champions and leaders. The Press is developing rapidly and its influence is growing. This new nationalism is also causing internal conflicts in the Orient. When groups with a life and interests of their own unite, it must lead to clashes with the aspirations of similar neighbouring groups. But it may be that the joint defensive struggle against the white race imposed upon the Oriental fellowship of common destiny will partially counteract these disintegrating tendencies of modern nationalism.

The inner unity of the Oriental fellowship is based primarily upon this process of transformation which is initiating a course of historical evolution just ended, as it seems, in Europe. It appears that the Asiatic peoples, under European influence, are to pass through this process more rapidly and consciously than was the case with the white race. And already we discern on the horizon the outlines of a new epoch, destined to succeed, in the first instance for the European fellowship, to the period in which dominating nationalism and middle-class capitalism are basic political principles. For the first time in history the Russian Revolution has enfranchised the fourth estate, and the conception of the social class war has ousted that of national war. The new estate will introduce its own culture and its new myth. The transformation will, indeed, be gradual. Just as in England after 1832 the power of the great aristocracy persisted almost unimpaired till 1911 side by side with the rising middle class, just as in Germany the great aristocracy and the military caste ruled till 1918, so too the fourth estate will take its place beside the third for many decades yet in various combinations and forms. And just as religion, though it has ceased to be the politically determining principle in society, yet retains a mitigated power over many people's minds, so national sentiment will persist side by side with social consciousness.

The evolution of the East is subject to a peculiar influence, in that the first symptoms of the new epoch dawning upon the European fellowship are making an impression upon the East as well, partly through European contact with the Orient and partly through the immediate effects of the Russian Revolution in Asia. The demand for national liberation is accompanied by demands for social liberation, still

confused and bewildered and hardly according with actual economic conditions. The two demands are constantly interwoven and intermingled and each movement seeks to make use of the other as an ally in its struggle. The social propaganda of the Third International in Asia frequently includes nationalist demands. Like the liberal nationalism of Germany or Mazzini's in Italy, this new national democracy feels itself to be the champion of the lower classes. Thus the Young Tunisians, the nationalist party in Tunis, demanded in their programme of November, 1924, not only a Parliament and municipal corporations, elected by universal suffrage, but also the eight-hour day and the legal recognition of trade unions. But everywhere it is middle-class intellectuals who are making such demands, and the beginnings of class consciousness among the small peasants and workers themselves are as yet barely visible. Thus in reality the East is in the condition of Europe eighty years ago, but many of its leaders have before them the spectacle of post-war Europe. The contrast may result in a rapidity of progress which, however, is seriously checked by the state of affairs in the East and by the complexity of the problems involved.

The fundamental tendency of the Oriental fellowship of common destiny is westwards. It may be that this westernism is not accidental, not merely the effect of influence, but that rather the historical consciousness of mankind evolves through inevitable epochs, and that in this case the European fellowship has merely traversed the road earlier, as on previous occasions the East moved forward more rapidly. But the tendency to turn towards Europe cannot in any event be mere imitation. The European historical phases of the past two centuries—nationalism, the dominance of the middle classes, and the rise of the fourth estate—will appear in the East in a new and characteristic form. Voices are already multiplying in the East which utter warnings against the superficial assimilation of European historical tendencies and systems. They urge recollection of the traditions of the ancient native civilisation. Their appeal comes home to the masses and is better understood by them than the apostles of alien systems. But these voices are not only heard in Asia; they penetrate as far as Europe, where a similar painful transformation has begun since the World War, where the future is equally un-

certain and chaos as menacing a prospect. The World War left the three fellowships of common destiny mutually threatening and opposed, in consequence of the economic and political convulsions that it produced; and yet the above considerations suggest that it may mean the beginnings of a common human consciousness embracing for the first time remote, forgotten, and little evolved peoples.

CHAPTER II

REFORMATION AND RENAISSANCE IN ISLAM

THE intellectual and social life of the East is to-day undergoing a process of transformation at the close of an historical epoch in which religion and a religious moral code dominated the whole inner life, and at the beginning of a new epoch in which, upon the European model, nationalism is destined to succeed to the rôle of religion. In Europe the Thirty Years War heralded the passage from the religious to the nationalist principle. Here we are confronted with the remarkable spectacle of an epoch ending, not with the fading away of its distinguishing characteristics, but with their final extreme intensification. It is as though the hitherto dominating principle had sought, by a tremendous concentration of creative will-power, to impress itself on a world already dimly alienated. For the Thirty Years War was inspired by religious motives and represents the zenith of religious influence as a principle moulding the social life of mankind. The thesis *cujus regio illius religio* aims at the capture of absolute power by religious policy. As late as 1685 Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, issued by Henry IV in 1593 and assuring religious liberty to French Protestants.

Similarly the World War of 1914 marked the zenith of nationalism as a political principle, and yet at the same time marked the beginning of its end. Here, too, the thesis *cujus regio illius natio*, doomed to be received with scepticism within a few decades, is seen as the guiding rule of statesmanship.

But before and during the Thirty Years War there was a period of deepened and intensified religious feeling, a rejuvenation and new flowering-time of religion. The Reformation and Humanism, the Anabaptists and the Moravians, Pascal and the Jansenists, bear witness to this ferment. These movements tended in two directions. In part they

aimed at a return to the uncorrupted, primitive Christianity of the Bible, in part they constituted a liberal and humanistic development of the ethical content of Christianity.

Islam in the nineteenth century offers a surprising parallel. It was a period immediately preceding the supercession of the religious by the national world principle in the East. In the eighteenth century Islam began to awaken from the lethargy in which, like Christianity before the Reformation, it was sunk. In both cases there were abuses, empty formalism, decadence. In the eighteenth century a ferment set in which shook all the length and breadth of the Islamic world and tended in its after effects to revive Mohammedanism as a living force. During the nineteenth century it advanced victoriously in all directions and proved its vitality.

Here, too, the reformers' efforts tended in two directions. On the one hand they sought to restore the ancient religion in its primitive uncorrupted purity and simplicity. They were animated by a spirit of stern Puritanism. In their sense of righteousness they observe a stern and rigorous isolation. This tendency centres first and foremost in the Wahabi movement, which again gave birth to a number of other movements, including that of the Senussi. On the other hand reforming zeal aimed at a revival of the basic ethical code of Islam in a new liberal and humanistic form, not shunning the influence of other religions. These aspirations found expression principally in Babism and the Ahmadiya movement.

The Wahabi movement is in every sense a return to the original principles of Islam. It arose in the most inaccessible part of Central Arabia where even yet hardly any Europeans have penetrated. Nevertheless, three explorers have described accurately the doctrine and life of the Wahabis, and chance has ordained that each of the three came in contact with the Wahabi movement at a decisive moment in its history.

The first modern European explorer, the Dane Karsten Niebuhr, travelled in Southern Arabia and especially in the Yemen from 1762 to 1764; he mentions the Wahabis, but the movement had existed only a few years and he never came in direct contact with them at all. Nevertheless, he had a true prevision of its significance, for he reported that a new sect,

or rather a new religion, had arisen a few years earlier in the province of El Ared, and that it might in time effect considerable changes both in the faith and the government of the Arabs. The next explorer, Johann Ludwig Burckhardt, who visited the Hejaz forty years later, saw Mecca a short time after the expulsion of the Wahabis from the Holy City, so that he was able to give an account of the rise to power of the new movement and its conclusion. William Gifford Palgrave, the son of a baptised English Jew and well-known historian, became a Jesuit after a brilliant career in the Indian army, and in 1862 he travelled through Nejd. He draws a vivid picture of the period between the first forward push of the Wahabis and the rebirth of the movement, which began a hundred years later, and of the conditions in the two kingdoms then existing in Central Arabia. H. St. J. B. Philby has described in detail the new Wahabi revival of recent years. In 1917-18 he was head of the British Political Mission at the court of the Wahabi ruler, and travelled through Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.

The Wahabi movement is a true mirror of primitive Mohammedanism alike in the manner of its first appearance and in its aim. Recent research shows that originally Mohammed and his immediate circle nowise intended the extension of the Arabian Empire. Mohammed felt himself rather the prophet of his own people than the founder of a universal world religion. He saw the decadent morals of Mecca, his native town, and the folly of Arab tribal separatism, leading to endless bloody feuds and a total lack of any lofty, unifying idea. His religion, therefore, was first and foremost a call to repentance, the announcement of a coming unescapable judgment and of the need for self-examination and preparation for such judgment. Salvation was to be found solely in unreserved and devout submission to the will of God. Compared with the joys of Paradise, the privations of life on earth were of no account. This religious appeal borrowed its doctrines from Judaism and Judaic Christianity, both widely disseminated in Arabia at that time; it was of great political and national significance. Not only did Mohammed wish to transmit to his fellow clansmen the loftier faith in God which is embodied in the Holy Scriptures of monotheistic religion, he wished also to weld the Arabian race to a unity,



MAP I.—AREAS OF COMMON DESTINY IN THE POLITICAL WORLD OF TO-DAY.

to join the mutually warring tribes in a law-abiding alliance of peace and brotherhood. And within this brotherly league there were no longer to be distinctions of wealth and poverty.

Mohammed's plan succeeded with astonishing rapidity. The religious bond of unity proved the basis of nations and states. It was not till after Mohammed's death that the Arabians turned their energies to the conquest of provinces of the Byzantine and Persian Empires. It is not yet clear what motives inspired them. Perhaps it was the desire of the Bedouins to gain possession of the rich resources of the cultivated agricultural land, especially when they observed how the seemingly powerful empires threatened to collapse before their attack. Perhaps, as Leone Caetani suggests, there was an economic reason driving the Arabs to start on a new migration of peoples. Caetani supposes that an increasing dryness of the soil in Arabia destroyed the livelihood of the tribes settled there. And ancient Arabian traditions do in fact point to a more plentiful water supply, as well, possibly, as to artificial irrigation by Babylonian engineers. In that case Mohammed's message would simply have created favourable conditions for developments due to geographical and economic facts.

Be that as it may, originally the Arabian national motive was a far more important factor in the victorious campaigns of Islam than the religious motive. As a matter of course, and in spite of warning voices from the circle of the Prophet's former companions, the rapid and astonishingly easy conquest of rich provinces was a temptation not to lay down the sword, but to extend further and further the domain of Arabian rule. The idea once fostered, that it was the Arabs' duty to spread the reign of Islam by the sword and to convert subjected peoples to the new religion by force, proved untenable. In the newly conquered territories beyond the confines of Arabia proper the peoples retained their former religion. So also their customs and institutions remained unaffected. The Arabian conquerors formed a ruling caste. They were the true State, the fully enfranchised citizens. But since the conscious bond of union in the ruling class in the new Empire was religion, the subject peoples could, by accepting Islam, raise themselves to the ruling class, the brotherhood of equals amongst whom, according to the Prophet's teaching, there

must be no distinctions of social caste or race or colour. Conversion to Islam was, therefore, voluntarily accepted from motives of self-interest. The Arabs hardly welcomed this development. Naturally the Arabian ruling caste lost in importance as it gained in extent. It was the non-Mohammedans who had paid taxes. Their conversion to Islam changed the whole social and financial structure of the Mohammedan Empire.

The Empire retained its original structure only under the first four Caliphs, or successors to Mohammed. Under the dynasty of the Ommiades, who ruled in Damascus in the second half of the seventh century and the first half of the eighth, conditions were already changing. The Empire was still governed by the old Arabian hereditary aristocracy. The influence of former simplicity could be observed at the Caliph's court, and traces of former democracy remained, though restricted, of course, to Mohammedans. Religious interests and speculations were not prominent; they were fostered in circles remote from court life. But in administering their vast domain the new rulers were bound to learn from former conditions. The Byzantine system of administration continued substantially unchanged. Hellenic civilisation, itself a blend of Oriental and Western influences, penetrated the whole inner life of Islam.

This process ended under the rule of the Abbasside dynasty. The reigning house still belonged to the old Arabian aristocracy, but their power was finally broken. The subject peoples had accepted Islam. It seems that the Byzantines and Persians, the first to be converted to the new faith, were zealous missionaries. The atmosphere of theological controversy which prevailed, especially in eastern Christendom, made them more actively interested than the Arabs in religious controversies. In their hands, under Hellenistic and Persian influence, the theology and philosophy of Islam developed. Persian officials and scholars who had adopted the Islamic faith filled all important positions. From the lofty heights of their ancient civilisation they looked down upon the Arabs as barbarians. The Arab State had inevitably been driven to adapt itself to the more advanced civilisation of the conquered peoples. But that did not put an end to the Arab national State. There was no longer a ruling upper

class in whose midst democratic principles prevailed. It was replaced by an Oriental despotism on the Persian-Byzantine model. In the sight of the Caliph all his subjects were equal. This religious and cultural levelling resulted in social levelling. The court in Baghdad was dominated by Persian influence and ceremonial. The Abbassides, unlike the Ommiades, were interested in religion. They took an eager part in theological discussion. And now for the first time intolerance made its appearance. Heretics were persecuted and punished. Many Caliphs exercised minute personal control over the orthodoxy of their subjects.

These new developments necessarily enfeebled the Empire. There was no longer a class bearing the burden of authority. The feudal system flourished luxuriantly throughout the Empire and hastened its progress on the road to ruin. But Islam had proved its great power of adaptation. This seemingly inflexible religion had been pliant enough to absorb both Hellenic and Persian culture. The amalgamation destroyed its original character, which had borne the stamp of the desert and of Arab nationalism. But as C. H. Becker has shown, in this process Mohammedanism took its place in the Mediterranean cultural unit which joins Europe with the Near East and is fed by a single stream flowing from Judaism, Parseeism, and Babylon to Greece, and returning to the East in the form of Hellenism, whence it created modern Europe through the instrumentality of Arabs and Jews and fertilised the peoples of Northern Europe. Because of this power of fusion with other systems and this capacity for the absorption of humanistic culture, Islam was able in the nineteenth century to give expression to profound human impulses in Babism and the Ahmadiya movement, whilst at the same time the Wahabi movement stood for a return to early Mohammedanism, moulded by the desert and the needs of the Arab race.

The religion of Mohammed had given the Arabs a political organisation and had evolved their State. Religious decadence brought with it the dissolution of the State organisation. Round about the year 1000 Arabia had relapsed into its former chaotic state of ceaseless tribal feuds, without any connecting unity or territorial organisation. Islam was riddled with all manner of ancient superstitions, and heathen

customs flourished amongst the Arab tribes. Mohammedanism not only manifested its power of adaptation to a higher level of culture, it was also capable of harmonising its teaching with the traditions and customs of primitive peoples, and that in Central Africa and the Malay Archipelago as well as in Arabia. All these innovations could be accepted in Islam by virtue of the admittedly binding principle of *idshmā*, of universal agreement. *Idshmā* asserted that "everything that is, everything that remains unquestioned and is tolerated without protest by the competent doctrinal authorities throughout the Mohammedan community, cannot be disputed from the point of view of religion and must be recognised as harmonising with the Prophetic Law." The force of this principle of universal agreement operated especially in the admission of old heathen customs or new ones which were in flat contradiction to the fundamental principles of Islam, as proclaimed under Mohammed and the early Caliphs. This applies particularly to the worship of the saints, with its crass polytheistic traits, which was common in all Islamic countries. Thus it came about in course of time that the decisive factor in the religious life of Islam was not the Koran and the earliest traditions, but the interpretation of the Koran, in accordance with the evolution of centuries, sanctioned by ecclesiastical authority. Herein Islam shows itself in many respects akin to the Catholic Church. There is a distinction in that the *idshmā*, the *consensus ecclesiæ*, is determined neither by ecclesiastical councils nor by a spiritual head. "Any external concerted plan is wholly alien to the growth of this *consensus*. It was moulded unconsciously and undesignedly in those circles which for the time being were recognised as the competent *idshmā* authorities. Thus differences of opinion concerning the scope of *idshmā* long remained possible until at last, in the nature of the case, it came to be conceived as the agreed doctrine and opinion of those Islamic theologians who were recognised at a particular period. These are the people, empowered 'to bind and to loose,' the men who interpret and expound the law and are called upon to judge of its proper application. Since the recognition of the *idshmā* valid for the time being is regarded as an attribute of orthodoxy, the Wahabi movement could, for example, be branded as heretical, in spite of the fact that

its aim was precisely the restoration of uncorrupted doctrine. For it sought to thrust Islam back into a situation anterior to the *consensus* then valid, and condemned the outcome of an evolutionary process of many centuries duration approved by the recognised ecclesiastical authorities" (Ignaz Goldziher).

The Wahabi movement represents a Protestant reaction against this state of affairs. Its founder came under the influence of the theologian Ibn Taimiya, who lived at the beginning of the fourteenth century. He had rejected the *consensus ecclesiæ* as an evolutionary and binding force and declared that every word of the Koran was to be taken literally and interpreted only through the Koran itself. He had already protested against the innovations of later times, and in particular had condemned the worship of the saints as idolatry. The founder of the Wahabi movement, Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who was born in Nejd in Central Arabia at the beginning of the eighteenth century, followed the main trend of this protest against the *consensus ecclesiæ* and the abuses and deviations from the original faith which it had rendered possible; he stood for a return to the teaching of the Koran and the Sunna, the oldest body of tradition. In this sense the Wahabi movement is akin to Protestantism. It, too, adopted a belief in literal inspiration and a pietist attitude which urged the strict fulfilment of religious commandments and duties in every external detail.

But Protestantism was not only a religious reform movement which opposed developments in contradiction to primitive teaching and abuses that had crept into the Catholic Church—a movement of reaction, that is—for the peoples in whose midst it arose it meant the awakening of their national consciousness. Protestant reform movements were often simultaneously a nationalist breach of the religious unity which surmounted ethnic differences. Thus the Hussite movement meant also a rebirth of Czech national consciousness. In a like sense the Wahabi movement, though aiming simply at religious reform, was the precursor of Arab nationalism, and so its second prime in the twentieth century ushers in a fully developed Arab nationalism. As Mohammed had done in the past, so too Abdul Wahhab sought both to sweep away heathen abuses and introduce pure monotheism, and to create from the utter political chaos in Arabia a State

organisation held together by the ties of religion, brotherhood, and equality. Like Mohammed's original teaching, his own was based on a belief in reward and punishment in a future life; it was a call to repentance and submission to the approaching divine judgment. The utmost importance was attached to prayer and fasting. All religious commandments must be obeyed with the minutest care. Besides strict obedience, a puritanical way of life was required. All luxury in habitation, dress, and daily life was proscribed. The prohibition of wine was more strictly enforced, tobacco and opium were forbidden. All decorations were removed from the mosques; minarets, a Turkish innovation, and the rosary adopted from Buddhism were abolished. The primitive moral purity and simplicity of the ancient desert religion was to be restored and the influence of city civilisation on the development of Islam was to be eradicated. In this respect the Wahabi movement resembles certain tendencies in ancient Jewish religious history which centred in the sect of Rechabites and the circles influenced by the early prophets. Elijah and Amos, in their dress and mien and teaching, stood for the ancient austerity of the primitive desert religion as opposed to the emasculating influence of Canaan's city civilisation and the abuses and idolatry which had crept in in consequence. It seems that the Rechabites aimed at a like return to the ancient ideal; they were Puritan nomads who scorned wine and the cultivation of the soil. But at the same time this early prophetic movement involved a national protest against alien ways.

About the middle of the eighteenth century Abdul Wahhab set about realising his reforms, at once religious and national-political. He was a widely travelled man and had studied in Basra, Damascus, and Mecca; but the scene of his labours lay in his homeland in Central Arabia. There he succeeded in converting to his doctrines Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Saud of Deraya. Like Mohammed in the past, Ibn Saud now felt called upon to unite the Arab tribes by means of the new faith. Ibn Saud and his son succeeded in uniting all the Central Arabian tribes once more in a single kingdom. For centuries complete anarchy had prevailed, and the Wahabis call this the period of "ignorance," just as other Mohammedans speak of the time before Mohammed's appearance; but

now in Nejd and in the whole of Central Arabia there was a unified political organisation, and peace and order held sway. The Turkish Government was disturbed by the Wahabis' successes and sent troops against them, but they were defeated. And now the Wahabis proceeded to aggression beyond the bounds of Central Arabia. They regarded as their real enemies those Arabs who had lapsed into heathen superstition and the worship of the saints. Against them first and foremost they turned their arms. Particularly they hated the Holy Cities where all manner of abuses had struck root. In 1801, under the leadership of Ibn Saud's grandson, they captured Karbala on the right bank of the Euphrates, the sacred city of the Shiites. They killed the inhabitants, destroyed the Holy Sepulchre, plundered the treasures in the temple collected throughout centuries, and destroyed the sacred relics. The very next year the sacred city of the Sunnites, Mecca itself, fell into their hands. The tombs of the saints and all objects of worship were ruthlessly destroyed, and all rites and ceremonies suspected of heathen origin were forbidden. Two years later Medina fell, and the monument erected there over the Prophet's grave was destroyed; the assembled treasure was taken away.

The destruction of sacred objects and the rapid growth of the Wahabis' power induced the Turkish Sultan to intervene promptly. As Caliph he was the guardian of the Holy Cities, and their possession was one of his titles to the Caliphate; moreover, the Turks felt the very existence of their empire menaced by the Wahabis, who were at that moment preparing to march on Baghdad. Further, the devastation of Mohammed's grave had roused widespread indignation in Islam against the Wahabis. The Pasha of Egypt, Mohammed Ali, was entrusted with the task. In 1811 his troops landed in the Hejaz. The struggle lasted for years, but in 1818 it ended with the victory of the Egyptian army, thanks to its superior technical equipment and its European armaments. Not only the Hejaz but the whole of Nejd fell into their hands. The capital, Deraya, was razed to the ground, Egyptian garrisons were stationed in the cities of Central Arabia, and Ibn Saud's great-grandson was led in triumph through Constantinople and executed.

So ended the first period of the Wahabis' glory. They

had been the first to rebuild a great Arab State which embraced, besides Central Arabia, the Hejaz, Yemen, Oman, El Hassa, and the Bahrein Islands. They had given a new meaning to Arabian national consciousness. And now this growing power was finally over and done with. True, the Egyptian garrisons were withdrawn later, and Ibn Saud's descendants succeeded in establishing a new kingdom in Nejd with the new capital of Riyadh. But it was limited in extent. In the north of Central Arabia, in Djebel Shammar, Abdullah Ibn Rashid established a realm of his own with Hail as capital, and this soon outstripped in importance the Wahabi kingdom to the south. The history of the nineteenth century records the continued decline of Ibn Saud's successors. The religious bond of Wahabi doctrine degenerated to empty and bigoted fanaticism without a trace of high-minded ardour. A change set in at the beginning of the twentieth century. A religious reform movement now made the Wahabis once more the protagonists of the new Arab national movement.

But Wahabi influence had not been confined to Arabia. When it fell into decay there its apostles transmitted it to the other peoples of Islam. It was the first breath of life to rouse these peoples from the absolute lethargy in which they were sunk in the eighteenth century. Othman Dan Fodio, of the warlike pastoral tribe of the Fula in the Sudan and on the upper reaches of the Niger, had been converted by the Wahabis at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Mecca. He returned and converted his own tribe and then endeavoured to weld the Fula tribe scattered over a wide area into an organised State, as the Wahabis had united Arabia. In 1804 the powerful Hausa kingdom of Gobir was subdued. And now Dan Fodio unfurled the green banner of the Prophet, preached the holy war, subdued wide territories, and established a great kingdom with Sokoto as its capital, calling himself "the king of the Mohammedans." He became the acknowledged spiritual leader of the Mohammedans in the Western Sudan, and his successors maintained that position even after the establishment of the British Protectorate early in the twentieth century.

As in Africa so too in India and Sumatra the Wahabi movement proved a stimulating and vitalising force amongst Mohammedans and led, though only temporarily, to the


establishment of theocratic Mohammedan States which sought to revert to the earliest traditions of Islam and were, at the same time, hostile to European influences. The Wahabi leaders in India were Syed Ahmad and Ismail Haji Maulvi Mohammed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. They had come under Wahabi influence on their pilgrimage to Mecca. They were deeply impressed with the religious corruption among Indian Mohammedans and the intermixture of Hindu with Mohammedan customs and habits, and they resolved to dedicate themselves to the reform of Islam in India on the Wahabi model. In India, especially, many people were Mohammedans only in name. They observed the customs of the Hindus, celebrated their festivals, maintained their laws of inheritance and marriage, and prayed to their neighbours' many gods. All this was to be changed. Islam was revived in all its primitive purity and fanatical austerity and the holy war against the Sikhs was preached. For a brief space the Indian Wahabis succeeded in establishing a realm of their own in the Punjab, but in 1831 it was overthrown by the Sikhs. Nevertheless, the influence of Wahabi doctrine was by no means extinguished. Its influence spread. A copious literature came into being, written by the two leaders already mentioned and their disciples. The Koran was diligently studied. The titles of the books are characteristic of the spirit which gave them birth. "The Awakener of the Heedless," "Confirmation in the Faith," "A Call to the Holy War," "A Guide for the Faithful," "An Exposition of Deadly Sin and of Heresy"—these are some of the titles. The Wahabi movement had breathed new life into the torpid existence of the Indian Mohammedans.

In Northern Africa, too, the Wahabi movement was a decisive factor in the revival of Islam. Mohammed ben Ali ben es Senussi, a Mohammedan of high birth from Algeria born at the close of the eighteenth century, who had travelled all over Northern Africa from Cairo to Fez, came under Wahabi influence in Mecca. He became the founder of the Brotherhood (*Ahwan*) or Order of the Senussi, one of the many Orders of Dervishes which were akin in some respects to the Western monastic orders and in others to the Freemasons' lodges, and which played an important part in

Mohammedan life. These orders had their origin in Sufism, the mystic theology which arose in Islam under Persian influence. But the separate orders had always enjoyed considerable freedom with regard to their rule and their doctrines. The Senussi Brotherhood differed fundamentally from all others. It was not related to Sufism, mysticism, ecstatic trances, or secret rites. Therein the Senussi proved themselves faithful disciples of the Wahabis. They turned back to the primitive, uncorrupted orthodoxy of early Islam. Their manner of life is simple and puritanical. They are hostile to European civilisation and fear its penetration into the territories under their influence. They aspired to invigorate and revitalise Islam as well as to purify it. They were zealous propagandists and missionaries, and to them is due the increase in the number of Mohammedan tribes on the edge of the Eastern Sahara.

The Order had its seat in the desert of Tripoli whither Senussi retired in 1843. Its influence soon spread all over Northern Africa, and it had communities and adherents in Turkey, Arabia, and India. Pressed by the advance of European civilisation and the claims of the Turkish Sultan as overlord of Tripoli, the Order withdrew its headquarters further and further into the desert to almost inaccessible oases. In the Eastern Sahara and part of the Western Sudan the head of the Order was regarded as the most powerful ruler. The Senussi cultivated the oases of the Eastern Sahara, unprecedented law and order reigned amongst the desert tribes, and trade developed actively. After the death of the founder his younger son, El Mahdi, became the leader of the Brotherhood. The story goes that Senussi chose his younger son as his successor for the following reason: before the assembled Brotherhood he commanded both his sons to climb a lofty palm tree and then exhorted them, in the name of Allah and his Prophet, to leap to the ground. The younger boy leapt at once and reached the ground unhurt, but the elder refused. And so El Mahdi, who had not been afraid to trust to the will of God, was made leader. He justified his father's confidence. He lived as a saint and a sage. When he died in 1902 many believed that he was still living in concealment.

The political leadership of the Senussi was wise and



MAP II.—SPREAD AND INFLUENCE OF THE WAHABI MOVEMENT.

cautious. They avoided direct attack, and it was not till Italy tried to occupy Tripoli in 1910 that they allied themselves with the Turks, against whom they had fought hitherto, and were induced to support Pan-Islamic schemes. During the World War they attacked Egypt, as allies of the Turks, and for a time the situation seemed menacing for the British troops in the Nile Valley. But like all Arab tribes, they are more dangerous to enemies invading their land than in an attack upon troops with European equipment. Moreover, the use of military aircraft against desert tribes has entirely altered warfare in the East. Internal strife under El Mahdi's children weakened the Order. The Grand Sheikh Sidi Ahmad esh Sherif, El Mahdi's successor, who had been foremost in advocating the Turkish policy, left Northern Africa for Turkey, where in 1920 he joined Mustafa Kemal Pasha's party. He was succeeded as Grand Sheikh by Sidi Mohammed el Idris, who concluded peace both with Great Britain and India and continued to be recognised by them as chief of the Eastern Sahara.

The Senussi are disciples of the Wahabi teaching, but have carried a step further its original rude and aggressive warrior spirit. Their success lay principally in the sphere of good administration and the colonisation and cultivation of the oases in the desert by permanent settlers. The revival of the Wahabi movement under Ibn Saud in the twentieth century was on similar lines. The *Ahvan*, or Brotherhood, which Ibn Saud established among the tribes of the Central Arabian desert, was first and foremost an instrument of orderly government and the settlement of Bedouin tribes in the oases. But all these movements, springing from Abdul Wahhab's great reformation in the eighteenth century, have in common the return to the spirit of primitive Islam and the repudiation and exclusion of European influences. They roused the Mohammedan peoples from the torpor in which they had sunk. They were the first living signals of a re-awakening religious and national consciousness. They struggled against the existing indifference and utter decadence. They shook the East to its foundations, from Morocco to Sumatra. They were succeeded by other movements of a totally different character. But they were the first to give expression after the lapse of centuries to the individuality of the Oriental peoples and their spiritual life.

The mediæval rigidity of Islam was broken down in Persia in a totally different sense and yet with like success. The Persians belong to the Shiite sect. The question which divides Shiites and Sunnites concerns the Caliphate, Mohammed's succession. The Shiites believe that Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, was his sole true successor, and that the office of Caliph is hereditary in his house. When Ali, who was the fourth Caliph, died and the Ommiades became Caliphs, the Shiites continued to believe that Ali's descendants were the chosen successors of the Prophet. At the same time they believed that the Caliph was not merely an earthly chief, as the Sunnites held, but also a spiritual head, an incarnation of the Holy Spirit, a leader of the faithful alike in spiritual and worldly matters. The largest sect of Shiites believes that there have been twelve such Caliphs or Imams. A further explanation of the Persians' faithful adherence to the house of Ali may be that, according to popular legend, Ali's second son El Husain married a daughter of the last Sassanide king, Yazdigird III, thus allying his house with the last Persian national dynasty before the country was subdued by the Arabs. The twelfth and last descendant of Ali in the line of Imams or incarnations of the Holy Spirit, which descended upon each generation in unbroken succession, had succeeded his father in 873 and disappeared finally in 941 after a life of retirement. It is said, however, that he is not dead, but lives in a secret city and will return some day as the Messiah, the Imam Mahdi. During his life of retirement the twelfth Imam communicated with the faithful through a mediator, the Bab, the "gate of revelation" from the leader to his followers. But with the final disappearance of the twelfth Imam this communication also ceased. The Shiites were left without a visible head, but they awaited the return of a visible incarnation of the Holy Spirit.

Thus public life as a whole was permeated with spiritual influence in a State which was merely a temporary expedient, pending the development of a complete theocracy under the legitimate Imam, and this resulted in giving immense power to the clergy, especially the Mujtahids, the learned students of the sacred law. At the beginning of the nineteenth century this dominance of a religious caste acted like a powerful

brake, checking all possibility of freer intellectual and political development for the people. Here, too, as in all other countries, Islam had fallen into utter paralysis and corruption. It was the Babist movement which roused it from its torpor about the middle of the nineteenth century, shook the power of the Shiite Mujtahids, and helped to awaken modern Persia and create the first beginnings of intellectual freedom. In this sense the Babist and Wahabi movements are of like significance, though Babism sprang from wholly different sources and developed along wholly different lines. Babism and its developments are more familiar because, unlike the Wahabi movement, all its leaders were exceptionally active with their pens, and because American and European proselytes have written about it and translated some of its holy books.

At the outset Babism was conservative and riddled with a mass of mystical theology and dogma, such as only the favourable soil of Shiite Persia could produce. But even at this stage it stood for the principle of religious evolution, the denial of the finality of revelation, and in the schisms which arose in its subsequent history the victory always went to the non-stationary party which stood for continued revelation and was thus constantly developing towards liberal and humanistic tendencies. Babism was at first wholly confined to Islam, but as it evolved it overstepped the bounds of Islam and sought itself to become a world religion, unrestricted by any national or linguistic tradition. Its later forms in particular not only prove Islam's plastic power of intellectual development in its struggle towards rebirth, but betray the influence of the liberal theology and philosophy of nineteenth-century Europe. In this sense they are in direct contrast with the Wahabi movement, which may be regarded definitely as a protest against the liberal theology of the modern West and a repudiation of it.

The year in which the twelfth Imam was last seen in public (at his father's funeral) was the year 260 of the Mohammedan era. According to tradition he was to return at the end of a thousand years. In the year 1260 of the Mohammedan era (1844 of the Christian era) Mirza Ali Mohammed, a youth of twenty-four, came forward and proclaimed himself to be the Bab. He regarded himself as the harbinger of a Messianic

epoch in which the Imam would come forth from concealment and God's Holy Spirit would hold sway upon earth, pure and incorrupt. The Bab obtained a great following with surprising rapidity. The Government and the clergy were alarmed at the new movement and intervened. Bloody persecutions followed, and the Bab himself was imprisoned for years. In 1850, before he was thirty, he was executed. During the last year of his life he wrote a number of theological pamphlets in prison, and no longer proclaimed himself to be the Bab, or harbinger, but the actual Imam, the incarnation of the Holy Spirit, the Mahdi.

Within a few years Babism had shaken the public life of Persia, where politics and religion were wholly identified, to its foundations. The dynasty was cruel and corrupt, and as unpopular as the clergy. To both Babism was a serious menace. After an unsuccessful attempt on the Shah's life in 1852 the sect was savagely persecuted. The steadfastness of the martyrs and their heroic sufferings rather increased its influence. But its leaders moved their headquarters from Persia to Baghdad in 1864, and thence to Adrianople in European Turkey, since the Persian Government refused to tolerate the presence of the head of the sect so near to the Persian frontier and the two most sacred cities of the Shiites, Karbela, where Ali's son, Imam Hussain, suffered a martyr's death, and Nejef, where Ali himself lies buried.

Before his death the Bab had chosen from among his followers a youth of nineteen named Mirza Yahya for his successor, and called him Subh-i-Ezel, the Dawn of Eternity. He shared the leadership of the sect with his elder half-brother, Mirza Hussain Ali, known later as Baha-ullah. In Adrianople Baha-ullah proclaimed that he was the Imam, the Messiah, of whom the Bab had been merely the harbinger. After prolonged internal strife Baha-ullah, with his constantly increasing host of followers, was sent in 1868 to Akko in Palestine, whilst Subh-i-Ezel was allotted a dwelling-place in Cyprus, where the number of his followers, the orthodox, continued to shrink.

Once more the progressive triumphed over the stationary element. The Ezelites remained a Shiite sect. They regarded the Bab as the Imam, and for them his revelation was final; Baha-ullah, on the contrary, carried on the revelation.

Islamic rites were for the most part retained, but people turned in prayer to Akko instead of Mecca, whilst Akko replaced Mecca as a place of pilgrimage. This involved a distinct breach with the tradition common to all other Islamic sects. At the same time Bahaism revealed itself more and more as a liberal, humanising religion, not uninfluenced by its contact with the West in Adrianople and Syria. "Everything is permissible that does not conflict with the common sense of humanity," so Baha-ullah taught. Originally the Babists had been an ecstatic sect, like many which appeared with the Reformation in Europe, eagerly expecting the dawn of God's kingdom; but Bahaism seemed to overleap the centuries and bring itself into harmony with European liberal thought or the Humanism of the Renaissance. True, it was still permeated with the old Shiite ideas and had nothing approaching the religious breadth and tolerant individualism of the most distinguished Sufis. But it broke down the barriers confining not only Islam but the Orient. It was a call addressed to all mankind. More and more it stressed universal ethical and humanistic principles. It advocated international peace and sharply repudiated the conception of the Jihad, the holy war against unbelievers. It forbade slavery, as also the use of wine and opium. It pressed for universal education, for women as well as men, and not only allowed but demanded intercourse with all mankind, of whatever religion; it even advocated the ideal of a world language. Every effort was made to encourage the study of foreign languages. "In order that he who has the gift of tongues may carry God's word east and west, and so proclaim it amongst States and nations that men's souls may be drawn to it and life may be breathed into the most modern bones;" so it is written in the sacred Book of Bahaism. Baha-ullah taught his followers: "It is better that ye be killed rather than kill." And: "It is no merit to love your fatherland, but to love the world." His followers in Persia, who were very numerous and not without influence on account of their superior education and freer outlook, often suffered martyrdom without resistance. But naturally they opposed the existing régime in Persia, and often the dynasty and the clergy, and were, therefore, well-disposed towards libertarian reform movements. They had no priesthood and no professional

scholar class; every member of the community was to carry on a productive and generally useful trade, and those who had the ability were to be unpaid teachers and leaders. And thus, although Babism subsequently often admitted reactionary and anti-republican tendencies, it was as closely linked with the new nationalist movement in Persia as the Wahabi movement was in a different sense with the Arab nationalism of recent years.

In 1892 Baha-ullah died, and again a characteristic schism appeared within the sect. The younger son, Mirza Mohammed Ali, steadily maintained that Baha-ullah's revelation was final. Once more this stationary group lost influence and followers in favour of the other, led by the elder son, Abbas Effendi, known as Abdul Baha. According to him revelation was not yet complete. He himself carried it further. There was no such thing as final revelation, but every revelation—that of Moses, of Jesus, of Mohammed, of the Bab or Baha-ullah—was suited to its own age. In spite of this continued growth of their doctrine, the Bahais are dogmatists. With individuals it is not the inner light that decides, but simply and solely the word of the incarnation for the time being of the Holy Spirit.

Under Abdul Baha the sect entered upon propaganda and missionary activities on a large scale, first in America and later in Europe. A missionary society was founded entitled "Unity of East and West," and its success, relatively speaking, was not inconsiderable in the United States, England, France, and Germany. It is true that the initial character of the sect was further attenuated through this Western propaganda. The original Shiite doctrines were obscured, especially the theory of divine incarnation in the leader of the sect; more and more stress was laid upon the confirmation of doctrine from the Old and New Testaments; Bahaism developed into universalist eclecticism, and its pacifism, its religious liberalism, and its feminism were more and more strongly emphasised. At the same time the schism in Syria was repeated in like manner in America. The first Bahai missionary in America, a Syrian called Khairullah married to an Englishwoman, remained true to the teaching of Baha-ullah and decided in favour of his son, Mirza Mohammed Ali, whereupon Abdul Baha began counter-propaganda in America.

But the Bahais are not the only sect springing from the Islamic Renaissance to initiate successful missionary activities in the West. The Ahmadiya movement arose amongst the Indian Sunnites and, although it is of more recent origin and still little known, it has attracted attention by its missionising centre in England and its publications in English. It, too, is liberal and humanistic in spirit, but unlike Bahaism it remains consciously within the pale of Islam and feels itself to be the protagonist and champion of the Mohammedan Renaissance, which itself consummates and gives true expression to the essence and principal aspirations of all great religions. This, again, lends it a universalist character akin to Bahaism. The founder of the sect was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, born in 1838 in Qadian, not far from Lahore in the Punjab, who came forward as an apostle of the new gospel in 1889. In his own country he had come under the influence of the West as well as that of the rationalist liberalism of many distinguished Mohammedan leaders in India. He had likewise become acquainted with Hindu reformist movements and theosophical tendencies. Later Ahmad declared himself to be the Mahdi awaited by the Mohammedans as well as the Messiah of the Jews and Christians, and the Avator, the incarnation of Krishna, to whose coming the Hindus look forward. It is written in the gospel announced by the sect: "Praise be to Allah, the Almighty, the Merciful, the Gracious, the one God to be worshipped, the Preserver of all creation; who in his mercy has raised a Prophet in our day like the Prophets of former days, Ahmad, the promised Messiah, the Mahdi of the Mohammedans, Krishna, the Reformer of the Last Days known to the Parsees, the hope of all the nations of to-day—the champion of Islam, the reformer of Christianity, the Avator of the Hindus, the Buddha of the East. Blessed be they who believe in him and take refuge beneath his banner of peace." Thus Ahmad believed that he had discovered the true Islam which, however, is as wide as mankind and embraces all true religions, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and so on; for they proclaim the same basic truths, only in various tongues. Ahmad also taught that Jesus did not die on the cross, but that another suffered death on his behalf. Jesus himself travelled to Afghanistan in order to convert the ten lost tribes of Israel

which were settled there, and his grave is in Srinagar in Kashmir.

But the liberal tendency in the Ahmadiya movement is even more important than its universalism. Ahmad declared against the Jihad, the holy war against unbelievers; he preached pacifism and the brotherhood of the peoples. His followers, who are now said to number 70,000 in India, are, therefore, not opposed to British rule. From the outset the Ahmadiya movement attached great weight to questions of education and Western culture. In their principal centres in Qadian and Lahore they founded secondary schools and colleges; they had their own printing presses and published a copious literature, much of it in English. They issued their own English magazine in India, *The Review of Religions*, which enables Islam to follow with interest the development of Christian theology and Western science, though the manner in which subjects are treated impresses the reader as very un-European. The Ahmadiya movement likewise maintains a theological college where missionaries are trained. It has published an English translation of the Koran with a detailed commentary giving the interpretation of the Ahmadiya sect, and an Arabian edition in Latin characters to make it easier for new converts to learn by heart those passages in the Koran that are important for prayer.

Ahmad died in 1908. His Caliph or successor stepped into the leadership of the movement. Under the first Caliph a schism arose, and one party now has its headquarters in Qadian under the Caliph and devotes itself chiefly to propaganda amongst Mohammedans, whilst the other group, centred in Lahore, feels itself rather the champion of Islam against the West and is developing vigorous missionary activity in London. From the mosque in Woking Khvaya Kamal ud-Din edits the monthly *Islamic Review*. A number of Englishmen, including Lord Headley, were converted to Islam. The sect also has a room for prayer in the west of London and cares for the welfare of Mohammedan students in London.

Both Bahaism and the Ahmadiya movement have served to break through the scholasticism of mediæval Islam and thus to usher in a new era in the East. Both originated in mystical, ecstatic revelations and were hedged in by dogma-

tism only comprehensible in the light of its Asiatic sources. Both have led in some of their developments to a humane liberalism and have sought to blend the philosophy of West and East without, however, uprooting themselves from their native soil. Both, too, have begun to develop vigorous missionary activities among the white races.


They seem wholly unlike the Wahabi and Senussi movements. Nevertheless, all are the outcome of the ferment accompanying a great historic process which is entirely reshaping the intellectual and social life of the East. Even the humanitarian sects feel themselves to be representatives of the East, pleading its cause at the bar of the West. In particular the Ahmadiya movement aspires to bring about a more adequate understanding and a juster appreciation of Islam in Europe. But all these new developments within the pale of Islam point to a rejuvenation, a new flowering-time, a deeper and more spiritual religious life, such as Europe experienced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries before religion finally ceased to be the decisive factor in moulding Western States and Western society.

CHAPTER III

PAN-ISLAMISM

BUT before the new principle of nationalism began to make way in the Orient, an intensification and vitalisation of religious life came about in the East, as formerly in the West, and, further, the religious principle became once more a force bridging over political and national barriers. The end of the nineteenth century witnessed a Pan-Islamic movement which had its roots partly in the needs of the Turkish Empire, partly in the revival of faith initiated by the Wahabis, partly in the example of the West, but which at all events represents an impulse to resist and repulse the attacks of the European Powers. Ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century Islam had felt itself in peril. Province after province was torn from its grasp, and it seemed as if, slowly but surely, all Mohammedan States were to fall under the sway of unbelievers. The era of the Crusades was recurring. Not unfrequently they were called to mind by the European States themselves. English Liberal politicians of the nineteenth century, especially Gladstone, were guided by such a conception. Even the Balkan War of 1912 was waged in that spirit. The Cross triumphed over the Crescent. The idea of uniting all Mohammedans in a common defensive struggle against European attacks seemed obvious. Islam had been stirred by the religious reform movements; revolts broke out on all sides independently of one another, and as far afield as China and the Dutch East Indies Mahdist fanaticism flared up among the people.

Single individuals were the first to seize upon the Pan-Islamic idea, and became its propagandists. Chief among them was Djemal ed Din el Afghani, an Iranian, in whose veins flowed the blood of the Prophet, as is shown by the title "Sidi." He had visited Western Europe and Russia and travelled in most Mohammedan countries. Everywhere he left traces of his influence. He was familiar with the



MAP III.—MIGRATIONS OF BABISM.

ancient civilisation and power of the East and yearned to rouse it from a state of complete decadence. He recognised all the menace of existing conditions and the need of a solid alliance against Christian Europe. As a professor at the El Azhar mosque in Cairo he had endeavoured to break down the absolute scholastic rigidity in the customary teaching at that Mohammedan University. He had read Avicenna with his students and brought a globe to his lectures in order to make clear the shape of the earth. But he was compelled to yield to the wrath of his colleagues, who considered his innovations unlawful, and he was soon regarded as a dangerous agitator by the European Governments as well. He found refuge at the court of the Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the first prince to develop Pan-Islamism as a deliberate policy and attempt to restore to the office of Caliph its ancient significance as the chief and protector of all Mohammedans. He died there at a ripe old age in 1896. Though he belonged to a past age, he was nevertheless able, by virtue of his keen intellect, to see further than his contemporaries, and yet he was hardly conscious of more than the first faint stirrings of the spirit of a new era.

From the very first Islam was not only a religion, but a political and social system as well. The Koran, the Sunna, and the systems based upon them, contain not only religious commandments but also the principles of private and public law. There is here no dividing-line between the various spheres of thought and life. Religion is the source of all order in public and private life. Christianity, in accepting the succession to the Roman Empire, was led from the outset to acknowledge, in addition to canonical law, a secular law springing from sources independent of the former and preceding it in date. The Roman Empire adopted the Christian religion. Mohammedanism, on the contrary, created its own Empire. Neither the public nor private law of Mohammedan States could be discovered and developed anywhere but in the authority and interpretation of the sacred Scriptures. Hence the great influence exercised in Islam by the Ulemas, those who know, though Islam has no priesthood in the true sense. The Ulemas are doctors of law, scholars, who have studied the Koran, the traditions, and the commentaries, and are qualified to pronounce judgment. To

them, therefore, constant appeal must be made for counsel and decision. Their influence and power are, consequently, exceedingly wide. The training which they receive in the once famous Mohammedan Universities bears unmistakably the marks of the decadence of latter-day Islam. It is narrow, intolerant, purely theological.

These Ulemas and students have often been the apostles of Pan-Islamism. We still meet with students, though far less often than formerly, who visit many and distant lands in order to sit at the feet of famous teachers. In the El Azhar mosque the students are united in national clubs, as they were in the Middle Ages; there are pupils from distant Mohammedan countries, from India and Central Asia. The Ulemas, moreover, are generally the keenest opponents of all change, all progress, every approach towards the West, and are, therefore, frequently opposed to nationalism in the East. This may partly account for the fact that, although Islam has no actual priesthood, modern national movements have often borne the marks of a secular, free-thinking spirit, as was also the case in Europe.

From the earliest days Islam has been animated by a feeling of brotherly unity. According to the Koran, all the faithful are brothers. The common sacred Book, and likewise the language in which that Book is written and in which all theological and legal instruction is imparted and all prayers are recited, established a medium of communication between the most distant Mohammedan countries. National movements often began, therefore, with emancipation from this common religious language. Just as the Bible was translated into the vernacular, so too the Koran was translated into national languages, in spite of prohibitions. In Morocco as early as the twelfth century Ibn Tumart, who led the revolt in which the Muwahhidi overthrew the Murabite dynasty, was a champion of Berber nationalism as well as a religious fanatic. He translated the Koran into Berber and had the call to prayer proclaimed in Berber instead of Arabic.

Even more important as a unifying influence than the common language was the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. It must be made at an appointed time, so that Mohammedan pilgrims from all lands, from Java and Astrachan, from Morocco and East Africa, met in the Holy City. There the

sentiment of unity was intensified by ceremonies performed in common, and penetrated to profounder depths in the atmosphere of religious exaltation. The pilgrims who returned from the Hejaz were looked up to with esteem among their own people and were able to communicate their experiences to many others. The idea of developing these annual gatherings into Pan-Islamic Congresses occurred to a certain Pan-Islamic writer of the last century, Abdar Rahman el Kawakibi, who described in his book *Umm-al-Kura* (*Mother of Cities*, that is, Mecca) how the highest spiritual dignitaries from all Islamic lands assembled in the Holy City and took counsel for the welfare and the future of the faithful.

In spite of these influences urging unity, the Mohammedan world has never formed a united whole since the early days of the decadence of the Caliphate under the Abbassides. Individual Mohammedan princes have often, in their mutual jealousies, allied themselves with unbelievers against other Mohammedans, and have hardly ever helped one another. The outward and visible expression of Mohammedan unity was the Caliphate. The most important sectarian division of Islam arose from the question of the Caliphate. But for centuries the office had been void of all real significance. It was not till the revival of Pan-Islamism in the nineteenth century that it rose again to importance, especially through Abdul Hamid who endeavoured to restore the authority of the Caliph.

The Koran does not anticipate the office of Caliph, that is, of Mohammed's successor. It sprang from military and political needs. The Caliph was the leading chief of the Arabian tribes who began their victorious advance after the Prophet's death. Originally the Caliphate was entirely devoid of spiritual significance. The Caliph was nowise a Mohammedan Pope, empowered to develop doctrine or exercise authority in questions of faith. Islam knows no mediation and no Mediator between man and God. All men are equally dependent upon God, all are nothing as against Him, and their sole salvation lies in submission to the will of God revealed in the Koran. That revelation is final; no new teaching, leading beyond the Koran and the tradition dating from the lifetime of Mohammed and his companions,

can be introduced by inspired wisdom. All that remains is interpretation, and that is not the business of the Caliph but of the Ulemas, the scribes.

Ancient tradition contains various precepts regarding the necessary characteristics of the Caliph, though in this matter there is no complete or unified legal doctrine, and tradition is sometimes self-contradictory. The prevailing view is that the Caliph must belong to the house of Kuraish, from which the Prophet sprang, and the two Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca must be in his possession. He is the protector of these cities, the overlord of all Mohammedans, the defender and propagator of the faith, and commander in the Holy War. Originally the ancient democratic customs of the Arabs restricted his powers by requiring the assent of the faithful to his decrees, but under Persian influence he soon became the embodiment of Oriental despotism.

About the year 900 the power of the Caliphs had passed its zenith. They soon became mere puppets in the hands of powerful generals or foreign conquerors, who deposed them at will. But the Caliphate remained a symbol and still inspired reverence in the masses; its representative, though in fact a helpless captive, was in theory still the overlord of all the faithful, from whom many a powerful Mohammedan prince received fiefs and honours. His name was still cited in prayer on Friday in the mosques, which was the general and customary form of recognition of the Caliph. In 1258 the last Caliph of the Abbasside dynasty was killed in Baghdad by the Mongols. A great past met with an unworthy end. Since then the Caliph's name ceased to be cited in the Friday prayers in Mecca. A few years after the capture of Baghdad by the Mongols a successor of the Abbassides was established as Caliph in Cairo by the Mamelukes. For two centuries and a half the Caliphate dragged on an unrecognised and ignominious existence there. Various powerful Mohammedan princes assumed the title of Caliph during that period; it ceased to designate the Prophet's representative on earth, descended from his house, and came to mean simply God's representative on earth as the ruler of men.

Nevertheless, Mohammedan scholars continued to discuss and develop the theory of the Caliphate as though the Caliph were still the absolute ruler of the faithful, as he had been

in the days of the Ommiades. Originally the Caliphate had been an elective office, but it had soon become dynastic and hereditary. The theory was maintained, however, that the Caliph was subject to election, or to the confirmation of his election by the assembled Ulemas as representing the people. About the year 1000 Mawardi stated that the quality of an elective office was preserved if the Caliph were elected by a single man, by his predecessor. According to the same scholar, the Caliph must belong to the house of Kuraish; he must be of age, and a man of unblemished mind, character, and body; he must possess sufficient knowledge to administer justice, and be brave and powerful enough to defend Mohammedan territory. This last point was, perhaps, the most important. Considerable independent power was, therefore, a condition of the Caliphate. Mohammed Ali, the leader of the deputation of Indian Mohammedans to the British Government, expressed this plainly. Islam, he said, needed secular power for the defence of the faith, and therefore, if the ideal combination of piety and power were not to be found, the Mohammedans said: Let us seek the most powerful prince, even if he be not the most pious, provided he will put his power at the disposal of our piety.

The last of the Abbassides in Cairo were utterly powerless. But in 1517 the mightiest Mohammedan prince of the age, the Osmanli Sultan Salim I, followed his conquest of Egypt by causing himself to be chosen as successor by the last of the Abbasside pseudo-Caliphs. Since then the Caliphate has been attached to the house of Osman.

Not only were the Osmanli Caliphs not of the house of Kuraish, they were not even Arabs. With them the Caliphate passed to the barbarians. But they held possession of the two Holy Cities, and at that time, when their armies marched to the very gates of Vienna, their power marked them out as the appointed champions of Islam. The Caliphate had, however, fallen so far into decay and oblivion that the powerful Turkish Sultans made no use of the title and the honours attached to it. It was not until, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Turkish Empire fell into decay and it became necessary to devise some means of resisting the increasing pressure of the European Powers, that the Turkish Sultans began to call themselves Caliphs and thus to claim

overlordship of all Mohammedans in order to acquire rights over their co-religionists in other countries similar to those assumed by the Christian Powers as protectors of the Christians in the Turkish Empire. A misunderstanding, which Turkish statesmen doubtless encouraged, caused European politicians to regard the Caliph as a kind of Mohammedan Pope. This enhanced his prestige and especially made good his claim to reverence and a certain loyalty from Mohammedans in other countries and in European possessions.

But it was Abdul Hamid II and his emissaries who first made the Caliphate a centre of Pan-Islamic aspirations. It was a venerable institution, surrounded by great traditions and associated with a brilliant past which the protagonists of a new Islamic golden age desired to recall. They felt the full significance of the Caliph's essential task of protecting Islam by the sword. The Turkish Sultan was the only Mohammedan prince to whom they paid any regard. Pan-Islamic propaganda was borne into all lands from Abdul Hamid's court. His emissaries reached Java and Russia and Tunis. Everywhere they succeeded in strengthening Mohammedan sentiment. Frequently the claims of the Caliph, as the supreme protector of Islam and lord of all believers, were successfully asserted. The Emir of Bukhara, Shah Murad, called upon the Kirghiz Khan to make war upon the Russians, since the Turkish Sultan, the Caliph, God's shadow upon earth, had so commanded. In the Turkish Constitution of 1876 Article 3 declares: "Ottoman sovereignty, which unites in the person of the sovereign the Supreme Caliphate of Islam, is the right of the eldest prince of the Osmanli dynasty." And Article 4: "His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, as Supreme Caliph, is the Defender of the Mohammedan Faith." Turkey became a place of refuge for leading Mohammedans, who gathered in great numbers in Constantinople, especially from Russia and the Christian Balkans, but also from all other Mohammedan countries. A multitude of great newspapers in Cairo and Constantinople, in Baku and India, served exclusively to spread Pan-Islamism.

Even Christian Powers acknowledged the Caliph's claim to exercise a certain jurisdiction over the Mohammedans in their domains. The treaty of 1908 between Austria-Hungary and Turkey, recognising the annexation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, provided that the Sultan was still to be named in the public prayers in Bosnian mosques—the customary form of homage to a monarch or overlord in Islam—and that the chief Mohammedan divine in Bosnia should continue to be subject to the Sheikh ul Islam in Constantinople and invested with authority by him. So also in 1912 the Treaty between Turkey and Italy stipulated that the name of the Turkish Sultan should continue to be cited in the Friday prayers in Tripoli and that the supreme Cadi of Libya was to be appointed from Constantinople. In 1913, in the treaties with Greece and Bulgaria, the Caliph-Sultan secured for himself the exercise of similar influence on the appointment of the chief Mufti in those countries; he, too, nominated the supreme Cadi in Egypt, whose representative the principal divine in Khiva claimed to be. Abdul Hamid's name was cited, too, in the Friday prayers in Indian mosques, an honour which had never before been paid to a Turkish Sultan.

Pan-Islamism, moreover, had practical results. Attachment to the Sultan as the Caliph and champion of Islam was stirred in Mohammedans of all countries. The European Powers regarded Pan-Islamism as a peril and a menace. Its possibilities were often exaggerated in print. But the sentiment of unity among Mohammedans was active in the fourteenth century of the Hegira as it had never been, perhaps, since the second century. Events in one part of the Mohammedan world rapidly found an echo in far distant parts. Mohammedans of all lands, especially India, contributed to the building of the Hejaz railway, on which Abdul Hamid embarked not merely for strategic purposes, but even more to serve Pan-Islamic ends. The wars in which Turkey became involved called forth demonstrations of sympathy from all Islamic circles. Gifts to the Red Crescent came from many lands. When Turkish troops recaptured Adrianople after the first Balkan War, telegrams of congratulation came from places in North America, Brazil, and South Africa where there are Mohammedan communities. Even in foreign lands the Mohammedan emigrants to America, Natal, and Cape Colony retained their sentiment of loyalty. Arabic newspapers began to appear in New York and Brazil. Italy's attack on Tripoli speedily reconciled the Tripolitan Arabs and the Senussi with the Turks, although both had hitherto

barely recognised Turkish sovereignty and frequently resisted it. The Italians were themselves astonished when the Arabs at once threw themselves whole-heartedly into the struggle beside the Turks. It was no longer with Turkey alone that Italy had to reckon, but with Islam. In 1913 a society of the "Servants of the Caaba" was found in Lucknow, in India, to protect the interests of Islam throughout the world, and especially to save the Holy Cities of Islam, Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina from falling into non-Islamic hands. Even Aga Khan, always so loyal to Great Britain, wrote from India in 1914: "For more than two years past the Moslems of India, in common with their co-religionists in other countries, have been going through the most painful experiences. The Turkish loss of sovereignty in Northern Africa and in the Balkans, the continued disintegration of Persia, the treatment of Indians in South Africa, and certain matters of Indian administration, have all deeply affected Indian Moslems. . . . The Mohammedans (of India), newly awakened to national consciousness by the education England has given them, are not limited in their gaze by the vast ramparts of the Himalayas or by the waters of the Indian Ocean. There is between them and their fellow-believers in other lands an essential unity, which breaks through differences of sect and country, for it is not based on religious grounds alone. . . . They share the glorious heritage not only of the Koran . . . but of the history and philosophy of Arabia, the incomparable poetry of Persia, the romances and legends of Egypt and Morocco and Spain. Drinking from these imperishable springs, Moslems, whether Turks, Persians, Arabs, or Indians, and whether or not they have also come to the Western wells of knowledge, are bound together by a certain unity of thought, of sentiment, and of expression. The feeling of brotherhood thus engendered is not dammed up within the confines of devout faith. On the contrary, agnostics and atheists of Moslem origin have felt the Turkish and Persian misfortunes just as much as the most orthodox mullah."¹

This same movement spread to the Dutch Indies. The "Sarekat Islam" was established there in the years just preceding the war; its name may mean either "Mohammedan

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, January, 1914, pp. 2-4.

League" or "Native League." The native princes in Java founded Mohammedan schools and issued stern decrees compelling attendance at the mosques and forbidding the people to come in European garb. In 1912 a renowned Arab scholar arrived in Batavia from Hadramaut and preached in the mosques of Java, and he was followed by other Arab itinerant preachers who were also Mohammedan propagandists. But it was noticeable precisely in this Mohammedan renaissance in Java that it sprang from two separate sources. The native princes furthered it because it repulsed the penetration of modern European ideas, because it was an attempt to resist the innovations of the period and at the same time to make religion a bulwark of their authority. The Young Java Party reverted to Islam for other reasons, after coming in contact with Western modern political ideas in the Dutch Government schools and also through travel. It was not from religious motives that they gathered round the standard of Islam, but because they hoped to find in it a means of resisting the Europeans and their domination. In this case Pan-Islamism was coloured with national sentiment.

The sentiment of Mohammedan unity has grown in recent decades to such an extent that it has sought to heal the schism between Shiites and Sunnites which dates from the earliest days of Islam. Hitherto the two sects had regarded one another with deadly hatred. The difference of faith had always sustained the lively antagonism between Persia and Turkey. Now the Persian Shah paid his first visit to the Turkish Sultan. In Astrachan the Sunnites and Shiites celebrated divine service in common, and the glorification of the holy martyrs of the Shiites, Hassan and Hussain, was united with that of the Caliph, an act of blasphemy for the orthodox of both sects hitherto unheard of in Islam. The Mohammedan Congress in Kazan in 1906 resolved that instruction should be given jointly to Sunnites and Shiites and that the same textbook should be used.

In 1903 a lawyer named Abdullah al Mamun Suhrawardy founded the Pan-Islamic Society in London. Its secretary was Sheikh M. H. Kidwai, an Indian barrister, who had issued a pamphlet entitled *Pan-Islamism* in 1908. It is characteristic that this contains the author's photograph decorated with the Usmania Order, and the accompanying text mentions

the fact that the Order was conferred upon the author by His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, in recognition of his services to Islam. Sheikh Kidwai, moreover, cannot sufficiently extol the hospitality with which he was received in influential circles in Constantinople when he visited that city.

In this pamphlet he wrote: "The reason why the use of the word 'Pan' with Islam gave rise to such a vehement outburst of opposition among the Christian peoples is not far to seek. The glorious past of Islam accounts for it. Islam once defied the mighty Empires of Rome and Persia, Greece and Egypt, and succeeded at last in extending its influence over all the known world. It has also defied successfully the armed, fanatical, and aggressive opposition of the combined forces of Christendom during the Crusades, and as a religion, in spite of the innumerable odds against it, it stands not only unvanquished but even progressive and victorious. It spread with lightning speed from one corner of the world to another, east and west, north and south, on account of its innate life-giving qualities and morally exalted and practicable principles, and there is no reason why the great moral force within it should not conquer the world again, if the brutal force and the military superiority of the peoples professing another religion be not incessantly applied to make up for the weaknesses of that faith which has been doing its best to annihilate Islam, and if the followers of Islam once more adhere in practice to the principles of their great faith which made the nomads of the desert of Arabia the civilisers of Europe. The far-sighted European peoples know well their own weakness and the mighty latent force of Islam. Hence any effort on the part of Musulmans to revive the inherent expanding spirit of Islam by bringing the Musulmans of different parts of the world more in touch with one another, by educating the Musulmans in their past history and bringing into play the mighty force of the 'Pen' to counteract the force of bloodthirsty weapons of warfare and other modern instruments of destruction used so much these days and with such deadly effect by the followers of the Prince of Peace, cannot naturally be welcome to them."

Islam's champions prophesy a brilliant future for it: the faith of Mohammed alone is able to hold its own against the advance of rationalism, and, therefore, it is the sole religion

that will survive present-day scepticism. The original principles of Islam are wholly free from superstition; by their strict monotheism they appeal directly to the reason. Wherever the Mohammedan faith has penetrated it has brought purity of morals, not merely implying an advance on early stages of development, but capable of serving as an example to modern Europe, with its vice, its sins of drunkenness, betting, and gambling, and its shattered conjugal ethics. Mohammed raised the Arabs from a state of anarchy and immorality. Again to-day Europe is swayed by complete anarchy in public and moral degeneration in private life. Islam bears the seeds of salvation for Europe and all the world—Islam, which everywhere has not merely preached but actually realised full equality and fraternity between all races and peoples, Islam which is true Socialism, which knows no pride of wealth or colour. Only Europe's indolence, which lacks courage to quit its accustomed path, and Europe's arrogance prevent it from perceiving the truth. When a Christian fights for his country and his faith, he is a hero. When an Oriental does the same, he is a fanatic. When white men despise those with skins of a different colour or close their frontiers against them, they are justified; but when Orientals attempt the same on a far smaller scale, it is proof of their backwardness and their unfitness to form part of the community of civilisation.

Pan-Islamism, that renaissance of the Mohammedan religion and of the religious principle as a political factor, roused the Mohammedan peoples to self-consciousness, revived their historical traditions, and paved the way to their national and political rebirth. It stood at the parting of the two eras. It embraced many tendencies. Religion was still a powerful force in the popular mind; this, indeed, was a period of renewed depth and enrichment of religious feeling. All political innovations were still made in the name of religion. The speech from the throne with which the Turkish Sultan opened Parliament on November 14th, 1909, began with the words: "The Parliamentary Government decreed by the Sharia (Mohammedan canonical law). . . ." Article 2 of the Persian Constitution of October 7th, 1907, declares: "The Persian Parliament, established by the will of God, the monarch, and the people, must preserve harmony with

the laws of Islam in all its decisions. Since the heads of the Church are called upon to determine whether or not the new laws are in accordance with Islamic doctrine, Parliament shall always include among its members five Mujtehids (men versed in the Holy Scriptures and canonical law), men of proved integrity and wide knowledge, fully acquainted with the needs of the age. They shall be consulted on all important questions regarding Bills which have a bearing on questions of Mohammedan doctrine."

In part Pan-Islamism was a political weapon in the hands of the Turkish Sultan against the European Powers. But it was still more a tool used by Abdul Hamid in his effort to maintain the conditions of the past unchanged, and to prevent all innovations, particularly the infiltration of the modern European ideas of freedom, democracy, and nationalism. He felt the advance of the nationalist idea as a menace to the stability of his empire. He regarded the Mohammedan religion as a most powerful cement, calculated not only to preserve his empire, but to assure him of the goodwill of many millions in other countries. To strengthen religious bonds and oppose all rationalist enlightenment appeared to him the course best adapted to his aim, as it had to European princes some decades earlier who likewise stood at the parting of two eras. In this course he was supported by the clergy. The vast majority of the Mohammedan clergy in Asia were little enlightened and ignorant of the libertarian and philosophical tendencies of their own faith in previous centuries: like the Christian clergy under similar circumstances in Europe, they were a bulwark of reaction. The masses were shut off from all knowledge outside the narrow confines of religious tradition. Theological teaching itself was dry and narrow, and the great philosophers of Islam were unknown or banned. Everything that came from Europe was discredited.

But these efforts proved fruitless. Pan-Islamism itself served to smooth the path of national consciousness and liberalism. It stimulated the realisation that reforms were needed in order to give the Mohammedan peoples the strength to resist Europe. Absorption in the study of Islam's past showed that precisely in the palmy days of Mohammedan culture greater freedom of religious thought had been allowed. The continued interaction between Asiatic and European

civilisation in past centuries was held to prove the possibility of new and fruitful interaction which could only benefit the East. Abdul Hamid's reactionary tyranny made liberal and progressive circles suspicious of the Pan-Islamism which he promoted. More and more the national ideal came to prevail over religion as a political principle.

Pan-Islamism is still a living sentiment to-day, as was proved by the attitude adopted by the Indian Mohammedans in the question of the Caliphate. As late as 1913 the foundation-stone of a modern Islamic University was laid in Medina for the furtherance of Pan-Islamic tendencies, and in 1915 that of a Salaheddin University in Jerusalem under the direction of Sheikh Abdul Asis Chavish. In some respects, perhaps, there is to-day a stronger sense of unity and of the need for an alliance of all Mohammedans than ever before. But Pan-Islamism to-day is tinged with national sentiment. It has undergone a process of secularisation. The abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish National Assembly is the clearest indication of this process. In the confusion and complication of political tendencies during the past forty years Pan-Islamism has taken a turn which, though not always plain and unequivocal, is yet unmistakable and significant of the whole historical evolution through which the East is at present passing.

Even in 1906 Arminius Vambéry could still write: "Religion absorbs the intellect of the Asiatic; it is stronger than his feeling of nationality, for the latter is almost everywhere of secondary importance." And an English student of Oriental life observes: "Each religion in the East represents a social group with a more or less self-contained culture, and in many respects the term 'religion' rather corresponds to what we understand by 'nation': indeed the Muslim is accustomed to regard Islam and Christendom as two Nations." The celebrated leader of the Indian Mohammedans, Mohammed Ali, wrote in the *Revue Politique Internationale* in January, 1914: "In the West the whole science of government is based on the axiom that the essential divisions of mankind are determined by racial and geographical considerations; but I must make it clear that such ideas are far from axiomatic to Orientals. In their eyes, as a modern publicist lately wrote, the inhabitants of the world are grouped according to their religious faith. The unit is no longer the nation or state but rather the millah (sect). Europeans regard the

religious bonds which unite Mussulmans in the twentieth century as the mark of a phase of social and political evolution which they themselves left behind with the Middle Ages. How ill they grasp what religion means to a Mussulman! They forget that Islam is not only a religion, but likewise a social organisation, a type of culture, a nationality. . . . The principle of Islamic brotherhood, of Pan-Islamism if you prefer that term, is like that of patriotism; but there is a difference: the Islamic brotherhood has not arrived at identical laws and institutions by means of common descent, a common fatherland, and a common history, but has received them direct as a gift of God." A few years later Mohammed Ali became one of the founders of India's new national unity. Perhaps the change that had taken place in the Islamic world is most vividly reflected in the words of one of the highest spiritual dignitaries in one of the holiest centres of the Mohammedan faith. An English official in the Palestinian administration declared on the occasion of a farewell banquet given in his honour in the spring of 1924: "Palestine is a Mohammedan country, and its government should, therefore, be in the hands of the Mohammedans, on condition that the Jewish and Christian minorities are represented in it." The Mufti of Jerusalem, Haji Emin el-Husseini, replied: "For us it is an exclusively Arab, not a Mohammedan, question. During your sojourn in this country you have doubtless observed that here there are no distinctions between Mohammedan and Christian Arabs. We regard the Christians not as a minority, but as Arabs."

Such a declaration is not yet characteristic of the masses in the East, but only of those in influential circles. The people are still wholly under the sway of religion, as in many parts of Europe. But recent decades have brought great changes. Nowhere are the dominating ideas religious; they are national, however much their nationalism may be combined with religious impulses. At the same time the sentiment of union which found expression in Pan-Islamism is developing into a consciousness of common destiny throughout the East, into Pan-Orientalism. Thus the attempt to shift the centre of gravity of Pan-Islamism to Egypt resulted in 1922 in the establishment of an Oriental League in Cairo. Its objects were to spread scientific knowledge as the basis of all social progress; to strengthen the ties of solidarity and brother-

hood between the peoples of the East without distinction of race or religion: to revive Oriental culture by fostering what is characteristic of it at its best, while at the same time adopting everything in European culture which may serve the cause of this revival and be compatible with the spirit of the Orient. At present this society, led by Abdel Hamid el Bakry, includes representatives of none but Mohammedan peoples—Egyptians, Arabs, Persians, and Turks. But its endeavour to revive Pan-Islamism in the form of a new Pan-Orientalism is characteristic.

So also the Indian Mohammedans are making common cause with the Hindus. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 there even arose some idea of a union of Islam with Japan. Turkish students went to Japan to study. A Mohammedan newspaper was published in Japan, first in English, and then a second in Japanese. Vambéry tells of a book of travels published in Petrograd in 1907 by Molla Suleiman Shukri from Anatolia, which holds up China as an example to Mohammedans and speaks of the necessity of an alliance. The Chinese revolution of 1911, bearing witness to a change like those in Turkey and Persia, strengthened the sentiment of fellowship. Pan-Islamism finds an outlet in the national movements of the separate Mohammedan peoples and in the sentiment of fellowship uniting the whole Orient. The union of State and religion has been relaxed. Liberal Mohammedans have recognised that this separation has raised the dignity of religion and rendered it more spiritual. "Islam can prosper only if the Ulemas are independent, if they are not compelled for the sake of their daily bread to depend upon kings and nobles in the exercise of their office as teachers and leaders, as has hitherto been the case."¹ As in Europe, the union of State and religion was replaced by a union of State and nation, and here, too, it impaired the sincerity and dignity of nationalism. But external forces exercised a decisive influence upon these developments. The new Orient was not fashioned solely by impulses from within. Like all great historical processes, it was the outcome of action and reaction. It was European civilisation, especially through the instrumentality of England and later of the Russian Revolution, that directed the awakened East in its search for new forms of intellectual, social, and political life.

¹ Mohammed Rashid in the monthly journal, *al-Manar*, Cairo.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELIGIOUS RENAISSANCE IN INDIA

ISLAM was not alone in its experience of religious ferment in the nineteenth century. The process set in even more violently in India. Hinduism was not strictly speaking a religion. It was a conglomeration of popular sects, traditions, and superstitions based upon a peculiar social system, that of caste, which spread all over India in its extremest form. But even in this popular religion, with its varying forms of heathen worship, the incomparable metaphysical gift of the Indian people survived, their longing for the Absolute, and their religious discipline. At rock bottom Hinduism was one with philosophical Brahmanism and Buddhism. All sects share as basic conceptions the belief in Brahma as the only reality, the source and good of all living creatures, and in the migration of souls as an expression of the essential oneness of all souls and their purification and reunion with the Absolute; and this gives a loftier philosophical meaning to their superstition. All the rude forms of worship—customs, ceremonies, and images—become in this light the outward sign of that reality which alone is spiritually true, a popular symbol of the one absolute Being which is all in all, whilst the objects in our sense world are the mere delusion of the individual soul, separated for a time from its source.

The multiform world of Hinduism was stirred and awakened to a spiritual revolution in the nineteenth century, much as Europe had been in the sixteenth. This ferment was in part the outcome of its contact with Islam and Christianity, and led to a modern Humanism. But the movements which sought to restore the ancient purity of the Brahmanical faith struck deeper root in the popular consciousness. Like the Reformation, they reverted to the earliest traditions and attacked the degeneration and superstition of later days. Thus religious reform went hand in hand with remembrance

of the value of the peoples' own traditions, their racial culture and philosophy and art, so that it came to assume the character of romantic nationalism. But this religious renaissance became a source of renewed strength to the various Hindu sects and Hindu orthodoxy. All these movements finally merged in India's new consciousness of her unity and her mission, in Indian nationalism.

On the threshold of the Indian Renaissance stands Ram Mohan Ray. His position among the Hindus is similar to that of Sayad Ahmad Khan amongst Indian Mohammedans. But being an Indian and a member of a Bengali Brahman family he was deeply disposed to the study of theology and metaphysics. In his youth he came in contact with Islam, learned Arabic and Persian, and especially came under the influence of Sufism, which confirmed his monotheistic tendencies. The Deism of his later years displays obvious traces of Sufist influence although, characteristically, it contains an element of liberal rationalism alien to the mysticism of the Sufis. He was brought through Islamic influence to condemn the polytheism and image-worship of his own religion. Moreover, he soon came sharply into conflict with his family over suttee, one of the most hallowed customs of the Hindus. The sight of his young sister's torments when she suffered death by fire matured his resolution to carry out social reforms in India. In consequence of the conflict with his family he had to quit his father's house. He travelled throughout India and Tibet and later entered the service of the British Government, where he remained for ten years. He learned English and devoted himself to the study of religions, immersing himself in the Vedas and Christianity. He translated several of the Upanishads into English and published extracts from the Gospels, under the title *The Precepts of Jesus*. He laid stress chiefly upon the accounts given by Matthew and Luke, and wholly ignored the Johannine tradition. He explained Jesus and his gospel in the deistic and rationalist spirit of liberal theology, and the whole of later Christology seemed to him erroneous.

In 1828, when he was fifty-six, he founded the Brahma Samaj or Theistic Society. The doctrine and ceremonial of the society blended in a remarkable manner a consciously nationalist return to pure and primitive Brahmanism,

Christian influences, and humanistic rationalism. The Brahma Samaj doctrine was a deism which rejected every form of polytheism and image-worship. In 1830 the community bought a new building which, according to its constitution, was to serve as a meeting-place "for all without distinction who comport themselves decently, soberly, piously, and devoutly, and for the worship and adoration of the eternal, inscrutable, and unchanging Being who is the Creator and Preserver of the universe. But it shall not be worshipped under any distinctive name or designation or title, such as any person or sect might attach to any being, and no statue, sculpture, picture, nor anything of the kind, shall be admitted. No sacrifice shall be offered up, nor any animal or living creature be deprived of life." The weekly service consisted of reading from the Upanishads and their translation in the Bengali vernacular. Vedic hymns were sung to the accompaniment of instrumental music, and a sermon in Bengali was introduced. But together with this effort to revert to primitive Brahmanism with the assistance of the Vedic tradition went the observation of all Hindu social precepts, except in so far as they clashed with humanitarian and deistic tendencies. Only Brahmans, members of the priestly caste, might pray aloud and conduct divine service.

Ram Mohan Ray was the first of his countrymen to advocate English education and likewise the first Hindu to sail for Europe. The Indians were so intensely conscious of a unity which shut them off from the rest of the world that they regarded as unlawful any journey to strange lands or any sea voyage, where they were unable to observe the strict rules of caste. Ram Mohan Ray broke through this seclusion, socially as well as in his religious reforms. His interests centred in social reform, and he therefore established a vernacular press in Bengal. The ideal before him was the union of Europe and Asia, not a union in which Asia sacrificed her individuality and merely imitated, but rather one in which she adopted so much of Europe's intellectual treasure as advanced her own development.

Ram Mohan Ray died in 1833 on his travels in England. Bentham had saluted him as a deeply honoured and much loved colleague in the service of mankind. For all his religious faith, Ram Mohan Ray was a child of rationalism.

Through him European thought began to penetrate to a circle—narrow, it is true—of young Hindus of high birth. His disciples founded a “Society for the Acquisition of General Knowledge” and issued a journal entitled *The Search for Knowledge*. When the Medical College was opened in Calcutta in 1835 there were already a few high-caste Hindus who touched and dissected corpses in spite of the fact that it was unlawful for them to do so.

Ram Mohan Ray’s friend and colleague in his labours was Dvarikanath Tagore, the son of an old and distinguished family that had already endowed India with a number of statesmen and scholars. In consequence of his wealth and position and charitable works he was known to his contemporaries as Prince Tagore. Like his friend, he died thirteen years later on a journey to England. His son, Debendranath Tagore, succeeded Ram Mohan Ray as leader of the Brahma Samaj. Under his guidance the society took a definite turn back towards Hinduism. The essential traditions and ritual of the ancient faith were observed. But here, too, reform of great importance broke through the established order. After prolonged consideration it was decided not to recognise the infallibility of the Vedas as a source of knowledge of God. Knowledge of God was to be sought only in nature and intuition. Here, too, then, the Indian Renaissance passed through the phase of the Reformation, with its return to the written word, and passed beyond to a purely spiritual and philosophical knowledge of God. Debendranath published his *Brahma Dharma* taken from the Upanishads, a prayer-book for public and private worship. He himself was a remarkable character, a noble and deeply religious nature who lived in perpetual prayer and yearning for union with God. He spent his days in meditation and seclusion and passed the latter years of his long life in retirement as a revered hermit. The people gave him the title of honour of *Maharshi*, or great and holy seer. Of his seven sons, Rabindranath became the greatest of Bengali poets, Dvijendranath became a philosopher, and Satyendranath a famous musician. Three of his nephews are among the most eminent modern Indian artists.

The attempt to develop the Brahma Samaj along the lines of a spiritualised Hinduism was checked by the entry of a young reformer, Keshab Chandra Sen. He was only seven-

teen when he entered the Brahma Samaj. Debendranath Tagore loved the youth dearly and put great hopes in him, but Keshab's impetuous energy rapidly broke through existing bounds; he lacked the inward harmony and noble serenity of his teacher, deeply rooted in the soil of tradition. Keshab soon began to effect bold reforms in the Society. Although he himself was not a Brahman and was, therefore, not authorised to exercise priestly functions, he prayed in public at divine service and brought his wife to the meetings for worship, although women, in accordance with Indian custom, had hitherto been excluded. From the very beginning he devoted his attention chiefly to social reforms and education. In 1861 he began the publication of an English periodical, *The Indian Mirror*, and welcomed the Calcutta College, the first school founded by an Indian with English as the language of instruction.

His reforming zeal was so great that in 1865, at the age of twenty-four, he found himself compelled to leave the Society and found one of his own. The new Society was established from the outset on a wider basis. Its theism was universal in character, and less and less emphasis was laid on the association with Hindu tradition. At divine service the Jewish, Christian, Mohammedan, Zoroastrian, and Confucian Scriptures were read, as well as the Upanishads and Vedas and the Indian and Buddhist sacred books. The Society admitted both sexes. It began to train missionaries and send them out. Besides the two sources of the knowledge of God originally recognised by the Brahma Samaj, Keshab added a third, that of human history in which God had revealed Himself through great men. At the same time Keshab came more and more under the influence of Christianity. In a lecture on "Jesus Christ: Europe and Asia," he argued that Jesus was an Asiatic and that Europe's conversion to Christianity formed a link with Asia. He was proud to be an Asiatic. "Was not Jesus Christ an Asiatic? Yes, and his disciples were Asiatics. . . . Christianity was founded and developed by Asiatics, and in Asia. When I reflect on this, my love for Jesus becomes a hundredfold intensified: I feel him nearer my heart, and deeper in my national sympathies." Why should he himself not confess to a national allegiance to which Jesus had confessed? Might it not be

said that Jesus was more closely akin to an Oriental in character and in his habits of thought and feeling? "And is it not true that an Asiatic can read the imageries and allegories of the Gospel, and its descriptions of natural sceneries, of customs and manners, with greater interest, and a fuller perception of their force and beauty, than a European?"¹ Since, therefore, Europe acknowledges Jesus, the Asiatic, Asia and Europe may attain harmony in Jesus.

In 1870 Keshab visited England. After his return he reverted with increased energy to his social activities. He advocated the education of women and established cheap newspapers in the vernacular to communicate his ideals to the masses. But simultaneously the movement took a new turn which brought about a fresh split in the ranks. Keshab began to feel the call to found a religion. He declared that he was the instrument of the fifth revelation (following Veda, Buddha, Jesus, and Mohammed), surrounded himself with a company of twelve Apostles, introduced a new ritual composed of Christian and Indian elements, founded Orders for men and women, and restored the custom of sacrifice. By his command saints were worshipped, whilst mystic dances united the community in ecstatic transports. Keshab himself died in 1884, three years after his proclamation of the new revelation.

The further history of the Brahma Samaj is without significance. Under its three leaders it fulfilled its mission. It was the first impulse towards the Indian Renaissance, its first contact with the West, and at the same time its first act of self-examination. Ram Mohan Ray was the first to stir India's spirit. Bepin Chandra Pal, one of the leaders of later nationalism, has thus described his place in history: "The chief value of the Raja's labours, to our mind, seems to lie in his fight against the forces of mediævalism in India, and it is for this reason that we claim for him the honour of being the Father of the present Indian renaissance. . . . The objective of all the many-sided activities of Raja Ram Mohun Roy was to free his country from this fatal incubus of mediæval abstraction."²

¹ *Keshab Chandra Sen and the Brahma Samaj*. By E. T. Slater, Madras, 1884, Appendix, p. 4.

² *The New Spirit*, Calcutta, 1907, pp. 52 and 54.

The inspiration emanating from Ram Mohan Ray spread far and wide and gave birth to movements alien to the deism of the founder of the Brahma Samaj. In Bombay alone a similar society, the Prarthana Samaj, was founded in similar circles, though this was more than thirty years later. Its spiritual leader was Mahadeo Govind Ranade, one of the first Hindus to pass examinations at the University of Bombay and later a judge in the Supreme Court there. He was also a social reformer who advocated the education of women and the permission for widows to remarry. He was likewise one of the founders of the Indian National Congress and the social reform conferences. Like the Brahma Samaj, the Prarthana Samaj was an eclectic movement which sought to discover the common basis of all great religions, but nevertheless avoided cutting loose from its Indian roots. Ranade recognised this fact. India, he said, stood for a continuity of the faith, traditions, literature, philosophy, custom, and forms of thought peculiar to the country. There must be a reason why Providence had granted them this special favour. If the miraculous preservation of a few thousand Jews had a purpose, then the preservation of one-fifth of mankind, which was still more miraculous, could not be mere chance. They lived under the stern discipline of a lofty purpose. The true reformer came not to destroy but to fulfil. His task was not to write upon a blank tablet, but rather to complete an unfinished sentence.

The Prarthana Samaj was founded in 1867. Eight years later the first group of the Arya Samaj came into existence, also in Bombay. It regarded itself as leading to the fulfilment of true Hinduism in a totally different sense from the Brahma Samaj. Its very name indicates as much. It is no longer the pure philosophical conception of God that is proclaimed, but the old and honourable name of the Hindus is adopted. The name Hindu is of alien, Persian origin and was imposed upon the country and its inhabitants by the conquerors; native writers called the country Aryavarta, the home of the Aryans.

The founder of the Arya Samaj was Swami Dayananda Sarasvati, born of an orthodox Brahman family in 1824. His father, a well-to-do man, was a worshipper of the god Siva. When he was still quite young Dayananda realised that image-

worship and polytheism were evil features of Hinduism. This brought him into conflict with his father. When his family tried to force a marriage upon him at the age of twenty he quitted his father's house and never saw it again. His real name of Mul Sankar was not known till after his death. He never bore it during his lifetime, in order to break off all connection with his earthly home. He became a homeless wanderer. All India, with its roads and forests, was his home. He travelled on foot all over the country and learned as a wandering beggar and ascetic. He received the name of Dayananda from his teacher. It was not till 1860 that he himself began to teach publicly. In his years of study he had immersed himself in the ancient scriptures. He retained the passion for freedom of judgment and conscience which had driven him from his father's house. He came to see that modern Hinduism was utterly opposed to the spirit of the Vedas of two thousand years ago. He sharply condemned the later commentators and philosophical systems which in his view had distorted the purity of the original Vedic gospel. As with the Reformation, he returned to the original word, and like the European reformers he believed unflinchingly in the authority of the Vedas.

During the early years of his public activities he spoke nothing but Sanskrit, a language which only a few educated people understand. He earned the violent hatred of the Brahmans by his attack on polytheism and image-worship, as well as by his views on the caste system. He did not regard caste as divine or decreed by religion, but as a political institution introduced by the rulers for the general good. Nature, he held, has made all men equal and brothers, and their salvation and fate after death do not depend upon their caste. In 1870 Dayananda debated in Benares with the most eminent and learned Brahmans, and from this time onwards he appeared more in public and began to teach in the vernacular. He continued to live as a wandering monk, wearing no robe. In 1875 he founded the first Arya Samaj in Bombay. In 1883 he died.

The Arya Samaj was at once a religious and a national revival. It sought to bring new life to India and the Hindu race. As a means to this end it taught that people should study the ancient uncorrupted culture of their race, should

turn back to Sanskrit and the Vedas, and it fostered a new type of education in the spirit of traditional discipline. It was opposed to the majority of the Brahmans, deploring their power over the ignorant masses, more especially because the Brahmans themselves were often utterly ignorant, barely acquainted with the Upanishads; lacking knowledge, they had smothered the ancient faith beneath a whole network of ceremonies, rites, temples, and festivals. Here, as almost everywhere, a movement of religious and national rebirth combated the powerful, ignorant, reactionary priesthood, with its devotion to ritual law. In its services the Arya Samaj tried to revive the ancient Vedic ritual. It was distinguished from the Brahma Samaj principally by its belief in the infallibility of the Vedas, which it held to be the sole source of moral law as well as knowledge of God, and by its belief in the transmigration of souls. The eclecticism of the Brahma Samaj was alien to its character. Yet both were children of one and the same revolution which destroyed the mediæval India ruled by the Brahmans, and created modern India. But it was the Arya Samaj which, by re-awakening the India of the past, did most to pave the way for the India of the twentieth century.

The Brahma Samaj had always stressed its universalist character. The newer movement, too, though in essence and aim it was an exclusively Hindu movement, declared on principle that its ranks were open to all, of whatever race or religion, provided only that they acknowledged the principles of the Arya Samaj. Dayananda himself wrote in his *Sattyarath Prakash*: "I believe in a religion based on universal and all-embracing principles, which have always been recognised by mankind as true and to which men will always remain faithful. That is why I call my religion the eternal, primeval religion, and why it stands above the battle of all human religions. My idea of God and of all else in the universe is based on the doctrines of the Veda and is in harmony with the faith of all the sages from Brahma to Yaimini. I offer an account of this faith so that all good men may accept it. For I hold only that to be acceptable which is worthy to be believed by all men in all ages. I have no desire to found a new religion or a new sect. My sole aim is to believe the truth and help others to believe it." The basis of this apparent universalism

was not the spiritual freedom of the Brahma Samaj, but the belief that all wisdom and all knowledge is contained in the Vedas. For the first time after the lapse of centuries Dayananda made the Vedas the centre of study. Hitherto their study had been a privilege of the Brahmans, and even they contented themselves with particular commentaries and learnt of the original text only a few verses needed for the performance of the rites. The ancient freedom was now restored and everyone could immerse himself in the Vedas, and was expected to do so.

Dayananda repudiated the methods by which later commentators, as well as European scholarship, had interpreted the Vedas. He believed that a true interpretation would discover in the Vedas the whole of modern knowledge, all the discoveries and inventions of recent years, at least in the germ. Veda means knowledge. Since the Veda is of divine origin, it means God's knowledge. That is all-embracing. The Vedas contain it as unfolded in the spiritual world, nature in the material world. The modern discoveries and inventions of Europeans are only an application of what Indians recognised thousands of years ago. All true knowledge and religion spring from a single source, the inspiration of the Veda. Thus India has become the mother and source of all knowledge. In order to reach this conclusion, Dayananda had to explain the Veda in his own way. Max Müller writes: "By the most incredible interpretations he succeeded in persuading himself and others that everything worth knowing, even the most recent discoveries of modern science, were alluded to in the Vedas. Steam engines, railways, steamboats, all were shown to have been known, at least in their germs, to the poets of the Vedas, for Veda, he argued, means divine knowledge, and how could anything have been hid from that?"¹

Perhaps the Arya Samaj was nearest akin to the Brahma Samaj in its social outlook. It proclaimed the equality of all mankind, of the peoples and the sexes. Social service and works of charity were among its principal activities. It opposed the strict separation and the large number of castes, and taught that all should have equal opportunities in accordance with their capacity and their *Karma*. Nobody belonged to a particular caste inevitably because of his birth,

¹ *Biographical Essays*. By F. Max Müller, Longmans, Green, 1884.

but the four chief castes are based upon the capacities and inclinations of individuals, and justified on that account. Most of the members of the Arya Samaj, moreover, have retained their caste. They likewise demand equality in the position and education of women, although they follow Vedic custom in not adopting co-education. They oppose early marriage and stipulate as the minimum age for marriage sixteen in the case of a woman and twenty-five for a man.

But their greatest achievement is in the educational field. There they hope to see the ideals of their religious and national renaissance realised in the rising generation. In 1886 they founded the Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College. A few years later there was a split in the movement. One section did not consider that the College was meeting their full demands; they wanted a more decided return to ancient Indian education, its methods and ideals. And so, under the leadership of Munshi Ram, they founded a *Gurukula* on the Upper Ganges, where teachers and pupils lived together for many years. There were other reasons for the split: outwardly it was a question of whether the eating of meat was permissible, but inwardly the question was whether only the ten commandments given by Dayananda, which every member must accept, were to be binding, or whether members were to be bound by Dayananda's own way of life and his other precepts.

The Dayananda College is an attempt to conduct an Indian school wholly independent of the influence and support of the Anglo-Indian Government. Its basic principles are described thus: "If education is to be fully effective, it must be national in tone and character. Man does not live to himself alone, but in the well-being of the community to which he belongs by birth, locality, and inheritance. Education must be so imparted that the pupils may become the best possible members of their community. The bond uniting the individual and the national community must be strengthened. The customary system of education (in India) works in the opposite direction. It denationalises. The rapid inflow of alien ideas introduced with English literature has certainly succeeded in enlightening thousands and clearing their intellect, and the country has reason to be proud of some of them. But alien education has given rise to a rift in the

community which is truly deplorable. An educated class has been created which lives its own separate life without being able to influence the uneducated masses or be influenced by them; such a class has nowhere been seen before. The remedy is national education, and the demand for it is growing. Youth is to be taught our national language and literature, to learn customs and manners in harmony with our national life. . . . In addition knowledge of the English language is to be fostered, and especially the economic progress of the country is to be promoted by a wider knowledge of the pure and applied sciences." The subjects taught include Sanskrit, Hindustani, English, Persian, Oriental philosophy, European philosophy, history, economics, logic, physics, chemistry, botany, geology, and mathematics. The school receives no Government grants. The education imparted is free, or the fees as low as possible. That is possible because the Principal and most of the teachers give their services free.

The *Gurukula* in Kangri seeks to carry out the ancient educational ideals even more radically than the Dayananda College. It is built in the old Indian style on the model of the famous Indian Universities of ancient times. Simple in style and on the level ground, it blends with the fairyland of the surrounding Indian countryside, the same that India's sages have sought for thousands of years past. The *Gurukula* is situated on the Upper Ganges, within sight of the snow-covered Himalayas and surrounded by the primeval forest. Whilst the Dayananda College aimed at preparing its pupils for the Anglo-Indian Universities, the *Gurukula* cut itself altogether free from that aim. Its purpose is knowledge of the Vedas and the formation of character on the basis of the Vedas. The ancient manly and life-giving culture was to be revived, the ideals of abstinence and asceticism were to be cultivated, the ancient philosophy to be rejuvenated; early Indian history was to be studied and a new Hindu literature created, absorbing what is best in Western culture. Boys enter this school at the age of seven and stay till they are twenty-four. On entering they take a vow of poverty, chastity, and obedience for a term of sixteen years, and renew it after ten years. During the whole period they never leave the school. They may not even visit their homes unless in

exceptional circumstances, and their parents may see them at most once a month. Thus the school has its own life, shut off from all outside influences; it is a pedagogic world in which the boy passes all his days. Teachers and pupils feel themselves bound by a family tie and mutual attachment. Social consciousness and a spirit of comradeship are awakened. During the first seven school years the boys learn Sanskrit, and the Vedas; not till they are fourteen do they begin to come in contact with the English language, the modern sciences, and Western civilisation, and then it is through the medium of their mother tongue. Strict discipline, bodily hardihood, and the observance of daily religious ritual are intended to create a new type of manliness. Here, too, the Principal and most of the teachers are unpaid. Education is free. In 1912 there were about three hundred pupils in the school. The whole atmosphere is saturated with the spirit of the Vedas and Upanishads. Lessons are given in Hindustani, but the pupils read, write, and speak Sanskrit with ease. Daily discussions with the Principal on ethical problems, daily bathing in the Ganges, agricultural work and carpentry, laboratory experiments and Sanskrit as the medium of all culture, these lend a remarkable character to the school in its peaceful seclusion. Holidays are devoted to travelling through India on foot. Here, in an atmosphere of spiritual discipline and pure, regular living, a new India is to mature. The founder and first Principal of the school, Munshi Ram, withdrew from active life in 1917, in accordance with Indian tradition, and has since then led the life of a Sannyassi under the name of Swami Shraddhananda.

Besides these two schools, the activities of the Arya Samaj cover a wide field. It supports schools for boys and girls, homes for widows and orphans, and organises relief in times of famine. Its membership is constantly growing. It has branches in Burma and East Africa. It has played a remarkable part in awakening Indian national consciousness. It has strengthened national sentiment and national self-confidence and has pointed the way of self-help to the Indian people; the whole of its well-constructed organisation is inspired by a mighty forward impulse. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that when Sir Valentine Chirol visited India on behalf of *The Times* to investigate the causes of unrest

after 1907, he looked upon the Arya Samaj as a serious menace to England and her sovereignty. The Society has revolutionised the whole of Indian life by its return to what is best in India's past. It created an ancient Vedic ritual for daily worship, recommended daily reading of the Upanishads, retained the custom of sacrifice consisting of offerings of butter accompanied by Vedic hymns, and required a good action daily—the giving of food to a scholar or ascetic, to domestic animals or poor persons.

Further, the Arya Samaj developed missions and considered that a part of its duty was to combat Christian missions and Mohammedanism. It taught the Indian people that the West has never in its religions fathomed those depths and heights known to Indians thousands of years ago. European philosophy in its most distinguished representatives struggles for insight attained by the thinkers of ancient India and gropes in the dark where India's knowledge has clearly pointed the way. Indian wisdom, too, can solve Europe's social problem. Thus the Arya Samaj stands at the threshold of the Indian Renaissance. And one of its leaders, Lajpat Rai, concludes his book on the movement with the words: "The Arya Samaj has to remember that the India of to-day is not exclusively Hindu. Its prosperity and future depend upon the reconciliation of Hinduism with that greater *ism*—Indian Nationalism—which alone can secure for India its rightful place in the comity of nations. Anything that may prevent, or even hinder, that consummation is a sin for which there can be no expiation."

Movements akin to the Arya Samaj arose everywhere in India. The Vedic Mission or Sadharana Dharma (The Common Road) was likewise based upon the conception of Vedic monotheism and its purpose was educational and social work. It did not seek to abolish all existing sects, but gradually to build up a unity within their variety, a common foundation, which might spread thence to all religions throughout the world.

The year 1870 is of special significance in Indian history. From thenceforward it becomes unmistakably clear that a new spirit is abroad. Yet it is a spirit which not only gives birth to reformers like Dayananda, but stirs orthodox Hinduism and the many religions and sects of India to new life

and consciousness. A biography of Ram Krishna begins with the words: "The student of Indian history is familiar with the fact, how during each transition period of the country, spiritual teachers of great importance have arisen and guided the people to save their national inheritance, 'the spiritual basis of collective life and conduct,' on which they had been established from very early times. . . . India was destined to pass through a much greater transition . . . when . . . the rule of the country gradually slipped into the hands of the British. For, at this time came the avalanche of the materialistic ideas and principles of life which were so foreign to the land, and it looked for a time, as if the very foundation of the collective spiritual life of the people was going to be undermined and destroyed by them. . . . None can say how far the country would have proceeded along this line of self-destruction by imitating Western methods without the attempt to assimilate them, had it not been for the strong check that it received from an opposite power coming from an unrecognised and unlooked for quarter, the seemingly dead bones of the religion of the country."¹

This rebirth of orthodox Hinduism is associated with the public appearance of Ram Krishna. He was born in 1834 of a poor Bengali Brahman family, and became a wandering monk, studying Yoga and Vedanta in the solitude of the forests. After serving for a few years as a priest in the temple of the goddess Kali near Calcutta, he withdrew into the jungle near the temple and there lived a life of stern asceticism and unceasing prayer, wrestling for union with God. He became a Sannyassi, a monk without caste or home, without property or family. Gradually he attained the gift of utter ecstasy. He did not seek to solve the riddle of the universe by way of knowledge, but through the service of God. He burned with the ardour of his faith and the vastness of his transcendental experience. After twelve years of trial he found peace. In order to learn about other religions he made friends with a Sufi and later with a Christian missionary, and lived with them in their own manner according to the precepts of their religion. He was without Western education. Nor did he know Sanskrit. He wrote nothing, and only

¹ *Sri Ramakrishna. The Great Master.* By Swami Saradananda, Madras, 1920, pp. 29-32.

taught orally; he had a great number of disciples. His influence grew. His activities came at a time when the educated youth of India was looking yearningly towards the West. He preached the East to them in his words and his life. In an age which, under European influence, aimed at self-assertion and self-realisation, he taught renunciation and asceticism. In contrast to a life devoted to the cult of comfort and machinery and growing more and more elaborate by reason of new discoveries, he held up the example of great simplicity. And herein precisely lay his influence over the best of India's youth. Protap Chandra Mazumdar, the most distinguished disciple of Keshab Chandra Sen, was among Ram Krishna's devotees and experienced the miracle of his influence. What, he said, have I in common with him? I am a Europeanised, civilised, self-reliant, half-sceptical, so-called rationalist, and he is a poor, uneducated, untrained, idolatrous, solitary Hindu zealot. Why should I, who have listened to Disraeli and Fawcett, Stanley and Max Müller, and a whole bevy of European scholars, why should I sit at his feet for hours together? And it is not I alone, but thousands who do as I do.

Four years before Ram Krishna died in 1886 he had found a disciple who constructed a system from his teaching, Swami Vivekananda. Vivekananda had enjoyed a good English education and knew the world. In his new Vedanta System he taught that all religions were fundamentally the same, and that the varying customs and ritual of the peoples were only allegories and symbols of the one truth. In addition to this allegorical form for the multitude, there is esoteric wisdom for the initiated. So also in the New Testament there were three degrees of understanding. In the first it was said: "Our Father which art in Heaven;" in the second: "The Kingdom of God is within you;" and in the third: "I and my Father are one." But Vivekananda was not only a Gnostic. The spirit of the age and of the new India lived in him and he helped to create it. He taught that man can become one with God not only through meditation, but by ceaseless self-sacrifice for the common good. The chief aim of his Ram Krishna Mission was social service. He was animated by a burning love of his country.

"Once more the world must be conquered by India.

This is the dream of my life, and I wish that each one of you who hear me to-day should have the same dream in your minds, and stop not till you have realised the dream. They will tell you every day that we had better look to our own homes first, then go to work outside. But I will tell you in plain language that you work best when you work for others. . . . This is the great ideal before us, and every one must be ready for it—the conquest of the whole world by India. . . . Let them come and flood the land with their armies, never mind. Up, India, and conquer the world with your spirituality! Aye, as has been declared on this soil, first love must conquer hatred, hatred cannot conquer itself. Materialism and all its miseries can never be conquered by materialism. Armies when they attempt to conquer armies only multiply and make brutes of humanity. Spirituality must conquer the West. Slowly they are finding it out that what they want is spirituality to preserve them as nations. They are waiting for it, they are eager for it. Where is the supply to come from? Where are the men ready to go out to every country in the world with the messages of the great sages of India? Where are the men ready to sacrifice everything so that this message shall reach every corner of the world? Such heroic workers are wanted to go abroad and help to disseminate the great truths of the Vedanta.”¹

So Vivekananda spoke when he returned from the World Congress of Religions in America. And he went on: “We must go out, we must conquer the world through our spirituality and philosophy. There is no other alternative, we must do it or die. . . . The only condition of national life, once more vigorous national life, is the conquest of the world by Indian thought.”²

In 1893, at the age of thirty-three, Vivekananda took part in the World Congress of Religions at Chicago, and there and on his return through Europe he won disciples for his teaching. Among them was Miss Margaret Noble, who, under the name of Sister Nivedita, joined the group of English men and women who sought to merge themselves in the life of India. In 1898 Vivekananda returned to America, where he

¹ *From Colombo to Almora. Seventeen Lectures.* By Swami Vivekananda, Madras, 1897, p. 193.

² *Ibid.*, p. 195.

founded Vedanta Societies. In 1900 he took part in the Congress of Religions in Paris, and died after his return at the age of forty.

He was no reformer. He found everything in Hinduism good, even image-worship and polytheism. The old conceptions, he said, might all be superstitions, but in the midst of these superstitions were nuggets of the gold of truth. Had any means been discovered of retaining the gold without some chaff? "If there is a religion which can lay that claim (to universality), it is only ours and none else, because every other religion depends on some person or persons. All the other religions have been built round the life of what they think an historical man, and what they think the strength of the religion is really the weakness, for disprove the history of the man and the whole building tumbles to the ground. . . . But the truths of our religion, although we have persons by the score, do not depend on them. The glory of Krishna is not that he is Krishna, but that he was that great teacher of Vedanta. . . . Thus our allegiance is to the principles always and not to the persons."¹ The very names of those who taught these principles were often unknown. Vivekananda regarded Hinduism as a noble and beautiful work of art woven around the profoundest truths, and held that it must be kept free from Western influence. Like Dayananda, Vivekananda taught young India self-confidence and trust in her own strength.

The religious ferment then at work in India produced a number of great men who travelled the country on foot and taught and, though they left no written works, exercised a wide influence. Another disciple of Ram Krishna's, Ram Tirath, who had begun a brilliant university career as a professor of mathematics, left it all and went on foot as begging monk, withdrawing into solitude and living for a long time in the wildest parts of the Himalayas. Then, full of inward strength and joy, he travelled all over India as a poet and teacher. He was drowned in a river. Another itinerant monk, Sivanarayana, who died in 1909, preached similar doctrines, but independently. But it was not till after his death and without his intending it that sects were formed which followed his teaching.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

Simultaneously with the reawakening of orthodox Hinduism there were signs of new life in all manner of sects and religions. They founded societies to defend and develop their faith, held congresses, opened schools, and began new literary activities. The various Hindu movements held a joint national Congress in Delhi under the presidency of the Maharaja of Darbhanga, one of the most powerful and influential princes of Northern India, who walked in a procession at the head of a hundred thousand people, barefoot and carrying a copy of the Veda. In 1902 the Bharata-Dharma-Mahamandala Society was formed, with its headquarters at Benares, with the object of fostering religious education, distributing important literature, reforming Hindu religious organisation, and founding schools, libraries, and institutes. It was supported by a number of Indian princes. Kindred movements among the Jains and Sikhs gave evidence of a revived interest in their religion. And among Indian Mohammedans a new national orthodoxy came into being, stimulated partly by these movements and partly by Pan-Islamism; it turned brusquely away from such liberal reformers as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. In 1885 the Anjuman-Himayet-i-Islam was founded in Lahore with the object of arousing new interest in the Mohammedan religion, combating Christian missions, and establishing vernacular schools of a religious character.

Most interesting of all were the movements which endeavoured to create some organisation among the outcastes, the pariahs. At first it was the most advanced of these tribes who learnt to trust their own strength, and began to stand on their own feet, to organise, to educate, and to make demands. All such movements were originally religious in character. On the south-west coast of India lived the Tiyas, a people numbering some two million, who were subdivided amongst themselves into three classes that would not eat together or intermarry. Because they had always been allowed to study medicine and astronomy, they had some knowledge of Sanskrit. Like most outcaste peoples, they were demon-worshippers. About 1890 Sri Narayana became their leader. He taught them to build temples like the orthodox Hindus and to copy Hindu customs and ritual, except for the fact that their priests were not Brahmans,

but chosen from their own midst. Attached to each temple was a small Sanskrit school. The strict separation between the three classes was abolished. Within a few years they made great progress. They were admitted to the Government service in Travancore, and their children were allowed to attend the general schools. They held yearly conferences, tried to promote agriculture and industry in their midst by exhibitions, instructors, and schools of their own, and under the leadership of Dr. Palpus produced their own literature and journals.

The idea of social service, which had spread among the higher castes through the religious revival, took hold of the ablest among the outcastes. In 1906 seven leaders of the Vokkalikas summoned a conference in Mysore. There it was resolved to send teachers to the villages to explain the importance of enlightenment and education, to improve agricultural methods, to promote popular hygiene, and to establish a school with a library and reading-room and a little museum of crafts. Ever since then the conference has met annually and great progress has been made; the people have their own literature and press in English and in the vernacular, they have set up model farms, founded technical schools, and arranged travelling exhibitions. Thus the spirit of social reform awakened in India under Ram Mohan Ray has brought new life to the whole country and has even enabled the fifty million outcastes to take the first steps upwards out of their degradation.

Inseparable from religious revival and reform was the idea of a national rebirth. Even Keshab Chandra Sen, who went further than any other reformer to meet Europe and advocated an eclectic Humanism, said: "But the future church of India must be thoroughly national; it must be an essentially Indian church. The future religion of the world I have described will be the common religion of all nations, but in each nation it will have an indigenous growth, and assume a distinctive and peculiar character. All mankind will unite in a universal church; at the same time, it will be adapted to the peculiar circumstances of each nation, and assume a national form. . . . We shall see that the future church . . . does not come to us as a foreign plant, but that it strikes its roots deep in the national heart of India . . . and

develops itself with all the freshness and vigour of indigenous growth.”¹

Dayananda and Vivekananda laid incomparably greater emphasis upon national tendencies. A biography of Dayananda declares that, for good or ill, religion has undoubtedly come to take second rank in the thoughts of India's great men, and national policy the first; indeed, national policy may be said to have become the religion of the country's best intellects.

Here, too, religious reform and the religious revival paved the way for nationalism and destroyed mediævalism by subjecting existing conditions to critical examination, judging them by the standards of antiquity and of foreign lands. It was a period when men's outlook was immeasurably broadened and enriched. They became aware of ancient civilisations and wholly new conditions of life. Man was discovered anew, and man, as he emerged, was a social creature.

¹ *Keshab Chandra Sen and the Brahma Samaj*. By T. E. Slater, Madras, 1884, Appendix, p. 17.

CHAPTER V

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ORIENT


THE political greatness of an historical structure is determined by the balance between the ideals and the interests which dominate it and reciprocally mould, create, and destroy one another. Rising and existing interests find their justification in ideas, thus gaining the force of an ideal unity and the enthusiasm of faith, whilst ideas, because their fulfilment has become possible, give birth to deeds and link themselves closely with life. Kurt Riesler says that it was "Britain's historical good fortune that from Elizabeth till the Empire of the present day every interest was linked with a theory; religious and moral ideals, concrete and pliant and moulded by a keen and constant sense of actuality and practicability, managed to follow in their development the sequence of political interests." This close connection between idea and interest, which is the characteristic trait of English history and of its organic growth, has nowhere, perhaps, been so significant or so clearly demonstrated as in the history of British Imperialism, in the expansion of England to the mightiest colonial empire of the present day.

The foundation was laid for an English empire when England vanquished France in 1763; thenceforward there follows an unbroken ascent, only once seriously menaced when the troops of the French Revolution landed in Egypt under Napoleon and sought to give the Orient what England also meant to give: an idea. Great as was the importance to the East of Napoleon's campaign, it was nevertheless only an episode, and the English pitted all their force against him when they recognised the danger until, after a desperate struggle, they overthrew him. England's rise to great imperial power cannot be explained merely by historical accidents or the English love of and gift for ruling. A German student of English life, Wilhelm Dibelius, has called attention to the inner causes of England's rise to power: in the wars

waged for the establishment of England's imperial sway "doubtless the desire for political power and economic influence was the actual motive. And yet there is an idealistic impulse in these wars which gives a sanction to England's struggle for power in the name of civilisation: England felt that she stood for freedom. . . . She had found a universal watchword in which every Englishman believed honestly and fanatically and which possessed the power of every gospel, not only to influence all mankind but gradually to purge its devotees of the dross which still hampered their energy. It is not pertinent to England's place in world history whether the conception of English liberty in the eighteenth century was truth or legend. What is pertinent is that at a time when diplomats were haggling with all the arts of secret intrigue over villages and souls and alliances, England, in addition to all these arts, which she practised with masterly skill, had a watchword for mankind in which every Englishman believed. . . . From the end of the eighteenth century England became a world power, for she ruled a considerable portion of the globe, and what is an essential corollary, she conferred upon the world a vital principle which at that time it needed and which has not yet lost its vigour." England has conferred such a life-giving principle upon the East. Her mercantile interests and her struggle for power have always been subject to correction by moral and religious ideals. "England is the only State in the whole world which, even while pursuing its own interests, has something to give to other peoples, the only State in which patriotism is not synonymous with an attitude of defensive pugnacity towards all the rest of the world, the only State which always invites the co-operation of some part of the progressive, able, and idealistic elements in every nation."¹

In her rise to a world hegemony which, through the power of an idea, includes the control of lands that have never been her political dependencies, England has met with only two rivals in the past two hundred years: revolutionary France with her great influence upon the peoples of Europe and the Near East, and quite recently revolutionary Russia whose world-embracing ideal of a new era has given Russia a

¹ Wilhelm Dibelius.



MAP IV.—DOMINIONS AND COLONIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

driving force such as the Tsarist Empire never possessed, for all its power; already this revolutionary Russia is engaged in a struggle with England for predominant influence in the East.

European Liberalism in the eighteenth century received its chief inspiration from England, and England was the only State to regard its colonial possessions as the occasion for new and ideal developments. The other European colonial Powers, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Holland, and France, attached too little importance to their colonial possessions to make them the subject of idealistic conflicts and developments. Russia, on the other hand, was linked territorially with her Asiatic possessions and endeavoured to bridge the cultural differences between the motherland and the colony, in which endeavour she was assisted by the fact that her Government was a despotism. But England alone not only brought to the East the ideals of democracy and nationalism (revolutionary France did that although, it is true, only in areas which were not her own colonies), but tried to educate her colonies in Western ideas and to bring about a closer understanding between the East and Europe; she herself offered an example of the completest political organisation, which succeeded in adapting itself to a changing public sentiment with unparalleled flexibility and without doctrinaire theorising; at the same time it derived its vigour from ideals which seemed to promote the evolution and the liberties of all mankind. This process went on in two directions: in the organisation of the Empire and in the exercise of civilising functions. The first applied principally to England's overseas possessions colonised by whites, and is only of secondary significance for Oriental countries in so far as the new ideas of freedom and decentralisation, once accepted, began to spread to colonies and protectorates inhabited by coloured races. The exercise of civilising functions was the strongest bond of union between the British mother country and the Dominions inhabited by the same race, but its special significance lay in the East, where, particularly in India, it constituted the most powerful ferment that had penetrated the ancient civilisation of the Hindus for thousands of years; and through the Indian Mohammedans it influenced the whole development of Islam.

Unlike French and German colonial possessions, the British Empire did not come into existence through organised State action, but in the same extraordinary, individual, yet organic manner in which the whole of English life is carried on. This is demonstrated as much in the foundation of the American colonies as in the acquisition of the Indian Empire. It was not till the period between 1839 and 1850 that the relation of those colonies to the mother country was seriously considered. At that juncture Canadian aspirations to declare independence, like the New England States, attracted general attention.

These were the decisive years in the history of the British Empire. England herself had entered upon a new phase of her political development after the great Reform Act of 1832. Her statesmen ventured upon the solutions of new problems with great courage and foresight. Between 1846 and 1856 self-government was introduced in the separate provinces of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, with a parliamentary régime and full ministerial responsibility. The colonial reformers, as the statesmen were called who introduced the reforms of that period, can hardly have dreamed that within a few decades these separate colonies would evolve into powerful federal States of continental magnitude, facing the mother country with a national consciousness, a highly developed nationalism of their own. The autonomy originally granted to the colonies only covered their own internal affairs. The point of view of the colonial reformers is best indicated by a speech of Sir William Molesworth's in 1830: "We ought to look upon our Colonies as integral portions of the British Empire, inhabited by men who ought to enjoy in their own localities all the rights and privileges that Englishmen do in England. Now, the colonists have no right to interfere in the management of the local affairs of Great Britain, therefore we ought not to interfere in the management of the local affairs of the Colonies. We are entitled to reserve to ourselves the management of the common concerns of the Empire, because imperial power must be located somewhere for the maintenance of the unity of the Empire; and because we are the richest and most powerful portion of the Empire, and have to pay for the management of its common concerns. In thus laying claim

to imperial powers for the British Parliament, I must add, that in my opinion, it would tend much to consolidate the Empire if we could admit into the Imperial Parliament representatives of the Colonies, for then the Colonies would feel that they formed with the British Islands one complete body politic."¹

It was a far call from this attitude to the recognition of complete Dominion independence, even in questions of foreign policy, and the extension of such ideas to the colonies inhabited by non-Europeans. The journey is not yet ended, institutions have not reached their final form, everything is in a state of flux, formulas are being sought elastic enough for the variety and complexity of political and social evolution. But a long stretch of the road has been covered since 1850, and the slowly crystallising structure of the British Empire may be regarded as one of the most interesting and promising experiments made with the object of superseding the conception of absolute State sovereignty in the name of general peace and supreme law, without the sacrifice of the independence and individuality of the parts.

The Manchester Liberal school did not favour the extension of the Empire. Richard Cobden's maxims are well known: he said that it would be a happy day when England ceased to possess one acre of land in the continent of Asia, and that he believed it to be alike in England's interest and Canada's to sever the political tie that bound them as quickly as possible. But after 1870 new interest in the Empire awoke in Great Britain. The wave of nationalism, militarism, and protectionist doctrine which surged up in Europe in consequence of Germany's victory over France gave rise to the idea of colonies as possible sources of raw materials and soldiers. At the same time the colonies began to realise the importance to themselves of foreign policy. Impressed by the Civil War in the United States of America, the Canadian colonies had formed a federal State in 1867. The penetration of European Powers into the Pacific caused Australia and New Zealand to fear possible future entanglements. The British Empire was, therefore, faced by two problems in its further development. It was necessary to grant the colonies a share in con-

¹ Speech on the second reading of the Australian Government Bill February, 18, 1850.

ducting foreign policy. On the other hand it was desirable, in case of war, to unite and co-ordinate the military and economic resources of the mother country and the colonies. The more rapid communication between the separate parts of the Empire, by improved steamship services and telegraphs, was of assistance. All English parties were now inspired by the imperial idea. In his speech in Edinburgh in 1880 the Liberal leader, Gladstone, gave utterance to feelings which moulded not only the Liberal Party programme, but that of the predominating section of the Labour Party, as is proved by the policy of the first Labour Ministry in 1924. Gladstone said: "I believe we are all united in a fond attachment to the great country to which we belong, to the great empire which has committed to it a trust and a function from Providence as special and remarkable as was ever intrusted to any portion of the family of man. When I speak of that trust and that function I feel that words fail. I cannot tell you what I think of the nobleness of the inheritance which has descended upon us, of the sacredness of the duty of maintaining it. I will not condescend to make it a part of controversial politics. It is a part of my being, of my flesh and blood, of my heart and soul. For these ends I have laboured through my youth and manhood and, more than that, till my hairs are gray. In that faith and practice I have lived and in that faith and practice I shall die."¹

Herbert Samuel, afterwards the first British High Commissioner in the mandated territory of Palestine, outlined the responsibilities of English Liberalism in the matter of imperialism in his *Liberalism*; in this book, to which Mr. Asquith, the leader of the Liberal Party, wrote an Introduction, he describes the principles and plans of contemporary Liberalism, and writes: "If Imperialism . . . is held to signify a loyal determination to defend the empire we hold, a sentiment of close unity with the English colonists, a desire to promote the interests of the empire without injury to domestic progress, to develop its commerce while scrupulously caring for the well-being of the subject races, to maintain its sovereignty while preparing the way for an extension of native liberties; if our Imperialism includes no wish to attack the rights of our neighbours, no eagerness for further

¹ *Times*, March 18th, 1880.

expansion save when the advantages very clearly outweigh the drawbacks, and no callousness of bloodshed; if it is inspired by an enthusiasm not indiscriminating and a pride not deaf to criticism or blind to the needs of reform—then we may say, without danger of denial, that the Liberal Party as a whole is essentially Imperialist.”¹

The ideal of English statesmen in those years was a federation of the whole Empire. Joseph Chamberlain’s protectionist proposals pointed in that direction. Later on the group which made the quarterly *Round Table* its organ took up the idea again.

Meanwhile, however, the self-governing colonies had acquired a national consciousness of their own. In 1900 the Australian colonies united in a federal State. The colonies would not hear of a great, overruling imperial union. Their ideal was something in the nature of co-operation and an alliance of independent States with equal rights. It is to the credit of English statesmen that they managed to adapt themselves to these developments and did not oppose them. Formerly England, like every other ruling Power, tried to govern her colonies inhabited by Europeans (as well as her Eastern possessions) on the principle of *divide et impera*. Later she herself encouraged the union and federation of the colonies. In the middle of the last century neither Canada nor Australia had any national sentiment. The inhabitants of Nova Scotia or New Brunswick were offended if they were called Canadians. It was not till the second half of the nineteenth century that the watchword of “Canada first” was coined, that is to say, that people felt themselves citizens of Canada even more than of the separate Canadian federal States. The same process of evolution took place rather later in Australia and is repeating itself in India.

In 1887 the first Colonial Conference was summoned in London, the Ministers of the self-governing colonies taking part. This was the first of a series of conferences destined to lay the foundations of the new British imperial structure. In 1907 it was resolved that the conferences should meet regularly every four years, that henceforth they should be called Imperial instead of Colonial Conferences, that the

¹ Pp. 343-4.

participants should no longer be called colonies but Dominions, and that the Chairman should be the English Prime Minister, instead of the Colonial Secretary, as hitherto. These changes indicate how the position of the self governing colonies was evolving, for they now felt the very term "colony" to be humiliating and no longer in consonance with their real position. Whereas in 1902 the phrase had been "... as between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of the self governing colonies," it became in 1907 "... as between His Majesty's Government and his Governments of the self governing Dominions beyond the seas."

This new dignity and freedom nowise undermined the sentiment of unity, indeed it seemed to have the opposite effect. Shortly after the outbreak of war in 1914 the Prime Minister of Canada declared: "The strength of the Empire rests upon the eternal foundation of liberty expressed in the ideal and consummation of autonomous self government which is vested in the people of the self governing Dominions as of right, not of grace."

Volunteer troops from the colonies fought in England's common cause as soldiers of the Empire. In 1885 New South Wales and Canada took part in the campaign in the Sudan, and in 1900 Australian troops joined the expedition against China. The Boer War bore witness anew to the solidarity of the Empire. The threat of international complications which loomed on the political horizon from the beginning of the twentieth century once more brought to the forefront the question of Imperial defence, and the share of the Dominions in a responsibility hitherto borne by the mother country alone. Moreover, the colonies grasped the fact that the key to their defence lay outside their own territory, principally on the sea, and that union was their surest protection. In 1907 the English General Staff was expanded to an Imperial General Staff, it included officers from all parts of the Empire and gave them a common training. A few years later Lord Kitchener visited Australia and opened a school for officers, and Australia introduced compulsory military training, as New Zealand and South Africa did shortly afterwards. A Committee of Imperial Defence was formed.

The fruits of this policy appeared in the war of 1914.

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa sent nearly a million soldiers, and their war expenditure amounted to more than £862,000,000. This share of the Dominions in waging the war necessarily entitled them to a share in its direction and in determining that foreign policy which had led to war and which the war was to modify. During the war an Imperial Cabinet was created in London to which the Prime Ministers of the Dominions belonged. Thus they had a voice in all problems of the war, the peace, and in foreign policy. The first consequence to the internal relations of the British Empire was the decision that on important questions the Prime Ministers of the Dominions were to have the right of communicating direct with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and should no longer depend upon the mediation of the Colonial Secretary.

But the consequences to the foreign policy of the Empire were even more important. In 1914 the English Cabinet alone was the competent authority to determine foreign relations and decide questions of war and peace, and it was responsible to none but the English Parliament. The Dominions were involved in a war without their representatives having any share in the decision. During the war the position changed fundamentally. For decades the Dominions had been independent in the matter of internal legislation and administration; now for the first time their independence was recognised as separate members of the society of nations; their capacity to conduct foreign policy was acknowledged in international law. The last trace of the ideas formerly associated with the word "colony" vanished away. At the Peace Conference in 1919 representatives of the Dominions sat in their own right beside the representatives of all other nations. The Peace Treaty of Versailles was signed by the representatives of the Dominions in the name of their own States, it was presented to the Dominion Parliaments for approval, and ratified by the Crown in the name of the Dominions on the advice and responsibility of their Governments. Likewise the Dominions became members of the League of Nations.

For the time being this ends the constitutional evolution of the British Empire. The English Prime Minister is President of the Imperial Conference, but he is only *primus*

inter pares; the representatives of the Dominions are his equals. Both they and he are responsible to their own Parliaments, and to the people of the country which they represent. Each one of these nations that has grown up within the British Empire has a voice in questions which concern all alike. Each retains its own full and unrestricted autonomy and the responsibility of its Ministers to its own electors. In all important questions of foreign policy which have arisen since 1919 England has asked the opinion of the Dominions. Efforts are still being made to find a means of uninterrupted mutual consultation. New methods are continually being tried, and the reciprocal relation has grown more elastic. Canada has her own Ambassador to the United States, and even in England at the end of 1924 so conservative an organ as *The Times* proposed that all Dominion questions should be definitely withdrawn from the competence of the Colonial Office and reserved for the Prime Minister. The question of Dominion representation in London, whether through Ambassadors or Ministers of Cabinet rank, is constantly under discussion. In 1925 what had hitherto been the Colonial Office was divided into a Dominions Office and one for the Colonies. Thus the unity of the British Empire rests chiefly upon the desire for unity and upon a solidarity of interest. André Siegfried, who knows the British Empire as well, perhaps, as any Frenchman, has justly summed up the present position: "The Dominions, in emancipating themselves from England, do not emancipate themselves from the Empire; they know well enough that without it the essence of their power and even their real independence would melt away."

This British policy of freedom as a principle of development in the Empire had proved valid in the Colonies settled by whites. In Canada the colonists of French and English descent had merged in one people, and the Frenchman, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, was not only the greatest statesman in the British Dominion of Canada, but occupied for nearly twenty years a unique and prominent position in the British Empire. Not only had he a rare mastery of the English language, he was likewise a whole-hearted admirer of English institutions; Canada's participation in the Boer War was first and foremost due to his influence.

Even stronger proof of the British liberal principle in imperial policy was furnished by the case of South Africa. After a war waged by England up to the year 1902 with exceptional cruelty and unswerving determination in order to annex the whole of South Africa to the Empire, Campbell-Bannerman's Liberal Government immediately on assuming office in 1906 granted full self-government to the two former Boer Republics, on the same basis as the other Dominions. In the elections to the new Parliament the Boers secured a majority, not only in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, but also in Cape Colony. By 1910 the South African Union was an accomplished fact. Its first Prime Minister was General Botha, who, as a Boer General, had held out longest in the war against England. The Dutch and English languages had been declared to stand upon an absolutely equal footing in the new State. Throughout the history of the South African Union, and especially during the war of 1914, there has been no more eloquent advocate of England's interests than the Boer Smuts. In 1915 General Hertzog openly sided with De Wet and others who had attacked Great Britain with armed force after the outbreak of war. Yet when, in the 1924 elections, the Boer Nationalist party under his leadership was returned to power in the South African Union, there was no talk of severing the tie with Great Britain. When in 1922 there was occasion to give a new form to the relation between Great Britain and Ireland and so in part to make good a scandalous injustice committed by England over a period of hundreds of years, the experience of recent decades suggested Dominion status for Ireland.

It can well be understood, therefore, that English liberal politicians predict similar developments in those parts of the Empire that are inhabited by coloured races. During the war, in 1917, it was decided that India, like the Dominions, was entitled to a voice in questions of imperial foreign policy. India's representatives sat in the Imperial War Cabinet, signed the Peace Treaty, and take part in the deliberations of the League of Nations. The policy of granting political and civic rights to the inhabitants of the colonies, and of recognising their right to a share in legislation and administration, was gradually applied to colonies inhabited by alien races. All this came about very slowly and

cautiously. The measure of self-government conceded, the method of native representation in deliberative bodies, their numerical proportion to the official members whose duty it was to represent Government policy, all these things varied from one colony to another. But everywhere the basic principle stood fast that for the present and the immediate future the real authority must remain in the hands of the English Government and its representatives. Even the most far-reaching reforms hitherto carried out in India, and known as the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919, were introduced in Parliament on August 20th, 1917, by a speech from the Secretary of State for India, who said: "The policy of His Majesty's Government is that of increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible."¹

But this declaration was promptly circumscribed by what followed: "I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility."

Notwithstanding England's endeavour to retain real authority in her own hands, even when granting political liberty, it was English policy and methods which stirred the desire for extended liberty and self-government. Even in the days when freedom and self-government existed in England only within the narrow circle of the landed nobility and the well-to-do middle class—in fact the gentry—pride in these blessings was common to all classes, a universal possession of the English people and their civilisation. In its name, and by a slow process of evolution, the lower classes secured a share in liberty and self-government.

¹ *Hansard*, August 20th, 1917, col. 1695.



MAP V.—BRITISH IMPERIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

This ideal of the gentleman with his manly and political virtues the English carried with them to their colonies. It set up between themselves and the native peoples an inseparable barrier of arrogance known to no other colonising nation. In districts suitable for white settlement the arrival of English colonists meant the extermination of the native races. This has proved true in the case of the North American Indians, as well as the natives of Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand. In South and Central America the Spanish were able to mix with the Indians and so give birth to a peculiar civilisation that did not destroy the original culture, adapted to the country's natural conditions. The English, conscious of their superiority, did not assimilate and graft upon their own the forms of civilisation and culture which they found established, and so bring about a new and natural fruiting. They regarded them with aloofness; even in countries where these seemed unnatural, they retained down to the smallest detail the habits they had brought from England. They avoided all participation in native ways and customs; so far as possible, they left them undisturbed. But they set up in sharp contrast their own civilisation and their own ideal of the gentleman: there was no uniting link, and the English did not attempt to make one.

But their most liberal politicians conceived the idea of admitting the natives to the blessings of their own civilisation. As had happened in England, a small upper class of the alien race was to be raised to the ranks of the gentry. There were practical considerations in favour of this scheme. The "educated" natives could render assistance in the administration of the country and its commercial settlement. But the very fact of this sharp and uncompromising contrast between the European ideal, as developed by England in politics and industry and habits of life, and Oriental civilisation, made the European model an influence in moulding the East. Asia judged herself by this new ideal, she absorbed it, learned, and was transformed under its guidance; accepting it and permeated by it, she recognised her own defects and its alien character, and became conscious of herself as mirrored in the alien ideal. In this respect English influence was, perhaps, the most powerful of the forces creating the new Asia which emerged from contact with Europe.

In all her colonies England acted upon the principle of winning the natives for the ideal of gentlemanliness. We find the educated native in England's African possessions. His class is particularly numerous in West Africa, and is entirely assimilated to the English type in speech, education, religion, and manner of life. It provides England's officials and interpreters who carry her civilisation far into Africa. But in conferring upon them English civilisation and ideas, England has roused in them the desire for that political freedom which is the inherent right of the gentleman. And now they have become the champions of their own race against the Europeans; they seek to educate the negro race to demand the right of self-government. In 1920 their delegates met in a West African Congress which protested against racial inequality and demanded the introduction of self-government. And in fact England has already conceded considerable rights to the negroes in colonial administration, especially in the municipalities.

Similar developments are taking place in South Africa, where unrest and consciousness of their racial individuality is growing among the natives. It is significant that the process of Europeanising the negroes was more advanced in the originally English colonies than in the former Boer Republics. The Bantu people, who are by no means lacking in ability, first received European education in the missionary schools. There were soon negro lawyers, doctors, and journalists in South Africa. A separate native press came into being. The negroes had their own political and professional organisations. Within a short space they began to establish their own primary and secondary schools and tried to emancipate themselves from missionary influence, following the example of the North American negroes and setting up their own churches, separate from those of the Europeans. The most influential of these was the Ethiopian Church of South Africa. They also formed a Native National Congress, which demanded first and foremost racial equality; its deputation to England in 1919 did not, indeed, ask for independence, but it did ask absolute equality with British citizens. The negro who believed that he had attained the standard of his model, the English gentleman, in speech, religion, education, and manner of life, now demanded the

political rights of the gentleman. A few went further and raised the cry: "Africa for the Africans!" The World War accelerated this movement. A few decades before there had been only tribal sentiment amongst negroes. Each group regarded the rest with hostility, and the sentiment of solidarity and a common responsibility in face of Europeans was altogether alien to their habit of mind. The influence of European education upon those negroes whom it has reached has destroyed their tribal sentiment and cleared the ground for a racial consciousness. The negroes realise their unity and even include in its scope their fellows in America. They endeavour to present a united front to the whites, to whom they originally owed this racial consciousness. And it is precisely this which has exacerbated racial hostility anew by rousing the whites to a defensive struggle. But English policy, wholly opposed to the Boer conception, has been guided by the watchword of the great English coloniser, Cecil Rhodes, who said that the same rights should be conceded to every civilised man of whatever race. Moreover, it is only in Cape Colony that the negroes possess the parliamentary franchise.

The effect of English policy upon races that had possessed a high civilisation for thousands of years was necessarily profounder than upon the negroes. The first step in that policy in India is marked by the visit of the English Liberal statesman and historian, Thomas Macaulay. His first public activity at home had been in connection with the anti-slavery movement, and he tried to apply in India those Liberal principles in defence of which the great campaign had been fought in England a few years earlier. He advocated the freedom of the Press and the equality of Europeans and natives before the law. But most important, he was responsible, as Chairman of the Committee of Public Instruction, for introducing the system of European education into India. In 1835 he presented his memorandum on the subject. It is typical of the Liberalism of the period. Indian culture and its value was practically unknown in Europe at the time, and the great discoveries and translations of scholarship had not been published. Liberal Europeans saw in things Indian only an unprogressive barbarism, the mediæval darkness which Europe had left behind her. Oriental scholarship

seemed childish and out of date. What was wanted was the introduction of the modern knowledge of natural science, and of a culture that had led onwards from Greece to English Liberalism, and so to the modern industrial State with its mastery of nature. A bold policy of progress left no room for consideration of an organic connection with India's past. And so it was resolved that the Government should undertake the task of spreading a knowledge of European literature and science among the inhabitants of India, and should promote English education by every means in its power. Macaulay was immersed at the time in the study of classical antiquity, and it was his ideal to Anglicise India as Rome had Latinised Gaul and Iberia in the past. The Indians were to become out and out Englishmen in all but the colour of their skins. The British Empire was to be welded into a united whole by means of English culture and the ideal of the gentleman, much as Macaulay believed the Roman Empire had been welded. He wrote in his memorandum: "It may be that the public mind of India may so expand under our system that it may outgrow that system, and our subjects having been brought up under good government may develop a capacity for better government, that having been instructed in European learning, they may crave for European institutions. I know not whether such a day will ever come, but if it does come it will be the proudest day in the annals of England."

The new type of education was exclusively English in character. The teaching was modelled on the English schools with old traditions, and its aim the training of gentlemen like those who studied at Oxford or Cambridge. Nothing was taught of Indian national languages or culture. Such education was accessible only to a small upper class. This was due equally to its costliness and its quality. Popular education, which must have been carried on in primary schools and in the vernacular, was wholly neglected. The percentage of educated people was minute, and it was precisely their education which divided them from the people by a deep gulf. This was not so much the deliberate intention of English colonial government as implicit in the nature of English education and administration. In spite of apparent concessions, the English ruling class has always retained the

real power in its own hands at home until very recently. Freedom and self-government had existed only for the narrow caste of gentlemen. But that caste has always managed to enlarge its basis by drawing in elements from below, and to turn precisely the most active and pushing elements in the lower classes into defenders of its power, by granting them a share in the privileges and wealth of the rulers. No country in Europe had advanced education in the few aristocratic Universities and large public schools to such heights as England, whilst at the same time so completely neglecting popular education. It was not till 1880 that compulsory education was effectually introduced, and it was not till quite recently that the foundation was laid for universal and equal secondary education. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that principles which had not yet found acceptance even in England, were not applied in the colonies.

Macaulay carried out his reforms in the teeth of opposition from the Indian Civil Service. He had before him the same ideal as Cecil Rhodes: a great Empire built upon the foundation of English civilisation and not bounded by racial limits. Rhodes, like Macaulay, was an ardent worshipper of antiquity, and always advocated the principle of freedom and self-government within the united Empire. He had been the first to conceive the plan of a United States of South Africa, five and twenty years before its realisation, a South Africa in which Boers and English should form an absolutely autonomous part of the British Empire. Local self-government was, to his mind, the only possible lasting foundation on which the Empire could be built. For that reason he supported the Irish Home Rulers. In his famous will he sketched his idea of the British Empire, and beyond its bounds of the great commonwealth of peoples linked together by the bond of English language and culture, serving the cause of peace amongst men. His aim was "the extension of British rule throughout the world, the occupation by British Settlers of the entire Continent of Africa, the Holy Land, the Valley of the Euphrates . . . the whole of South America . . . the ultimate recovery of the United States of America as an integral part of the British Empire, the inauguration of a System of Colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament, which may tend to weld together the disjointed

members of the Empire, and, finally, the foundation of so great a Power as to hereafter render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity."

But it would be an essential condition of communicating this English ideal to alien races that those who had assimilated the ideal of the gentleman, through the mediation of the ruling classes, should now themselves become part of the ruling class, should share the privileges and wealth of government, and in so doing broaden its basis. The conception of freedom and equality was awakened in the minds of Indians educated by English methods, but it was not satisfied. They were excluded from any share in legislation and administration. They became, therefore, the agents of revolt against existing conditions. Economic were added to ideal motives. On the model of Eton and Oxford in the first half of the nineteenth century, education was purely in the humanities. It trained boys for the professions, especially for the Civil Service and the law. But posts in the Civil Service were not open to Indians. Hence there arose an educated proletariat, uprooted from its natural surroundings and clamouring for the well-paid posts for which it was fitted by education and which it saw occupied by foreigners who looked down upon it arrogantly. What happened in the first instance unintentionally was done later with a purpose. The English utterly neglected the technical and industrial training of Indians; in those important spheres English supremacy remained unchecked. But the education they had received endowed the Indians with the capacity and the will to make good their arrears and to work for themselves. The reforms of the year 1835, the Anglicising of Indian education, had created a new India. Nor were its effects confined to India. It made its way to China and Japan, and to Western Asia through the influence of Indian Mohammedans.

It is only in the last few years that English politicians of liberal outlook, including both the Liberal and the Socialist Labour Parties, have heralded the idea of granting Dominion liberties to India and other parts of the Empire where the people are "ripe for self-government," and this has been done under pressure of the demands of the educated classes in Oriental lands under English influence. Here the historic rôle of the educated classes is justly assessed. In the Montagu-

Chelmsford Report on Constitutional Reforms in India, issued in 1918, Article 139 runs: "It is one of the most difficult portions of our task to see them (the politically minded portion of the people of India) in their right relation to the rest of the country. Our obligations to them are plain, for they are intellectually our children. They have imbibed the ideas which we ourselves have set before them, and we ought to reckon it to their credit. The present intellectual and moral stir in India is no reproach but rather a tribute to our work. . . . We owe him (the educated Indian) sympathy because he has conceived and pursued the idea of managing his own affairs, an aim which no Englishman can fail to respect. . . . He has by speeches and in the Press done much to spread the idea of a united and self-respecting India among thousands who had no such conception in their minds." The aim is to give these cultured classes, educated in English ideals, a place within the British Empire similar to that of the English themselves. This idea is plainly stressed in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report: "Further we have every reason to hope that as the result of this process (reforms aiming at future Dominion status), India's connection with the Empire will be confirmed by the wishes of her people. The experience of a century of experiments within the Empire goes all in one direction. As power is given to the people of a province or of a Dominion to manage their own local affairs, their attachment becomes the stronger to the Empire which comprehends them all in a common bond of union. The existence of national feeling, or the love of and pride in a national culture, need not conflict with, and may indeed strengthen, the sense of membership in a wider commonwealth. The obstacles to a growth in India of this sense of partnership in the Empire are obvious enough. Differences of race, religion, past history, and civilisation have to be overcome. But the Empire, which includes the French of Canada and the Dutch of South Africa—to go no further—cannot in any case be based on ties of race alone. It must depend on a common realisation of the ends for which the Empire exists, the maintenance of peace and order over wide spaces of territory, the maintenance of freedom and the development of the culture of each national unity of which the Empire is composed. These are aims which appeal to the imagina-

tion of India and in proportion as self-government develops patriotism in India, we may hope to see the growth of a conscious feeling of organic unity with the Empire as a whole."¹

This policy of broadening the basis of the British Empire so that the coloured races may share in its administration has met with opposition in England and the Dominions in wide and influential circles. The Liberal Party and the leaders of the Labour Party aim at effecting the change only very gradually and by very slow stages. But the greatest obstacle on the road to self-government, which has been approved in principle by the Parliament in London, is the actual English population of the colonies, especially the bureaucracy. These officials are accustomed to govern millions of coloured people autocratically, and this is only possible where arrogance and rigorous differentiation draw a sharp line of division between rulers and ruled; morally and economically, these white officials occupy such a privileged position as is beyond the reach of even the highest classes in Europe; and they cannot accustom themselves to see their "subjects" withdrawn from their paternal care, to regard them as equals, and to share with them the precedence and high salaries that formerly were theirs alone. And so it has happened again and again that the barbarous and senseless conduct of officials in the East has counteracted the effect of reforms determined upon in London. The historic and fatal example is that of the Rowlatt Acts, following India's great sacrifices in the war, and the action of Sir Michael O'Dwyer and General Dyer in the Punjab, which was the reply of the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy to the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. But it must be plainly stated that the barbarous cruelties and humiliations which have often attended English colonial government are not peculiar to it. Not only do they occur, sometimes in a more extreme form, in the colonial administration of every other white Power, but they have been greatly exceeded by the abuses of which Japan was guilty in Korea and England in Ireland, and something not unlike them is still to be met with in Europe in the relation between rulers and ruled, especially where alien peoples are being oppressed.


¹ Article 180.

For the past hundred and fifty years England's policy has been an Eastern policy. The aim pursued with increasingly conscious deliberation has been the establishment of great lines of communication northwards from Capetown right through Africa to the Mediterranean and thence eastwards to China and Australia. To defend these great lines England strove to gain possession of all important strategic positions on the great sea routes. With the coming of the steamship, her immense coal supplies at home and her coaling stations on all the seas ensured England's continued mastery. The decisive wars which she fought to a successful conclusion with rare tenacity, were all in defence of her Eastern possessions. Her first rival, France, was disposed of by the Battle of Trafalgar and the victory over Napoleon, who had become especially dangerous on account of his schemes in Egypt and the Levant. The following decades were devoted to the struggle with Russia for influence in Asia, until the Anglo-Japanese alliance secured the desired object of undermining Russian prestige. In the succeeding decade Germany threatened to drive a wedge between English possessions through her influence on the Baghdad railway, and once more England resisted successfully and destroyed her opponent. Just because she was so deeply concerned with Asia, England could pursue a peaceful policy in Europe. Bismarck's Imperialism aimed at an extension of territory on the European continent; Disraeli countered it with an Asiatic Imperialism which found expression in the proclamation of the Indian Empire. And at the same time England was clever enough not only to avoid the mere appearance of that brutality which was inseparable from Bismarck's policy, but actually to accomplish her vast conquests with relatively small means. The assertion that India was conquered for England by the Indians themselves is largely true. And since that day Indian soldiers and other colonials have fought Britain's battles in the East. Perhaps the best examples in recent years are the conquest of the Sudan, mainly by Egyptian troops, and the fact that the Sudanese deficit has been met with the money of the Egyptian taxpayers. The ancient maxim of government, *divide et impera*, has been applied by the English with masterly skill. They always knew how to adapt a flexible policy to a new situation.

After the World War the great importance of air communications was realised. Just as in the past England had aimed at acquiring strategic positions on the sea routes, so now she strove to secure suitable stations for future aircraft. The development of air communications brought the separate parts of the Empire nearer together and made it possible to exercise a more rapid and effective control. At the same time aircraft proved useful in warlike action against tribes on the edge of the desert or in difficult country, and made warfare easier and more economical. Recent years had seen a revolution in shipping, for oil replaced coal as a source of power and heat. This destroyed the importance of England's coaling-stations, and she turned her policy to the acquisition of oil-wells and the possession of pipe-lines to the sea.

This systematic Oriental policy of England's is without parallel. We may, therefore, reasonably use it as a guide in tracing the effects of Western civilisation on the East. It is true, something similar was effected by France in the Levant and Indo-China, by the United States in Eastern Asia, and by Holland in Java; by introducing European habits of life and thought they gave the initial impulse to a fundamental change in the culture and economic systems with which they came in contact. Not only did England's intervention, however, affect by far the largest number of Orientals, but it was a far more powerful influence than that of other States. Its effect was both cultural and economic.

Its primary economic effect was to break up and destroy native craft industry and traditional methods of production. It was a process like that which went on in Europe in the early days of capitalism, when factory production ousted home labour and guild organisation, leading for several decades to new and widespread penury and actually to a reduced output of labour. The first European efforts at colonisation by the Spanish and Portuguese were haphazard and akin to piracy. But in those days the colonisers traded with the alien peoples as economic and cultural equals. There was no essential difference between the two parties; indeed the Europeans looked with admiration upon the ancient culture and the seemingly immeasurable wealth of Asiatic courts. The English were the first to introduce the



MAP VI.—INDIA AS THE PIVOT OF BRITISH ORIENTAL POLICY.

epoch of systematic colonisation, and felt themselves vastly superior to the alien peoples, conscious of their knowledge, their energy, and their gift for organisation. Instead of aiming at chance piratical wealth through the seizure of gold and jewels, they formed trading companies; their representatives on the spot were invested with the authority of the State, and it was their duty to provide large dividends by means of systematic exploitation. Policy was wholly subordinate to economic interests. Among the worst examples are the notorious Opium Wars waged by England against China.

It was not till the middle of the nineteenth century that a change came about in methods of colonisation. Under Liberal influence economic exploitation was confined within reasonable limits, technical improvements and modern machinery were introduced in the colonies, and the first steps were taken in organising education and sanitation. Colonial administration was no longer regarded as a means of the speediest and most unscrupulous enrichment; people talked, rather, of the task entrusted to the white man of educating and elevating the colonial peoples, of the white man's burden, of European trusteeship on behalf of the natives. But it was precisely this change which created between the races a gulf of arrogance and hatred unknown in previous centuries. In the twentieth century, when Capitalism entered its Imperialist phase, there was a return to unrestricted exploitation, and the Liberal principles of an earlier day remained simply as a threadbare disguise. But meanwhile the most progressive and vigorous Oriental races had begun to assimilate the European economic system; they resisted Europe by her own methods.

In the seventeenth century the cotton industry had established itself in Manchester. But as commerce developed between England and India, English materials were ousted by Indian textiles produced by old traditional methods with all the beauty and delicacy of Oriental taste. Indian competition threatened the British industry in all its markets. Only the invention of new machinery enabled the mills of Lancashire to produce more plentifully and cheaply and better in quality. England's cotton output soon outstripped the older woollen industry, and after the Napoleonic Wars cotton began to be exported on an increasing scale to India

and other Eastern countries. Within a few decades this had destroyed India's once flourishing spinning and weaving trades, which could not compete with the cheapness and technical equipment of modern industry. Millions of hand workers were ruined and disappeared. India was transformed into a purely agricultural country, and her people lived perpetually on the verge of starvation. But the rise of English industry, the technical inventions and their exploitation on such a scale, had been rendered possible by the very wealth which had come from India to England in the eighteenth century. Thus colonial exploitation had made large-scale industry possible, and that, in turn, needed markets. To gain wider and wider markets required a perpetually augmented industrial capacity.

The European Powers regarded their colonial possessions as the basis of their trade and industry. In Asia and Africa they found the necessary raw materials, and thither they exported their cheap mass production. Transport between the mother country and her colonies was provided by her own ships, and this was a fresh source of profit. To open up colonial territories, to build railways, and supply machinery, the mother country had to invest large capital sums in Asia and Africa. She received considerable profits in return, and, moreover, an increase in political power, since it was necessary to guarantee the safety of the capital invested and the interests of the capitalists. Again, the colonies offered a wide field of highly paid activity to the sons of the ruling class, and this profited the mother country, for when these officials returned home they continued to draw their pensions from the colonies.

According to a statement issued on January 1st, 1916, Great Britain had £3,836,104,000 invested abroad, and of this £1,935,740,000 was in her own colonies. Of the new capital investments subscribed in London in 1921, £276 millions went to the United Kingdom itself, £90 millions to the colonies, and only £22 millions to foreign lands. Amongst the countries which receive British exports, India stood first in 1922 and the following year. Of imported cotton, so vital to English industry, 6,703,047 centals (of 100 lb.) came from the United States in 1923, 3,486,322 centals from Egypt and the Sudan, and 1,085,375 centals from British India. England is trying

to make herself less dependent on American imports by enlarging the cotton-planting area in the British Sudan. In the matter of wheat imports, so essential to England, the Empire is also rendering great service. Imports from Canada and Australia are already increasing, and together they exceeded imports from the United States in 1923; the Canadian supply alone far exceeds imports from Argentina. It is hoped to obtain wheat from Mesopotamia when large irrigation works have been completed. Almost all imports of oil, raw rubber, and raw wool come from British possessions or spheres of influence; oil is obtained from Persia, whence its transport is assured by English influence in Mesopotamia.

Great Britain's largest export is cotton goods, which reached a total value of more than £138 millions in 1923. India is her best customer, with Egypt and China standing second and third. India is also Britain's best customer for exported iron and steel goods and machinery. It will be readily understood, therefore, that the development of India's own cotton and steel industries, and especially their protection by import duties, is a menace to British industry.

Oriental countries are slowly beginning to resist exploitation by European States. Some of their leaders dream of a return to former conditions. The ugliness of cheap European imports fills their hearts with a yearning for the products of native industry, harmonising in their beauty and dignity with their setting in the country and its traditions. Many a Western romantic has felt a kindred yearning for the Middle Ages in contrast with the ugliness and chaos of modern labour. There is a demand for the boycott of European goods and the introduction of high protective tariffs. But a return to the old village handicraft industry is impossible. Instead, a native industry on the European capitalist model is developing on all sides in the East. We meet it in Egypt and India, in China and Japan. As in Europe in the early days of capitalism, it has brought many evils in its train. Wages are exceedingly low and hours of labour very long. There are still many abuses associated with factory labour in the East which have been abolished in Europe. On that account the output of labour is poor; the workers are not strong enough or skilled enough to produce goods of high quality. The great manufacturing towns of Japan only

turn out cheap mass production. But slowly men are coming to realise that labour conditions must be rationally organised and that technical and trade instruction must be developed.

In agriculture, too, modern methods are penetrating. In India Agricultural Co-operative Societies were introduced in 1904, particularly for purposes of credit. In 1915 there were 17,000 of these societies, and by 1921 there were as many as 42,582 Agricultural Co-operatives, in addition to 1,559 Central Co-operatives and 3,822 societies other than agricultural, with a total membership of 1,757,000 and capital amounting to nearly £18 millions. Industries on a large scale were soon established by the natives themselves, for European capital had no confidence in their capacity. Native banks appeared likewise, with the object of attaining independence of the great banks supported by European capital, whose activities profited none but Europeans. In 1921 there were in India 280 cotton mills with 6,652,000 spindles, and 78 flax mills with 870,000 spindles. Articles of European manufacture penetrate to the remotest villages all over the East. Sewing-machines, gramophones, and paraffin lamps have become indispensable articles of household use. After the war the number of motor-cars in all Eastern countries increased enormously, and the Sheikhs of desert tribes on the frontiers of Mesopotamia inspect their herds of camels in motor-cars.

European industry profits by these new demands from the East. But it watches the rise of native competitors with the utmost disgust. Perhaps one of the most serious charges that can be brought against England's government of India lies in the fact that she has systematically injured Indian industry for her own benefit, that she has hampered the rise of native industry and utterly neglected technical education. When in the latter half of the nineteenth century a native cotton industry began to develop in India, all import duties on cheap English cotton goods were removed in 1877. When in 1896 it became necessary for fiscal reasons to re-introduce an import duty of $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., it was, indeed, imposed, but at the same time an excise duty, equal in amount, was imposed on all home-produced cotton goods. At the time of the World War, the policy hitherto pursued of hampering and damaging Indian industry began to prove a

menace to the cause of Imperial defence, and it was only then that the authorities began to meet the Indian demand for a tariff policy framed in Indian rather than English interests. Even at the end of the nineteenth century so moderate an Indian leader as Ranade had declared that the political domination of one country by another made far more stir than the much more dangerous but less noticeable domination exercised by the capitalist enterprise and ability of one country over the trade and industry of another. The latter, he said, exercises a more lasting influence, drying up the springs of all the various activities which together make up the life of a nation.

In 1905 the Indian National Congress called into being an annual industrial conference. Students were sent to Japan to learn the technical methods of modern industry. A number of small industries sprang up, though many collapsed within a year or so. But the movement itself made headway in all countries. The industrialisation of the East and the introduction of the methods and outlook of capitalist economy began on all sides, and we may question whether it is now possible to check the process, even if it were desirable. The incipient protectionist policy in India in the interest of native industry is hastening development on these lines. In 1917 the import duty on cotton goods was raised to 7½ per cent., whilst the excise duty remained as before, and in 1921 the import duty was fixed at 11 per cent. Finally, in 1925, the excise duty on native cotton goods was abolished. There were exhibitions of native goods in order to promote the purchase of home products. Individualism took the place of the former collectivist outlook of the Oriental, bound by inheritance to his craft and his caste. The spiritual unrest of this period of change and transition found expression in the economic sphere, as elsewhere.

One of the most remarkable native industrial establishments on the European model is the famous Tata Ironworks in India. A Parsee from Bombay, Jamsetji Tata, who had already set up cotton mills, and in Mysore a silk industry on the Japanese model, resolved during a visit to the United States in 1902 to start a native steel and iron industry in India. He turned to England in the first instance to obtain the necessary capital, but met with refusals on all sides. Then

he turned to his own fellow-countrymen. Within a short time he had secured the capital, and in 1912, after his death, his two sons were able to initiate the Tata Iron and Steel Company as an exclusively Indian concern. An American firm erected the buildings. The works are in the neighbourhood of plentiful sources of coal and ore. Originally the company was obliged to employ European engineers and managers, but they are being slowly replaced by Indians trained abroad. The works employ 45,000 men. They are surrounded by their own town with over 100,000 inhabitants, a modern Oriental industrial town, similar to those in Japan, called Jamsetpur in honour of the original founder. During the war this factory produced the material for the railways in Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, and East Africa. In 1915 the Tata Works carried out the necessary construction for the water-power which was to supply Bombay with electricity. Like the Japanese and Chinese, the new Indian captains of industry seek to acquire concessions in other Eastern countries. They give liberal donations for the endowment of technical instruction, and the industrial and scientific development of the country. Under European influence the East has entered upon a new economic era which involves a complete break with the former conditions handed down from the past. New developments in the social and political spheres proceed together and in turn provoke reactions which, imitating European models in rapid succession, open the door to new possibilities.

Even more important than the economic effect of Europe's activities was the influence of the West upon Eastern culture and thought. At the outset European civilisation stood higher than ever before. The middle class, with its characteristic capitalistic economic system and its doctrine of liberal nationalism, had just come into power; it was young and full of great ideas, and it had faith in the future. Personal freedom had been won after a prolonged intellectual and political struggle, and in England the great Reform Act of 1832 had opened the door to democracy; on the continent liberal and rationalist ideas were being revived, and establishing themselves together with the claims of the new democratic nationalism. Freedom of conscience had been proclaimed, and thorough reforms effected in the domain of

constitutional and criminal law. At the same time poetry, philosophy, and science burst into new life in the more important countries, and reached circles where hitherto they had been a closed book. New discoveries and inventions gave promise of a future of unceasing progress. The age pulsed with an unsubdued spirit of hope. People seemed to forget that only a few decades back religious persecutions had flourished, and the burning of witches, torture and a barbarous criminal law, the ignorance of the masses and in particular of women. They regarded the Eastern peoples, amongst whom these things still persisted, with unconcealed scorn.

It is easy to understand that the Orientals, who came into contact with this European civilisation, regarded it as something new and superior, something to aspire to in their own lives. The natural conservatism of every civilisation, especially those which had been bound for centuries by the trammels of tradition, led the East to resist such influence, or any change. Nevertheless, it came about inevitably from the natural intercourse of everyday life. In those countries which first came in touch with Europe, like Egypt and India, there were signs of an assimilation to Western civilisation even in the nineteenth century. The more distant lands, and the great mass of the people even in countries open to European penetration, remained unaffected by the movement right into the twentieth century. But recent years give proof that it is already penetrating to the depths, though no longer in the naïve form in which the process of assimilation first appeared; already there is an element of criticism and the peoples are aware of their own individuality, for the very process of assimilation aroused national consciousness in the most influential circles subject to its action, and a repudiation of conscious assimilation was the result.

This first process of assimilation among the upper classes of Eastern peoples may, perhaps, be compared with the case of the "Westernisers" among the educated Russians in the early nineteenth century, and at the same period that of the rationalist intellectuals among the Eastern Jews. The first Orientals to come under the intellectual influence of the West belonged one and all to the upper classes. They made it their aim to familiarise their countrymen with Western science

and Western achievements, through education and by translating and distributing the most important Western books; they strove also to carry through religious, political, and social reforms in order to assimilate the mediæval life of the East to nineteenth-century Europe. They visited Europe and told their experiences when they returned home. They sent their sons to English and French Universities. In their daily life they imitated Western customs and adopted them in their institutions and their public life.

It was the Indians who initiated this process of transformation under the influence of England's educational methods introduced into India in 1835, as described above. In this matter the Hindus were far ahead of the Indian Mohammedans. At that time the Mohammedan religion had fallen into a state of putrefaction, and it was regarded as unlawful to learn foreign languages or pursue worldly knowledge, in sharp contrast to the custom of past centuries. Slowly, however, Western influence produced even in Islam an adaptation to changed circumstances. For instance, the Mohammedan religion forbids the faithful to take interest, but the Mufti of Egypt, Mohammed Abdu, devised means to proclaim in a learned Fetwa that the taking of interest and the drawing of dividends was lawful and permissible. This enabled the Egyptian peasants to make use of savings banks. Similarly in Turkey and Persia the new political institutions of democracy have been interpreted as things ordained by religious principle, and have often been declared to be a reversion to the original principles of Islam. The issue of interest-bearing Government bonds in Constantinople was declared permissible under canonical law, just as had happened in Egypt. Learned Ulemas pronounced judgment and proved by quotations from the Koran and from early authorities that the study of foreign languages and worldly knowledge was lawful.

The cultural influence of the West found its chief expression in the adoption of political institutions and the acquisition of European languages. Here, too, India was in the vanguard. Liberal English politicians could point to the fact that, though the British Empire was not based upon racial homogeneity, it had instead a unity of culture and language. The Parliament at Westminster, the Mother

of Parliaments, was regarded as a model for all colonial Parliaments. Customs developed through the tradition of centuries, and often meaningless when separated from that tradition, were copied in minute detail. Whenever a question of procedure or ceremonial was disputed, the custom obtaining at Westminster was taken as a precedent. Official terminology, legal language, and the formalities observed are everywhere the same in the British Empire. English education has introduced the English language among a numerically small class of Indians, but it is the only class that counts in intellectual and public life. English is the language of the Indian National Congress, and of the most influential publications and newspapers of the Indian national movement. It is the language which all educated Indians understand. It has not obtained such widespread acceptance as in Ireland, but it was well on the way there, and with it the whole of English literature began to permeate Indian thought. The vernacular languages were neglected in the schools. Students come from all the colonies and from many Oriental countries to study at the older English Universities. In 1923 the English Universities counted 1,171 African students, 1,401 from Asia, 765 from America, and 253 from Australia. Of these 1,094 came from India and Ceylon, and 298 from Egypt. The number of negroes who receive their education at English Universities is constantly increasing. The customs of Oxford and Cambridge and the peculiarities which have sprung from the tradition of centuries are imitated in the Colonial Universities, just as English parliamentary procedure is imitated in Montreal or Delhi. The sports which occupy so important a place in English life are pursued with equal ardour in the colonies.

It seemed, therefore, in the second half of the nineteenth century that the assimilation of East to West was a process no longer to be checked. It is true that it affected only a small number of the highest classes among the Oriental peoples, but from them it permeated wider and wider circles, and this process was assisted by the rise of the middle class and the development of capitalism and the professions. How far the assimilation was merely superficial, or how far it really tended to blot out the profound differences of race and tradition, was a question to which careful observers at

the beginning of the twentieth century gave various answers. But it is a fact that the progress of the Oriental peoples towards modern nationalism led through a phase of assimilation. The whole idea and character of the modern nationalist movement and policy were borrowed from the West and first struck root in those circles where the process of assimilation to European customs had gone farthest. Oriental nationalism arose as a retort to European nationalism. "By her very contact with her masters, India learned to know herself in the very act of resisting them," says Professor Demangeon. We must not forget, however, that it is not merely a question of absorption, but of a transforming process not very long completed in Europe itself.

Let us trace the most important stages in this process of assimilation, in the testimony of several Indian Mohammedans; something like it took place in all Eastern countries. The Indian Mohammedans resisted Western influence longer than the Hindus. That is why the nationalist movement first arose among the Hindus of Bengal. On the other hand, the Indian Mohammedans under English influence were in advance of their co-religionists in Western Asia and Russia.

The movement in favour of assimilation had two sources: one was a practical need; it was felt in influential circles that an approach to the West would be politically and socially advantageous, and that enlightenment and reform were prerequisites of rational progress in industry and essential to the acquisition of power in modern times; secondly, and of later date perhaps, was the longing of youth to escape from the death-like torpor of Oriental culture to the new and enticing fields of European literature and science. The older generation did not wish to go so far, but nevertheless they had struck out a path for the younger men, though they protested when the succeeding generation proceeded further along it than they had originally intended to go. The Europeans, too, encouraged assimilation in its early stages, for they saw that they would find allies in the liberal and enlightened members of the upper classes. It was not till the succeeding generation, as a result of further assimilation to the European outlook, turned hostile to them that they began to doubt the wisdom of encouraging the process.

A statement made by Nawab Abdul Latif Khan Bahadur

in 1861 is characteristic of the earlier phase of assimilation. If any language could be of value to a student in India, he said, it was English. Moreover, many and obvious political advantages would accrue both to the Mohammedans and the Government, if the former should learn English. The English-educated Mohammedan could understand the Government's good intentions. He would grasp the strength and intelligence, the perseverance and power of the British people. His devotion to the Government would be well grounded. He could not be led astray, and nobody would try to lead him astray. He would know that security for life and property depended upon British rule, and would therefore condemn all attempts by his ignorant and misguided countrymen to overthrow it. He would do everything in his power to convince all with whom he came in contact of the benefits of British rule.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan is a typical reformer of this first generation. He sprang from an aristocratic Mohammedan family that had come with the conquerors at the time of the Mohammedan subjugation of India. His forbears, as also his father and uncle, had held important positions at the court of the Great Moghul in Delhi, where he himself was born in 1817. He received a good Mohammedan education, and later he published valuable treatises upon Indian antiquities. He learned English late and imperfectly, so that when he entered the Government service as a judge he could only occupy subordinate posts. During the Mutiny in 1857 he adhered faithfully to the English Government. Later he directed his efforts to introducing modern education among the Mohammedans in order to counteract their prejudices and their narrow religious fanaticism. He hoped, too, that it would lead to a better understanding between the English and their Mohammedan subjects in India. Like all reformers and apostles of enlightenment during this phase, he thought that suitable education would cure all ills. He therefore founded a scientific society in Aligarh in 1864, with the object of translating Western scientific books into the vernacular, so as to make them accessible to the broad masses in the East. He himself began to write a commentary on the Bible in Urdu, his own mother tongue. Five years later he was able to accomplish his desire and visit England with his

two sons; his elder son remained behind to study at Cambridge, and was afterwards called to the Bar in London. He hoped thus to see his son enjoy what he himself had failed to attain, a real grasp of the English language and English culture. He wrote letters home telling of his visit to England in order to give his countrymen an idea of the greatness of European civilisation. The following utterance is characteristic: "The result of all this is that although I do not absolve the English in India of discourtesy, and of looking upon the natives of that country as animals and beneath contempt, I think they do so from not understanding us; and I am afraid I must confess that they are not far wrong in their opinion of us. Without flattering the English, I can truly say that the natives of India, high and low, merchants and petty shopkeepers, educated and illiterate, when contrasted with the English in education, manners, and uprightness, are as like them as a dirty animal is to an able and handsome man. The English have reason for believing us in India to be imbecile brutes. . . . What I have seen and seen daily, is utterly beyond the imagination of a native of India. . . . All good things, spiritual and worldly, which should be found in man, have been bestowed by the Almighty on Europe, and especially on England."¹ He attributes this progress mainly to universal education. A servant girl in England, he said, was better educated than ladies in the best society in India.

At the same time Syed Ahmed Khan never wavered in his religious convictions. Whilst he was in London he wrote a series of articles on Mohammed in defence of his faith. But whilst he wished to cling to essentials, it was his aim to break down the rigidity which had come upon Islam in recent centuries. On his return he began to bring out a paper under the title of *Mohammedan Social Reformer*, in which he sought to refute his co-religionists' prejudices against the study of foreign languages and worldly knowledge, basing his argument upon the Koran and the early history of Islam. For nine years he continued in his course, meeting with the most violent opposition, and was thus the first to make a breach in the isolation and rigidity of Islam.

¹ *The Life and Work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.* By G. F. I. Graham Hodder and Stoughton, 1909, p. 125.

He promoted his schemes primarily by spreading enlightenment and education amongst Indian Mohammedans. First he founded a "Committee for the better Dissemination and Encouragement of Education amongst Indian Mohammedans," which developed later into the famous Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh, on the model of the English colleges. This institution was designed to give a liberal education to the sons of the Mohammedan aristocracy, and enable them to realise the ideal of an English gentleman whilst retaining their loyalty to their ancestral religion. The college, therefore, endeavoured to impart a thorough knowledge of English and also to teach Arabic literature and Mohammedan theology. Outwardly the manner of life at Cambridge served as a model, except in so far as the Mohammedan religion required some modification; it was at Cambridge that Syed Ahmed Khan's son had studied, and thence came the Principals of the college. Athletic sports were fostered as they are in England, the pupils boarded at the school, and the relation between them and the teachers, as well as their unions and debates, were based on similar institutions in England. True to the spirit of the founder, the boys at the college were educated in an atmosphere of loyalty to British rule. When the Viceroy of India visited the school in 1884 Syed Ahmed Khan presented an address in which he said that, among the many blessings that British rule had conferred upon India, none in his opinion was greater than the introduction of a system of education based upon Western methods calculated to promote the moral and intellectual progress of the native population. The educational policy of the Indian Government, laid down some fifty years previously, and eternally linked with the great name of Lord Macaulay, had since registered successes unparalleled in world history. When the foundation stone of the college was laid in 1877 Syed Ahmed Khan had said to Lord Lytton that when he was no longer with them the college would continue to flourish and successfully train his countrymen in that same love for England, that same sentiment of loyalty to the British Government, that same recognition of its benefits, as had constituted the guiding principle of his own life. In 1903 the college had 703 students, including 531 boarders.

Syed Ahmed Khan had justly observed that it was the English educational policy introduced by Lord Macaulay which had given the impulse to new development, not only in India but throughout the East. In 1917 at a conference in Simla on the substitution of vernacular languages for English in the schools, Rai Sita Nath Ray declared himself vehemently opposed to the proposal. Did they wish, he said, to plunge the country once more into the darkness which reigned when Lord Macaulay came, whose great educational policy helped to dispel it? Lord Macaulay had laid the foundation for the rational educational policy that had done so much to spread the culture, the enlightenment, and the science of the West. They owed Lord Macaulay profound gratitude for the courage and perseverance with which he persisted in making English, and English alone, the medium of instruction throughout the country.

But the course of evolution did not halt where the first generation of the apostles of enlightenment would have liked. In a twofold direction the action of Western education was other than Syed Ahmed Khan had wished and assumed. In spite of the Western education which he held to be necessary and inevitable, he wished to preserve the Oriental religious spirit and the Oriental way of life. It has taken only a few decades to prove that this is impossible. Western influence disintegrated the very foundations upon which the ancient traditional life rested. Syed Ahmed Khan had hoped that Western education would confirm the existing political and social order, British rule and the authority of the native aristocratic leadership. But the spirit of criticism and revolt, penetrating from the West, spared no authority. And thus the early educational movement did not lead to gradual reform, as its protagonists had hoped, and to an organic assimilation of new influences with a living and continuous tradition, but rather to a period of rapid transition and restless doubt, and to a sharp break with the past.

Hitherto, the peoples of the East, Mohammedans, Indians, and Chinese, had attached the utmost value to classical education, indeed they had recognised no other kind as education at all. Education, or scholarship, meant absorption in classical literature and philosophy, their further development and interpretation; all else was technical study

and practical skill. The same position had obtained in Europe a few centuries earlier. But now the most advanced section in the East, like the revolutionaries and Nihilists in Russia in the middle of the nineteenth century, began to strive first and foremost for useful knowledge and technical training. The liberal Turkish journal *Turk*, which appeared in Cairo, urged people to send their children to Europe, where they might learn something useful, instead of building Koran schools. The reactionary character of the existing religions, and particularly of the priests, was vehemently censured. Thus the Russian Tatar Mohammed Fatih wrote in 1904: "In my humble opinion the precepts of the Koran can easily be brought to conform with culture and civilisation. But unhappily there are no Ulemas living in our day capable of inspiring Islam and reconciling it with civilisation. The Ulemas of to-day occupy themselves with outward forms alone; they do not understand the philosophic spirit of Islam, and cannot therefore apply their religion advantageously in practice. Our ignorant clergy expound Islam according to their own ideas, and instead of benefiting they injure us. You Europeans have strained every nerve and rescued your religion from the guidance of ignorant popes and priests, and have spread the light in your midst. Your faith is in your own hands, your conscience is free, and your minds are enlightened, whilst our religion is still dominated by priests. Until we follow your example and escape by our own efforts from the grip of the mollahs, abandoning empty formalities, our decadence is inevitable."

Thus in the early years of the twentieth century the East began to free itself from the universal domination of religion and its official representatives, just as Western Christendom had done in the eighteenth century, and Judaism in the nineteenth. The Press was a powerful ally in the struggle; especially in India, as well as in Turkey and Egypt, it rapidly rose in importance in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The process of rationalisation and enlightenment necessarily brought a certain religious apathy in its train. The ancient forms were partly retained, but in their hearts men regarded them with indifference. Religion had ceased to be the universal foundation of life, no fervour breathed in it, it had become an obligation of piety and decency. The

Algerian Mohammedan Ismael Hamet has described this transition state. European scepticism, he said, was influencing the Mohammedans of Algeria. They had retained a certain attachment to the outward forms of worship, but they were strangers to the morbid and devious byways of religious emotion. They did not abjure their religion, but they never dreamed of converting those who did not hold it; they wished to impart it to their children, but they were unconcerned for the salvation of their own brothers. Their condition was not yet one of unbelief, it was not free thought, but it was apathy.

At this point of transition, the road divided. In one direction lay complete agnosticism and atheism, as represented by numerous young Turks, young Egyptians, and young Chinese, though political considerations have sometimes prevented their acknowledging it in public. Here, too, we find as a product of transition the *grands seigneurs* who mocked at religion in their hearts, but always professed it in public. Thus Khuda Bukhsh wrote that he had been acquainted with a gentleman who professed the Mohammedan faith and owed his success in life to his religion. But although his outward conduct was in accordance with all the precepts of Islam, it turned out that he expressed opinions regarding his religion and its founder which even Voltaire would have repudiated indignantly.

In the other direction lay a liberal and rationalist theology. Its most eminent representative among the Indian Mohammedans is Syed Amir Ali, a leading authority on the subject of Mohammedan law. He succeeded Syed Ahmed Khan as advocate and leader of his co-religionists, whose political rights he defended in unwavering loyalty to the British Government. His books on the doctrines and ethics of Islam and on the Prophet Mohammed revive the rationalist tradition of the early decades of the Mohammedan era. A number of Mohammedans, pre-eminent among them S. Khuda Bukhsh, are striving to preach a pure Islamic doctrine stripped of all superstitious notions and formalism. "Nothing was more distant from the Prophet's thought than to fetter the mind or to lay down fixed, immutable, unchanging laws for his followers. The Qu'ran is a book of guidance to the faithful and not, to be sure, an obstacle in the path of

their social, moral, legal, and intellectual progress. . . . Is Islam hostile to progress? I will emphatically answer this question in the negative. Islam, stripped of its theology, is a perfectly simple religion. Its cardinal principle is belief in one God and belief in Mohamed as his apostle. The rest is mere accretion, superfluity."¹

Thus there arose a liberal and simplified Islam, like liberal and simplified Christianity and Judaism, fundamentally in harmony with the intellectual outlook, the progress, and the knowledge of the age.

But this transforming process made its mark alike upon religion and in all spheres of life and conduct. The generation which was torn from its moorings in tradition and snatched up by the tornado of new influences showed the typical aspect of a society in transition. These people were unsettled; they stood in the borderland between two worlds and two eras, akin to both but nowhere at home. Between them and their fathers a gulf yawned, bridged by no mutual understanding. The fathers regarded the ways of their sons with misunderstanding and disapproval. For the sons the conditions under which their fathers lived constituted the enemy that must be vanquished. The past was falling gradually into oblivion, and the future was not yet fully grasped. These transitional types had many unattractive qualities; their instability of mind, their inability to distinguish the essential from the unessential, their capacity to adapt themselves to outward forms without being able at the same time to evolve to a deeper harmony, all these were repellent features. Family life degenerated; respect for the head of the family decayed along with all respect for authority, subjected to the test of a critical spirit. The position of women was fundamentally changed; nowhere has the new spirit of freedom so thoroughly broken the fetters of the past as in women's education and participation in public life. In this period of transition the rising generation found a basis of stability neither in spiritual tradition nor in the existing economic system. Socially, too, they were blown hither and thither by every wind. With their rationalist outlook and in their unsettled state they easily became doctrinaire.

¹ *Essays: Indian and Islamic.* By S. Khuda Bukhsh, Probsthain. 1912, pp. 20 and 284.

The rising generation assimilated European teaching with astonishing receptivity. They quickly became nationalists, democrats, and socialists. Cavour, Mazzini, Kossuth, Parnell, and Mill became their teachers and heroes. The English Government forbade European history of the nineteenth century to be taught in Indian schools. But already it was too late. The process could no longer be checked, and at this point it soon took a new turn. A more intimate acquaintance with European culture had been attained, and it was no longer accepted uncritically. Doubts arose concerning Europe, and her arrogance gave offence. People became aware of their own ambiguous position. They aspired once more to harmony with the East. By the process of assimilation and through a nationalist outlook copied from Europe, a new Oriental social consciousness came into being. The European writers who themselves criticised Europe—Ruskin, Carlyle, Tolstoi, and others—played their part. Even so discreet a friend of Europe as Khuda Bukhsh writes: "We have adopted European costume, European ways of living, even the European vices of drinking and gambling, but none of their virtues. . . . We must learn at the feet of Europe but not at the sacrifice of our Eastern individuality. But this is precisely what we have not done. We have dabbled a little in English and European history, and we have commenced to despise our religion, our literature, our history, our traditions. We have unlearned the lessons of our history and our civilisation, and in their place we have secured nothing solid and substantial to hold society fast in the midst of endless changes."¹ And so the rising generation in the East is faced with the task of reconstruction.


The West, and England in particular, brought the East to the threshold of a new era in the nineteenth century. The whites brought with them their notions of justice, order, and industry. According to their ideas there has doubtless been immense progress in the East of recent years. But at the same time life lost much of its charm for the people of Asia. It has become monotonous and subject to rule. It is regulated by principles which they do not acknowledge, principles whose action, though possibly useful, strikes them as lacking in beauty. An Englishman and a Frenchman, Meredith Towns-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

end and Louis Bertrand, both intimately acquainted with the East, have stressed this point of view which most Europeans ignore. Not only did Western civilisation destroy the beauty of life in the East, it also drained it of the personal element. Life had formerly been fuller and richer; human relations, as, for instance, those between a ruler and his subjects, had been more direct. Countless ordinances have complicated life. Seeking to eliminate chance, they have destroyed romance.

Many of these antitheses now appearing between East and West are the outcome of profound differences of race and climate and age of civilisations. Meredith Townsend concludes that, since the races and the worlds they live in are so far asunder, they must remain for ever alien and without mutual understanding. Europe's efforts of the past hundred and fifty years to dominate and assimilate Asia, to dominate her too in the spiritual sphere, will be no more than a passing phase in the thousands of years of human history; they will pass over Asia like so many other phases, like the Crusades, and leave no profound traces behind. Nor will the English hold India. In this vast sea of brown-skinned people they are no more than the crew of a ship which sails past, puts into port, and leaves hardly any memories of its sojourn when it proceeds on its voyage. What is this British Empire in India?

"Above this inconceivable mass of humanity, governing all, protecting all, taxing all, rises what we call here 'the Empire,' a corporation of less than fifteen hundred men . . . who are set to govern, and who protect themselves in governing by finding pay for a minute white garrison of 65,000 men . . . less than the army of Sweden, or Belgium, or Holland. That corporation and that garrison constitute the 'Indian Empire.' . . . Banish those fifteen hundred men in black, defeat that slender garrison in red, and the Empire has ended, the structure disappears, the brown India emerges unchanged and unchangeable. To support the official world and its garrison . . . there is, except Indian opinion, absolutely nothing. Not only is there no white race in India, not only is there no white colony, but there is no white man who purposes to remain. . . . No ruler stays there to help, or criticise, or moderate his successor. No successful white soldier founds a family. No white man who makes a



MAP. VII.—OIL-FIELDS IN THE EAST.

fortune builds a house or buys an estate for his descendants. The very planter, the very engine-driver, the very foreman of works, departs before he is sixty, leaving no child, or house, or trace of himself behind. No white man takes root in India, and the number even of sojourners is among those masses imperceptible. The whites in our own three capitals could hardly garrison them, and outside those capitals there are, except in Government employ, only a few planters, traders, and professional men, far fewer than the black men in London. In a city like Benares, a stone city whose buildings rival those of Venice, a city of temples and palaces, beautiful and original enough to be a world's wonder, yet in which no white man's brain or hand has designed or executed anything, a traveller might live a year talking only with the learned or the rich, and, unless he had official business to do might never see a white face. And . . . it is so everywhere. There are no white servants, not even grooms, no white policemen, no white postmen, no white anything. If the brown men struck for a week, the 'Empire' would collapse like a house of cards, and every ruling man would be starving prisoner in his own house. . . . This absence of white men is said to be due to climate, but even in 'the Hills' no one settles. Englishmen live on the sultry plains of New South Wales; Americans who are only Englishmen a little desiccated, are filling up the steamy plains of Florida; Spaniards have settled as a governing caste throughout the tropical sections of the two Americas . . . but the English, whatever the temptation, will not stay in India. . . . An uncontrollable disgust, an overpowering sense of being aliens inexorably divided from the people of the land, comes upon them, and they glide silently away. It follows that even in the minute official world and the minute garrison nothing is permanent. The Viceroy rules for five years, and departs. The Councillor advises for five years, and departs. The General commands for five years, and departs. The official serves thirty years, probably in ten separate counties, and departs. There is not in India one ruling man whom two generations of Indians have known as a ruling man. Of all that in Europe comes of continuousness, heredity, accumulated personal experience, or the wisdom of old age, there is in India not one trace, nor can there ever be. Imagine if in Europe no Sovereign or

Premier or Commander-in-Chief ever lived six years ! Yet these men, thus shifting, thus changing, do the whole work of legislating, governing, and administering, all that is done in the whole of Europe by all the Sovereigns, all the statesmen, all the Parliaments, all the judges, revenue boards, prefects, magistrates, tax-gatherers, and police officers. They are ' the Empire ' and there is no other."¹

Between these mysteriously alien races there can hardly be love and mutual understanding. Nevertheless, Townsend sees the contrast more sharp and irreconcilable than it actually is. Much is the outcome of the period, the present stage of historical development; much is as it once was in Europe; much has evolved in recent decades in the East, and more will so evolve in coming decades, as it did in Europe. But both, alike the adoption of European ideas and European mechanical inventions and the consciousness of existing contrasts of race and culture, lay bare before mankind the possibility of a great, decisive conflict. In that conflict England feels herself the champion of the white race. The people of the East also regard her in that light. The other white peoples realise the danger. Their differences appear small compared with their common solidarity in this conflict. The white race opposes its own solidarity to the slowly awakening solidarity of the Eastern peoples. It is more deliberate, more far-seeing, more prudent. As early as 1911 the German Professor Georg Wegener declared with emphasis in a lecture on India: " I should like to refute the idea that it would be advantageous to us Germans, if English sovereignty collapsed in India. I believe that the very opposite is true. Ever since Japan's victory over Russia and the consequent awakening of the East, we have been aware that a positive answer to the great question whether the white race and white culture are finally to dominate the earth is nowise so assured as we formerly believed; on the contrary, we still have the really decisive struggle before us. In that struggle all white nations must feel themselves at one, if victory is to be ours. Now it is in India, of all places on the earth, that the superiority of the white over the coloured race is most strikingly demonstrated. If the Asiatics were to succeed

¹ *Asia and Europe*. By Meredith Townsend, Constable, 1901, pp. 85 ff.

in destroying English mastery there, then the position of the whole white race throughout the world would be fatally undermined. We, too, should suffer. Not only in our own colonies, but everywhere else where we aspire as merchants, engineers, investors, and what not to guide and control coloured peoples."

The war of 1914 and the subsequent quarrels among the victorious Allies, especially in their Oriental policy, displayed the dissensions of the white races before Asiatic eyes. And a new factor emerged: Russia. Situated on the borderland of East and West, her people have an admixture of Asiatic blood in their veins. Under Bolshevik leadership she has combated European capitalism and Imperialism, and European thought as it has evolved the since end of the eighteenth century. She finds her natural allies in the East in her struggle against Imperialism and Europe. On the other hand, England is leading the white peoples to a livelier sense of unity. The Washington Conference of 1922 pointed in that direction. At the end of 1924, with the coming into power of the Conservatives in England, a conviction penetrated the influential circles in England, France, Italy, and North America that a menace to the colonial possessions of even a single white Power involved a menace to the predominance of the whole white race. Events in the East since 1919 have caused the European Powers to suppress their mutual jealousies in face of a common danger. They fear a reaction in their own possessions. France, herself anxious on account of Tunis, watched England's action in Egypt with sympathy, and the successes of the Berber Riffi against Spain with apprehension. When the Foreign Secretary visited Rome in December, 1924, he established a united front of England, France, and Italy in the Near East, and on his return he said in the House of Commons, with reference to events in Northern Africa: "At bottom and in the long run the interests of all of us are common interests, whatever possible minor divergencies of opinion may at any moment arise among us."¹ That same month the London *Times* devoted important articles to the colonial possessions of other Powers and the developments and reforms in process there. Discussing the position in the Philippines, it warned the United States

¹ *Hansard*, December 19th, 1924, col. 1472.

against undue haste in granting independence and observed that such a course must have its reactions in the possessions of England and other Powers, so that the problem could not be solved solely with a view to the interests of the United States. About the same time like opinions were expressed in the leading newspapers of other countries. The *Paris Temps* pointed out the possible danger to the United States, England, and France of an alliance between Russia and the Powers of Eastern Asia. In the Near East and on the shores of the Pacific the interests of the white race are inextricably interlinked. Albert Sarraut, who was French Colonial Minister and Governor-General of French Indo-China, pointed out in a speech in February, 1925, that only the co-operation of all white peoples, especially France and England, could avert a great war between Asia and Europe. The matter was of equal interest to France in Indo-China and to Great Britain with her East Indian possessions. Not only was the predominance of the white race in danger, but their culture and their economic system as well. So, too, on the occasion of the Syrian revolt in the autumn of 1925 there was close co-operation between France and England, and early in 1926 England sought an alliance with Italy against a possible menace from Turkey and Russia.

We are nearing the end of an epoch which has lasted for a hundred and fifty years, that of Europe's eastward aggression; during this time people had come to regard European domination in Asia as finally established, equally with her domination of Africa. During this period Asia has learned many things from Europe. Europe has imparted some of her vigour to Asia. She has awakened a new consciousness. The contact of two different worlds has opened a new chapter in the history of mankind. In a sense hitherto unknown, the whole earth's surface has become a stage for this single historical evolution. The very conflict of race has given an impetus to the unification of mankind. Pitted against the solidarity of the white race we find a corresponding solidarity, little more than a presentiment as yet, among the Oriental peoples. But their first meeting is on a common battlefield fertilised by the common ideas and conceptions that they have exchanged.

CHAPTER VI

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE ORIENT

OF all the peoples of Europe two would seem to offer the fairest promise of intellectual and social development: England and Russia. England was the birthplace of middle-class revolution. Russia has been the first to achieve social revolution. These two peoples, so diametrically opposed in their history and character, both live on the outer edge of Europe, always in a certain detachment and seclusion; both would seem to have preserved their primitive vigour and profundity. On the English island the races, civilisations, and languages of Western Europe were fused in a new unity: Celts and Teutons, the Latin habit of mind and Renaissance influences. On the plains of Russia, open on all sides, Eastern Europe was fused with Asia: Slavs and Finns, the Byzantine Church and Mongol hordes. Both peoples have likewise exercised a decisive influence in recent years upon the development of the East: the English approached it from a distance as masters of the seas, the Russians discovered highroads into the heart of Asia which, in turn, was itself encroaching upon Russia.

It is not only geographically that Russia is the borderland between Europe and Asia: she is linked with the inhabitants of Asia by customs and mentality even more than by the character of the countryside and the vast expanses of nature. For centuries Russia was ruled by Asiatic peoples; when she herself became the aggressor she sent her armies eastwards, and southwards where the Turks held sway. Right into the eighteenth century she was as completely cut off from the intellectual life of Europe as India or China. Neither the Renaissance nor the Reformation nor the modern era could make any impression whatever upon this rigidly mediæval structure. Peter I broke down the barrier. He took the first step towards piercing the defences of mediævalism and founding a modern State: he subordinated the Church to the

State and abolished the Patriarchate. At the same time he moved the capital from Asiatic Moscow in the interior, with its Asiatic traditions, to the newly erected St. Petersburg, facing westwards and overlooking the open sea. Following the example of the West at the time of the Reformation, Peter substituted the vernacular as a literary medium for the ancient ecclesiastical language; he introduced a new, simplified alphabet, and replaced the old, stilted literary style by a new style borrowed from life. But his heart was still in the East, and thither he directed his efforts.

The first who made a serious endeavour to lead Russia out of the Middle Ages into the modern world was the German princess, Catherine. Here, too, the change was preceded by profound religious convulsions which caused a schism in the Russian Church at the close of the seventeenth century. Though the cause at issue may seem insignificant, the *raskol* or schism was the first indication of a critical spirit, a revolt against the hitherto intact machinery and unquestioned authority of the Church and the State. Linked with this reformation we find a fanaticism such as makes its appearance in all periods of profound mental disturbance, centring in such movements as the Hlysti (the Flagellants) and later sects of a similar type.

Under Peter I the Europeanising of Russia had been the outcome of a far-seeing policy which sought to substitute an outlet to the Baltic for an outlet to the Black Sea; under Catherine the movement had spread in court circles. Napoleon's campaigns had a similar significance for Russia as for Egypt and Syria, though their action was different, and it was not till afterwards, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, that the Europeanising process began to penetrate further into the educated, propertied classes, themselves very few in numbers. The westernisers in Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century were not unlike the westernisers in India. To them Europe was "the land of holy miracles." In Russia, as in India, popular education was totally neglected and all efforts were directed to the higher education of a narrow class; here, too, education alienated that class from Russian life, so that they preferred European customs and speech, and even liked to live in the West rather than at home. Everything that was Russian

seemed trite, ugly, and barbarous. In Europe they found freedom, beauty, and a spaciousness in life; literature and art and social life were highly developed; and when they were compelled to return to the desolation of existence in Russia, they were homesick for these things. A spirit of critical contempt for tradition necessarily led to revolt against Russian religion and its mediæval, Byzantine forms; Russian thought turned towards secularism under Catherine, and ended in adopting the theories of European materialist philosophy. In spite of their inadequacy, these westernisers laid the foundation of the modern Russia which evolved during the nineteenth century and entered more and more decisively into the European community of nations.

But the westernising movement in Russia called forth a reaction similar to that which appeared at a later date in Asia; people remembered their own traditions, they reverted to religion and to the past, and all this found expression in the Slavophil movement. We come across just such assertions regarding the aberrations of life and civilisation and the truth radiating from the essential culture of the East, as were produced later by the reaction against Europe in India and China. The westernisers gave Russia the empirical and political secular nationalism of a liberal philosophy; the Slavophiles put in its place the romantic nationalism of religious ecstasy tinged with Messianic faith. "To all Slavs the loftiest idea must be that of Slavdom, above freedom or science, education or knowledge," says Danielewski in *Russia and Europe*. "Every great people believes, and must believe, that in them alone is the salvation of the world, that their sole purpose in life is to lead all peoples to that final consummation appointed for all. . . . The immense arrogance of believing that we can and shall say the final word is the pledge of a nation's most exalted destiny," says Dostoevski in his *Diary of a Writer*. The Slavophiles' faith in Russia and her mission in Europe grew to a conviction, analogous to what we find among Asiatic peoples, that the Russian people, young and fresh with their unplumbed depths, would succeed the old, dying civilisation of Europe. The Russian character represented a new and higher cultural type, whose vocation it was to lead mankind and to replace the decaying senility of the Roman-Teutonic world. Like the more recent

nationalism of Asia, Russia's romantic nationalism subjected Europe to its mordant criticism, yet remained exceedingly uncritical of itself and of Russian civilisation. Its words are full of high-sounding promises which it is apt to regard prophetically as realisation and certainty.

The westernising tendency and romantic nationalism in Russia were repeated in Asia, without, however, any influence of the one upon the other. It is a case of similar conditions arising from similar causes. Although the policy of Tsarist Russia was directed more and more decidedly towards Asia, towards Constantinople, Persia, India, and China, yet it exercised no perceptible cultural or intellectual influence upon Asia. Herein Russia differed fundamentally from England, and even from France, as Arminius Vambéry has rightly pointed out in his comparative studies of English and Russian colonising activities in Asia. The Russian Tsarist régime was itself far too Asiatic to be able to influence Asia.

But Russia did intervene decisively in the destiny of Asia and of all coloured peoples at the beginning of the twentieth century: through the Russo-Japanese War. Here was one of the mightiest empires in Europe, perhaps the greatest military Power, which had been ceaselessly engaged for centuries in subduing one Asiatic Khan after another, yet in this war it was vanquished with comparative ease by an Asiatic race, few in numbers. This fact revolutionised the political thinking of the Asiatic and African peoples more than any other event. For the first time it seemed that the victorious advance of the European race had been checked. And so Tsarist Russia proved to be one of the most important allies in the struggle for freedom and the awakening of racial consciousness in the non-European peoples. Though an unwilling ally, she could play the part only because of the muddle and lack of organisation which prevailed in Russia and which is described as "Asiatic."

C. F. Andrews, who has worked in India for many years, gives the following picture of the effect of the Russo-Japanese War upon the peoples of Asia: "At the close of the year 1904 it was clear to those who were watching the political horizon that great changes were impending in the East. Storm-clouds had been gathering thick and fast. The air was full of electricity. The war between Russia and Japan had kept

the surrounding peoples on the tip-toe of expectation. A stir of excitement passed over the North of India. Even the remote villagers talked over the victories of Japan as they sat in their circles and passed round the *hugqa* at night. . . . A Turkish consul of long experience in Western Asia told me that in the interior you could see everywhere the most ignorant peasants 'tingling' with the news. Asia was moved from one end to the other, and the sleep of the centuries was finally broken. . . . A new chapter was being written in the book of the world's history. . . . Delhi . . . was a meeting-point of Hindus and Musulmans, where their opinions could be noted and recorded. . . . The Musulman, as one expected, regarded the reverses of Russia chiefly from the territorial standpoint. These reverses seemed to mark the limit of the expansion of the Christian nations over the world's surface. The Hindus regarded more the inner significance of the event. The old-time glory and greatness of Asia seemed destined to return. The material aggrandisement of the European races at the expense of the East seemed at last to be checked. The whole of Buddha-land from Ceylon to Japan might again become one in thought and life. Hinduism might once more bring forth its old treasures of spiritual culture for the benefit of mankind. Behind these dreams and visions was the one exulting hope—that the days of servitude to the West were over and the day of independence had dawned. Much had gone before to prepare the way for such a dawn of hope: the Japanese victories made it, for the first time, shining and radiant."¹

The influence of the Russo-Japanese War was not confined to Asia. It penetrated to Africa. Dicey, an Englishman who lived for forty years in Africa, writes: "Suddenly and unexpectedly, the conviction that native forces, however brave, were bound to be worsted by Europeans, was shaken to its base by the discovery that Russia, which was regarded in the East as the greatest military Power in Europe, had been driven from pillar to post by the victorious Japanese, that her armies had been put to flight, her navy destroyed, her fortresses captured by a comparatively diminutive and feeble Power, whose people, whatever else they might be,

¹ *The Renaissance in India*. By C. F. Andrews, Young People's Missionary Movement, 1912, p. 4.

were certainly not Caucasians or Christians. It may be said with truth that the native Africans . . . knew nothing . . . about Japan. But yet I should doubt whether there was a town or village in the whole of Africa where the inhabitants did not learn directly or indirectly that the Russian invaders of the Far East had been scattered like sheep by an unknown non-European race. In the Mussulman communities there was sure to be some Mahdi or student of the Koran ready to point the moral of this reversal of all previous experience, and to instil the belief that what the Japanese had accomplished against Russia might be achieved . . . by native forces trained and disciplined, as in Japan, by native officers."¹

In Egypt, as in India, we observe a revival of nationalist activities after 1905. But Russia influenced the East in another direction that year. It was the year of the first Russian Revolution, and this attempt of a people to revolt against autocracy and despotism found an echo in Turkey and Persia and China. In his treatise on *The Problem of National and Colonial Policy and the Third International*, M. Pavlovich could assert: "The Russian Revolution of 1905 played the same great part in the life of the Asiatic peoples as the French Revolution had formerly played in European countries. It gave the impulse in Turkey to the revolutionary activities which led to the fall of Abdul Hamid. It made an overwhelming impression upon Persia, which was the first Asiatic nation to start a simultaneous struggle against its own despots and against the rapacity of European governments. The same is true of China. But everywhere European intervention frustrated the fulfilment of dreams of national liberty."

When the Russian Revolution became an accomplished fact in November, 1917, Russia's relations with the East entered a new phase. Now Russia, like England in the past, had a message for the peoples of the East. Though Russian policy in Asia after 1917 was often determined by national egotism and conducted from the point of view of Russia's well-being and expansion, yet this was done in the name of an international ideal which augmented its force and at

¹ *The Egypt of the Future*. By Edward Dicey, Heinemann, 1907, pp. 139-40.

the same time gave it a sanction comparable only with England's middle-class European ideal of gradual training in the blessings of freedom and self-government.

At the same time it was precisely the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia which stood for the attempt to discover a new synthesis uniting Europe and Asia. The fundamental forces slumbering in the Russian people, Asiatic in origin, were roused in them in an active and sometimes disastrous form. But the Bolsheviks had been trained in Europe, and they endeavoured to apply to this chaos the method and system of European thought and European labour, and to westernise the country's administrative system in a way occasionally attempted but never achieved by Tsarism. In Russia, as in the East, alike in office and administration and in everyday life, the maxim of the Koran had held good: "Haste is the work of the devil, deliberation is pleasing to God." And now there was to be a clearance of all these remnants of a mediæval Oriental order. The Bolsheviks took as their ideal a conception of order and punctuality learned from Europe; in its name they conducted a crusade against those sections of the population addicted to an Asiatic indifference to time, and their crusade served as a model to other countries. Like the revolutionary movements in Asia itself, Bolshevism aims at the westernisation of Russia. Reforms demanded for years, such as the simplification of spelling, and the introduction of the metrical system and the Gregorian calendar, were now accomplished. The aim was to fuse harmoniously the mystic imagination and vital enthusiasm of Russia's primeval spirit, which nevertheless tended all too readily to degenerate into wordiness and extravagant fancy, with Europe's conscious love of action and persevering zeal, which was always in danger of sinking to mere vulgar busyness. "It is the essence of Leninism in practice that it associates the Russian revolutionary inspiration with the American practical genius," wrote Stalin.

The Russian Revolution aimed at a new social order, a new era in social life. Modern transport has made all countries mutually interdependent, and such a new order could not be restricted to a particular area, but was bound to aim at embracing the whole earth. The leaders of the Russian Revolution were obliged to include the awakening

East in their schemes and endeavours. The new social order attacked its predecessor, middle-class capitalism. Lenin taught that the social revolution could now begin because capitalism had newly entered upon its last dying phase of Imperialism, which must collapse because it was inwardly at war with itself. The rivalry between great financial groups must inevitably lead to mutual struggles for the possession of raw materials, and in this fratricidal strife Imperialism enfeebled itself.

But through its possession of the lands which produce raw materials, Imperialism is involved in a far more fatal embarrassment. It is most seriously enfeebled by the opposition of a few powerful, "civilised" nations to the small, weak nations and colonial peoples. Imperialism means the unbridled exploitation and the inhuman oppression of hundreds of millions of human beings in the colonies and dependencies. The object of oppression and exploitation is to make the greatest possible profits out of those countries. But for this purpose, Imperialism has been driven to build railways and factories and establish centres of trade and industry, "and to give the natives so much education that they can be of service in exploiting the country. The rise of a proletariat, the creation of a native intelligentsia, the awakening of national consciousness, the reinforcement of movements aiming at freedom: these are the inevitable consequences of such a policy; they beget revolution in the colonies and subject countries. This process is of the utmost importance to the proletariat; for it undermines the position of capitalism by transforming the colonies and subject provinces from reserves of Imperialism into reserves of the proletarian revolution."¹ Hence the organic link between the social revolution, with its fight against capitalism, and the struggle of the Eastern peoples for national freedom.

The very fact that Russia is spiritually and geographically on the borderland between Europe and Asia makes her the leader in this twofold revolution, facing east and west and yet following a single aim in both directions. Because all countries are mutually interdependent under modern Imperialism, that system can be attacked upon the "colonial front," where conditions are more favourable than in the

¹ Stalin's *The Theory and Practice of Leninism*

homeland of the few sated colonial Powers. Early Marxist theory was wrong in the view that the structure of capitalism would be pierced at the point where industry and capitalist economy are most vigorously developed; it will be rather where the links of the Imperialist chain that binds the world are weakest. That was why in 1917 the Revolution triumphed more easily in Russia than in the Western countries, and for the same reason the most favourable ground for the next attack is in the colonies, where the enemy of the proletariat is an alien Imperialism possessing no moral authority and rousing to opposition the instincts of patriotism as well as those of class.

Thus the idea of social revolution is linked with that of national liberation. Indeed it is only in an era of social revolution that the peoples can achieve national liberation. As is proved by the activities of the Second International, even Socialist parties at the pre-revolutionary stage of development believed in the national rights of only a small number of peoples, the white peoples, and approved the struggle for independence of these alone. It was Leninism which first broke down the barrier between white and coloured peoples. Lenin was convinced that the problem of nationalism could be solved only through the proletarian revolution, and that if the revolution were to succeed in Europe, the European proletariat must ally itself with the anti-Imperialist movements in the colonies. It is from this standpoint that he watched events in the East. Stalin writes: "Regarded objectively, the struggle of the Emir of Afghanistan for his country's independence is a revolutionary struggle, notwithstanding the fact that the Emir and his Ministers are monarchists; for it is undermining Imperialism; on the other hand, the struggle of the Democrats and the Socialists of the Second International during the imperialist World War was a reactionary struggle, for its success meant the extenuation and veiling of Imperialism, its consolidation and triumph. Objectively regarded, the struggle of the merchants and middle-class intellectuals for the independence of Egypt is a revolutionary struggle, notwithstanding the middle-class origin and position of the nationalist leaders, and notwithstanding their opposition to Socialism; whilst the struggle of the Labour Government in England to hold Egypt in subjec-

tion to England is a reactionary struggle, notwithstanding the working-class origin of those Labour Ministers and their position, and notwithstanding their so-called Socialist opinions." Thus the struggle of the oppressed peoples for national independence was included in the aims to be pursued by the social revolution, which is to involve with its own success the final liberation of the nations.

The middle-class era of capitalism which began with the English and French Revolutions found expression intellectually in the ideas of nationalism and democracy for the peoples participating in capitalist evolution. It was the nationalist idea that was the guiding political principle and the myth of this epoch. With the rise of the new era of humanity beginning with the Russian Revolution, a new myth appears and the national idea is losing its political dominance. The aim pursued is a single world economy in which all peoples are united.

The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics created by the Russian Revolution offers a model for this kind of union of free peoples within a great economic whole. The first Soviet Congress in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, held in Moscow on December 30th, 1922, laid the foundation, and on July 6th, 1923, the Executive Committee of the Union worked out a constitution for this new type of united States of various nationalities. In principle those united States are not limited to their present territory; it is their endeavour to take in more and more peoples as partners freely co-operating within the Union, as soon as these peoples have adopted the constitution of a Socialist Soviet Republic and co-ordinated their economic system as part of the united whole. The declaration of principle which precedes the constitutional charter states that capitalism has proved incapable of organising co-operation between the peoples, and that Socialism alone can create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and lay the foundation for brotherly co-operation between the peoples. "This Union is a free league of nations enjoying equal rights; each separate Republic has the right to withdraw freely from the Union. Membership of the Union is open to all Socialist Soviet Republics, both to those at present established and to those which may be constituted in future; the new federal State is a worthy consummation of the

struggle begun in October, 1917, to lay the foundations of neighbourly freedom and the fraternal co-operation of the peoples. It will serve as a firm bulwark against world capitalism, and will be a new and decisive step towards the union of the workers in all lands within a universal Socialist Soviet Republic."

The era of middle-class nationalism reached its zenith in Wilson's declaration of the rights of all peoples to national self-government and free development. Those principles were its crown, at once the consummation and conclusion of its development.

But even then the bourgeois world proved too weak to put its own principles into practice. So, also, was the Provisional Government in Russia between March and October, 1917; the right of self-determination was promised to the numerous peoples inhabiting the territory of the Russian Empire, which had hitherto been subjected to a policy of forcible Russification; but these promises remained no more than words, fair but meaningless. It was not till after the Revolution of November, 1917, that efforts were made to find a form which, whilst it enabled the numerous peoples to live their own national life, yet superseded, as was essential, the idea of national State sovereignty and established a co-operative union of many—if possible of all—peoples. Those nations that had aspired to independence before the Revolution and possessed the rudiments of a separate national culture formed independent Socialist Soviet Republics; such were the Ukrainians, the White Russians, and the Trans-Caucasian peoples. These three States thereupon joined with the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. But even within the Union the Socialist Federative Soviet Republic gave evidence of a remarkable variety of structure; it was a federal State, and within its borders peoples hitherto sunk in torpor and oblivion began to lead a national life of their own and to develop their own language and traditions. In every small autonomous republic or territory the vernacular was the official language, and became thus a written, literary language. Earlier colonising Russian governments had deprived the original inhabitants of their land and distributed it among Russian settlers; this injustice was redressed by the Bolsheviks and

the lands were returned. That is why in 1919 and 1920, which were perilous years for the Soviet Government, it found support among the eastern and southern frontier peoples, especially since the counter-revolutionary parties and governments, even including the right-wing Socialists, evinced neither sympathy nor understanding for the non-Russian peoples' struggle for autonomy.

Almost all these peoples belong to Asiatic races. They are Turco-Tatars or Mongolians, and their first awakening to national self-determination cannot fail to bear important fruit in the East. Only foreign affairs and questions of general economic concern are directly or indirectly subject to the central Government; language questions, education, agriculture, justice, local administration, health, and social welfare are left in the hands of the autonomous Republics. There are ten such autonomous Republics within the Russian Federation, including those of the Bashkirs, Tatars, Kirghiz, Yakuts, Crimean Tatars, and Buriat Mongols. Other and smaller peoples within the Russian domain constitute autonomous territories, not Republics; such are the Chuvashes, the Votyaks, the Kalmuks, the Karachayevs, and other national groups. Most of these peoples are Mohammedans or Buddhists, or devotees of primitive religions. Through the influence of the central Soviet Government the principles of universal education and enlightenment penetrate to them, they tend to become more European and secular in outlook, and the result is seen particularly in the universal political education of the masses and of women, a process that is advancing in a revolutionary epoch with unprecedented rapidity. The separation of Church and State, the secular appropriation of Church property, and the abolition or reform of canon law, have been extended to Islam. First and foremost the Soviet Government has advanced education and the establishment of schools. Teaching was based upon the principles of the new social theory, and though it did not penetrate to all parts, its influence nevertheless set up a considerable ferment which counteracted traditions hitherto dominant over a wide area. The emancipation of women advanced still more rapidly under the influence of the Russian Revolution. As early as 1919 the Mohammedan Republic of Azerbaijan, inhabited by a Turkish stock, conferred upon

women full equal rights and the franchise. In manners and education the women of Azerbaijan are altogether European. The autonomous Mohammedan Republic of the nomad Kirghiz abolished polygamy in February, 1922.

Another Federation resembling the Russian Republic is the Trans-Caucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, established on March 12th, 1922, with its three great provinces of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, each retaining a considerable degree of independence. It is here alone that the promises so generously given by the Great Powers to establish a national home for the Armenians have been at least partially fulfilled. The Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic, with its capital at Erivan, has 1,200,000 inhabitants, of whom 95 per cent. are Armenians and 450,000 of them refugees from Turkey. In justice to the various smaller nationalities making up the racial medley of the Caucasus, as, for instance, the Ossets, three reserves have been marked off within the Georgian Republic.

Tsarist Russia had two vassal States in Central Asia, the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva, both ruled by native despotic princes and the orthodox Mohammedan clergy. The importance of these States to Russia is due in part to the fact that they constitute a bridge to Afghanistan and so into the heart of Asia, and partly to the peculiar relation that has grown up between them and the Union of Soviet Republics. Under the influence of the Revolution in Russia the Young-Bukharan party, a group of enlightened and progressive nationalists, succeeded in driving out the ruling prince and changing the form of government to a republic. Even before this revolution in Bukhara, Khiva had been transformed in April, 1920, from a Khanate to a popular republic. Both States concluded treaties with the Russian Federative Republic; Russia acknowledged their independence and renounced all privileges and concessions formerly granted to the Russian Government. At the same time Russia engaged to assist the new Republics in the economic and technical sphere, and to grant them such support as they required. In September, 1924, the popular Assemblies of both Republics resolved to join with parts of the autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Turkistan (hitherto forming part of the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic) and to constitute

two Socialist Soviet Republics according to the principle of national self-determination, no longer drawing their boundaries in accordance with historical accident; these were to be the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Uzbeks, united with the autonomous Republic of the Tajiks, and the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Turcomans. Both applied for admission to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, which now consists of six separate groups of States, three exclusively Oriental in character.

Thus it is that social and national problems act and react in the theories and policies of the Russian Revolution. Their connection is not accidental, nor is it the fruit of Machiavellian agitation, but the necessary outcome of theory, of a recognition of historical fact. Moreover, the Russian Revolution accepted the practical consequences of the theory of self-determination and put them into effect. Just as in the West the Bolsheviks tried to usher in a new era in diplomacy by their manner of conducting the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and by publishing the secret archives of the Petrograd Government, so in their negotiations with Asiatic peoples they closed the nineteenth century period and introduced an entirely new method of diplomatic intercourse.

During the nineteenth century the European Powers were constantly reducing and suppressing Asiatic and African rights. The twofold method particularly favoured was that of capitulations and concessions. The capitulations conferred upon Europeans the right of extra-territoriality, so that they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country where they lived. Like so many things in Eastern life, this was merely the consequence of mediævalism grown stereotyped. In past centuries in Europe, likewise, it was not territorial but personal law that was valid. When the Turks captured Constantinople they found settlements there of Venetian and Genoese citizens living under Byzantine sovereignty yet subject to their own laws. There was sufficient ground for adopting this system in the fact that Moslem law, which was based upon the Koran and upon tradition, and though religious in origin, embraced all civil and constitutional law, was not meant to be applied to Christians. Originally there was no intention of favouring the Christians; it was rather a degradation of non-Mohammedans to whom the

right of living under Mohammedan law was not conceded. But in modern times the capitulations were extended by the European Powers and claimed as giving Europeans the right of constant intervention in the judicial affairs of an Asiatic State. As the process of secularisation set in the East, and with the attempts to introduce constitutional methods on the European model, the Eastern peoples became increasingly conscious of the annoyance caused by the capitulations.


With the advance of commercialism and industrialism in the East, concessions were equally felt as an annoyance. These were industrial, or political and industrial, in character, and had been obtained by European Powers from Oriental States in the course of the nineteenth century, particularly from rulers whose imitation of European customs had brought them into financial straits. Capitulations and concessions did, in fact, narrowly restrict the sovereignty of Asiatic States still formally independent, and seriously imperilled their economic and national development. Japan alone, rising to the position of a great military Power in the modern world, had succeeded in inducing the European Powers to abandon their privileges.

Thus it involved a complete revolution in the relations between European Powers and Oriental States when Russia went so far in applying the principle of national self-determination as to renounce all former concessions and privileges of the Russian State in China, Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey. This was not done, as in Japan's case, in face of a powerful adversary, but voluntarily in accordance with principles proclaimed from the outset. The effect was all the more marked because at the very same time the Great Powers were proving in the Paris peace negotiations and by their behaviour towards China, Persia, Turkey, and Egypt, that they never dreamed of applying the principle of national self-determination which they themselves had proclaimed; on the contrary, their demands for concessions and privileges far exceeded anything obtained in the past. For the first time a great European Power recognised Oriental States as genuinely possessing equal rights in a community of nations henceforward no longer European but world-wide; this act on the part of revolutionary Russia can never be undone, and

its full significance will only become apparent in the progress of future relations between East and West.

The consistent Oriental policy of the Third International even exercised some influence upon the colonial theories of the Second International. Thus at the Congress of the Second International at Marseilles at the end of August, 1925, Otto Bauer could declare in his speech on Eastern problems: "What is happening over there is the first step in the great mutiny of the last great reserve army of capitalism. And that is why, comrades, what is happening there is our own intimate concern, that is why we . . . hope that it may not be long before they (the Asiatic and African workers) will be waging the fight . . . in conscious co-operation with us." And the resolution passed on Eastern questions reads: "The Labour and Socialist International hails the awakening of the great working masses of the Chinese, Indian, and Mohammedan world. The L.S.I. is aware that another world war can only be averted if European and American democracy itself recognises unreservedly, and realises in the teeth of European and American Imperialism, the right of self-determination of all peoples. Consequently the L.S.I. urges upon all Socialist Parties to wage a continuous and energetic fight for the right of self-determination of the oppressed nations of Asia and Africa." So far did the Second International go in accepting theoretically the basis of Bolshevik Oriental policy, though the practice of the English, and still more of the French party, is still in flat contradiction to that theory.

The very first proclamations of revolutionary Russia showed the basis upon which her Oriental policy rested. As early as November 24th, 1917, the Council of People's Commissaries issued a proclamation to all Mohammedan workers in Russia and the East, promising full religious and national liberty to the Mohammedans of Russia and proceeded: "Mohammedans in the East, Persians and Turks, Arabs and Indians, all you whose lives and liberties and homes have been bartered for centuries by the rapacious robbers of Europe, you whose lands the brigands that began the war seek to divide: we declare that the secret treaties for the forcible seizure of Constantinople, entered into by the fallen Tsar and confirmed by the fallen Kerenski, are now torn to shreds and annihilated. . . . We declare that the



MAPS VIII. AND IX.—SOVIET STATES IN THE EAST.

treaty partitioning Persia is torn to threads and annihilated. . . . We declare that the treaty partitioning Turkey and the seizure of Armenia is torn to shreds and annihilated. . . . Do not lose time, but shake off the tyranny of those who for a hundred years have plundered your lands. Cease to leave your native soil in their pillaging hands. You yourselves must be masters in your own lands. You yourselves must order your lives in your own way and as you see fit. It is your right. Your fate is in your own hands." On October 31st the "League for the Liberation of the East" was founded. The following passage occurs in its programme: "It is the aim of the League for the Liberation of the East to unite all the separate movements striving for new life in the awakening East, in order so to create an anti-imperialist united front at the very source of Imperialism in Asia. . . . Those who undertake the great task of national self-determination and constitutional construction now facing the whole vast territory of the Orient cannot belong to the class of large landowners and princes, who have for the most part no interest in the destruction of Western Imperialism in the East; nor can they come from the intermediate grade of the intellectuals, who belong to no class; only the labouring masses of Asia can undertake that task. . . . The medley of nationalities in the East involves the danger that national dissensions, already inflamed, may break out anew, and that a species of nationalism typical of the Great Powers may appear, for it is constantly springing up on this soil. In order to avert this danger, unification in the East must be based upon absolutely equal rights for all the peoples of Asia, and that in federal form. It may begin with a more limited Federation—in India, for instance—and develop into the United States of Asia."

In this programme we see that the two dangers involved in linking the social and national revolution are clearly envisaged; on the one hand there are sharp contrasts within the nations striving for national freedom and the peril of conflicts among the liberated peoples; and in parts where several peoples live side by side it is possible that a nation formerly oppressed and now liberated, will itself become an oppressor, often of a far more dangerous type. As a remedy for this latter evil, and a protection against the dangerous

idea of the national State, the inadequacy of which is just becoming clear in the case of the enlarged States of Central and Eastern Europe, revolutionary Russia points to the method that she has adopted: that of a federal union of separate nations. This is the first occasion upon which the Pan-Asiatic idea of the federation of all Oriental nations is clearly formulated. Revolutionary Russia, believing in the unity of the human race and of an economic domain embracing the whole earth, would certainly not set up a Pan-European in theoretical opposition to a Pan-Asiatic ideal; situated on the borders of Europe and Asia, she would make the future reconciliation and unification of the two her aim.

The principle of nationalism divided the peoples along national frontiers, irrespective of opposing social interests; the social revolution in Russia sought to replace it by the principle of class conflict which unites each class irrespective of national frontiers. But the Orient was just entering upon the phase in which the nation takes the place of religion and hereditary groupings and tribal leagues as the ruling principle in politics. This overlapping of antithetical epochs inevitably produced conflicts and friction within the alliance of revolutionary Russia and the awakening East. There were similarities between Russia's social structure and that of the East. The Revolution in Russia had swept away the belief that a social revolution could take place only in a highly industrialised economic system. Like Russia, the East was predominantly agricultural. As in Russia, the most urgent task was to solve the problem of the peasants and the land. As in Russia, modern industry had sprung up in recent years in Eastern countries, though more limited in extent. As in Russia, there had been large investments of foreign capital in Asia. There, too, modern machinery had begun its victorious advance. As in Russia, so in the East, modern town industry stood face to face with mediæval industrial methods in the country. As in Russia, education in the East was the privilege of a small class of so-called intellectuals, who stood aloof from the people in Russia and the East as in no other country. In Russia, as in the East, religion still exercised a powerful sway over the masses. In all these respects Russia was, indeed, a few decades ahead of the East, but the conditions of life were still similar.

The incipient social transformation in the East had stirred up profound social unrest on all sides. In all Eastern countries the people's needs were few. Meredith Townsend says of the Indian that he manages to live on such an incredibly small wage of a few shillings a month "by a habit of living which makes him independent of the ordinary cares of mankind. He goes nearly without clothes, gives his children none, and dresses his wife in a long piece of the most wretched muslin. Neither he nor his wife pay tailor or milliner one shilling during their entire lives, nor do they ever purchase needles or thread. . . . The poorer peasant inhabits a hut containing a single covered room of the smallest size . . . and he constructs and repairs his own dwelling. He virtually pays no rent, except for the culturable land. He never touches alcohol, or any substitute for it. . . . He eats absolutely no meat, nor any animal fat, nor any expensive grain like good wheat; but lives on millet or small rice, a little milk, with the butter from the milk, and the vegetables he grows. Even of these he eats more sparingly than the poorest Tuscan."¹ And like the modest sum of his needs, so is the resignation of the Asiatic to his fate. To him the whims of despots small or great, misrule, and bad government are not abuses against which one rebels, but natural phenomena, unavoidable, and to be accepted like drought or tempest. His lack of sanitary or technical appliances is not a spur to improve his condition, but a misfortune sent by God, and probably, in fact, not felt as such at all.

When Europe opened up Asia and introduced modern machinery and new types of industry, she created new needs and new stimuli among the masses. At the same time the destruction of native crafts by European competition aggravated the poverty of the masses, and that at the very moment when improved means of communication enabled the masses to compare their own lot with that of other classes, especially the Europeans. Remote villages were brought into communication with the outer world and their inhabitants were mentally stirred, so that class consciousness began to grow up: a consciousness altogether unorganised, still sunk in torpor, yet clearly perceptible.

This process was greatly accelerated by the war, and

¹ *Asia and Europe*. By Meredith Townsend, pp. 228-29.

that in a twofold manner. During the war capitalism developed in the East, especially in Japan, and received a sudden and unforeseen impetus; money flowed into all the countries of the East. This new heyday of capitalism stirred a new social consciousness in the growing propertied class amongst the Eastern peoples, and at the same time gave birth to capitalist Imperialist tendencies; they sought markets, opportunities of investment for their rapidly accumulating wealth, and sources of cheap raw materials. Japan, for instance, commanded no territory yielding cotton and iron.

Naturally this new burst of capitalist prosperity affected the masses; it attracted more and more into industrial employment in the towns, and accentuated conflict and poverty. In addition, the cost of living was everywhere greatly increased in consequence of the years of war; and soon after the peace the slump set in in trade and industry. Thus the war exacerbated class conflict within the ranks of the Eastern peoples and rendered it a more conscious process. News of the Russian Revolution, obscure and confused, penetrated everywhere, especially in the Far East. In 1918 the Japanese Socialist Sen Katayama stated that Japanese workers had recently awakened, as was proved by the numerous strikes of the past year. They were instigated chiefly by the influence of the Russian Revolution, which made a profound impression upon the people, especially upon the labouring masses, and roused their interest.

Thus it was that a social conflict of class interests arose for the first time among the peoples of the East. At first the ruling classes in the East welcomed Russian revolutionary propaganda as an aid in their struggle against European Imperialism, but later they opposed it bitterly. The ruling classes were alarmed. Here, as in every revolution, it proved that at a critical juncture class interests are more powerful than considerations of national policy. (The French *émigrés* helped Germany against France in 1792; the Russian middle-classes allied themselves alternately with Germany and the Entente Powers against the Russian Revolution.) The old feudal aristocracy and the rising capitalist class in the East were ready for a compromise with colonial Imperialism, and themselves made ready to fight Socialism in their own country. In Egypt and elsewhere the leaders of the middle-class

nationalist revolution were deterred from too vigorous action by their fear of a real revolution and the chaos which might follow and imperil their own dominant position. So it came about that in many parts an alliance of rival capitalist classes was envisaged in face of the common danger. (By like process in Czechoslovakia the Czech and German middle classes have allied themselves in opposition to Socialism.)

The leaders of the Russian Revolution were fully aware of these facts; they realised also the danger of the capitalist class in a liberated nation setting up a more ruthless rule of force in their own country than alien conquerors had ever done, and oppressing alike the national minorities included within the newly created State and their own class adversaries. The first years in the history of free Ireland, or of the new independent Turkey, have proved that national governments rule with a heavy hand in their own country, as alien masters never do, being conscious that they might easily unite all classes against them. These conflicting considerations are clearly traceable in the discussions of the Third International. In September, 1920, a Congress of Eastern Peoples, summoned by the Third International, was held at Baku. In the invitation to the Congress the following passage occurs: "Peasants and workers of Persia, the Government of the Kajars of Tehran and their vassals, the Khans in the provinces, have robbed and exploited you for centuries. The land which the laws of the Sharia made your common property has passed more and more into the hands of the lackeys of the Tehran Government. They act according to their own good pleasure. They oppress you with taxes at will, and when they had reduced the land to such a condition that it no longer yielded them enough, they sold Persia last year to English capitalists. . . . You peasants of Anatolia have gathered together beneath the banner of Kemal Pasha to fight the foreign interloper. But we learn at the same time that you are trying to organise a party of your own, a true peasant party, resolved to fight even if the Pashas make peace with the despoilers in the Entente. . . . Peasants and workers of the Near East, if you organise, if you set up your own government of workers and peasants, if you arm yourselves, if you ally yourselves with the Red Army of Russian workers and peasants, then you will be able to stand

up to foreign capitalists, then you will be able to settle accounts with your own native profiteers, then you will be able to care for your own interests in free alliance with Workers' Republics all over the world and to exploit your country's wealth for your own benefit and that of all the workers of the world, who will exchange the products of their labour honourably and help one another mutually. We want to discuss this question with you in Baku. Spare no effort to come to Baku in as large numbers as possible. For years you have crossed the desert to visit the sacred places where you pay homage to your past and to your God—now cross deserts and mountains and rivers to discuss together how you may sweep away servitude and join in brotherly union in order to live as free and equal men."

Zinoviev declared at the Congress: "Our hardest blow must be struck against English Capitalism. But at the same time we want to rouse a spirit of hatred in the labouring masses of the East, and the resolve to fight all wealthy classes without distinction, whoever they may be. It is not the object of the revolution just beginning in the East to beg the English Imperialists to remove their feet from the table simply in order to enable rich Turks to stretch out their own more comfortably."

"No, we will request the rich very courteously to remove their feet from the table so that there may be no more vain luxury in our midst, no more contempt for the people, no more idleness, but that the world may be ruled by the horny hand of the worker."

But in *Isvestia* of October 18th, 1925, Zinoviev wrote in a more realistic vein of Russia's relation to the nationalism of the Eastern peoples: "For us there is no possibility of neutrality with regard to national movements comprising hundreds of millions of Orientals, for that would imply a further step on the part of the Soviet Union towards the Western Imperialist camp. But the Western Powers, and especially England, might turn our action to account in order to strangle first China and the East, and afterwards Russia. The Soviet Union is the great hope of the awakening East. The great Revolution, which has transformed Russia from the graveyard of the peoples to a family of nationalities, all enjoying equal rights, has become a beacon illuminating

the path of the oppressed masses in the East. Upon that force the Soviet Union bases its foreign policy and from that it derives its remarkable power. That, too, is the reason why Western, and especially English, Imperialism is determined to attack the Soviet Union."

Actual Communist propaganda failed to make any real progress in the East, especially in its efforts to organise. That is plainly indicated in the proceedings of the Congresses of the Third International. At the Third Congress in Moscow, in the summer of 1921, Communist parties were represented from Persia, Turkey, India, Korea, and Japan, whilst China and Mongolia only sent individual delegates. The party membership was as small as the organisation was weak. The delegate of the Persian party, Jabad Zade, unreservedly admitted the weakness of organisation: "You think it strange that in many Eastern countries there are several Communist parties. There are three in Turkey, two in Persia, two in Korea, and so on. The reason is that every Pasha wants to exploit Communist ideas for his own ends, and so organises his own Communist party." The President of the Committee of Revolutionary Mohammedans reported on the Committee's work in various Islamic countries, but declared at the same time that it was not Communist; Zinoviev replied that the Communist International could only support genuine Communist activities and must repudiate anything in the nature of pure nationalism, however it might be disguised. Kara Sadiel affirmed that it was typical of the Near East that all revolutionary activity must be national in character in its early stages. Revolutionary efforts must begin by liberating the masses from their religious prejudices.

At the fourth Congress, which was held in Moscow in the autumn of 1922, the Mandates Committee recognised parties in China, India, Persia, Turkey, Java, Mongolia, Korea, and Egypt. The membership reported was small; thus China counted 300 members, of whom only 180 had fulfilled all their obligations. Japan showed the largest membership, with 1,800. But Zinoviev's inaugural address rang hopefully: "In the present year we are witness to a mighty movement in the East, a movement which has made such big strides forward that there is hardly any Eastern country at present where we do not possess a nucleus, however small, of the

Communist Party. But we remember that our 'Labour emancipation group' in Russia in 1883 was also only a small group. Its organisation, however, was a sign that a new era had begun in Russia—the era of revolution. The establishment of Communist Parties in such countries as Japan, India, Turkey, Persia, and China, which constitute an inexhaustible reserve of the proletarian social revolution, is an historic event. . . . During this year great nationalist movements were also initiated among the oppressed peoples. These are heavy blows to international capitalism. The risings in India, China, and Egypt, which are growing in magnitude, will destroy the bourgeois régime. These movements are on our side. . . . We shall witness the world shaken by numberless revolts, and tens, nay hundreds of millions of oppressed peoples rising against Imperialism." The delegate from the Dutch Indies reported that at first his party had co-operated with the Pan-Islamic movement, which was very strong in Java, but had ceased to do so after the second Congress of the Communist International, which declared against such co-operation. The Government had incited the peasants against Communism by spreading the report that it sought to destroy Islam. In these circumstances the Communist Party must act with great caution. Pan-Islamism was a nationalist struggle for freedom; for to Mohammedans Islam was everything—not only a religion, but their State, their economic organisation, their daily bread, in short, their all. Thus Pan-Islamism meant the brotherhood of all Mohammedan peoples, and the liberation, not only of the Arabs, but of the Indians, Javanese, and all oppressed peoples. That brotherhood found expression in the struggle against the British, French, and other European capitalists; he asked, therefore, once again whether they might support Pan-Islamism in this sense, and how far they might go in their support.

The nineteenth and twentieth sessions of the Congress were devoted to the discussion of Eastern questions, in which the representatives of India, Japan, China, Tunis, Egypt, Persia, and Turkey took part. The negro question and propaganda in Africa were also considered. The Dutch delegate Ravenstein declared: "Proletarian Russia (is) the friend of genuine self-determination and the freedom of

Oriental nations. The international proletariat, therefore, acclaims the political aspiration of the Mohammedan nations towards complete economic, financial, and political enfranchisement from the influence and dominance of the Imperialist States; acclaims it as an aspiration which, even though it may not aim at the abolition of wage slavery and private ownership of the means of production in Mohammedan lands, none the less menaces the foundations of European capitalism."

The report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the period between the fourth and fifth Congresses shows no expansion of Communist organisation in the East. But it points to a number of facts demonstrating the growth of social unrest, which found expression in a hitherto unparalleled wave of great strikes in all Eastern countries, especially in Turkey, India, Java, and Japan. These led to Government persecution of Communism. After the great strike in Alexandria at the beginning of 1924, during which the workers had occupied several factories until their demands were conceded, Zaghlul Pasha's Government arrested the labour leaders and dissolved the labour organisations. There were similar occurrences in Turkey, where a trade union organisation was established in the autumn of 1923 with Government support to combat Communist influence. In India, Japan, and Korea the party could only work in defiance of the law. In Southern China, on the other hand, it was recognised and allied itself with the nationalist revolutionary Kuo Min Tang party of Sun Yat Sen. Particular attention was paid to the emancipation of women, and large numbers of women students from Korea, China, Turkey, and Mongolia attended the Communist University of Eastern Workers.

Only in Java did Communism develop on more vigorous lines. There colonial capitalism was rapidly expanding and has called into existence a constantly increasing wage-earning class, calculated to number about two and a half millions in 1922. The Sarekat Islam, founded by Haji Samonhoedi in 1911, at first pursued Pan-Islamic aims and combated the economic predominance of the Chinese. It soon numbered over two million members. Until 1917 it was loyal to the Dutch Government. Not till that year did socialist and nationalist influence begin to make itself felt

within the Society. At the second Congress of the Sarekat Islam vehement opposition to the existing leaders and to the Government found expression; and demands were put forward for political autonomy and the struggle against capitalism. This tendency grew stronger under the influence of the Russian Revolution. At the fourth Congress, held in Soerabaya in October, 1919, the national Indian party affiliated to the Sarekat Islam, but advocated only national, not economic, demands; this party embraces the half-castes and is led by Douwes Dekker, a descendant of Multatuli. Finally, in 1920, a Communist party was formed which seceded from the Sarekat at the sixth Congress in October, 1921. Seven of the Sarekat's thirty sections then declared for Communism.

At the fifth Congress of the International in Moscow in the summer of 1924, Manuïlski made a speech on policy and re-examined the problem of revolutionary Russia's understanding with nationalism. It was at the second Congress that the International had first proclaimed the idea of a united revolutionary front of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples, on the model of Lenin's and Stalin's solution of the problem of nationalities in Russia. In the meantime their theories had found practical expression in the creation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. "Comrade Lenin once said that Soviet Russia, because of its geographical position, is a natural bridge between Europe and Asia. This is undoubtedly true. Our revolution had a double result. It reacted on the European proletariat in the sense that it made it believe in its own power and in its ability to seize power. Simultaneously it reacted on the Oriental nations. Kautsky prophesied after the 1905-1906 Revolution, that the Russian Revolution would awaken the nations of the Middle East and Asia to historical life. This prophesy has proved correct. After the October Revolution, 1917, Soviet Russia became the centre of gravitation and attracted the Oriental nations to itself. . . . We would never have succeeded in preserving the influence of the Soviet Republics in our present situation of capitalist encirclement had we not formed a united front between the oppressed nationalities and the proletariat from the Baltic Sea to the farthest Asiatic plains. The Russian Vendée deliberately chose the borderlands of the old Russian Empire for their offensive against the victorious

proletariat of Moscow and Leningrad. And it was only the fact that we had behind us the sympathy of millions of the population in these borderlands that helped us to smash . . . the leaders of the counter-revolution."

The success of such a league of different peoples, widely separated not only by race and religion, but also by their industrial methods, in a Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was only possible on two conditions which contain the seeds of any future organised neighbourly relations between dissimilar peoples. Unlike other federal States, the Union carried the recognition of the clear right of self-determination so far that every partner had the right of withdrawal. Withdrawal can be effected at any time and without any formalities. Thus we have here a league held together wholly without the aid of compulsion. "Miliukov asserted that the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has no basis of law, since it lacks the element of superior force, and that, therefore, a Union without stability cannot undertake international obligations. But the very fact that our Union is organised without the element of compulsion constitutes the great strength of our moral influence over the peoples who participate in it." The other binding link between the nationalities was the unification of the whole economic system, the socialisation of the natural resources of all these countries and their conversion into the common property of the population of the whole Union. The natural resources and industrial wealth of one region ceased to be the exclusive possession of the people inhabiting that particular region. National and economic territorial boundaries were no longer one, and thus the most frequent cause of national differences and quarrels was swept away, whilst each nation maintained its complete cultural independence and enjoyed increased opportunities of development. For quarrels arise most frequently over rival claims to natural resources, harbours, routes of communication, and tariffs. Here the question of frontiers became one of secondary importance.

Though the home policy of revolutionary Russia was determined in this sense, her foreign policy in the East fluctuated with world conditions for the time being. When the German, Austrian, and Hungarian Revolution collapsed in the middle of 1919, and destroyed the hope of an early

transformation of Europe, the Russian Government turned its attention to the East. Until 1921 it was principally occupied with the Near and Middle East, with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. Russia was linked with Western Asia by the numerous Mohammedan peoples inhabiting her own territories, particularly Turkistan and the Caucasus, which command the roads to Turkey and Persia. After 1922 Russian policy was directed more and more decisively to the Far East, until it reached its goal in a provisional understanding with China and Japan. Thenceforward Russia played a double game, trying to reach an understanding with the States of the West, and at the same time to lead the anti-imperialist struggle in Eastern Asia. The attempt seemed successful at first, until in the summer of 1927 the break with England coincided with the internal disintegration of the Chinese Revolution.

Everywhere the Russian Revolution was confronted with British opposition. The Caucasian Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan were supported in their struggle against Moscow by England, which likewise endeavoured to organise resistance to Russia in Northern Persia. At the very beginning of 1918 an English military mission under General Dunsterville left Baghdad for Tiflis to help the Caucasian Republics against Turkey and also against the menace from the north. General Dunsterville succeeded for a short time in the summer of 1918 in occupying Baku, the important centre of the oil-fields, on the Caspian Sea in the territory of Azerbaijan. At the same time a second British military mission under General Sir Wilfrid Malleon pushed forward against Russian Turkistan and occupied Ashqabad and Transcaspiia for a few months, but was obliged to withdraw into Northern Persia again in the spring of 1919. In the summer of 1918 the English also attacked the Russian Revolution by setting up a fleet in the Caspian Sea, joining with Denikin's fleet, and annihilating the Bolshevik navy in May, 1919, when it set sail from Astrakhan.

The English were not merely animated by the desire to destroy the Russian Revolution, but also by the fear of revolutionary propaganda spreading to India. In 1919 it seemed that British policy was to win the day. The treaty with Persia signed on August 9th, 1919, was intended to confirm England's

preponderating influence in Persia after the overthrow of her Russian rival. At the same time Turkey's fate appeared to be decided in a sense favourable to English policy. But in 1920, after the overthrow of the counter-revolution in Russia, the situation changed. In that year and the next the Moscow Government succeeded in concluding treaties of friendship directed against England with Bukhara, China, Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan. True to her professed principles, Russia had renounced in these treaties all the privileges and concessions hitherto enjoyed. Thus in the treaty with Khiva she renounced all the privileges of the former Russian Government, and in addition all private concessions to Russians or the Russian State were declared void. At the same time Russia sent teachers and books to Khiva, established the first printing-presses, issued the first newspaper in the country, and laid the foundation of a policy of public welfare and health by sending a medical mission and building hospitals; she likewise sent machinery for cotton-spinning mills and so introduced the beginnings of industry. In the treaty with Persia of February 26th, 1921, Russia renounced all her former privileges, declared that Persia's debt to Russia was annulled, and the routes of communication built by Russia in Northern Persia, roads and railways, were handed over to the Persian Government. The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Persia was abolished, and its property passed to the Persian State. Likewise the Credit Bank established by Russia was handed over to Persia.

In May, 1920, after the landing of the Russian troops in Northern Persia, the English troops had left the country. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia joined the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and Turkey's success at this juncture in her war of independence against Anglo-Greek policy might be credited to Russia as a success, for on March 16th, 1921, she had concluded a treaty of friendship with Turkey, which stated in the preamble: "The two contracting parties declare the community of interest between the East in its struggle for national freedom and the labouring people of Russia in their fight for a new social order, and proclaim emphatically the right of the Eastern peoples to freedom and independence and a form of government in accordance with their own wishes."

Russia concluded a similar treaty of friendship with Afghanistan, the historic bridge between India and Asiatic Russia, where England had contrived to maintain her predominance until 1919 and to keep the country in the position of a dependency. The treaty of friendship between Russia and Afghanistan bound each to enter into no political or military agreement with a third Power which might be detrimental to the other contracting party. Besides entering into diplomatic and consular relations, Russia also engaged to render financial and technical assistance to Afghanistan. By this means Afghanistan for the first time made herself completely independent of England and India.

In Western Asia revolutionary Russia did not attain her object. She failed to carry social revolution into those countries. But in three respects she scored a remarkable triumph. In Turkey, in Persia, and in Afghanistan she weakened or destroyed British influence. By so doing she secured her southern frontiers from new threats of a military or diplomatic nature by the Western Powers, and she helped the national revolution to success in those three countries. To-day Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan enjoy a full measure of independence such as they had never known since their first contact with Europe. From being colonial peoples, whose self-determination was encroached upon by perpetual intervention and concessions to the Great Powers, they have become independent national States. This they have attained with the support of revolutionary Russia in their struggle against the European Powers. The alliance between Russia and the nations of Western Asia has led to a successful advance in the process of transforming the East.

Revolutionary Russia's relations with the people's of the Far East have assumed a different form. Here she was dealing with a civilisation far more advanced both culturally and economically. Japan has been transformed into a national State in the European sense in the past sixty years, a change which has found expression in the religious sphere. Her rulers made a national religion of Shintoism, which culminates in the worship of the divine Mikado and thus in the deification of the State authority; in this nationalist form they encouraged it at the expense of Buddhism.

China, with her ancient intellectual culture, was stirred

to the depths by a process of fermentation and transformation. The Chinese renaissance of recent decades stands beside the awakening of India as the most interesting example of change in the East. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 was no more than the expression of this national renaissance. Patriotism did not centre in student and literary circles alone, but in the merchant class. The National Union of Chinese Chambers of Commerce has, perhaps, been the most important centre of political activity, the most important unifying influence amidst the internal chaos that has been China's scourge since 1911. But of even greater consequence as a centre for the Chinese renaissance were the nation's educational institutions. Young China's intellectual leaders soon discovered that the political revolution of 1911 could not alone reach the goal; what was needed was a profounder study of ancient Chinese civilisation, but with the help of modern methods. The new "cultural movement" (*Haing wen hu yuan tung*) approached Chinese civilisation in a critical spirit. It is significant that a religious renaissance was proceeding simultaneously. The attempt to proclaim Confucianism as the State religion of the Republic did not succeed; complete secularisation and the separation of Church from State was aimed at. From 1911 to 1917 the Republican Government persecuted the Buddhist religion and its monastic orders. The official renaissance was free-thinking; it advocated free inquiry and opposed religion. Meantime internal movements of reform sprang up within the existing religious structure. "The followers of these religions began to set their hopes on new pronouncements and new organisations. No less than six new Buddhist journals have been started in recent years. Whilst materialist philosophy and anti-theistic study made further and further inroads, there were, nevertheless, growing numbers of young men and women who turned to religion as the solution of their difficulties. Girls and young men left their schools and professions to lead the ascetic lives of Buddhist devotees." Efforts were made to assimilate Confucianism and Buddhism. In 1910 a Chinese National Political Association was formed for that purpose and the monasteries and monastic orders were reorganised.

But the official tendency of the Chinese renaissance turned whole-heartedly in the direction of modern Europe. Barriers

were broken down that had stood for thousands of years, a new literary language was created modelled on the vernacular, and this brought the democratisation of culture within the bounds of possibility. People set to work busily to translate from foreign languages. Chinese history was studied with methods of modern criticism, and special attention was paid to the golden age of Chinese art; all kinds of modern questions were discussed in the newer journals; the relation of the sexes, modern education, the social problem, the latest ideas and views in Europe and America were examined. The Society for Lectures on New Learning invited foreign scholars to lecture in China.

In spite of the civil wars and the disturbances in the interior, the renaissance gained impetus and inspiration. The China National Association for the Advancement of Education set to work to reform the Universities and secondary schools. The National Popular Education Association set before itself the task of stamping out illiteracy within a few short years. These societies developed vigorous activities. Modern methods of education were adopted. The constitution proclaimed during the Presidency of Ts'ao k'un enacted: "Citizens of the Chinese Republic must receive a primary education." New Universities were founded, and were especially endowed with technical and commercial faculties; trade and professional schools were established; particular care was devoted to girls' education. In many cases co-education of the sexes was introduced. A much-cited maxim declared: "Educate the girls, for they are our children's earliest teachers." Popular lectures, evening courses, and free libraries were started. The best illustration of educational progress is given by the figures for the Shansi Province in the interior, west of Peking; this, it is true, became a model province under the guidance of the Governor, Yen-shu-shou. The figures are:

	1916.	1919.	1922.
Colleges and Universities	4	5	5
Students	1,119	1,267	1,958
Secondary Schools	30	44	51
Pupils	4,703	9,901	12,829
Primary Schools	11,393	16,519	26,834
Pupils	309,651	551,656	1,052,912

Great difficulties hampered the development of the school system, for the educational organisation, unlike that introduced by England in Egypt or India, was built up by the people's own efforts; nor was it a question of educating a small class of intellectuals, but mainly of spreading education among the people by a broad network of primary schools. For this purpose the first essential was the establishment of teachers' training colleges. In the first instance it was only possible to introduce compulsory education in the towns for children between six and ten, but a decree of the Minister of Education issued on November 1st, 1922, made compulsion universal. Stress was also laid upon the introduction into the schools of athletic sports on the English model.

Side by side with this forward move in education, the radical reorganisation of the judicial system marked the changed outlook in China since 1911. An immense work of legislation and codification has been accomplished. A new Criminal Code was published in 1912, with addenda in 1914, and in the same year an Act regulating citizenship and naturalisation was promulgated. The Commercial Code of 1914 was authoritative on questions concerning trading companies, the exchange, the Chambers of Commerce, commercial courts of arbitration, and the registration of companies. In 1914 a mining law was promulgated, in 1915 a law of copyright, in 1923 a patent law. Under a series of Acts between 1912 and 1920 forty-nine new and up-to-date prisons were built. A Codification Commission appointed in 1914 is considering new laws in the Civil Code with the assistance of French and Japanese experts.

But even more important than these reforms in the various branches of public administration were the fundamental changes in Chinese intellectual life due to Western influence. The stirring of a new spirit had made itself felt ever since the beginning of the twentieth century. But it had only touched the surface of Chinese life. At the end of the nineteenth century Western scientific and philosophical books were first translated into Chinese. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*, Spencer's *Sociology*, Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, were amongst the earliest books to be made accessible to the Chinese public and to sharpen their critical sense. Hitherto all Chinese education

had been strictly classical and humanist, and at the same time severely orthodox. The works of the Chinese classical authors and their commentators were studied. The written language was that of the classics, one that had been dead for centuries and was wholly unlike the vernacular actually talked by the people. There was no teaching except this voluminous memorising of classical scholarship; no technical subjects or applied sciences were taught. It was not till 1902 that a beginning was made in the establishment of modern schools and that students were sent abroad by the Government. Three years later the existing examination system, which applied only to the Chinese classics, was abolished, and at the same time a commission was sent to Europe and America to study public institutions there.

A beginning was made likewise with representative assemblies; in 1909 Provincial Assemblies were summoned, and the following year a National Assembly followed, intended to be the forerunner of a Parliament. The Revolution of 1911 hastened this incipient rejuvenation of Chinese civilisation, which had seemed absolutely stationary for so long. A rising tide of a conscious nationalism expelled the Manchu dynasty, thus overthrowing the dominion of an alien conquering people, and then sought, by means of constitutional reform and a revival of national vigour, to strengthen China in her resistance to the attacks of the Western barbarians, but recently regarded with such scorn, and of their imitators the Japanese. Simultaneously we find a revolt of the progressive intellectuals against all traditional accepted authority, an awakening of the critical spirit, and, further, the discovery of a new world and the rediscovery of elemental man. The success of the revolution, the overthrow of a State organisation thousands of years old and to all appearances so firmly established, this achievement enhanced the nation's self-assurance and restored unshaken confidence in its own strength. The World War was to China a respite during which her industry and her other activities could develop undisturbed; it caused a burst of industrial prosperity which stimulated the merchant class in particular to understand the significance of the new nationalist movement and lend it their support.

In 1917 China experienced a further revolution, this time not political but linguistic and literary. Like every national renaissance, China's inevitably included a rebirth of her language. Instead of the classic language of scholarship hitherto holding sway, a new literary language had to be moulded from the vernacular. This revolution was heralded by the journal *Youth*. It explained the poverty of latter-day Chinese literature and intellectual life by the fact that all expression was bound in the fetters of a language long dead. Just as the English Midland dialect became England's literary language through Chaucer and Wyclif's translation of the Bible, and just as literary German evolved from the Saxon dialect of Middle High German by the agency of Luther's translation of the Bible, so a new literary idiom must be created from the everyday speech of Northern China, the Mandarin dialect. "No dead language can stir up a living revolution." Writing in *New Youth* and *Renaissance*, certain professors at the Chinese National University of Peking, in particular Hu Shih, strove for a critical revolution of China's ancient culture and a critical infusion of new ideas and ideals from the West. Around this movement the great national anti-Japanese demonstration in 1919 revolved. Young China felt the influence of modern European philosophy. Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Eucken, and Bergson made their mark upon the students organised in the "New Culture Movement." "The Society for the Organisation of the National Heritage" sought to apply Western methods to the ancient Chinese classics and devoted itself to critical historical research. This critical mood led naturally to the dissolution of religious beliefs and ties, and produced a type of free thought akin to the French age of reason. Towards the end of 1922 a definitely anti-religious movement set in among Chinese students, and in 1924 and 1925 especially its strength increased. They opposed Christianity from national motives as well. In the weekly journal *Awakening*, appearing in Shanghai, a feud was carried on against Christian missions "based on our national consciousness and the scientific spirit"; but the paper's opposition to religion in general was due to the fact that it is a conservative force, impeding scientific enlightenment and augmenting the sense of dependence instead of teaching self-help, and that sectarian strife

is a menace to national unity and the harmonious relations of all mankind.

Hu Shih, one of the founders of the cultural renaissance, summed up its aims; all that could be said, he declared, was that there was a Chinese renaissance and a new China was coming to birth. It was no mere modernisation of unessential externals, but a great transformation of the whole edifice of national life. Old ideals and conceptions were being undermined by a critical temper, and new ideas and ideals were reaching the Chinese and undergoing a process of adaptation and selection; old institutions were undergoing critical examination; age and authority were no longer held to be a sufficient justification for a custom or institution. The vast field of ancient tradition and scholarship was being subjected to systematic examination by modern historical methods. The history of Chinese thought was being written anew, and Confucianism, seen in historical perspective, was now recognised as only one of many philosophical systems and no longer regarded as a universal religion, as had formerly been taught. The history of Chinese literature and language was being studied anew, and the Chinese were beginning to grasp the fact that their classical literature, which had absorbed Chinese men of letters for thousands of years, was not the only literature produced by the creative genius of the Chinese people; that genius had been perpetually and ceaselessly at work altering and gradually improving the people's living speech, in which the true creators of literature had produced their great poems and tales and dramas. Folk-songs in all dialects were being collected under the direction of the National University at Peking. They were witnessing no slavish imitation of the West, but the rebirth of an ancient civilisation, guided by a new inspiration and a new outlook on life, the fruit of direct contact with the ideas and methods of the modern world.

Thus in Northern China the Revolution fulfilled itself in a rebirth of art, language, and philosophy, whilst in the South it worked itself out in the sphere of national, constitutional, and social life, mainly thanks to the personality of the great revolutionary Sun Yat Sen and the nationalist revolutionary Kuo Min Tang party under his influence. This party realised that the Revolution demanded a new social order. In the

great success the Chinese social problems had become more acute in recent years and the socialist thoughts had been turned towards social reforms. The Kuo Min Tang likewise felt the influence of the Russian Revolution more strongly, and was the first to enter into relations with it. Before his death in March 1924 Sun Yat Sen summed up his final attitude in the following letter to the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "As I lie here looking with an illness against which there can be nothing, my thoughts turn to you and the fate of my party and my country. You stand at the head of the Union of free peoples, the friends left to the oppressed East to the oppressed peoples of the world. With the help of that heritage the enemies of Imperialism will be able to escape from the international system which is based upon servitude and injustice. I shall have helped to a party which, as I have always hoped, will be allied with you in the historic task of freeing China and other oppressed peoples everywhere from the yoke of Imperialism. I shall have my task completed and shall leave it to those who will remain faithful to the party's principles and demands. I therefore charge the Kuo Min Tang to carry on the work of the national revolutionary movement, so that China may be free. To that end I have recommended my party to remain in constant touch with you. I have no remaining doubt that you will continue to help my country as you have done in the past. In taking leave of you I desire to express the hope that the day will not come when the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics will welcome a free and powerful China as a friend and ally, and that in the great struggle for the liberation of the world's oppressed peoples these two allies may advance side by side from victory to victory." In January, 1926, the Sun Yat Sen University was opened in Moscow, attended by two hundred and fifty Chinese students, including forty women, all members of the Kuo Min Tang.

In the course of correspondence with the East, revolutionaries of both kinds experienced a growing understanding. Just as Trotsky and the Communists formed a bridge for Stalin to Western Asia, so in the early days of the Russian Revolution Mongolia presented a means of communication with China. It had already formed that bridge in 1919.

days. In 1911, after the Chinese Revolution, Mongolia had declared its independence under the Hutuchtu of Urga, one of the most exalted lamas and representatives of Buddha on earth. This revolution involved separation from China, but not any Europeanising or reform of existing conditions. The hereditary nobility and the priesthood continued to exercise their traditional authority. Russia was interested in the independence of Mongolia and signed a treaty at Urga in the autumn of 1912, recognising Mongolian autonomy and promising to support its maintenance. In 1913 Mongolia's autonomy under Chinese suzerainty was recognised by China and Russia, and relations were so developed in the Treaty of Kiachta of 1915 that, although China's nominal suzerainty remained, actually a Russian protectorate was established. Disorders broke out after the Russian Revolution, and Mongolia was soon drawn into the eddy. China tried to use the opportunity to restore her former authority. The troops sent to Mongolia compelled the country in November, 1919, to renounce her special position. A certain Baron Ungern-Sternberg, a follower of the counter-revolutionary Cossack Hetman Semionov who held sway in Transbaikalia, attacked Urga in October, 1920, and captured it in February, 1921. The Chinese were driven out, Mongolia's independence was proclaimed under the rule of the "Living Buddha," and Baron Ungern-Sternberg was appointed Commander-in-Chief. A ghastly reign of terror ensued under this half-insane adventurer, and the coronation of the Living Buddha in May, 1921, was made the occasion of a manifesto against Soviet Russia couched in terms which mingled apocalyptic mysticism and lama theology. But the occupation of Mongolia by Russian counter-revolutionary forces gave the Russian Revolution, which had already conquered the whole of Siberia, a pretext to advance into Mongolia. In June, 1921, Baron Ungern-Sternberg's forces were defeated near Kiachta and a people's republic under Russian influence was established in Mongolia. In the treaty of November 5th, 1921, Russia and Mongolia accorded one another mutual recognition and concluded an alliance. It was not till then that a transformation of Mongolia's social and spiritual life made its appearance as the accompaniment of outward political change. The hereditary nobility was swept away

and replaced by younger men in the administration. The old feudal army made way for a modern Mongolian national army, European administrative reforms were introduced, and a Mongolian Academy was founded, at least on paper. A Russo-Mongolian bank and a Russo-Mongolian telegraph Convention aimed at creating economic ties between Mongolia and Russia. It was a strange spectacle to see the Mongolian Prime Minister, one of the Living Buddhas of Outer Mongolia, Chuhauch-Hutuchtu, taking part in a Red First of May celebration. In the autumn of 1926 the "first Buddhist world exhibition" was to be organised in Leningrad.

Another method open to Russia, especially in her efforts to make contact with Japan, was the creation of the Far Eastern Republic after the overthrow of the counter-revolution led by Kolchak and the Czechoslovak legionaries in Siberia. Early in 1920 a series of small States made their appearance east of Lake Baikal, and united in the course of the year in the Far Eastern Republic. But Vladivostok and the coastal region were still occupied by Japanese troops, and a counter-revolution in Vladivostok in May, 1921, only succeeded because the officially neutral Japanese troops gave it cover in the rear. Soviet Russia used the Far Eastern Republic as a buffer State, and at the same time as an intermediary in her negotiations with Japan in which she sought first to secure Japanese evacuation of the whole of Eastern Siberia and in the long run a Russo-Japanese alliance. That year saw the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance which for twenty years had been a pillar of international policy in Eastern Asia; simultaneously the danger of a conflict between Japan and the United States of North America became more serious, whilst for various reasons Great Britain's standpoint approximated more and more to that of America. Japan was therefore obliged, if she did not want to remain isolated, to seek new allies. When the Conference of Washington was about to meet at the end of 1922, including among its objects the settlement of Far Eastern questions, Japan agreed to evacuate Eastern Siberia in order to have her rear free in Asia.

In the Far East also revolutionary Russia succeeded, therefore, in subduing the counter-revolution and, further, in liberating the whole of what had been Russian territory

from foreign occupation. But she carried her triumph farther than Tsarist Russia had ever done in the past. By virtue of her reforms she had attached Mongolia to herself more firmly and hoped to bring about an alliance with China and Japan such as Tsardom had never known. Though the actual theories of Bolshevism made no more progress in Eastern Asia than in the west of the great continent, yet here they entered as a powerful leaven into the general ferment stirring in a peculiar culture.

After the Revolution Russia had addressed herself to China, as she did to Turkey and Persia, and proclaimed the new principle in accordance with which she proposed to respect the full independence of Asiatic States and therefore to renounce all concessions and privileges, as also the capitulations. Since the Revolution China had striven for precisely these things, the abolition of the privileges hitherto enjoyed by foreigners, especially the capitulations and extra-territorial rights. Extra-territoriality was based on treaties with sixteen States; it was only possible, therefore, to abolish it in respect of the citizens of the separate States by mutual agreement. As a result of China's entry into the World War in 1917 Germany and Austria-Hungary forfeited the right of extra-territoriality and their citizens became subject to the Chinese courts. Since the end of the war China had concluded treaties of friendship with Bolivia in 1919 and Persia in 1920 which expressly recognised that the citizens of those States enjoyed no special rights in civil or criminal actions. The Conference of Washington in 1922 gave China her opportunity to demand the abolition of the capitulations; a Commission was appointed to inquire whether Chinese legislation had already reached a point at which the European States could renounce their territorial jurisdiction. But Russia was the only Great Power to renounce capitulations and privileges of her own free will. It is easy to understand that the Chinese Nationalist Party welcomed her action as a precedent.

It was not till the summer of 1922 that negotiations began between Russia and China. They dragged on for three years in consequence of the disturbances in China, the mastery of the generals in Peking, and the various foreign influences dominant there. The first plenipotentiary sent by Russia to

conclude a treaty with China, Joffe, declared when he arrived at Harbin: "Soviet Russia is watching the struggle in China with close attention, for Soviet Russia is the only country which repudiates all imperialist policies. We are following hopefully the growth of national consciousness in many millions of Chinese; for together with the Russian Revolution this awakening of the Chinese people is a factor of immense historical significance." When Joffe reached Peking, Dr. Tsan-yuan-pei, the Chancellor of the National Chinese University there, declared: "The penetration of China by European thought has set on foot a process of social, economic, and political development in the land. The Chinese Revolution was a political revolution. It is now striving to extend to the social sphere. Therein Russia has set a good example to China." From the vantage ground of China Joffe tried to enter into negotiations with Japan as well. But the conference which took place in September, 1921, led nowhere for the time being. Joffe's negotiations with Sun Yat Sen were more fruitful. On January 26th, 1923, a joint communiqué was issued on the two statesmen's negotiations, announcing that both were agreed that the Russian Communist economic system could not be introduced into China, as existing conditions were not favourable. Joffe for his part stressed the fact that China's greatest need at the moment was the achievement of national unity and complete independence, and to that end she could rely upon Russian support. He reiterated his Government's declaration of September 27th, 1920, renouncing all privileges and concessions, including the Eastern Chinese railway which belonged to Russia, but ran through Manchuria. The two statesmen reached agreement on the question of the administration of this railway and of relations with Inner Mongolia.

When Joffe failed in a renewed attempt to come to an understanding with Japan he quitted the Far East and was succeeded that same year by Karakhan as Russian plenipotentiary. At this juncture the European Powers were making fresh demands, and it had become clear that no sincere desire for a new relation with China subsisted among the Great Powers, either in the Versailles or the Washington negotiations. Karakhan was, therefore, received with high honours, and in his speeches he compared China's position

with Russia's between 1917 and 1920, when the counter-revolution was attacking her on all sides under the direction of the Great Powers; he pointed to the example of Turkey, which had won complete independence, and declared that Russia was China's only true friend; an alliance between the two Powers offered the best guarantee of peace in the East. On May 31st, 1924, a Russo-Chinese treaty of friendship was actually signed, settling all outstanding questions between the two Powers. Shortly afterwards the Russo-Japanese treaty followed, providing the basis for a complete understanding between the two States.

Thus a Russo-Sino-Japanese bloc seemed in process of formation in Eastern Asia; its solidarity, however, was still to be tested by coming events, and it did not prove lasting, although its permanence seemed assured by the building of the English naval base at Singapore, America's hostility to Japan, and the implacable enmity of the Conservative Governments in Washington and London to revolutionary Russia. Growing mistrust of America and the British Empire obliged Japan to look towards Asia. A Pan-Asiatic League recently founded in Japan seeks to create a bloc of all the Asiatic peoples in opposition to the white race and its attempted domination. The realisation of the scheme will be prevented by internal conflicts in all Eastern countries. But the mere attempt is an expression of the growing sense of unity in the awakening East as against the white race, and the Russian Revolution has acted in several directions as a stimulus to this development.

But political awakening was accompanied by a new moral consciousness, a new attitude towards Europe and its problems. It was a similar reaction to the Slavophil movement in Russia. Europe, and all that Europe had to show in industry, thought, and ethics were severely criticised, and simple generalisations contrasted the materialism of the West with the idealism of the East. Doubts began to be cast on European ethics, which had only recently been joyfully acclaimed as the loftier and freer code, and on the blessings of European civilisation. This was partly due to the frequently shameless and unblushing conduct of the European Powers where their trade and financial interests were involved. One of the best examples is the opium question; even at the

League of Nations Opium Conference in 1925 we find the same characteristic attitude as in the conduct of England and other European nations towards China at the beginning of the nineteenth century. "Surely nothing that has yet been done in China can be regarded as the slightest compensation for the hideous suffering brought upon the people of that great country by the opium trade. The sole aim of that infamous trade was monetary profit. The traders must have been well aware that opium smoking was a curse to China in every respect. But that was nothing to the English merchants, capitalists, politicians, or statesmen. Large profits could be made with a relatively small outlay. An opium monopoly might benefit the finances of the poverty-stricken Indian State. Opium, therefore, was good business. The lucky adventurers who had made millions out of the degradation of the Chinese exercised great political influence on their return home. No notice was taken of the constant protests of the Chinese Government. The vigorous agitation of English philanthropists, in which the Quakers took a leading part, was ignored. The universal testimony of doctors and other independent witnesses regarding the criminal injury to the physical and spiritual welfare of the Chinese was brushed aside, and England forced more than one war upon the unhappy and wholly unprepared Chinese, all in the interests of traders in this dangerous and poisonous drug. England seized Chinese territory in order to provide harbours for her smugglers, so that she could land her increasing cargoes of opium in China in spite of the Government's resistance."

All European ethics appeared double-faced and riddled with hypocrisy and lies. All grandiloquent pronouncements seemed at bottom only a cloak for the attempt to exploit commercial dominance. On the pretext of protecting the rights of foreigners, military expeditions are sent to Egypt or China, supporting these foreigners in their religious propaganda and their efforts to secure political control, whilst at the same time States inhabited by the white race refuse even the right of immigration to Asiatics, although the latter have no desire to conduct religious or political propaganda. Asiatics discovered that the white man's burden, willingly shouldered, of imparting to the coloured peoples the blessings

of a higher civilisation, meant in fact the burden unwillingly shouldered by the coloured races of providing Europe with an object of exploitation for her own profit; and this discovery led Asiatics to despair of European civilisation and turn romantically to their own past, yearning for their own mediæval era. Thus Pramatha Nath Bose shows that an independent India adopting Western European institutions would not conduce to India's happiness; the blessings of the new civilisation would only impoverish India. It would be no advantage to replace the principal English officials by Indians who imitated their way of life. The example set by rich Indian officials would be even more powerful than it then was, and the demand for European goods would increase. Thus exploitation for the profit of foreign capital would not only continue, but would be extended. European education only estranged the people from their surroundings, augmenting and altering their demands, but not teaching them how to satisfy those demands. With the introduction of Home Rule, India might become still further enmeshed in the disastrous toils of Western civilisation without any adequate counterbalancing advantage; the West would crush and stifle India in a yet closer embrace. India's salvation was not to be found in the political sphere, in the desire to be one of the Great Powers of the day, but in a return to her modest position which yet, in his eyes, was one of solitary grandeur and glory; not in the forward march along the road of Western civilisation, but in a retreat to the farthest attainable point; not by enmeshing herself completely in the silken toils of the garment of the West, but by exerting every effort to cast it away as far as possible.

Rabindranath Tagore and Gandhi in India, Ku-hung Ming in China, each in his own way, give expression to the same trend of thought. Another writer, Ananda Coomaraswamy, in his *Message of the East* compares Europe and Asia: "The Western nations, after a period of unparalleled success in the investigation of the concrete world, the 'conquest of nature,' and the adaptation of mechanical contrivances to the material ends of life, are approaching in every department a certain critical period. The far-reaching developments of commercialism are undermining their own stability. One-tenth of the British population dies in the gaol, the workhouse,

or the lunatic asylum. The increasing contrast between extremes of wealth and poverty, the unemployed and many other urgent problems point the same moral. Extreme developments of vulgarity and selfishness imply the necessary reaction. To Europe in this crisis the East brings a message: the East has indeed revealed a new world to the West, which will be the inspiration of a 'Renaissance' more profound and far-reaching than that which resulted from the rediscovery of the classic world of the West. As the message of the West has been one of diversity, analysis, and the separate self, so the message of the East is one of the unity of all life, of synthesis, and the universal self. But the modern civilisation received from Europe threatens to smother true Asiatic civilisation. A century of 'progress' has brought India to the stage where almost everything of beauty and romance belongs to her past. But the West has this advantage, that it has learnt to subordinate material aims to spiritual values, whilst the East has only borrowed the former from Europe. There is no object in achieving a political revolution and winning independence of European domination, if at the same time the East remains in spiritual subjection to European influence. India and the East must proclaim their own message through their own life. That is their obligation towards mankind. That is their service in the creation of a new humanity. Therefore I say, awake while there is yet time. Ye are the salt of the earth: but if the salt have lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted? And even if you persist in believing that everything European is fair and everything Indian barbarous, yet remember that the highest ideal of nationality is service. You will be judged, not by what you successfully assimilate, but what you contribute to the culture and civilisation of humanity. Not merely is it impossible for you to reproduce (you can only caricature) the outward forms of Western civilisation, but it is a mistaken aim. In the lofty words of Sri Krishna: 'Better is one's own duty, though insignificant, than the duty of another, even though performed with brilliance.' The West will not fail to unearth and sooner or later assimilate the message of the East. But how different the power of that message delivered by the teachers of a living people whose own inspiration it still is, and its power if merely found to be implicit

in their ancient culture, and not realised in their actual lives. How great is the responsibility of those who are the hereditary guardians of this message. Theirs is the choice between intellectual and spiritual slavery, and intellectual and spiritual service. One choice is death, the other life."¹

Conscious of these things, the new nationalism attacked Europe with increasing severity. Europe is no longer an ideal and a pattern in the conduct of a life independent, but European, with all the latest and most complete developments of democracy and applied science such as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have brought forth. The principal charge levelled by the new nationalism against Europe is that it has not trained the East for independence, but rather has undermined its independence by rousing the imitative impulse. Dr. Coomaraswamy, who has done much for the revival and rebirth of Indian art and is custodian of the Museum of Indian Art in Boston, reproaches Europe, saying that one of the most remarkable features of British rule in India is that the greatest injuries inflicted upon the Indian people have the outward appearance of blessings. Education was a terrible instance. It was sometimes said that the nationalist movement in the East was the natural outcome of English education, and a thing of which England should be proud, for it proved that under the Pax Britannica Indians were at last growing fit for self-government. But the facts were otherwise. If the Indians were still capable of self-government, it was in spite of the anti-national tendency of a system of education which misunderstood or despised almost every ideal upon which India's civilisation was based. The profoundest condemnation of that education lay in the fact that it had destroyed all capacity to appreciate Indian culture in the great majority of those subjected to its influence.

The imitation of Western customs and dress has now given place to a newly awakened love and understanding of the whole manner of life and dignity of the East. These new nationalists are equally angry with the Europe which attempted to assimilate the East to itself and invented a facile system of education instead of labouring to work out a new method in harmony with Eastern tradition, and with their

¹ *The Message of the East.* By Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Ganesh, Madras, 1910, pp. 3, 4, 12, 31, 36.

own fellow-countrymen educated and dressed in the European style, who in spite of their nationalist principles have lost touch with their own civilisation and have even forfeited the power of understanding and appreciating their own art and customs. During the nineteenth century the West strove to civilise the barbarian East, and the outcome was the educated Oriental, alienated from his own people, his family, and his traditions. In the twentieth century the East has remembered that it possesses a civilisation of its own; it measures itself by the Western standard and realises that often its own level is the higher. It begins to resist the attempt to change the foundation on which its life is based. Both of these tendencies, that of the nineteenth and of the twentieth century, were liable to exaggeration and generalisation. The one accepted and the other rejected Europe, the one condemned and the other exalted the East, both uncritically.

Asia's new attitude contributed also to the rising consciousness of Eastern unity. The Indian reformer and revolutionary, Lajpat Rai, has summed up these tendencies in a book on Japan: "That the East must imbibe something of the aggressive spirit of the West and must also adopt and assimilate the intellectual achievements of the West if she wants to regain her self-respect, goes without saying, but it would be nothing short of a calamity to her as well as to humanity at large if she goes so far as to lose her individuality and become either a copy or a duplicate of the West. I want to establish that even at the present moment there is a fundamental unity between India, China, and Japan, and that the Western influences over these countries have not yet advanced sufficiently far to destroy that unity; that the said influences are, everywhere, in these countries, producing more or less the same results . . . and that in order to maintain their individual character . . . they shall have to struggle hard against the levelling influences of the West."¹

"Asia is a unity," proclaimed Kakuzo Okakura from Japan. "Arabian chivalry, Persian poetry, Chinese ethics, and the Indian world of thought, all speak of an ancient epoch in which a common life grew up in the soil of a uniform Asiatic peace; it bears a different character in different parts,

¹ *The Evolution of Japan and other Papers.* By Lajpat Rai, Chatterjee, Calcutta, pp. 87 and 96.

but nowhere do we find a hard-and-fast dividing line. Islam itself may be described as Confucianism on horseback, sword in hand." Thus it is precisely in nationalism that the consciousness of Eastern unity originates. For the present it is a sentiment of defensive solidarity in face of a united white race. But it may be the first step towards a world consciousness which for the first time in history will embrace mankind as a whole.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN EGYPT

EGYPT was the first Oriental country to come in contact with modern Europe. The French Revolution, which bore the tide of rationalist enlightenment as far as Russia, also reached Egypt. Napoleon landed in Egypt in 1798; the aim and pretext of this military expedition were a striking prelude to the country's history throughout the nineteenth century, during which period such expeditions recurred again and again. Napoleon wanted to use Egypt as a halting-place on the road to India, in order to advance further and strike at England in her Indian possessions. It was then only a few decades since the English had destroyed French hegemony in India and assumed it themselves instead. Napoleon recognised Egypt's strategic importance on the road to Asia, as he had recognised Malta's importance when he took it from the Knights Templars and tried to make it a base on the new sea route. In both cases the English followed his example. At that time Napoleon was already planning the Suez Canal. His Egyptian campaign, however, resulted in a decisive French defeat; it led to the British victory over the French fleet, beginning at Abu Qir, and ended in making Britain mistress of the seas. But Napoleon's Egyptian campaign likewise determined England to tolerate no other European rival in Egypt and to make that country, with Malta and Gibraltar, her third base on the great imperial route to India. Thenceforward English nineteenth-century policy never lost sight of this aim.

Napoleon, as he announced in his proclamations, had undertaken the campaign in order to restore the authority of Egypt's suzerain, the Turkish Sultan, which had been undermined by the victorious revolt of the Mamelukes, the warlike caste who actually ruled the country. It soon proved, however, that France was not concerned with the Sultan's interests but with the establishment of a French protectorate in Egypt.

The Sultan, therefore, attacked the French army of occupation, and in so doing found natural allies in the English. On this occasion Egypt was saved from the fate of becoming a protectorate by the mutual jealousies of the European Powers. Those same jealousies were to protect her eighty years longer from occupation by European Powers. In order to attack the Turkish armies, Napoleon entered upon his Syrian campaign; but the undertaking was a thorny one and quickly failed. From the earliest times the conquest of Syria has been the aim of any expansionist policy in Egypt. To the west and north the road is blocked by desert and sea; to the south it leads to unbearably hot and barbarian countries. Only Syria held out to the Egyptian conquerors fruitful cultivated land and an important bridge to the other civilised countries of Hither Asia. The Pharaohs repeatedly directed their warlike expeditions against Syria. Ali Bey, the Mameluke leader who expelled the Turkish Pasha from Egypt, likewise led his troops to Syria in 1771 and captured it from the Sultan for a short time. Napoleon followed in his footsteps, and somewhat later Mohammed Ali. It was a matter of course, therefore, when England controlled Egypt's destiny that she should make it a starting-point on the road to Syria. But it was not till the World War that the opportunity presented itself to Allenby. Ever since the occupation of Egypt by the English the fear that the unbelievers would use it as a base to threaten the three Holy Cities of Islam, Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, and take possession of them, had troubled Mohammedan circles. And in fact the English did endeavour during the World War to make the Red Sea with its coastal territories an English sea.

Napoleon did not stay long in Egypt. His successor, General Kleber, was killed by an Egyptian. General Menou then assumed command of the French troops; he himself had embraced Islam and married an Egyptian wife, and his sympathies were with the Egyptians. He tried, moreover, to carry out a series of reforms, favouring the Egyptians and Mohammedans, but the simultaneous proclamation of a French protectorate over Egypt alienated the Egyptians from the French. The British troops succeeded in defeating the French and compelling them to leave the country. Both French and English had announced that they had only come

for a limited period in order to support the Sultan's legitimate authority. But both endeavoured to erect the temporary occupation into a permanency. So the English troops stayed on, and it was not till 1807 that Mohammed Ali succeeded in driving them out, inflicting on them the severest defeats that the English had ever suffered in the East; he was able to exhibit four hundred and fifty English soldiers' heads on the citadel of Cairo.

The cultural effect of the five years of French occupation was of far greater importance than its political results. Here for the first time an Eastern people came into contact with the new Europe that was to emerge from the French Revolution, and the watchwords of equality and liberty reverberated in the French proclamations. The French carried out administrative reforms and also established representative bodies.

Nor did Napoleon's campaign mark the birth of modern Egypt alone; it involved also the discovery of ancient Egypt. Napoleon brought with him on his staff a number of the most distinguished scholars of his day. He founded an Egyptian Institute with the object of exploring modern Egypt scientifically, and the first steps were taken in excavation, thus reconstructing the buried world of antiquity. Egypt's former greatness and her art and learning were resuscitated before the astonished eyes of the Egyptians, and played a part in awakening Egyptian national consciousness in the nineteenth century.

After the disorders in which Napoleon's campaign had plunged the country, it had the good fortune to find in Mohammed Ali a statesman and organiser who created a new Egypt and founded it on a solid base. Mohammed Ali resembled Napoleon in many traits. He was an Albanian who had worked his way up from the ranks of the soldiery, an uneducated man who did not learn to read and write and understand Arabic till he reached manhood, and then only with great difficulty. But he had the natural gifts of a born ruler. He finally broke the power of the Mamelukes, created an Egyptian army and navy, carried through land reforms which bettered the lot of the fellaheen, and also won their support by the construction of new irrigation works; he promoted cotton growing and built the harbour of Alexandria. Though he himself had enjoyed no schooling he understood

the value of a thorough education, and he wanted to put his country in a position to benefit by European progress. He invited Europeans to come to Egypt, sent students to study at European Universities, and established a number of schools in the country itself, including a Medical College where he himself paid for the instruction of indigent students. Himself a barbarian, he could yet appreciate European advantages, and his thorough-going reforms frequently remind us of Peter the Great's activities in Russia.

Besides being the great organiser who created modern Egypt, he was a successful general. He conquered the Sudan, founded the city of Khartoum, and so laid the basis of Egyptian rule in the Sudan. But his military campaigns were especially directed against Syria and the Hejaz, as always in Egyptian history. Led by his son, Ibrahim, his army drove the Wahabis from Mecca and Medina and occupied Inner Arabia for years. It seemed that a wide field of further activity stood open to his energy. The weakness of the Turkish Empire tempted him to conquer and reform it, restore the Caliphate to Egypt, and establish a vigorous and rejuvenated empire in Western Asia. In 1832, after the capture of Konia, Ibrahim's armies were stationed in Asia Minor and the road to Constantinople lay open before them. But the Great European Powers, especially England, scented the danger of a reformed and invigorated Near East, and matters fell out as they have on repeated subsequent occasions: whenever the Eastern peoples have set about reforming their constitutional and social life by their own resolution and energy and so guarding the East from European interference, the European Powers have prevented them and intervened in the name of law and order and the protection of the *status quo*. At this time the Turkish people welcomed Mohammed Ali as the powerful defender of Islam. But English and Russian pressure obliged Mohammed Ali to desist from a further advance, so that he could only extend his rule over Syria. In 1839 the Sultan tried to attack him and recover Syria. This time, too, the Turkish armies were defeated, and only the intervention of England forced Mohammed Ali to retreat into Egypt and content himself with that country and the position of an hereditary prince under the Sultan's suzerainty.

Egypt continued to enjoy happiness and prosperity under Mohammed Ali's successors, especially Said. The condition of the fellaheen was good; the country had no debts, and the revenue, flowing in regularly, sufficed to cover expenditure and to construct railways and canals. The situation changed under Said's heir, Ismail. At first Ismail tried to follow Mohammed Ali's example and to introduce European reforms; a number of important public works owe their origin to him. But the immense cost of his extravagant court brought impoverishment and misery upon the fellaheen; their taxes became an intolerable burden and they suffered severely from the oppression of the tax-gatherers. At the same time Ismail put himself in the power of European finance by the acceptance of foreign loans; here, as with other Oriental Powers, financial dependence led to political dependence and the loss of the country's independence. Ismail's financial embarrassments obliged him to sell his shares in the Suez Canal Company to the British Government. It was, perhaps, one of the most far-seeing moves in Disraeli's imperialist policy that he exploited this opportunity in order to secure English control of the Canal. The price of the shares was not quite four million pounds, and Ismail devoted the money largely to unsuccessful military expeditions against Abyssinia. "This comparatively small financial operation brought about the long-delayed crisis and paved the way for the future prosperity of Egypt, for it induced the British Government to inquire more carefully into the financial condition of the country."¹ England sent a financial commission to Egypt, and other commissions followed. Each one reduced Ismail to further dependence upon Europe and involved another step towards the destruction of Egypt's independence. Great Britain seemed to be within sight of the occupation of Egypt, a goal which she had kept before her ever since the Napoleonic campaign. But its accomplishment was to be preceded by events which, whilst they led directly to the occupation, were nevertheless the first signal of an awakening national consciousness in Egypt and of the fellaheen's approach to political maturity.

England and France, as representing the principal creditors, forced financial control upon Egypt, and Ismail's deposition

¹ *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

ensued. He was succeeded by his son Tewfik. The English Finance Commissioner was Major Evelyn Baring, who as Lord Cromer was later to control the destinies of Egypt for twenty-six years. This open establishment of a European controlling organ, which intervened in all Egypt's internal affairs, set ablaze the first Egyptian independence movement under Arabi Pasha. This was the first awakening of political consciousness among the fellaheen, who were in revolt, not only against the threat of a European occupation of Egypt, but still more against the small upper class of Turkish and Circassian tyrants whose misrule had brought Egypt to the verge of ruin. The European Press and European diplomats followed their invariable custom and represented this struggle of a long oppressed people for freedom, not as an act of patriotism, but as an outburst of fanaticism directed against Europeans, and a revolt of irresponsible soldiers and agitators against all authority and order.

Arabi Pasha was the son of a fellah from Lower Egypt, and throughout his leadership he displayed all the weaknesses and peculiar characteristics of his race. He was, in fact, their very incarnation. He was neither a great soldier nor a great organiser, and the defeat of his troops was largely due to his irresolution. He was a good orator, and he had studied for several years at El Azhar, which raised him above his fellows. By good fortune he had been made a colonel, an honour for which the fellaheen were generally ineligible and which was open to none but Turkish and Circassian officers. He began his political career by leading a revolt of the handful of Egyptian officers against the favour shown to Turks in the army. In doing this Arabi Pasha was a conscious Egyptian, a representative of his race, and he proudly called himself *El Masri*, the Egyptian. The motto "*Masr li'lmasrijin*" (Egypt for the Egyptians) was heard for the first time in his day.

This military fellaheen movement allied itself with the efforts to effect reforms which emanated from the famous centre of Mohammedan learning, El Azhar University. We may regard the great Jemal ud-Din el Afghani as their originator, the awakener of all modern political consciousness in Islam, who has left traces of his influence in almost all Eastern countries. But his influence struck deepest in

Egypt and Persia. There he was the teacher of the rising generation and the father of the revolution destined to be effected in both countries. By his persuasion the spirit of reform began to penetrate to the precincts of El Azhar, hitherto so sedulously shut off from outside influences. The future Grand Mufti of Egypt, Mohammed Abdu, a character to whose greatness even his adversaries bear witness, was among Jemal ud-Din's pupils, as also the young Syrian revolutionary and poet, Adib Ishar, who sided with Arabi Pasha during his residence in Egypt and published Jemal ud-Din's El Azhar lectures in his journal *Misr*.

Of Jemal ud-Din's birth, origin, and early life we know little. He himself declared that he was born in Afghanistan about 1838 and was educated in Bukhara. Thence he went to India, undertook a pilgrimage to Mecca, and then returned to Afghanistan in 1857, where he entered the service of the Emir. In 1869 he travelled once more through India to Mecca, thence proceeded to Cairo for a short time, and then turned his steps to Constantinople. There he became professor at the Anjuman el-Elm, the Academy of Science, where his lectures astonished people by their profound erudition. He was thoroughly versed in the Koran and the traditions, as well as in the whole of Islamic literature, and just because of his vast knowledge and his orthodoxy he was able to criticise the commentaries with unusual freedom and to demonstrate that Islam was not a rigid structure, but capable of adapting itself to all spiritual needs and all the demands of the age. Nevertheless, he came in conflict with the Sheikh ul-Islam on the subject of one of his lectures and was obliged to quit Constantinople and betake himself to Cairo in 1871, where he remained for eight years and became the fructifying genius and teacher of Young Egypt. He imparted to his pupils his own critical spirit, his courage, and most of all his burning passion for the awakening of the East and his fears of the menace of European invasion. When in 1879 Franco-British financial control became the dominant power, Tewfik was persuaded to banish this dangerous agitator. Jemal ud-Din had always attacked despotism in his lectures and had expounded the doctrine that Islam aims at popular government in which the ruler's authority rests upon his respect for the law and upon popular consent. This reform movement

emanating from El Azhar was not a national movement in the narrow sense, but a general Islamic reform movement; nevertheless, it allied itself with the nationalist movement of the fellaheen led by Arabi, in order that the two might unite in opposing the European menace. A few years previously the French had occupied Tunis, also on the pretext of protecting the Bey from an alleged revolt of his subjects, and had set up a protectorate, and this certainly gave new life to the Egyptian movement of emancipation.

But the European Powers must share the credit of having started the struggle for liberation in 1881 and 1882, for they seemed to leave no stone unturned in their efforts to frustrate all peaceful progress. The new Khedive Tewfik, as soon as he came into power, wished to promulgate a constitution on the advice of his Minister, Sherif Pasha, but he was prevented by consular protests. Later, when the convening of the Assembly of Notables had been forced, Sherif Pasha again drafted a constitution, but the Consuls of the European Powers obliged him to withhold from the Chamber the right of voting and debating the budget, although budgetary control is among the most elementary rights of every Parliament, and the Egyptian Assembly of Notables was willing to confine its right of debate and control to the free half of the budget available for Egypt's internal needs, since half the Egyptian revenues were required to meet the claim of interest and debts. On January 6th, 1882, England and France delivered a Note couched in the most violent terms, threatening intervention and implying such a degree of interference in Egypt's internal affairs, which at that time were moving in the direction of liberal reforms, that there was an outburst of general indignation in the country, and the progressive and nationalist elements, hitherto divided, found themselves at one. The Assembly of Notables adopted a more unbending attitude on the question of the budget, and a section even of the Turkish element united with Arabi Pasha to resist foreign attacks. On February 2nd Sherif Pasha resigned and a Nationalist Ministry came into office under Mohammed Pasha Sami, with Arabi Pasha as Minister of War. But the reports of the English representative in Egypt and of the English Press continued to depict Arabi as a fanatical adventurer without popular support, whilst the

Khedive, it was said, was generally beloved, and only a little pressure was needed to get rid of the danger personified in Arabi. Here, as in all subsequent Eastern movements of emancipation, the English Press and public opinion were misled by false and tendencious information. But the reports attained the desired end. Military intervention became inevitable. In other European countries there was sympathy with Egypt's national aspirations. Menotti Garibaldi wanted to come to her assistance with volunteer bands from Italy.

But now events followed one another at headlong speed. In May, 1882, the English and French fleets appeared before Alexandria, and a few days later they presented an ultimatum demanding the resignation of the Ministry and Arabi's banishment from Egypt. The Ministry thereupon resigned. But a popular rising in Cairo compelled the reappointment of Arabi Pasha as Minister of War. He had become the national hero. The Khedive, well aware that there was little love for him in the country and that reform must involve the curtailment of his rights and expenditure, openly went over to the English. The commander of the English fleet issued a prohibition to the Egyptians to fortify their strongholds in Alexandria, and when this order was disobeyed, as being an encroachment upon national rights of self-defence, he bombarded Alexandria on July 11th. Meanwhile a series of liberal reforms had been carried out or planned in the country, and improvements introduced in the educational system. Embittered by the action of the English, the Egyptian nation united in support of Arabi Pasha and organised national defence. The Sheikhs of El Azhar issued a fetwa proclaiming that the Khedive, who was ready to sell himself and his country to foreigners, was no longer worthy to rule over Egypt and should be deposed. Of the fourteen provincial Governors, eleven declared for Arabi. A General Council or Committee of Defence convened in Cairo took over the government and appointed Arabi Pasha Commander-in-Chief.

But Arabi did not prove equal to the task. Here we see what may be called the technical tragedy of every revolution: Arabi could not trust the Turkish officers in the Egyptian army, and yet they were the only competent military leaders, whilst the fellaheen and he himself, who were the backbone of

the revolution, lacked the necessary ability and the necessary warlike qualities. In addition there was a factor which was destined again and again to hamper every movement of emancipation in Egypt and throughout the East: constant jealousies and internal quarrels among the leaders, which made it easy for the English to win some of them by means of bribes and promises. Further, the English had after repeated efforts persuaded the Turkish Sultan to denounce Arabi Pasha as a rebel against the Sultan and Caliph, although Arabi was always a champion of Islam concerned to maintain the Sultan's suzerain rights. The Sultan's denunciation sowed confusion in the ranks of Arabi's army, which was defeated in the battle of Tell el Kebir on September 13th, 1882. He himself was condemned by court martial as a mutineer. The Khedive and the Turkish despots, now restored to power, would have liked to carry out the death sentence. Arabi was saved by English intervention. He was banished to Ceylon and was not allowed to return for many years.

When Arabi Pasha died in 1911 his English friend, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, wrote in just appreciation of his place in history that he was a one-eyed man in a country of the blind—that was the least that could be said of him. He was the dreamer of a great dream which he had nearly realised thirty years earlier; if fortune should favour it, it would some day be recognised as the beginning of a noble reality. He—the writer—was little impressed by the fact that Arabi's fellow-countrymen had forgotten his work or misinterpreted it. What he had accomplished remained a true act of creation out of nothing; the creation of Egyptian nationality. He knew from his own personal experience that this was the simple truth. When he first saw Egypt before the Revolution it was an independent kingdom, but not a nation. There was an Egyptian Government, but no Egyptian people. The mass of the people were known as the fellaheen, the peasants; European travellers called them Arabs. Both were in a sense terms of contempt. No one spoke of "Egyptians." The fellaheen consoled themselves for the contempt in which their race was held by their pride in being Mohammedans. But they had not yet learnt to grasp the dignity of their forefathers' history. It had been Arabi's greatest merit that he was the first to discover that he was an Egyptian,

and that he was proud of it. The idea had been a new one, and it had gained an immediate hold on his fellow-sufferers under the alien yoke of their joint oppressors, the Circassians and the Europeans. A whole world of hope and expectation had seemed to lie concealed in this newly discovered name. This had been Arabi's genius, this and the eloquence by which he persuaded his unwarlike fellow-countrymen to fight so that they might become a nation. Success had not been his. But what of that? Thenceforward Egypt had been recognised as a nation. It could no longer be treated as a mere toy of the Khedive's. That had been his success.

So ended the Egyptians' first struggle for national freedom. They had striven to introduce reforms so as to protect the country from Europe. "The first book that ever gave me ideas about political matters," wrote Arabi Pasha, "was an Arabic translation of the *Life of Bonaparte* by Colonel Louis. The book had been brought by Said Pasha with him to Medina, and its account of the conquest of Egypt by 30,000 Frenchmen so angered him that he threw the book on the ground, saying: 'See how your countrymen let themselves be beaten.' I took it up and read all that night, without sleeping, till the morning. Then I told Said Pasha that I had read it and that I saw that the French had been victorious because they were better drilled and organised, and that we could do as well in Egypt if we tried."¹

In his tent at Tell el Kebir Arabi Pasha also read the history of the French Revolution. In a letter of April 1st, 1882, he wrote of the movement that he led: "Peace reigns over the country; and we and all our patriotic brethren are with our best will defending the rights of those who dwell in our land, no matter of what nation they may be. All treaties and international obligations are fully respected; and we shall allow no one to touch them as long as the Powers of Europe keep their engagements and friendly relations with us."²

And in fact peace and order did prevail in Egypt during the brief period of national government. The attempt to reorganise and revolutionise the whole conduct of life was

¹ *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*. By Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Fisher Unwin, 1907, p. 482.

² *Ibid.*, p. 246.

accompanied by far less disorder than has been the case elsewhere. The spirit in which the reforms were begun gave ground for hope that without English intervention Egypt would have developed along liberal lines. True, the condition of the country was described otherwise in the English reports; for they were designed to justify intervention. But in reality 1882 was not a year of mutiny and bloodshed and disorder, but of an awakening national consciousness throughout the younger generation of Egyptians. That generation included a man who was later to lead the third Egyptian struggle for independence, the new revolution of the fellaheen. This was Saad Zaghlul, like Arabi Pasha the son of a fellah and the embodiment of the characteristics of his race.

Between these two struggles of the fellaheen for independence lay the period of British occupation. It brought Egypt in closer contact with the world of European thought and produced a gradual change in Egyptian social institutions and habits of life. It was the schoolmaster thanks to whom the new struggle for independence was conducted with greater forethought and caution and, moreover, struck deeper roots in all classes of the population. This was partly because, true to its English character and unlike the French occupation of Algeria and Tunis, it did not lead to a simple protectorate; a compromise was steadily maintained which, in spite of the thoroughness of the occupation, nevertheless preserved the outward form of an Egyptian State; the occupation was declared by the English to be a temporary expedient, soon to be ended and designed to train the Egyptians in European Liberalism and progressive independence. England's occupation of Egypt, like her occupation of India, did not come about in accordance with a preconceived scheme, but in a sense accidentally; and yet it was the final link in a chain of events through which England managed to exploit every opportunity with skill, and if opportunity had not occurred, would have contrived to create it. A constitutional régime and a progressive nationalism in Egypt would have meant the end of English influence there. No sooner had they been checked than England sent Lord Dufferin to Egypt to lay the foundations of future organisation. "I have stated that . . . we desired that the Egyptian people should live their own lives and administer their own Government unim-

peded by any external anxieties and preoccupations," he wrote.¹ To accomplish this aim he drew up an Egyptian constitution with a Legislative Council of thirty members, fourteen nominated. But, in spite of its name, the Council exercised no legislative powers; it could only comment upon bills sent to it by the Government, which was not bound by its views. The thirty members of this Legislative Council, the six Ministers, and forty-six other deputies composed the so-called General Assembly, which met every two years; without its consent no direct taxes could be imposed. The progressive Egyptian constitution of 1882 was repealed. Nor was the Khedive's authority actually restored, though that had constantly been put forward as the aim of English intervention; for henceforward the power of the Egyptian ruler was completely hedged in by the representative of England.

Henceforward the British representative was the true ruler of Egypt. Shortly after the British occupation Sir Evelyn Baring was sent out, to remain till 1907 and return as Lord Cromer. The Egyptian Ministry continued in office, as well as the native civil service, but an English adviser was attached to each Minister, and it was the Englishman who was, in fact, the Minister; the chief posts in the civil service were likewise in British hands. There was never any clear understanding regarding the relation of authority and subordination between Egyptians and English in the Egyptian public service. In practice it was determined by Lord Granville's statement of 1884, in which he said: "It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course will cease to hold their offices."² In fact, therefore, all the real authority came to rest with the English officials, and the Egyptian Ministers and officials were mere executive tools.

English administration brought the country economic

¹ *Correspondence respecting Reorganization in Egypt* [C. 3462, No. 2 (1883)], No. 42.

² Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, January 4th, 1884. *British and Foreign State Papers*, London, 1891.

prosperity and created conditions that are a just cause of pride, if we compare them with the state of Egypt under Ismail. But it must not be forgotten that many of the abuses under Ismail's rule were due to European control and the pressure of European creditors. For these reasons the occupation was welcomed at first by the fellaheen. Conditions had been intolerable in recent years, and the starving people would have greeted any change with joy as a possible amelioration. England appeared to the fellaheen as a friend of the oppressed; the reforms which Lord Cromer carried out in the early years of his rule benefited the fellaheen in particular. For ten whole years it seemed that the force of the Egyptian nationalist movement was broken.

After the death of Tewfik Pasha his son Abbas II, became Khedive in 1892 and attempted, though without success, to free himself partially from English tutelage. He won the sympathies of the rising generation in Egypt, just awakening to national consciousness. The great Arabian daily, *El Mokattam*, edited by two Syrian Christians and voicing the aims of British policy, published reports of British military reinforcements in Egypt, in order to crush any national movement in the germ. These reports caused widespread indignation, for they seemed incompatible with the British Government's intention, repeatedly stressed, of evacuating Egypt before long.

Nationalist public opinion was voiced in those days in the newspaper *El Moajjad*, edited by Sheikh Ali Yussuf of El Azhar. But it was soon to lose its popular appeal in favour of a new leader, Mustafa Kemal, who was studying in France at the time and published a booklet entitled *Le Péril Égyptien* in Toulouse in 1895. At the early age of nineteen he had said to the French authoress Juliette Adam: "Through the spoken word and the schools, through newspapers and books, I will strive to awaken my countrymen's patriotism, so as to restore the Egyptians to Egypt, and Egypt to the Egyptians." He called himself a patriot who dreamed of nothing but the liberation of his country. In 1896 he returned to Egypt. This was the year in which England was making preparations for the reconquest of the Sudan, alleging that the lost Egyptian province was to be recovered for the Egyptian people. It was at England's instigation that the Egyptians had evacuated

and given up the Sudan; now it was to be reconquered with Egyptian blood and Egyptian money. Not only did the Egyptian budget bear the cost of the prolonged campaign against the Sudan, but after the land had been subdued and the so-called Anglo-Egyptian condominium established, it continued alone to cover the large deficit on the Sudanese administration, whilst the occupation benefited England by the extension of cotton growing and the irrigation schemes; moreover, the competition of the Sudanese cotton growers and the withdrawal of Nile water were a direct menace to Egyptian prosperity. Egyptian patriots foresaw at the time what would happen, and in a speech on April 13th, 1896, addressed to the European colony in Alexandria Mustafa Kemal declared: "As regards the reconquest of the Sudan, we all desire it and daily proclaim our desire. We are convinced that without the Sudan Egypt is the poorest country in the world. When we demand the withdrawal of the English troops from our country, we are not merely demanding the liberation of Egypt from Alexandria to Wadi Halfa, but the liberation of the whole Nile Valley, for the Nile cannot be subject to more than one Government. Hardly five weeks ago I told my fellow-countrymen that the Khedive's most important task was to recover Egypt's lost provinces. I repeat this evening what I always have said and always shall say. But we never have wished and never shall wish to conquer the Sudan under British command. The presence of the British at the head of our troops would undoubtedly alienate the Sudanese from us profoundly; it would call forth hatred that would make our reconciliation with the Khedive's former subjects impossible for years to come."

Henceforward until his early death twelve years later Mustafa Kemal was the indefatigable champion of Egyptian freedom. The younger generation gathered round him. He did not exercise his influence in Egypt alone, but travelled in Europe and tried everywhere to win support for his ideas. He was especially attracted to France by affection and education. He had great hopes of French assistance until 1904, when the basis of the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale was laid, and France agreed to the British occupation of Egypt. His speeches throbbed with the pathos and ardour of the Oriental educated in France: "To us Orientals material

civilisation is not genuine civilisation. True civilisation is based on the moral rectitude and freedom of the peoples. Of what value to us are the telegraph, the telephone, the gramophone, and all Europe's mechanical inventions, if we are oppressed by the inventors of those fine appliances, and if they only serve to hasten our subjection? I would rather a thousand times wander on horseback in the desert and feel free, than fly with the threefold rapidity of a motor-car across a country dominated by the English." "The most essential part of our programme is popular education. Egypt's misfortunes have always sprung from the ignorance of her people. In spite of the English opposition to education, patriots are opening private schools where the teaching is thoroughly national in spirit. This year twelve schools have been opened, and I have every hope of seeing our beloved land reckoned among enlightened countries within a few years. Nor is the education of girls neglected. I rejoice to see that our women are as patriotic as we ourselves. Most of them read the newspapers, and all hate the occupying Power implacably."

Mustafa Kemal began his public activities in July, 1897, when he spoke to an audience of two thousand in Cairo. The following year he founded the first national school, where the children were to be educated in the spirit of patriotism independently of the British administration. His brother was head of the school. But Mustafa Kemal felt that it was particularly necessary to work through the Press, and in 1900 he started his own organ, *El Lewa* (The Standard), which soon became the most widely read paper in Egypt; later he issued a French and an English edition as well.

In his political discourses Mustafa Kemal constantly pointed out that England's occupation of Egypt would naturally form a base from which England would seek to gain possession of the Holy Places in the Hejaz and Syria. He always defended the Sultan and was clever enough to exploit Pan-Islamism for his own ends. In 1904 Sultan Abdul Hamid made him a Pasha in recognition of his services. Towards the end of his life Mustafa Kemal was constantly engaged in extending his educational work. People's high schools, courses of lectures, and evening institutes were established, loan funds were started for the poorer classes,

and in 1905 Mustafa Kemal put forward a scheme for a national University, to bear the name of Mohammed Ali. The Anglo-Egyptian Government opposed the scheme and, in spite of enthusiasm at the outset, the requisite funds were not contributed by rich Egyptians. This induced the Government to establish a University itself at a later date; it was opened in 1908, but this actual University had no resemblance to Mustafa Kemal's plan; it dragged on a pitiable and insignificant existence.

Mustafa Kemal died on February 10th, 1908. His funeral swelled to a vast demonstration. J. Alexander, an English eye-witness, and a vehement opponent of the Egyptian nationalist movement, wrote: "Never was there such a spontaneous and universal demonstration of grief, for, whatever the main motive for his political attitude, there is no doubt that he gained the affection of the Egyptian public as no other Egyptian patriot has done before or since. Huge crowds of mourners, among whom were many of his vigorous political opponents, collected in the neighbourhood of the offices of *El Lewa* to participate in the pathetic scenes of public mourning. . . . His funeral the following day was one of the most impressive sights ever witnessed in Cairo in modern times."¹

The new wave of nationalist feeling that arose in Egypt in the first decades of the present century was different from Arabi Pasha's movement; the two were not externally connected in any way, and the later movement was consciously uninfluenced by the earlier. The nationalism of the eighties was the first stirring of self-assertion among the fellaheen; it sank back rapidly into oblivion and had no direct contact with Europe, geographically and linguistically remote. In the interval a class arose in Egypt that has always been the vehicle of nationalism, the middle-class intelligentsia. Thanks to the English occupation, which had no such deadening effect as the French occupation in Algeria and Tunis, a Press came into being in Egypt and rapidly extended its influence; economic prosperity created a lawyer class, apt for political leadership here as elsewhere. Little importance as the English attached to general popular education, they did nevertheless help to create a middle-class intelligentsia

¹ *The Truth about Egypt*. By J. Alexander, Cassell, 1911, p. 189.

and an official caste with a certain type of higher education; here as elsewhere these became champions of the nationalist cause, influenced by modern ideas and animated by resentment. Communication between Egypt and Europe had become freer and less restricted so that ideas could be exchanged without obstacles or barriers. Future Egyptian barristers who had to apply laws based on the *Code Napoléon* studied in France, especially in Lyons where a special course was arranged for them. The lack of an Egyptian University obliged many people to study abroad. Mustafa Kemal's nationalist movement was a townsmen's movement; it was the first awakening of a new middle class influenced by Europe and brought into existence by the adoption of Western types of economy and civilisation. It had no popular roots, so that the British Government had no difficulty in subduing it.

The third wave of nationalism, arising in 1918 under the influence of the World War, embraced the first two, uniting the middle class and the fellaheen. And meanwhile the fellaheen had come more under European influence. But the majority of the old feudal aristocracy of Turkish or Circassian descent were still on the side of the Government and against the nationalist movement; they feared it as the product of the democratic nineteenth century, involving the rise of new classes that might dispute their dominance.

Politically the new nationalist movement was pro-French. The ideas and phraseology of French democracy were their intellectual arsenal. The southern, fiery, rhetorical manner of the French appealed to the Mediterranean Egyptian temperament. French was the second official language, and the English, characteristically, had left it in that position. Until 1904, when France finally gave up Egypt to England in return for the promise of a free hand in Morocco, Mustafa Kemal continued to hope for the political support of the French at an appropriate moment. French influence had taught the leaders of the new nationalist movement a rationalist and indifferent attitude towards religion, but they were prepared to make use of Islam and the Pan-Islamic movement for their nationalist aims. The emphasis laid upon the Islamic faith gave support to the nationalist movement in its relations with the awakening East, especially when the hope of European help vanished in 1904, and in 1908 the Young Turks

set the example with a revolution achieved by their own unaided strength; religion constituted a link between Egypt and the Mohammedan Sudan. For the new nationalist movement laid particular stress upon the inseparable tie uniting Egypt and the Sudan, and at the same time upon the necessity of liberation without external aid. The party of constitutional reform, to which Sheikh Ali Yussuf, the editor of *El Moajjad*, belonged, hoped by constant pressure on the Government to achieve the gradual extension of Egyptian autonomy. The Nationalist Party believed only in self-emancipation.

When the Prince of Wales visited Egypt in 1906 the Egyptian notables presented a petition in which they cited England's numerous promises and asked for self-government for Egypt. They referred to the fact that recently England had even conceded liberty to conquered colonies and by so doing had laid the foundation of lasting friendship. The constitutional reformers had taken heart at this juncture because a Liberal Government had come into power in England and parliamentary autonomy had been granted to the former Boer Republics; they hoped that the Liberal Government would act in accordance with its principles and with former promises, and would adopt a new policy in Egypt also. But as regards that hope the *Encyclopædia Britannica* truly points out: "As far as responsible statesmen were concerned the change of government in Great Britain made no difference in the conduct of Egyptian affairs." The same proved true at a later date when, instead of the Liberals, the Labour Party took over the reins of government. In violation of all its principles and former promises, the Labour Government behaved towards Egypt and India exactly like the Conservatives. It was just this disappointment which confirmed the colonial peoples in their conviction that self-help was necessary. Thus the greater part of the Egyptian Press protested even in 1906 against the petition of the notables and the idea of asking rights from a European Power which the nation could secure for itself. In the same year, when the new railway from Khartoum to the Red Sea was opened, providing a separate route to the Sudan independent of Egypt, the Egyptian Press declared: "We must call this the day of Egypt's burial. For this railway severs the trade relations

linking Egypt and the Sudan, and robs us of that province. The Sudan is Egypt's lifegiver, and if the Sudan falls into the hands of a powerful government, nothing remains for Egypt but abject submission. Egypt will suffer, for a great part of the Nile water will be used to irrigate the Sudan; Egypt will suffer from drought. The Sudan was won with Egyptian blood and Egyptian money, and now England harvests the fruits of our victory. In England's hands the Sudan will be a dagger pointed at Egypt's heart; if some day Egypt is strong enough to demand the restoration of her rights, this new railway will enable England to attack our country, and thus to frustrate all our efforts to recover our freedom." This sentiment, expressed in 1906, still animated the Egyptian Revolution after the World War.

The liberalising movement had no direct contact with the new nationalist movement, but it exercised a considerable influence upon Egypt's reawakening; it originated with a section of the El Azhar divines led by the Grand Mufti, Mohammed Abdu, a disciple of Jemal ud-Din el-Afghani. He was a man who compelled the respect even of adversaries like Lord Cromer; a letter which he addressed to Tolstoi on April 8th, 1904, is typical of his attitude of mind: "Although I have not the pleasure of your personal acquaintance, yet I am no stranger to your spirit; our minds, too, have been illumined by the light of your thought; the sun of your ideas has risen in our sky and has linked our intellectuals with you in the bond of friendship. God has inspired in you an understanding of man's inborn nature as He created him, and has revealed to you the goal ordained by Him for the human race. You have grasped that man's present life is granted to him in order that he may be enriched by knowledge and may yield fruit through labour that wearies his body and brings peace to his soul. You have recognised what misery overtakes man when he departs from Nature's laws and uses the strength that is given him to be happy in such a way as to drag down the soul from its high place and destroy its peace. You have looked upon religion and dispelled the illusions of distorted tradition, and have thus penetrated to the innermost truth of the divine oneness. You have lifted up your voice and spoken to men as God commanded you, and have gone before them with your example. And as your words

have guided their understanding, so your deeds have stirred them to resolute determination and great aims. And just as your very existence has been God's rebuke to the rich, so it has been a support to the poor. Truly, the noblest reward for your labours as counsellor and teacher is that which is called excommunication and anathema. Your condemnation by the religious authorities was nothing but a confession before the whole world that it was not you who had gone astray. Praise God that they have turned away from you, as you have turned away from them and their deeds and beliefs. Truly, our hearts yearn for new utterances from your pen in the coming days, and may God prolong your life and increase your strength. May He open the hearts of men so that they may understand your teaching and incline their hearts to follow in your footsteps." But these beginnings of an Islam purified and open-minded, as embodied in Mohammed Abdu, developed no further. The Nationalist Party made use of Mohammedan orthodoxy as a political weapon or reduced religion to the platitudes of rationalist reform.

Egypt never succeeded in forming stable parties, either at this period or later. In 1907 there was a People's Party (*Hasb-el-umm*), of which Saad Zaghlul was a member, and a Patriotic Party (*Hasb-el-watan*) led by Mustafa Kemal. The lines of demarcation between the parties were fluid, and determined solely by personal views and considerations. In 1907 both united under Mustafa Kemal, and after his death Mohammed Farid Bey assumed the leadership of Egyptian nationalism.

Nationalist propaganda was powerfully reinforced by an incident at Denshawi, a village in the Delta. It was an incident essentially characteristic of colonial administration where a relatively small group rule over a far more numerous alien race and are able to maintain their supremacy only by asserting their prestige to the exclusion of all other considerations. A Government in such a precarious position, ruling against the popular will and unable to count upon the consent of the governed, must at times be liable to an access of panic which leads to terrorist action capable, no doubt, of maintaining the supremacy actually or supposedly undermined, but calculated to alienate the people more and more and so to diminish true prestige. This is what has happened

everywhere and may recur again and again under like circumstances, not only in countries where racial differences naturally widen the gulf separating the rulers from the people, but likewise in Europe.

On June 13th, 1906, some English officers went pigeon shooting near the village of Denshawī, although they had been warned that the villagers bitterly resented the shooting of pigeons. The officers accidentally wounded a village woman whilst shooting, and set fire to a peasant's hut. A scuffle ensued between the peasants and the officers, and three officers were injured. One of the wounded officers tried to run to the nearest station to fetch help, but fell dead after a few kilometres in consequence of the intense heat; it was impossible to tell whether his death was due to wounds or sunstroke. The English authorities were exasperated by the nationalist movement and feared its extension to the villages, and they determined to make an example. An extraordinary court, consisting of three Englishmen and two Egyptians under the presidency of the Copt Boutros Pasha, was required to pass sentence with the utmost rapidity; the sentence was predetermined and was presumably confirmed by Lord Cromer, who went to Europe on leave on June 19th, regardless of the serious situation. The court sentenced fifteen peasants: four to death, two to penal servitude for life, three to a year's imprisonment and fifty strokes of the lash, four to fifty strokes of the lash. The executions and floggings were carried out two days later on the spot where the officers had been attacked, with a great display of military force, in the presence of all the relatives and the assembled village.

The affair gave fresh food to the nationalist movement, and attracted the attention of genuine English Liberals to Egypt, though this did not prevent the Liberal Government from pursuing a policy of unhesitating support of the "man on the spot." The Denshawī affair may, indeed, have had something to do with Lord Cromer's departure from Egypt in the following year.

Cromer's Government was a benevolent despotism. The older he grew the more despotic he proved to be, and the less he was able to grasp that the East was changing. Thus in 1907 he wrote in a report: "Over and over again has it been urged on me that the (Nationalist) party consists merely of a

few noisy individuals whose action is often due to no very reputable motives, and who in no way represent the real wishes and aspirations of their countrymen. I believe this view of the situation to be substantially correct."¹ How far this was from the truth is proved by the fact that that very year the General Assembly, composed of notables and meeting every two years, passed a solemn resolution demanding a constitution with responsible, parliamentary government and the withdrawal of extraordinary legislation. It further demanded the release of the Denshawi prisoners, the occupation of all high offices by Egyptians, universal education and the reduction of the high school fees, the introduction of Arabic as the sole language of instruction, and the refusal of further concessions to foreign companies.

The Egyptian Revolution was a struggle of a rising middle class and a national democracy for popular sovereignty in opposition to despotism. It was the same struggle that had been carried on decades earlier in Europe and was being carried on simultaneously in Turkey, Persia, Russia, and to some extent in Central Europe. The fact that it was directed in Egypt against alien supremacy as well as against a despotism did not differentiate it essentially from the struggle in Turkey or Russia. Unlike the despotism of Abdul Hamid or the Persian Shah, Cromer's despotism gave the country security, orderly finances, and economic prosperity. Where he, like every despot, failed was in popular education and the training of the people for self-government. The census of 1907 showed that of 5,616,640 male Mohammedans in Egypt, only 402,090 could read and write, and of 5,573,338 women, no more than 10,579. The proportion was rather higher among the Christian Copts. With them 67,256 men out of 356,797 could read and write, and 5,765 women out of 349,525. Only the Egyptian Jews were generally educated on anything approaching the European scale. Of their 19,730 men 11,024 could read and write, and of their 18,905 women 5,910. The position was similar with regard to training for self-government. In contrast to the early years of Cromer's rule, when Europeans occupied only the most important official

¹ *Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan in 1906.* No. 1 (1907), Col. 339, p. 6.

positions, there was a growing tendency to fill all but the lowest posts in the civil service with Englishmen. Edward Dacey wrote on this subject in the *Daily Telegraph* in 1906: "The English officials, who have gradually crowded out the native officials from every post of importance are 'strangers in a strange country,' who are appointed to carry out reforms, excellent perhaps in themselves, but uncongenial to a conservative race, whose main desire is to be let alone and not to be worried."¹ This control of the whole administration from above excluded all possibility of training the Egyptians for self-government, yet that had been proclaimed by the English occupying powers as their aim. Theoretically the struggle for democracy against the English in their colonies was easier than the same struggle against the Sultan or the Tsar, for the English recognised the validity of democracy in principle, so that they were more vulnerable at that point than the rulers of Asia or Central and Eastern Europe who openly believed in the God-given rights of despotism.


Lord Cromer's successor was Sir Eldon Gorst. When he assumed office the notables presented a petition putting forward demands similar to those of the General Assembly; they also demanded an Egyptian municipal administration in Cairo and an Egyptian University. Even the programme of the constitutional reformers, which was issued in this year, demanded universal, free popular education in Arabic and far-reaching concessions to Egyptians in the matter of appointments. At first Sir Eldon Gorst addressed himself to the realisation of liberal reforms, and enlarged the powers of the Provincial Assemblies, but when the Egyptians proved dissatisfied with these minor reforms, the new Resident reverted to former methods. Boutros Pasha, the Copt who had been president of the extraordinary court at Denshawi and who was universally hated on this account and for his submissiveness towards the English, became Premier in 1909. Reactionary laws were passed restricting the freedom of the Press, nationalist papers were prohibited, "dangerous persons" were placed under police supervision or exiled. Such was the fate which overtook the most popular of contemporary nationalist journalists, Sheikh Abd el Asis Shavish, the editor of *El Alam*. All these measures only intensified the embitter-

¹ *The Truth about Egypt*. By J. Alexander, Cassell, 1911, p. 58.

ment of the nationalists. On February 20th, 1910, Boutros Pasha was assassinated by a student named Ibrahim Bardani, which led to a state of tension between Mohammedans and Copts in Egypt. In March, 1911, the Copts held a Congress in Asyut and demanded complete equality of rights within the nation; the Mohammedans replied with a rival Congress in Cairo the following month.

In 1911 Lord Kitchener came to Egypt as the British representative. He succeeded to all appearances in crushing the nationalist movement completely. Peace prevailed throughout the country. The English Press succeeded in diverting attention from Egypt. At this time Mohammed Said Pasha was Premier, and until 1912 Saad Zaghlul Pasha co-operated with him as Minister of Justice. In 1913 the constitution was revised and made somewhat more democratic. In place of the two previous Assemblies a "Legislative Assembly" was created, but the Government continued to be independent of the Assembly's wishes in drafting the laws. Elections were indirect, but the active franchise was not narrowly restricted. The President of the Legislative Assembly was appointed by the Government, and a Vice-President was elected. This election gave a clear indication of the Assembly's mood. Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the nationalist leader, was elected by an overwhelming majority. Throughout its brief existence till the outbreak of the World War the Legislative Assembly was in opposition to the Government, and was supported in its opposition by the Khedive.

Meanwhile Egyptian nationalism, like the kindred movements in Russia or Turkey, had set up its habitation in Europe. We may quote two utterances which are characteristic of the spirit of nationalism at this period. Early in 1896 Mustafa Kemal wrote: "Egyptian civilisation will be lasting only if it is rooted in the people, if the fellah, the merchant, the teacher, the student, in short every Egyptian, knows that man possesses sacred and inviolable rights, that he was not created to be a tool but to lead an honourable and reasonable life, that no sentiment is more beautiful than the love of our country, that the soul is noble, and a people without independence is a people without existence. Patriotism speedily raises backward peoples to civilisation, greatness, and power. Patriotism is the blood that flows in the veins



MAP X.—EGYPT'S EXPANSIONIST POLICY.

of virile nations and that gives life to all living creatures.” In 1910 Hamed el Alaily, the Secretary of the Egyptian National Congress, said in his opening speech at the Brussels Congress: “My subject . . . goes deeper than politics. . . . I shall try to describe the inevitable moral degradation and intellectual inertia which must follow the permanence of the English régime in Egypt. . . . It is not cotton-bales or the loans of fund-holders that are at stake, but human souls, men and women created in the image of God, children who are the heirs of all the ages and who can develop to be godlike men and women. . . . And when this aspect of the political movement is realised by our compatriots and our sympathisers in other lands . . . they will think less of economic questions and . . . the claims of nationalism . . . and more of those fair-haired, dark-eyed children who . . . will suffer for their fathers’ sins, if the foreign régime lasts forever. . . . Thus my own countrymen will work in earnest, if not for the glory of the Patrie, or the honour of their ancestors, or the cause of Justice . . . at least for the life and welfare of their children.” The speech went on to appeal to the Egyptians’ honour, by a reminder of their ancient historic past, their great deeds and civilisation at a time when Europe had not even come into being. So great a past justified the claim to a great future, for the Egyptians of to-day were heirs of the past. “The genius that reared the Pyramids and composed the Book of the Dead still remains in us like hidden fire. . . . The remembrance of our early history assures us that we are not a radically incompetent race . . . and that we can therefore believe in the final success of our Cause.” The speaker regarded Islam as an additional warrant of that success, its traditions and its spiritual treasure. So long as Islam was the subject of study at El Azhar, so long would the sacred flame be kept burning in the temple, however deep the gloom without. Islam taught equality, frugality, continence, and more especially forbade alcohol, the European’s ally. “An Egyptian who sets the evil example of indulgence in alcoholic drinks does more to perpetuate British rule in Egypt than the journalist who may write an article in favour of the occupation. For speeches and articles pass, but national habits remain.” Nevertheless, everything must be learned that Europe could teach, especially in the domain of

military organisation and politics. But the worst evil lay in the moral effects of foreign rule. It led to moral degeneration by preventing free self-determination and participation in public life; it undermined self-respect and taught hypocrisy. Assimilation to the conquerors would make Egyptian children despise their own social life and institutions and attribute too great merit to those of the alien race. "Thus an artificial and altogether uncongenial atmosphere will be created, in which no moral and mental progress will be possible, for each society needs its own natural framework for development. . . . A nation which lives under foreign rule loses all originality and power of spontaneous growth. It lives a false life at all moments. Its best men feel cramped and oppressed with a sense of want of harmony between the soul and the body of the nation. This process ends in the death of that soul. . . . The curse of the imitation of the superior foreign class destroys all springs of real life among the people. The nation then becomes only an intellectual parasite . . . and ceases to contribute anything of its own to the moral and intellectual life of humanity."¹

But it was the World War that first communicated this mood of profound dissatisfaction to the people at large; for the time being it only gained a hold upon the upper class and could only find open expression abroad. At the outbreak of the war the Legislative Assembly was prorogued for an indefinite period, meetings were forbidden, and martial law was declared. The English protectorate over Egypt was officially proclaimed, though this may be regarded merely as an inevitable war measure; the Khedive, who was in Constantinople when war broke out, was deposed and his uncle Hussein made Sultan. A number of Australian and Indian regiments were quartered in Egypt, and their behaviour aggravated the popular irritation. Requisitions were a heavy burden on the fellaheen, who were pressed subsequently into the service of the British Army in labour battalions where they were badly treated and where the rate of mortality amongst them was very high. The hatred of the fellaheen thus roused was intensified further by the tactlessness of many young officers and bureaucrats who now appeared. Collections for the Red Cross were repeatedly instituted and

¹ *The Future of Egypt*. By Hamed el Alaily, Paris, 1910.

perverted in practice into forced levies. Thus the way was paved for that union of the intelligentsia and the peasants which emerged in 1918 in so startling and unmistakable a form, and thus the success of the Revolution was assured.

But the English took no cognisance of all this. In 1918, before the end of the war, an Anglo-Egyptian Commission was appointed at the request of the Egyptian Premier, Hussein Rushdi Pasha, to work out a constitution after the conclusion of peace. The Egyptian Premier counted on the grant of a wide measure of autonomy after the war and had, moreover, proposed the inclusion of Saad Zaghlul Pasha in the Ministry. But his proposal was rejected by the English. Only Ziwar Pasha, the Governor of Cairo, was admitted to the Cabinet and accepted the Ministry of Pious Foundations. The death of Sultan Hussein in October, 1917, was a calamity for the Egyptians; he was a prince who commanded universal respect. The English were not happy in the choice of his successor, Sultan Fuad, a son of Khedive Ismail who resembled his father in many traits and, like him, was a man of despotic leanings; he was little respected, had never before lived in Egypt, and had hardly any ties with the country. He did not understand modern democratic tendencies in Egypt and looked for support to the reactionary element in the aristocracy; he had no more dislike than some of his predecessors to allying himself with the English in the struggle against democracy.

One member of the Commission on the Egyptian constitution was Sir William Brunyate, the English adviser to the Minister of Justice. Through an indiscretion his draft constitution was published in the Arabic Press and roused a storm of indignation, for it was altogether out of relation with Egyptian aspirations and the actual facts of the Egyptian situation; it proved that even English officials in Egypt had no glimmering of the true state of affairs. Still less had the English Cabinet, which was in an exultant mood and believed that the quiet which prevailed in Egypt during the war might be interpreted as a sign of final submission to the English protectorate. At the very time when the Allies were proclaiming the right of all peoples to self-determination as a war aim, and announcing that in Mesopotamia and Syria the result of their campaign would be "the establishment of

National Governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations," it was thought possible to exclude Egypt from such benefits.

On November 13th, 1918, a day which has since been celebrated as the birthday of the Wafd, or National Delegation, Zaghlul called upon the British High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, and declared his intention of visiting England in order to put forward the demands of the Egyptian people there. At the same time a list was circulated all over the country, with a declaration that the Egyptian people regarded Zaghlul and the delegation accompanying him as their representatives. This declaration was quickly signed by thousands in every town and province, including all the members of the Legislative Assembly, besides leading lawyers and officials. But the lists were confiscated by the English whilst they were still being circulated. Rushdi Pasha, the Premier, who had always worked most loyally with the English, also asked leave to go to London with the Minister of Education, Adli Yeghen Pasha; but though the High Commissioner urged consent, passports were refused to them. Rushdi Pasha thereupon resigned on December 23rd.

Meantime Zaghlul had received a discourteous reply from the High Commissioner's secretary, saying that if he wished to make suggestions regarding the government of Egypt, such suggestions were best made in writing, provided they were not in conflict with the declared policy of His Majesty's Government, and might be submitted to His Excellency the High Commissioner. Zaghlul answered on December 3rd that neither he nor any other member of the delegation was authorised to put forward proposals at variance with the nation's wishes; those wishes had been expressed in the delegation's mandate which bore the signatures of the whole élite of the nation and would certainly have borne that of every elector, if the Government had not confiscated the lists. He explained that the object of his visit to England was to get in touch with the representatives of the English people and with those who guided public opinion, for the success of his mission depended upon that sentiment of justice, liberty, and protection for the interests of the weak which characterised the British public. For this reason, he

explained, a written communication would not be enough, and he could not believe that the refusal of passports was in consonance with those principles of freedom and justice that had triumphed in the victory of England and her allies, and would confer blessings upon the peoples. But he was still refused permission to visit England. It was merely intimated to Rushdi Pasha that he might come later. Rushdi, however, now refused unless Zaghlul might come with him at the same time. Already public opinion had declared too openly and emphatically for Zaghlul and his policy for any other course to be possible.

In January, 1919, a banquet was held under the presidency of Hamid Pasha el Bassal, the member of the Legislative Assembly for Faiyum and one of the leading Bedouin chiefs east of the Nile, and on this occasion Zaghlul unfolded his programme of national independence. The Sultan had refused to receive the Wafd, and on March 3rd Zaghlul presented him with a petition pointing out that the protectorate was null and void. Upon this the general in command summoned Zaghlul and other members of the delegation and warned them to proceed no further. The next day the Wafd published a report of this interview and a protest. Two days later, on March 8th, by order of the authorities in London, Zaghlul and three of his colleagues, Hamid Pasha el Bassal, Mohammed Mahmud Pasha, and Ismail Sidky Pasha were arrested and taken to Malta on an English man-of-war. This was the signal for the outbreak of the Egyptian Revolution.

There was now no Ministry in Egypt. Martial law was in force, as it had been during the war, and the Press was under a severe censorship. The country was unarmed, for ever since martial law had been proclaimed at the outbreak of war it was forbidden on pain of death to possess arms. On March 9th, the day after Zaghlul's arrest, there was a demonstration by the students of El Azhar and the Law School, and students at other great colleges quickly joined. Hundreds of students were arrested. Next day the demonstrations were repeated on a large scale, the editorial offices of the pro-English newspaper *Al Mokattam* were attacked, the military were called out, and casualties occurred. On March 11th the lawyers struck, the trams stopped running, and there were more

deaths and injuries. Zaghlul Pasha's house was the centre of the movement, where his wife spoke for him and declared: "This is now the nation's house." The Wafd directed the rising under Ali Pasha Sharabi. Next day, March 12th, the disturbances spread throughout the provinces. The peasants destroyed railways and telegraphs, and Cairo was cut off for several days. In certain towns revolutionary provisional governments were set up. Towards the end of March the English had succeeded for the most part, by means of severe military measures, in suppressing the unarmed revolution. On March 25th Lord Allenby arrived in Egypt charged with the duty of maintaining the English protectorate. The day before Lord Curzon had said in the House of Lords: "But as regards Saad Zaghlul Pasha and the persons who have organised the present movement, it is a different matter. They are the self-appointed and irresponsible leaders of an agitation for the avowed purpose of expelling the British from Egypt."¹ So ill-informed was the English Government even then of the actual state of affairs in Egypt. The Egyptians now turned from active to passive resistance; lawyers, officials, and students struck. The whole town attended the solemn funerals accorded to the victims of the Revolution. On April 8th Lord Allenby ordered the release of Zaghlul and his colleagues, and they immediately went to Paris. Next day Rushdi Pasha again took office, with Adli Pasha as Minister of Interior. The officials on strike presented fresh demands, comprising the official recognition of the Wafd, the repudiation of the English protectorate, and the appointment of Egyptians to fill the military positions occupied by Englishmen. The Ministry were unable to fulfil these demands and resigned on April 21st. The strike broke down under English military pressure. But it had scored a great success: the Cabinet had been compelled to resign, not, however, at the command or desire of the English, as had happened for the past forty years, but for the first time in obedience to popular pressure and against the will of the English. Thus, although the Revolution had failed, it had attained two objects. It had shown the people their power and had attracted public attention to Egypt, which now possessed in Zaghlul a mouth-piece honoured by his own people and recognised internation-

¹ *Hansard*, March 24th, 1919.

ally. Mohammed Said Pasha, a pliant tool of the English and the Sultan, undertook to form a Cabinet.

But in this third phase the Revolution had further significance. In the March days of 1919 the Egyptian people had attained unity for the first time. The intelligentsia of the towns were united with the fellaheen in a common enterprise. Zaghlul, who designated himself a fellah and had also risen to the ranks of the city intelligentsia, acted as the natural leader of both sections. So great was the enthusiasm at this time that even the aristocracy joined the nationalist movement in considerable numbers, or did not dare to oppose it. The popular union went much further. In the Revolution of 1910 there had still been a sharp division between Copts and Mohammedans. The most remarkable occurrence in 1919 was the fraternisation of Mohammedans and Copts, united by the common ideal of the newly awakening nation. Copts were members of the Wafd and were amongst Zaghlul's closest associates. Copts were among the earliest victims in the March rising. For the first time Copt priests preached in El Azhar and other large mosques, and Mohammedans called upon men in the churches to take part in the national struggle. Christian priests went through the city streets hand in hand with mullahs, preaching love of the common fatherland. The banners of the demonstrators showed the cross linked with the crescent. In those days, too, Egyptian women were roused to political activity for the first time. They came out of the harems and demonstrated in the streets, they marched to meetings and spoke in popular gatherings. During the strikes of the officials they stood as strike pickets at the office doors. The pupils at girls' schools marched in the streets with their male colleagues. The wives of the fellaheen helped them in their revolt and bore their share of the military terror when it was suppressed. Thus in every sense the year 1919 brought a consummation of the national revolution in Egypt.

The wisest of the Egyptian leaders—and they are few in number—demanded national independence first and foremost as being essential to the education of their people. For during nearly forty years of their rule the English had done little or nothing in the most important spheres of social welfare. The sanitary condition of the country was exceedingly bad, with

dirt and vermin everywhere. The infant mortality in Egypt is terrible, and a people so ravaged with disease as the Egyptians is incapable of cultural achievements on a democratic basis. It is urgent and essential to raise the lower classes. Linked with this problem is that of popular education, which the English have totally neglected. "Unquestionably the worst of our failures," so Chirol describes the English educational policy in Egypt. The building and extension of primary schools was wholly neglected. Only 2 per cent. of the Egyptian revenue is applied to education, and barely £20,000 sterling annually is spent on primary schools. The money of the taxpayers, principally fellaheen, has not been used to improve their health or educate their children, but to cover the deficit in the Sudan. The few colleges that existed in Egypt before the British occupation were not developed by the English; they were inadequate in size and unable to accommodate the great number of students. There was no opportunity in Egypt to study natural science, nor Egyptian history and archæology, nor Oriental subjects. For years the public demanded technical and commercial colleges, but it was not till just before the war that the English Government met this demand, and then quite inadequately. Instruction was given in English, not in Arabic as the Egyptians demanded. "We have, unhappily, no more reason to be proud of our record of female than of male education. It shows an even worse failure to . . . keep pace with the growing demand."¹ The only reform effected was in the curriculum of the El Azhar mosque in 1911, with a view to adapting the students' training to some extent to modern conditions. Students may now enter between the ages of ten and seventeen, and the period of study is fifteen years. The entrance examination requires a knowledge of reading and writing and the committal to memory of at least half the Koran. Studies are divided into three sections, the first embracing Mohammedan theology and canon law, the second Arabic grammar and literature, and the third, introduced in 1911, mathematics and the rudiments of modern science.

Whilst public health and education were so ill cared for,

¹ *The Egyptian Problem*. By Sir Valentine Chirol, Macmillan, 1920, p. 230.

the English Government, like every despotism, had done nothing for the political and administrative training of the people. Naturally they liked Ministers and officials who were willing tools and never "upset" things. No initiative and no opportunities were left to the Egyptian official. The English officials were for the most part young, without any special qualifications for their duties, and frequently arrogant and provocative in their bearing. They were liberally, often extravagantly, paid and thus stood in sharp contrast to the great mass of small Egyptian officials who received starvation salaries. The number of English officials in Egypt steadily increased; at the same time the whole service became more and more rigidly centralised and the quality of the officials deteriorated seriously, especially after the outbreak of war. In 1896 there were 286 English officials in Egypt, in 1906 there were 662, and in 1919 as many as 1,671. The inevitable result was, as Chirol points out, that the English administration had not roused or encouraged the spirit of responsibility, self-government, and initiative, but disheartened and crushed it. All authority lay in the hands of a few officials at the top, altogether cut off from Egyptian life and public opinion and treating it as something of minor importance. Lord Allenby dismissed the most incompetent of these officials who were detested by the Egyptian public and responsible for the abuses; foremost among these were the adviser to the Ministry of Education, Dunlop, who was replaced by Paterson, Sir William Brunyate in the Ministry of Justice, and Haynes, the adviser to the Minister of the Interior, who was succeeded by Sir Reginald Clayton. But the policy of sending more and more young and inexperienced English officials to Egypt was retained. The incapacity of the English administration to carry out effective measures of public relief was revealed during the famine in the winter of 1919-20, when the situation was aggravated by misdirected action on the part of the Government. At last a national Egyptian relief organisation in Damietta under the guidance of the lawyer, Emin Effendi Yussuf, showed the right way, setting up large co-operative societies in various towns and alleviating the distress by the people's own initiative.

Meantime London had realised better how serious the situation was. In May, 1919, it was decided to send a special

Commission under Lord Milner "to inquire into the cause of the late disturbances in Egypt," and "to report on the form of constitution which under the protectorate will be best calculated to promote peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests."¹ Plainly a Commission with such terms of reference, formulated in such a way as to betray the intention of maintaining the protectorate and the English administration in Egypt, a Commission consisting entirely of Englishmen without the inclusion of a single Egyptian, was bound to meet with the sharpest opposition from the Egyptian people at the very outset. All Egypt protested against the Milner Mission; when, nevertheless, its appointment was definitely settled, the Ministry resigned as a protest, and a Copt, Yussuf Wahab Pasha, undertook to form a government. At this juncture Balfour declared in the House of Commons: "British supremacy exists (in Egypt), British supremacy is going to be maintained, and let nobody either in Egypt or out of Egypt make any mistake upon that cardinal principle of His Majesty's Government."² On December 7th the Milner Mission landed in Egypt. At the same time a large number of English officials were again sent to Egypt to fill administrative posts. The Egyptian people had resolved to boycott the Milner Mission, and the boycott was carried out with unexampled discipline. Alike in town and country no intercourse was possible with the Mission. The fellaheen replied to all questions with the stereotyped phrase: "Zaghlul knows." The royal princes, the leaders of Egyptian society, and the clergy protested in a similar manner against the Mission. Immediately after its departure in March, 1920, the members of the Legislative Assembly met and declared all government acts since 1914 illegal and null.

That same year the English announced their irrigation scheme in the Sudan. The Government maintained the utmost secrecy in working out this scheme, and the Commission entrusted with the task included not a single Egyptian, but only one American and two Englishmen from India. Yet the irrigation works were to be carried out in the Sudan and paid for out of Egyptian taxes; moreover, the Egyptians

¹ *Hansard*, August 18th, 1919, col. 1897.

² *Hansard*, November 17th, 1919, col. 771.

feared that the scheme would be detrimental to their own prosperity. It was planned to develop cotton growing in the Sudan, to the disadvantage of the Egyptian fellahs, for the benefit of English syndicates, and with the support of the British Government. Even leading English experts like Sir William Willcocks and Colonel Kennedy made serious accusations in connection with the scheme against the English adviser in the Ministry of Public Works. The Egyptians were confirmed in their struggle against the British administration by the events connected with the appointment of the Milner Mission and this irrigation scheme in the Sudan. In the same year they took the first step towards economic independence, for Egypt was almost entirely dependent upon foreigners in her trade and manufactures. The *Banque Misr* was established with a capital of £80,000 sterling and with shareholders who, according to its statutes, must be Egyptians.

Between April and August, 1920, the Milner Mission was working out proposals for a future Egyptian constitution, negotiating in London with Zaghlul and his Delegation and with Adli Pasha. The agreement reached in August provided for an alliance between Great Britain and an independent Egypt. The capitulations were to be abolished, but England was to succeed to all rights under them and to protect the interests of foreigners in Egypt. England was still to maintain a military force in Egypt to guard her imperial communications, but "the presence of this force shall not constitute in any manner a military occupation of the country or prejudice the rights of the Government of Egypt."¹ British advisers were still to be attached to the Ministries of Finance and Justice. Zaghlul declared that he must submit the agreement to the public opinion of his country. Four members of the Delegation left London and went to Egypt. The proposals of the Milner Mission were received with general favour, but a restriction of the rights of the financial and judicial advisers, with the immediate abolition of the protectorate and the capitulations, were demanded. In October the Egyptian Delegation returned to London and attempted to get these reservations embodied in the agree-

¹ *Report of the Special Mission to Egypt*. Cmd. 1131, 1921, p. 24.

ment. They failed, and as no understanding was reached the Delegation left London.

On February 18th, 1921, the Milner Report was published in its original form and the Commission recommended the Government to enter into immediate negotiations with the Egyptian Government on the basis of the Report. The British Government did not follow this advice. It invited the Sultan to send a delegation to London under Adli Pasha to continue negotiations, and to entrust Adli with the formation of a new Cabinet. Adli declared his willingness and invited Zaghlul to come to Egypt and co-operate with him in forming a new delegation. In April, 1921, Zaghlul returned to Egypt where the people welcomed him with unprecedented enthusiasm. They still stood unanimously behind him. But the whole nation was no longer as united as it had been two years earlier. A considerable section of the aristocracy began to feel Zaghlul as a disturbing force and turned away from him. And once again English observers deceived themselves about the actual course of events and the strength of national and democratic sentiment; they began to imagine that Zaghlul was supported by a mere handful of "extremists and agitators." The Government was in the hands of the aristocracy hostile to Zaghlul; the three elections held under strong pressure from this Government proved on each occasion that Zaghlul was right in claiming to be the sole representative of the people. He declared his readiness to go to London for renewed negotiations, but only on condition that the delegation be instructed to demand complete independence and the abolition of martial law and the censorship, and that his own Egyptian Delegation, which really had been chosen by the people, should provide the president and the majority of the new delegation, not the Ministry appointed in England. Adli, who continued to lean upon England, rejected Zaghlul's demand, as also a second demand for the summoning of a National Assembly to elect the new delegation. In 1921 he went to London to negotiate with Lord Curzon. The negotiations were fruitless. Even Adli could not concede Lord Curzon's demands. There were four principal points about which the struggle revolved: Egypt's right to the Sudan, the maintenance of British troops in Egypt outside the Canal zone, the dominant position of the English financial

and judicial advisers, and the measure of British control of Egypt's foreign relations. The negotiations broke down, therefore, and Adli Pasha resigned. Once more Egypt was without a government, and openly ruled by the English occupying force under martial law.

On December 3rd, 1921, Lord Allenby presented a comprehensive Note to the Sultan which even the most moderate Egyptians regarded as unacceptable, alike in form and substance. This Note, which may be traced to Churchill's inspiration, intensified the popular indignation. Here, as in Turkey and Arabia in the same year, it was Churchill's unconcealed Imperialism that prevented any peaceable understanding. It was he who influenced Lloyd George and Curzon in their Near and Middle Eastern policy.

The Wafd called a meeting for December 23rd which was forbidden under martial law. Thereupon Zaghlul issued a manifesto, and when he refused to submit to the prohibition of all further political activity, he and three of his followers were arrested and taken first to Aden and then to Seychelles. At this disturbances broke out in the country. Once more women played an important part, with Zaghlul's wife at their head. The methods of passive resistance, as practised in Ireland and India, were to be adopted here, too.

Meanwhile Lord Allenby tried to persuade the British Government to show a spirit of compliance. On January 31st, 1922, Sarwat Pasha published the substance of a declaration by Lord Allenby, offering him the opportunity of forming a Ministry on the basis of Zaghlul's earlier conversations with Milner. Sarwat Pasha drew up a programme which would partially have met Egyptian aspirations. But a statement from London rejected this programme and Allenby was summoned to England. There he succeeded in convincing the English Government of the seriousness of the situation. He returned at the end of February, and on February 28th the proclamation of Egypt's independence was issued. Four of the points most vital to Egypt were still reserved for England's exclusive judgment even after this proclamation. They were the safety of British imperial communications in Egypt; the defence of Egypt against all foreign attacks, the protection of foreign interests in Egypt, and the Sudan. English troops remained in Egypt and dominated Cairo from

its citadel. Independence was only illusory. England still retained every opportunity of intervening in Egypt's internal affairs in all manner of ways. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Egyptians expressed no peculiar satisfaction over the proclamation and were not "grateful" as the English had hoped.

On March 1st, 1922, the Sultan assumed the title of King and Sarwat Pasha undertook to form a Cabinet. But the Egyptian people demanded the return of Zaghlul. The correspondence between Allenby and Curzon, which had meanwhile been published, showed that Curzon regarded Sarwat as a British tool. When Fuad I solemnly adopted the royal title the people remained cold and cried: "Long live Zaghlul!" Sarwat's Ministry was composed of none but his own friends. The people demanded the summoning of a National Assembly under the electoral law of 1913, but as Sarwat feared that in the Constituent Assembly Zaghlul would command an overwhelming majority, the labour of drafting a constitution was entrusted to a commission of thirty-three under Hussein Rushdi Pasha, consisting almost exclusively of Sarwat's supporters. Martial law remained in force even in an independent Egypt, meetings were prohibited, political life was in fetters. It was not till July 5th, 1923, that martial law was withdrawn, at least on paper, after a so-called Act of Indemnity had declared all acts and decrees of the military administration since the beginning of the war valid and legal. In the autumn of 1923 Zaghlul returned to Egypt amidst tremendous popular enthusiasm, and preparations began for the election of the first Egyptian Parliament.

Early in 1924 the first Egyptian Parliament met. The elections had resulted in an overwhelming majority for Zaghlul. He accepted the Premiership. The Opposition was small in numbers and was composed of constitutional Liberals, including Adli, Abdel Asis Fahmi, Abdel Latif el Mekabbaty, Mohammed Mahmud Pasha, and Ismail Sidky Pasha; their organ was *Al Siyassa*. Zaghlul announced as his policy the full independence of Egypt, *Istiqlal el Tam*. He took his stand on the assumption that the four reserved points had not received Egyptian assent; their acceptance had been forced upon the country, which had a right to full independence. The British Government under MacDonal, on the

contrary, set out with the view that the concession of independence had been a gift to Egypt from England, and that England was fully entitled to reserve certain points for her own decision, and further to determine the degree and character of Egyptian independence. Under these circumstances the negotiations between Zaghlul and MacDonald could not lead anywhere. MacDonald adhered to the view adopted by the Churchill-Curzon Government. Zaghlul endeavoured to retain the greatest possible independence by way of internal administration. Thus on June 28th, 1924, the Egyptian Parliament resolved no longer to bear the cost of the English occupying army in Egypt. For hitherto this item in the cost of British Imperial defence, amounting to £146,000 sterling, had been borne by the Egyptian taxpayer. Zaghlul declared his willingness that the protection of the Suez Canal as an international waterway should be entrusted to the League of Nations. As for the protection of foreigners, it was beyond question that they could live as safely in an independent Egypt as an independent Turkey or an independent Yugoslavia. The protection of minorities was no longer necessary, for since the World War the Copts lived on the best of terms with the Mohammedans, and two of their leaders, Sinnot Hanna Bey and George Khayat Bey, were close associates of Zaghlul. Egypt's further demand that the English envoy should no longer be called a High Commissioner, as if Egypt were a protectorate, but should have the rank of an ambassador, might have been treated with consideration if the British Government had been more disposed for a genuine understanding. MacDonald was equally unyielding in the question of the Sudan; indeed the Sudan planters' syndicate, a capitalist cotton trust, received further subventions of many millions from the English Government, a policy quite the reverse of what might naturally be expected from a Labour Party.

The year 1924 marked the ascendancy of the Egyptian middle class. The sentiment of national unity that had prevailed in the revolutionary years rapidly disappeared. The new middle class soon came into conflict with the workers who were increasing in numbers and slowly developing class consciousness. In the centres of Egyptian industry, which, however, was largely in the hands of European capita-

lists, strikes had become frequent since 1919. The tramway employees in Cairo and Alexandria had demanded higher wages, regular hours of labour, and insurance against sickness and accidents. The management of the companies, situated in Europe, would not listen to these demands, and it was only after a strike lasting many weeks that the workers secured a part of them. Workers' trade unions were illegal and were slow in formation. In 1922 there were thirty-eight trade unions in Cairo, thirty-three in Alexandria, eighteen in the Canal zone, and six in the provinces. Many of these unions consisted of foreign workers, mainly Italian, Greek, and French. They were recognised by the official arbitration boards and owed their existence to a goldsmith in Alexandria, Joseph Rosenthal, who also formed the Egyptian Socialist Party in 1920, a body of right wing moderates. But soon an extreme left wing arose under the leadership of an Egyptian, Husni el Orabi; in 1922 it sent Orabi to Moscow, where he established contact with the Third International. After his return the party joined the Communists and Rosenthal was ejected. This party put forward a series of demands, some nationalist in character and vehemently opposed to the British occupation and reactionary legislation, some aiming at modern labour protection and social legislation, the complete emancipation of women, and free education. It is of interest to see how in a predominantly agricultural country like Egypt the principal emphasis was laid upon far-reaching agrarian reforms. The demand was put forward for the abolition of large feudal estates; all peasants owning less than thirty feddan (a feddan is a little more than an acre) of land were to have their debts remitted, whilst peasants with less than ten feddan were to pay no taxes. Nobody was to be allowed to own more than a hundred feddan. In February, 1924, serious strikes broke out amongst the workers in the factories of Alexandria; the buildings were occupied by the workers and held for several days. The foreign settlements were alarmed at these events and demanded Government intervention. Instead of introducing far-reaching legislation, Zaghlul proceeded to suppress the disorders and the workers' organisations ruthlessly.

In the first Egyptian Parliament Zaghlul's party had an overwhelming majority. Of 214 deputies, only 23 belonged

to the Opposition. But during its brief existence and in view of the necessity of struggling against the foreign obstruction of full administrative independence, it had no time to attend to the urgent social reforms that Egypt needed. The education estimates were, indeed, raised from £1,144,385 sterling in 1922 to £1,714,689 sterling, but the developments which soon followed, the renewed intervention of the British Government, and of the court and nobility with British support, checked any further growth of that spirit of social service and responsibility which is so often lacking in the Near East.

On November 19th, 1924, Sir Lee O. F. Stack, the Sirdar (Commander of the British troops in Egypt), was assassinated in Cairo. The Conservative Government, which had secured a parliamentary majority in England meantime, sent an ultimatum demanding an apology and inquiry, the payment of an indemnity of £500,000 sterling, and in addition the withdrawal of all Egyptian troops from the Sudan, the unrestricted use of the Nile waters for the irrigation of the Sudan, and the restoration of all the powers of the British advisers to the Ministries of Justice, Finance, and the Interior. Zaghlul Pasha declared that the last three demands were unacceptable, and resigned under British military pressure. Ziwar Pasha, the President of the Egyptian Senate nominated by the King, undertook to form a Ministry that would be prepared to accept the British demands. Parliament was dissolved and fresh elections proclaimed. In spite of the postponement of the election beyond the date originally fixed, and in spite of the pressure exercised by the new Government and the English administration, what happened was so obvious and inevitable that only the self-deluded English Press could fail to foresee it. On March 23rd, 1925, the new Parliament was opened by the King. The King's speech emphasised the necessity of universal and compulsory education, the foundation of an Egyptian University, and special attention to the education of girls. At this juncture official circles were still indulging in illusions regarding the composition of Parliament, but these were quickly dispelled when the President of the Chamber was elected and Zaghlul received 125 votes against 85 for Sarwat Pasha, the Government candidate.

That same day Parliament was dissolved at the Premier's request, and new elections were fixed in the first instance for May 23rd, in accordance with the constitution. It was justly recognised, however, that any election would inevitably give an overwhelming majority to Zaghlul, and as early as March 26th a new decree was issued stating that the elections would be indefinitely postponed until a new electoral law had been devised, in view of the urgent necessity of altering the electoral system so as to secure the better representation of the country. A Commission appointed to devise a new electoral law dragged on its labours for months. Instead of democratic, direct elections in which every citizen possessed the suffrage, indirect elections were to be reintroduced. According to the original draft electors must be at least twenty-five years of age and either pay a minimum sum in taxes or give evidence of higher education. The new regulations would have reduced the number of electors in the towns by no less than 60 per cent., in the country by 40 per cent. The *Times* correspondent wrote from Cairo regarding the Commission's task: "The task of the Commission is no light one, for it is obvious from the terms of Ziwar Pasha's declarations at the time of the dissolution of the last Chamber, that it is not the intention of the Commissioners to frame a law which would result in the election of a Chamber of similar complexion to the last. The task of the Commission is, primarily, to devise an electoral system which will not result in the return of a Zaghlulist majority. That, clearly, is not an easy task."¹

The year 1925 witnessed Egypt's relapse into the former despotism. A Ministry composed solely of aristocrats was governing in open defiance of the constitution, with the support of the British occupying force. Constitutional liberties were suspended, and a number of reactionary laws introduced. In actual fact the ruling power was the court, and King Fuad and his favourite, Nashaat Pasha, revived memories of the days of Ismail's arbitrary rule in the minds of a new generation. Though no money was available for the country's needs, extravagantly costly legations were established abroad, which were yet of no political value. Originally the Ministry was composed of members of the *Ittihad*

¹ *Times*, June 25th, 1925.

or Union Party, a small group of large landowners in close touch with the court, and of the Constitutional Liberals, a party of progressive large landowners and wealthy city men; amongst the latter was Ismail Sidky Pasha, the ablest man in the Government. In the autumn Lord Allenby, the British High Commissioner, was succeeded by Sir George Lloyd, a Conservative colonial governor who had already proved his quality in India and whose appointment was evidence of England's continued determination to maintain something amounting in practice at least to a protectorate in Egypt.

During the year an incident occurred that was characteristic of Egypt's transitional state. Sheikh Ali Abdel Razek, Cadi of the Mansura Mehkema Shariat court of justice, who had studied at Oxford during the war, after completing his course at El Azhar, published a book on Islam and the principles of the State, in which he expressed the view that Mohammedan law was intended solely to regulate individual life and personal conduct, not social life or State legislation. For this reason the Caliphate had never been an essential part of Islam. Further, the learned Sheikh declared against polygamy and in favour of the complete emancipation of Mussulman women. His demands were the logical outcome of the process of secularisation which had begun in Egypt as in all other Eastern countries and which had reached its climax at this time in the Turkish Republic. The conclusion to which his view pointed was the separation of Church and State, the idea of faith as a personal matter appertaining solely to private life and law, a religion stripped of its attributes of power and State authority, and further the gradual dispossession of those classes that had been predominant in the mediæval, ecclesiastical State: the feudal nobility, with the King at their head, and the clergy. The reception accorded to this book in Egypt was a touchstone for the country's evolution from a theocratic despotism to a national civic democracy. It was violently attacked by the orthodox clergy and the dominant circles in the El Azhar mosque. With them were associated the court and the Union party. A lively discussion began in all the papers. The Sheikh was arraigned by the Governing Council of the El Azhar University, found guilty of heresy by a court of five-and-twenty scholars, and deposed from his office as a judge.

Public opinion stood overwhelmingly on the side of the Sheikh. A petition signed by a hundred and fifty notables asked the King to refuse his assent to the sentence. But the King carried it out. Thereupon the Constitutional Liberals resigned their portfolios.

The autumn months of 1925 witnessed the growing alienation of the country from the Ministry, which had hardly any supporters outside its own ranks and was backed by none but the court and the English occupying army. Its ruthless exploitation of all expedients of State and administrative power for its own benefit brought about the union of the other three Egyptian parties, the Wafd, the Nationalists, and the Constitutional Liberals, though a few weeks earlier this would have been considered impossible. Their union created once more a single, consolidated front of the whole people, such as had existed in 1919. Even such personalities as Sarwat Pasha and Ismail Sidky Pasha found themselves unable to hold aloof from this movement.

On November 21st one hundred and seventy members of the Chamber and sixty-six Senators belonging to the three Opposition parties met and declared that, in accordance with the clear provisions of the constitution, Parliament still existed; they protested against the Government's policy and its illegal acts. Zaghlul Pasha was elected President of the Assembly which represented the still surviving Parliament, whilst Mohammed Pasha Mahmud, together with Abdel Asis Pasha Fahmi, the leader of the Constitutional Liberals, and Abdel Hamid Bey Said, the representative of the *Watani* or Nationalist party, were elected Vice-Presidents. All present swore to defend to their utmost the constitution for which the country had made such heavy sacrifices. A joint manifesto of the three parties was to call in the people's name for a struggle against despotism. Thus the overwhelming majority of Parliament and a solidly united people had spoken once more under Zaghlul's leadership. Next day the Egyptian paper *Balagh* wrote: "In this twentieth century of ours nations will never submit to the will of individuals and can never be subdued by violence and tyranny. In our century no Ministry can survive that does not respect the constitution. In our century wire-pullers and favourites must realise that the people have ceased to believe in the kind of absolute authority

that they obeyed in olden days, and that no authority can persist unless it wins the consent of the people. This day marks the beginning of a struggle between the nation and a Ministry which believes that it can act in defiance of the constitution and public opinion."

In the spring of 1926 the Ziwar Ministry and the British High Commissioner were obliged to yield to the pressure of public opinion. After an attempt to hold elections under a new, reactionary electoral law had been defeated by the threat of a general boycott, the elections were held in May under the 1924 electoral law of the Zaghlul Ministry. The third Egyptian Parliament again showed an overwhelming Zaghlulist majority, but there was no Opposition. The court Union party had been completely swept away, and the two small parties of Constitutional Liberals and Nationalists had entered a coalition with Zaghlul's party. The united front was as complete in Parliament as in the nation. Zaghlul became President of the Chamber, and the Ministry was composed of six Zaghlulists and three Constitutional Liberals under the premiership of tried Liberal statesmen, first Adli Yeghen and later Sarwat Pasha. In its first year the new Parliament devoted itself chiefly to questions of internal reform: economies were effected in the budget, preparations were made for universal, compulsory education, the existing educational system was developed, attention was paid to the development of agriculture, and in view of the reactionary aims of the clergy, theological institutions and foundations were brought under parliamentary legislation and control. In questions of foreign policy Parliament acted with caution: it was not till the summer of 1927 that the British High Commissioner provoked it by his arrogant bearing and constant humiliation of Egyptian national sentiment to press for an early settlement of Anglo-Egyptian relations with reference to the four points reserved in the proclamation of independence of February 28th, 1922. This was after Egyptian public opinion and the Press had been discussing for months the urgent necessity of abolishing the capitulations. In July, 1927, the Egyptian King and Premier visited England; the monarch was received with high honours, and this visit was made the occasion of negotiations between Egypt and Great Britain. Whatever their outcome may be, Egyptian public

opinion has set its face resolutely towards a democratic, modern transformation of the national life, though at the same time it has learned that this means a far journey and that England is less of an obstruction than the apathy and ignorance of the masses in Egypt itself.

The draft treaty between Great Britain and Egypt, the joint work of Sarwat Pasha and the British Government, was doomed from the outset. It paid no regard whatever to the Egyptian people's national aspirations. But what is more important is that a few months later constitutional government in Egypt was ousted by the dictatorship of the court and aristocracy. This apparent set-back in Egypt's march to independence will be no more than a passing phase.

CHAPTER VIII

TURKISH NATIONALISM

TURKEY came into close contact with modern Europe a few decades later than Egypt. The leaders of Turkish thought were quicker to grasp the nature of the change that had come over Europe. The form assumed by Turkish nationalism is more marked and characteristic than that of any kindred movement in the Near and Middle East. It copied European institutions more faithfully than any other. We need not be surprised, therefore, that at the end of this phase of her development Turkey strove to cast off everything Oriental and mediæval that still survived in her, and to take her place in the fullest sense in present-day Europe, without paying the slightest heed to her traditional character. True, it is due to the absence of any great past civilisation of their own that the Turks are willing to be fully Europeanised, as the Indians are not.

Constitutional reforms in Turkey owed their origin partly to Mohammed Ali, whose victorious campaigns in Syria and Asia Minor and exemplary modernisation of Egypt's government suggested the necessity of transforming Turkey from an Oriental absolute despotism, continuing unchanged for centuries, to a modern constitutional State. Like Peter the Great, Sultan Mahmud II recognised the necessity of creating an army trained on European lines and a modern absolutist administration. On May 28th, 1826, he abolished the existing janizary army and decreed the organisation of one recruited under Egyptian officers. That day may be regarded as the beginning of the *tanzimate* or period of reform in Turkey. Officers were obtained from the West, young officers were sent to Europe for training, and a military college was established. The first Ministries were created, an attempt was made to reorganise the administration systematically, an official newspaper, *Le Moniteur Ottoman*, was published in Turkish and French, the importance of road-

making was recognised, and permanent Turkish Ambassadors were sent for the first time to the most important European capitals. Thus the Sultan, who by the way was the first to wear European clothes, strove to remould his State on the model of enlightened absolutism. But he knew Europe only through rumour and report, and all his reforms remained on the surface; they did not penetrate to realities, so that the effect produced somewhat resembled the Balkans in operetta. Even the highest and most influential classes in Turkey remained almost grotesquely ignorant.

When the Sultan died in 1838, the people everywhere still regarded his reforms with a complete lack of understanding. His successor, Sultan Abdul Mejid, was at first influenced by Reshid Pasha, who had lived for years in Paris and London and had come home with clearer ideas of European progress. But Reshid Pasha, was a solitary exception, and the country remained unaffected by any modern tendencies. The reforms which the Sultan announced at his instigation were as much in advance of the nation's development as the reforms of Peter the Great in Russia or Joseph II in Austria. On November 3rd, 1839, the great edict of reform, the Khat-i-Sherif, was promulgated in solemn assembly in the palace of Gulhane. It abolished absolutism and established the validity of principles and laws above individual caprice. The foundation was laid for a modern constitutional State. True, these reforms were not announced as a deliberate change of policy leading to a new era, but as a return to the real spirit of the Sharia, the canon law of Islam. Individual liberty for all subjects and security of person and property were decreed, the equality of all Ottomans was proclaimed irrespective of religion, and reforms were promised in the spheres of taxation, justice, and the army. The equality of Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans before the law meant the end of the mediæval Mohammedan State. New codes of law on the French model were introduced: in 1840 a new criminal code was issued, in 1859 a civil code, and later a commercial code and new rules of judicial procedure.

But the people were hardly affected by these reforms. In orthodox circles and among those whose hereditary interests and power were endangered they met with resistance. The Sultan himself wavered and hesitated between reform

and the maintenance of former conditions. The Crimean War, which Turkey fought against Russia in alliance with England and France, gave a new impetus to the reforms. At the Peace Conference in Paris Turkey was received as the first non-Christian State into the concert of Europe. In February, 1856, the Khat-i-Khumajun was promulgated, confirming anew the reforms of 1839. Further, hopes were held out that Christians would be made eligible for all offices, the creation of Provincial Diets and a State Council with the participation of non-Mohammedans was promised, and the secular school system established. These reforms, likewise, remained for the most part on paper. Nevertheless, the first steps had been taken in a real process of transformation. The decree finally swept away the conception of the Sharia as the sole source of legislation. In 1857 a Ministry of Education and Instruction was established, matters which had hitherto been subject to the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the supreme spiritual authority. In 1860 the first decree was issued on the reorganisation of the schools, and schools were opened. In 1868 the Imperial Lycée of Galata was opened; its object was to train civil servants, and great importance was attached to French as a language of instruction. The death penalty for apostasy from Islam was abolished, and it was determined in principle to do away with slavery. In legal proceedings documentary evidence was admitted in addition to sworn statements, which were not accepted from non-Mohammedans. Paragraph 8 of the Edict guaranteed the free practice of all religions: "Since every religious community and denomination in my Empire may celebrate divine service in its own way with perfect freedom, nobody shall be impeded or annoyed in the worship of God in accordance with his own religion, and nobody shall be compelled to change his religion or denomination."

In 1861 Abdul Asis ascended the throne. He was a feeble and wavering sovereign, whose misrule and extravagance threatened to bring financial disaster upon the country. But by this time the new spirit had prevailed among the leaders of the Turkish intelligentsia. Constitutional reforms, due to diplomatic and military requirements, led to the first stirring of an intellectual renaissance; men aspired to renewed youth and enriched lives, and a new rhythm pulsed through

the whole body politic. This intellectual movement accelerated and stimulated political life, though for many years it was confined to a narrow circle of enlightened aristocrats and officers under European influence, just like the earlier revolutionary and rationalist movements in Russia. In addition to the reforms introduced by the Sultan, changes now came about based on a more widespread demand. The political and the intellectual transformation, the latter expressing itself chiefly in the literary sphere, were two aspects of a single process; both sprang from a single source. A number of students had been sent abroad, especially to France. In Turkey itself Western languages were taught, and the influence of Western literature began to make itself felt.

The man who transformed this first intellectual stimulus to positive achievement was Shinasi Effendi. After a year of study in Paris he returned to Constantinople in 1859 and published there a translation of French poets. This was the first purely literary translation from a Western language into Turkish. In 1860 he founded the first unofficial Turkish newspaper with the title *The Interpreter of Circumstances*. Both undertakings marked an epoch in Turkish literature.

Till then literary Turkish had been a highly artificial language made up of Persian and Arabic words and turns of speech. The people could not understand it. It was a secret language of the educated classes, unnatural, lifeless, and full of outworn, insincere rhetoric. There was no beautiful literature in the Western sense. Thus the first Egyptian printing press, the Bulak Press, established by the reformer Mohammed Ali in 1821, printed 243 books in the first twenty years of its existence. Amongst these, and amongst the eighty books printed by the first press in Constantinople between 1784 and 1828, there was not a single example of *belles-lettres* or light literature.

In Turkey as elsewhere modern nationalist sentiment arose simultaneously with the creation of a new, unaffected, and natural literary language akin to the vernacular, and this resulted, further, in the supersession of a type of humanism inseparable from mediæval, classical speech and form. Shinasi Effendi was the father of the new language, which he was the first to use in his translations and his newspaper. Turkish intellectual life awoke from its torpor. Not only a new

language, but a new world appeared on the horizon in these translations. As Gibb says in the last volume of his *History of Ottoman Poetry*, a new style of poetry now reached the people's ears; Nature was truly portrayed in hill and dale, cloud and wave. "The heavy fetters of secular tradition and convention are broken and cast away, and the poet finds himself at last a free man, free to seek his inspiration where he will, free to voice what is within him as he pleases."¹ Form and substance were adapted to modern needs. Shinasi published a number of popular scientific articles in his paper, dealing with modern Europe and the discoveries and inventions of man's inquiring spirit. In this way a comparison with existing conditions in the East was suggested, and for the first time venerable traditions were judged in a critical spirit.

Shinasi Effendi's pupil, Namil Kemal Bey, surpassed his master in poetical power; he had come under the influence of Lamartine and the romantic school in Paris, and deserves fame as the true rejuvenator of Turkish poetic style. He died in exile at an early age in 1888. Others soon followed: Ziya Pasha, who lived four years in exile in Western Europe and there became the leader of the political Young Turks, and Hamid Bey who was the first to introduce modern metre and modern ideas into Turkish lyrical poetry proper in his poem *Sahra* in 1879. In the sixties French novels and comedies were first translated into Turkish. About this time Molière was first produced on the stage in Constantinople. In 1872 the first original Turkish drama appeared, written by Tewfik Bey. New printing presses sprang up which showed an appreciation of beautiful and decorative workmanship. Cheap editions were published, and a new Turkish dictionary was produced. Ziya Pasha translated Rousseau's *Émile* into Turkish and wrote an introduction discussing educational problems in Turkey. Words in the existing language acquired a new meaning. *Watan*, which hitherto had meant "home" or "birthplace," now came to be used in the sense of "fatherland," and *millat*, which hitherto had designated a religious sect, acquired the meaning "national" or "people," as opposed to the court which had previously covered all State

¹ *A History of Ottoman Poetry*. By E. J. W. Gibb, Luzac, 1907, vol. v., p. 3.

activities. So also the word *hurriyet*, freedom, rang with a new note and a new significance. Thus Turkey, which had retained the structure of a mediæval State as late as 1859, had evolved twenty years later, like Russia about the middle of the nineteenth century, into a community where the upper stratum of society, thin as it still was, was dominated by the European spirit and ready to call a modern national State into being. The political developments of 1876 already found a sounding echo in the national life. It was no longer a case of reform imposed from above, but of a political revolution won by the efforts of the most advanced section of the population.

In the early years of Sultan Abdul Asis's reign liberal tendencies prevailed under Fuad Pasha, Ali Pasha, and Midhat Pasha. In 1862 the Young Turk political movement began to organise. In 1865 the newspaper *Mushbir* first appeared in Constantinople, edited by Ali Suavi and advocating radical reforms. In 1867 the paper was suppressed and the editor fled to London, where he edited it together with *Hurriyet* (Freedom) which had been established there in 1864. These papers were smuggled into Turkey and there acted as a ferment of democratic influence. After 1870 a number of "westernisers" returned to Turkey. Among them was Kemal Bey, whose new organ *Ibret* (Take Heart) was, perhaps the most influential paper in the Turkish language. In 1875 his drama *Watan* (The Fartherland) was produced, on a theme which stirred patriotic heroism. A young Turkish girl disguises herself as a man and accompanies her lover on the Russian campaign.

The Turkish Press, too, developed rapidly between 1870 and 1876. It was one of the most important factors in the great transformation of Turkish life and thought, for it promoted a practical spirit. People no longer accepted what came with Oriental submissiveness and fatalism as the decree of destiny. For the first time in the Near East a public opinion and public spirit came into being. Though the circulation of the papers was small, nevertheless they reached a very wide circle; social life still maintained its established forms, and the papers circulated in coffee-houses and bazaars and were passed on during visits. In 1872 Turkey already possessed three daily papers and a number of weeklies. In

addition to these Turkish papers there were six French dailies which the Turkish educated classes could read and a number of newspapers and weekly journals in the languages of the various Christian peoples inhabiting the Turkish Empire. By 1876 there were seven Turkish dailies in Constantinople. In 1859 there had been in all Turkey only one official and one semi-official weekly.

In the early years of Sultan Abdul Asis's reign there was steady political progress. In 1864 a law was passed under the influence of Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha fixing provincial boundaries; it superseded the existing very loose feudal organisation under Pashas, and separated the executive and judicial authority for the first time. In the more important cities elected Town Councils were introduced, to which non-Mohammedans were admitted. In 1869 the Sultan opened the newly formed Town Council headed by Midhat Pasha and including representatives of non-Mohammedans. In his inaugural speech the Sultan stressed the fact that henceforward he would recognise no distinction between his Mohammedan subjects and those of other faiths, and that all State offices, even the highest, were open to non-Mohammedans. At that time the Imperial Lycée, opened the previous year, already numbered 622 students, of whom 277 were Mohammedans.

This period of progress was speedily followed by an era of corrupt and unbridled tyranny. The Sultan's favourite, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, governed the country. But Turkish public opinion no longer acquiesced silently in such a state of affairs. Slowly a rebellion matured in Constantinople. On May 22nd, 1876, six thousand *softas*, or theological students, forced their way into the palace and demanded the dismissal of the Vizier. The Sultan yielded, and a Cabinet of reform under Rushdi Pasha, including Midhat Pasha, was formed. A week later the Ministry itself carried out a *coup d'état*. With the aid of a fetwa by the Sheikh ul-Islam the deposition of the Sultan was announced on account of his misrule. Murad V ascended the throne, but his predecessor's tragic death a few days after his deposition drove Murad out of his mind, and three months later he himself had to be deposed. Thereupon Abdul Hamid became Sultan. The reactionary tendencies of the new sovereign were no secret, but

he solemnly promised to grant a constitution. Midhat Pasha became Premier and proceeded to draft a constitution. To the astonishment of the European Powers, the new constitution was promulgated on December 23rd, 1876. Turkey, it seemed, was entering the ranks of European parliamentary States. This was an astute diplomatic move on the Sultan's part, for it enabled him to forestall the pressure of the European Powers, and he hoped that it would gain him the sympathy of Western Europe in the approaching war with Russia. But in February, 1877, Midhat and the other advocates of liberal reforms were exiled, and a year later the first Turkish Parliament was dissolved.

This was the beginning of Turkey's thirty years of reaction under Abdul Hamid. The period of early experiments in reform was past. They had not touched the broad mass of the people, who never understood their significance. The Sultan and the Ministry had wished to effect reforms against the will of the people. The position gradually changed under the pressure of a despotism which now felt its power consolidated. Liberal ideas struck root in wider circles and the movement turned against the Sultan, who was alarmed at the dangers involved in his predecessors' zeal for reform. Abdul Hamid regarded the awakening of nationalist sentiment as the harbinger of a democratic movement, an attack upon the absolute authority of the monarch, and, moreover, as a menace to the existence of the Ottoman Empire with its medley of races. He regarded Islam as a uniting force hallowed by custom and faith and dear to the hearts of the masses and capable, therefore, of consolidating the Empire and enhancing his own prestige alike with the European Powers and beyond the confines of Turkey in the Orient. Abdul Hamid became the most zealous supporter of Pan-Islamism. The office of Caliph, which had slowly fallen into oblivion, acquired a new lustre through the efforts of his envoys, even in distant countries. The mediæval supremacy of religion in political life was to be confirmed so that it might withstand all the assaults of modern thought.

Despotic rule like that which Tsar Nicholas I or Metternich had introduced in their own countries under similar circumstances oppressed Turkey still more heavily. Life was made unbearable by the worst type of arbitrary police rule, accom-

panied by an elaborate system of espionage and a strict censorship. To this was added corruption and misgovernment in all parts of the Empire. The unwearying activity of the astute and cunning sovereign, who tried to control every detail himself, was powerless to prevent these things. He shut himself off in fear and suspicion. Fearing for his life and his authority, he would tolerate no talent in his vicinity. Midhat Pasha was recalled from exile and appointed Governor of Syria, but soon afterwards he was accused of the murder of Sultan Abdul Asis. English intervention prevented the execution of the death sentence, but he was exiled to Taif in Arabia where he was strangled in 1884 by order of the Sultan. Turkey was to be isolated from all European influence, the frontiers were closed to books and ideas, ability and patriotism were no recommendation but rather grounds for serious suspicion against those who displayed them. In these circumstances Turkey, even in the army, degenerated further and further.

Patriotic and liberal Turks who managed to escape in spite of the obstacles placed in the way of foreign travel by Abdul Hamid's tyranny, carried on propaganda abroad like the Russian revolutionaries. In 1891 the Young Turks, as the progressives called themselves, held a conference in Geneva; this was the germ of what became later the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress which moved its headquarters to Paris and London. There is a frequent resemblance between the history of Turkish and Russian revolutionaries abroad. The Sultan's spies insinuated themselves into the revolutionary ranks, and bribery played its part. Progress was especially obstructed by hostility between the Turkish revolutionaries and those belonging to other races in the Ottoman Empire, and this was actually stimulated by nationalist ideas. It was particularly marked at a Congress held in Paris in 1902. A year later an understanding was successfully established between the Young Turks and the Armenian Committee in Paris. It was harder to come to an understanding with the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgars, whose aim was not the reform of the Turkish Empire, but separation from it. But a section of the Macedonian Committee was successfully persuaded to co-operate. At the Paris Congress of 1907 the representatives of Turks, Armenians, Bulgars, Jews, Arabs, and Al-

banians were united. It was agreed that the Sultan should be deposed, that the Empire should remain united, that all races and religions should enjoy equal rights, and that the government should be based upon parliamentary democracy.

Meantime the centre of revolutionary activity in Turkey itself had made progress. Officers of the Macedonian garrisons, especially those at Salonika, led the movement. In 1906 they realised that there was a danger of foreign control in Macedonia since the Austro-Russian Conference of Mürzsteg, and that speedy action was necessary. The Anglo-Russian understanding of 1907 seemed finally to make an end of the rivalry which had hitherto safeguarded the independence of Islamic States. Time, therefore, was pressing. It was easy to win over the army, which had little love for the existing régime, for it was ill-paid and ill-fed. The movement itself was organised in Salonika, and the strictest secrecy was observed, following the example of the Freemasons and the Italian secret societies at the time of the Risorgimento in Italy. Each new member as he was enrolled knew only two or three of his closest associates, so that if he should prove untrustworthy he could not betray much. From Salonika the movement spread to other towns in Macedonia and Asia.

The Young Turks had not yet completed their preparations when the danger of foreign intervention, and the Sultan's more vigorous counter-measures, caused them to proceed to action. On July 4th, 1908, a young officer, Niazi Bey, led a troop of two hundred soldiers from Resna into the Macedonian mountains; there he issued proclamations to the populace and began to organise volunteer bands. Liberty and the constitution were the keynote of his proclamations. The spirit of revolt extended further and further, the troops sent by the court to disarm the rebels refused to fire, and their generals were murdered. On July 13th Enver Bey, too, fled to Resna, and on the same day the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress placed itself officially at the head of the movement. Throughout Macedonia the Constitution of 1876 was declared to be the law of the land. The court was struck with dismay. When the Sultan wanted to send Anatolian troops to suppress the revolt in Macedonia, a step which required a special fetwa as being a war of Mohammedans against Mohammedans, he was met with a refusal. In the

Ministerial Council held on the morning of July 23rd the Ministers advised the Sultan to grant the constitution.

On July 24th it was known in Turkey that the revolution was victorious and the constitution once more in force. The people were carried away on a wave of jubilant enthusiasm. Though not all might understand the whole implication of what had happened, nevertheless the populace was wild with excitement. The long-suppressed joy of freedom, the possibility of expressing spontaneous ideas and feelings, had an intoxicating effect. Fraternisation ensued between all races and religions. Sights were seen typical of times of revolutionary rejoicing. Mohammedan divines and Christian priests embraced. The Press received a sudden, unprecedented impetus. The interest of the outer world was roused, and men were greedy for news. On July 25th the *Ikdam* printed an edition of 60,000, the *Sabah* 40,000. People snatched the papers out of each other's hands. On the afternoon of the same day quadruple prices were being offered for them. Long delays were now to be hurriedly made good. Newspapers were started daily, and public meetings were held everywhere. It was a harder task to lead the people from this festival mood back to the daily round. Soon the old hostilities began to raise their heads once more on all sides.

The revolutionary leaders returned from exile. One section clung to their belief in the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the principle of centralisation; their leaders were Ahmed Riza and Halil Ganem; the other section called themselves the Ottoman League for Decentralisation and the Constitution, and were headed by Prince Sabah Ed-Din and later by the South Albanian Ismail Kemal Bey. This group subsequently called itself the Liberal Union (*Ahrar*). Within a few months the gulf between these parties had widened, the more so on account of personal rivalries. A further subject of lively debate was the position of the separate nationalities and religions. In Kurdistan and Arabia disturbances broke out, led by generals who remained faithful to the old régime. The ship of state was entrusted to Kiamil Pasha, a man of over eighty but far-seeing and tactful and in sympathy with the views of the Liberal Union. On December 10th the Turkish Parliament was opened, but the Young Turk Party, aspiring to be the sole power in the State,

mistrusted the Premier and forced him to resign in February, 1909. Hilmi Pasha, formerly the secretary of Kemal Bey, the great literary exponent of the Turkish renaissance, became Vizier.

Meanwhile dissatisfaction with the new Government increased amongst a section of the orthodox clergy, who formed the Mohammedan League, and in the Army, which was still ill-fed and ill-paid, for the Young Turk officers were more concerned about politics than about their soldiers. On April 13th, 1909, a short-lived counter-revolution broke out, involving large sections of the army, the clergy, and the populace. They demanded that the Koran and the canon laws should be obeyed, that the Young Turk Committee should be disbanded, and that the Vizier Ahmed Riza should resign, together with the President of the Chamber and the commander of the first army corps, whose conduct had been largely responsible for the counter-revolution. Parliament conceded these demands on condition that the constitution should be maintained. The Liberals formed the Ministry and provided the President of the Chamber. The Sultan renewed his oath of loyalty to the constitution, and the whole revolutionary action was accomplished without excesses and without bloodshed. The Young Turk leaders fled to Macedonia.

But soon afterwards there was an outbreak of violence in Constantinople on the part of a fanatical mob. From Salonika the Young Turks demanded the punishment of the counter-revolutionaries and threatened to march on Constantinople. Mahmud Shewket Pasha led the Macedonian army against the capital. Every attempt at negotiation was rebuffed by the Young Turks. On April 25th the struggle was ended. Some of the leaders of the Liberal Union took flight, and next day during the *Selamlık* the Young Turks occupied the unprepared city after promising to do no injury to the Sultan. Street fighting occurred and theological students were foremost in offering resistance. But the Young Turks were resolved this time to establish their authority without check and to break all resistance. On April 27th Abdul Hamid's deposition was announced and he was taken to Salonika as a prisoner. Mohammed V succeeded him as Sultan. The victorious Committee treated its opponents with ruthless severity.

A number of soldiers and theological students were executed and the whole town was searched; for days Constantinople lived under a reign of terror. Liberty of the Press, of speech, and of assembly was suspended. The secret police archives discovered in the palace enabled the authorities to bring to justice a number of spies in the secret service of the former Government.

Thenceforward, Turkey became officially a constitutional State, but in actual fact the Young Turk Party exercised absolute power. Its efforts to improve administration in the Empire were not very successful. Authority was as strictly centralised as before. It is true, the new rulers of the Empire had no leisure in which to effect their reforms. The Empire so anxiously preserved by Abdul Hamid crumbled and fell to pieces. Wars followed in unbroken succession from 1910 to 1922. Yet the bitterest enemy of the new Turkish nationalism was not European Imperialism but the simultaneously rising nationalism of the other races inhabiting the Turkish Empire. Two courses were open to the Young Turks: they could transform Turkey into a decentralised State of composite nationality, offering to its various peoples free autonomy and the opportunity of fulfilling their national aspirations; or they could attempt to subdue the other peoples by force and so erect a predominantly Turkish Empire. The Young Turks chose the second solution, yet it was doomed to failure, for it was self-contradictory at the very core. Under Abdul Hamid the personal monarchy and religious faith formed a binding link, and for him, therefore, it was logical to believe in the stability of the Turkish Empire, though he forgot that no isolation can shut out the influences of a new era. But a movement which laid stress on nationalism, and exalted it to a political principle of basic importance, violated its own doctrine when it refused to extend that principle to other peoples in the Empire and their aspirations. It was the events of 1918 which provided a basis upon which the Young Turk movement could erect a genuine Turkish national State, for then the provinces inhabited by other peoples were detached from the Empire. So it came about that ten years later the process was completed which started in 1908.

The Young Turk Party continued to bear the name of the Committee of Union and Progress, and carried on the govern-

ment almost without a break from 1909 to 1918. The fourth party Congress, held in 1911, adopted a programme which declared: "Every citizen, without distinction of race or religion, has equal rights and a claim to absolute freedom, and all have equal duties. All Ottomans are equal before the law, and all subjects of the Empire shall be admitted to the State service according to their fitness and capacity."¹ Article 10 declares: "A law shall be quickly passed imposing military service upon all subjects of the Empire, in order to ensure Ottoman unity and the strength of the army." Article 11 demanded religious liberty, Article 12 the repeal of the capitulations, and Article 13 is directed against any kind of political and administrative autonomy for the provinces.

Since the time of the Balkan Wars the Committee of Union and Progress had been led by a triumvirate consisting of Enver, Talaat, and Jemal; the only serious opposition was the Liberal Union, composed of statesmen who wished to adopt the model of self-government provided by the British Empire. A third party arose at the end of 1912 under Lutfi Fikri Bey; it was known as the *Mujeddedin*, the Innovators, and though it never attained to any importance, its programme merits attention as giving evidence of the intellectual tendencies then prevailing in the most advanced section of the Turkish intelligentsia. The following passage occurs in its programme: "The party supports the principles of popular sovereignty and parliamentary government, its natural implication. In the opinion of the party it is a patriotic duty to enable the Ottomans and the Turkish nation to participate in all the material and moral progress of Europe, so that no more may divide the Ottomans from the other European nations than distinguishes the social life of two European nations. In drafting all laws, and in particular the criminal, commercial, and civil codes, the legislative body should enjoy complete freedom. It may borrow whatever laws it thinks good from whatever source. In this matter its rights are absolute; no ancient tradition shall restrict them. The sole aim of the party is to endow the Empire with a secular government which shall promote the happiness and well-being of the people within Turkey's present boundaries, and shall restore the land to youth and vigour, guided by the principles

¹ Article 9.

of freedom, peace, and security. At the same time the party firmly repudiates the vain theories of national or religious Imperialism and refuses to sacrifice for their sake the wealth of the country and the blood of its people."

The ten years from the Revolution to the end of the World War were not happy ones for Turkey. Oriental despotism was replaced by the rule of a group of officers and officials with European leanings. They had little understanding of the social and economic reforms that were needed, and devoted no time to their preparation. But these years were vital to the growth of Turkish nationalism.

Right into the twentieth century the separate religious communities in Turkey were also political units, and their religious leaders, especially the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs, were likewise princes in a political sense. The word "Turk" was often taken to indicate simply "Mohammedan," and often it was used in a contemptuous sense, meaning something like "peasant" or "uneducated person." The Empire was known as the Ottoman Empire, and when the new Kemalist Republic banned the word "Ottoman" and wished to name the country Turkey, there was no corresponding word in the Turkish language, so that the form "Turkia" had to be adopted. The word "Turk" now rang with a different tone. People were proud of the name. They no longer felt the Mohammedan faith as a bond with other non-Turkish Sunnite peoples, but began to recall Turkey's past and derived from it the proud consciousness of a warlike, sovereign race. Under the influence of kindred movements and an awakening modern racial consciousness, this led to the endeavour to unite with other peoples of Turkish blood and speech. Two further circumstances strengthened that tendency. The victory of the Balkan States in 1913 almost drove Turkey altogether out of Europe. Her centre of gravity was transferred to Asia, to Anatolia, and this turned her attention to the Caucasus and Turkistan, inhabited by peoples of Turkish race and speech. Moreover, some of the Young Turks had realised that the ideal of Ottoman unity without respect for the national claims of the various peoples in the Empire was not only illogical but impracticable. The Turkish national ideal pointed rather to a homogeneous State, consolidated by a natural unity of race and speech,

having its centre in the historic territories of the Osmanli Turks in Asia Minor, and seeking its natural expansion by the liberation of kindred Turkish tribes, many of whom still lived under the Russian yoke. Thus arose the Pan-Turkish or Pan-Turanian movement.

Like ideas had already emerged amongst the Russian Tatars of the Crimea and the Volga. Members of these tribes emigrated to Turkey in large numbers during the nineteenth century. Vambéry reckons that there were half a million of them. Their own national renaissance began even earlier than the movement in Turkey itself. Ilminski, a professor at the Academy in Kazan, wanted to substitute the Russian alphabet for the Arabic in the Turco-Tatar language and replace all Arabian and Persian words by words of pure Turkish derivation. Ismail Bey Gasprinski founded the first great Turkish newspaper in Russia, *Tarjhuman*, the earliest interpreter of liberal and reformist ideas. Its twenty-fifth anniversary celebration in 1903 was the occasion of great rejoicings amongst all Russian Mohammedans. That same year a discussion was carried on in the columns of the Turkish emigré organ in Cairo, *Turk*, under the heading "Three Political Systems." Ali Kemal Bey advocated the Ottoman System, Ferid Bey Pan-Islamism, and Yussuf Bey Aktshura Oghlu, a Volga Tatar and a brother-in-law of Ismail Bey Gasprinski, pointed to a Pan-Turkish solution as the only practicable policy. This early apostle of Turanism had lived in Constantinople since his youth; at the time of the first Russian Revolution he returned home, joined the Cadet Party, and founded a newspaper in Kazan. Subsequently, however, he returned to Constantinople as the correspondent of Tatar papers, and there in 1911 he established a journal entitled *Turk Yurdi* (The Turkish Family).

About the same time some of the Young Turks led by Sia Bey had conceived similar ideas, which first found expression in a paper entitled *Gentsh Kalemler* (Youthful Pens) founded by the rising generation of Turkish nationalists in Salonika. It "proclaimed the birth of a new language, a new literature, a new and purely Turkish civilisation. The language was to be purged of its borrowed Arabic and Persian words, an attack was to be made upon subjects and incidents borrowed from the ancient literature of those two languages, and a new

literature and new culture encouraged, based solely and exclusively upon ancient Turkish legend and tradition.”¹ The greatest Turkish writers and poets of the recent past and the present were regarded as old-fashioned and un-Turkish. A new society was founded called *Yenin Lissan* (The New Language) to purge Turkish of all foreign words. Such associations and journals as *Yeni Hayat* (New Life) and *Yeni Felsefe* (New Philosophy) symbolised the new movement in their very titles. All the westernising tendencies of the previous generation were sharply opposed. Applied science was to be imported from Europe, but the spirit and essence of life was to be Turkish, derived from inherited tradition. Those who sought to adopt European civilisation in its entirety were contemptuously called West-Eastern hybrids and Levantines.

The spirit of this new nationalism, which ousted the earlier Turkish patriotism of the romantic poets and reforming statesmen under European influence, was summed up by Halide Edib Hanum in her great political novel. She had received a European education in the American Women's College at Scutari. Even in 1921 a Turkish statesman said of her book: “That is our national ideal.” In it she wrote of the new nationalism: “As I listened (to the speeches at a Pan-Turanian gathering) my soul was profoundly moved and I felt how deeply the aspirations of the new Turkey are rooted in our forefathers' very being; the music welled up from the innermost source of our Turanian blood and carried me away, so that to this day I still seem to hear it, and I realised that we must learn to descend to the springs of life if we would breathe into our political aim the power of inspiration to win the people for its accomplishment.” The hero of the novel is “the type of an Attila or Jingis Khan evolved into a civilised man.”

Thus the movement forged links with ancient traditions. There was nothing to be discovered of a cultural heritage. All Turkish culture had been borrowed from Persia or Arabia. What survived of the past were the customs and songs of primitive nomad tribes and the cruel warlike deeds of victorious barbarian hordes. But it was precisely to these memories that Turkish nationalism reverted. In the hour of

¹ Tekin Alp.

affliction, when the Empire was breaking up, the ancient warrior spirit was to be stirred in an effeminate race. It was this very quality of primitive barbarism which gave many leaders of the new movement the assurance that, whilst senile Europe decayed and perished from an excess of civilisation, a virile and unexhausted race would stand ready to step into Europe's heritage. They began to distinguish three periods in the history of Islam: an Arabian and a Persian era, both past, and a Turkish era now dawning. The new history teaching in the schools went farther, perhaps, than with other peoples in glorifying the nation's own achievements. The ancient customs of the steppes were to be revived. Instead of calling children by the customary Mohammedan names, long-forgotten Turkish names were restored. Festivals that had never been observed before in memory of past events, such as the anniversary of the capture of Constantinople, were celebrated, and the Government decreed that they should be observed as school holidays. "A thousand demonstrators marched in procession to the grave of Constantinople's great conqueror in order to invoke his hallowed spirit and to lift up and inspire their hearts in preparation for the strenuous task before them. The crowd felt as though Constantinople had been captured again. They had never had the opportunity of cherishing the memory of their heroes. Now for the first time they began to look back upon them with pride and to pay them homage; for the people had only just begun to realise their Turkish nationality." Sia Geuk Alp Bey, one of the founders of the Turanian movement, wrote in his poems: "The feelings pulsing in my blood are the echo of my past. I do not read of the glorious deeds of my ancestors in withered, yellow, dusty pages of history, but in the blood flowing in my veins, in my heart. My Attila, my Jingis, heroic figures, the pride and glory of my race, are no less in stature than Alexander and Cæsar. Still more familiar to my heart is Oghus Khan, an obscure and mysterious figure to historic inquiry. He still lives in my heart and pulses in my veins in all his greatness and glory. Oghus it is that delights my heart, that inspires me to shout exultantly: The Turkish people's fatherland is not Turkey, it is not Turkistan, it is a far-flung land, and eternal: Turan."

This new nationalism found political expression in en-

deavours that were particularly active during the World War to form a Turanian League of Turkey, the Caucasus, Turkistan, and Afghanistan, with the addition of the Tatars actually living in Russia. For a short time after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk Pan-Turanian union came near to realisation, when instead of the Baghdad railway the route Berlin-Baku-Bukhara seemed to have passed into Turko-German possession. But the efforts to educate the people politically at home were more important than these fantastic political schemes. On March 25th, 1912, the *Turk Ojagi* or Turkish Centre was founded with the object of raising the intellectual, social, and economic standards of the Turkish people and labouring to perfect and develop the Turkish language. The movement was chiefly the work of students and literary men. Lectures and courses were arranged, an Academy of Turkish Studies was founded, and special attention was devoted to athletics and sport amongst the young. The Ministries of War and Education established a Union of Pathfinders in all Turkish schools under Enver Pasha's direction; it was official in character, and old Turkish names were conferred upon all its members. It brought the joy of activity and walking and games into the physically passive life of Eastern youth.

One of the most important tasks was that of strengthening the economic position of the Turks, who had played no part hitherto in trade and manufacture, but had left them to the Greeks and Armenians. The boycott of the Greeks and the establishment of Turkish co-operative societies and Turkish banks in the larger cities of Anatolia, all served this end. The old Turkish style of architecture was revived in erecting new buildings. And over all these particular activities hovered the nationalist spirit, the ideal adopted by the Turks from modern chauvinist Europe, with all its vanity and false interpretations of history. True, the Turks refused to admit as much, as may be seen from the words of Sia Geuk Alp: "Turan is no illusory fatherland. The Turkish tribes living together in Asia will gather around the Turkish flag and form a great Empire. Turks ought not to live like a mere conglomeration of men without reason or purpose; they should unite as a single whole, creating an eternal life formed of all the transitory lives of the individuals." Or as Omer Seifeddin puts it: "The Pan-Turkish idea will be realised when the Turks

have achieved their economic aims. These involve a road to India and China. We already have access to India. Our road to China is still blocked. When we command that road, as we did in the olden days, then the Turkish people will be united and will have begun to accomplish their sacred mission in the world." Under the shadow of these doctrines the Young Turks entered the World War.

As the nationalist ideal found its way into the hearts of the Turkish people, it was attended by the same social developments as elsewhere. Of these three may be distinguished as peculiarly characteristic: the rise of a new language, a new attitude towards religion, and the entry of women into public life. We have already referred to the creation in Turkey of a living literary language that the people could understand, in place of the traditional humanist and classical language of the educated classes. Turkish versification and rhythm, moreover, underwent radical alteration; the simplified metrical system of counting by syllables replaced the highly complex classical measures of Arabic and Persian literature. A special academy of terminology was established to determine the proper technical terms in all literature and in all branches of learning.

At this time the attitude of the new nationalism towards religion was not so marked as ten years later. Here, and also in the matter of women's emancipation, it was the years round about 1920, not 1910, that saw the conclusion of Turkey's transition from a religious to a national State. The Mediterranean religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—have always accorded to women a position of inferiority; the priestly office was confined to men. Only men devoted themselves to the study of the doctrines through which God and his ways may be revealed. The new democratic nationalism necessarily changed the position of women. Regarded from the point of view of the race, of its multiplication and physique, special consideration was due to women as the mothers and earliest teachers of the children. In its moments of inspiration nationalism was not an ecstatic union of God and man like religion, but rather the mutual ecstasy of a whole people made one and gathered chiefly around their hearths and homes. Inevitably, therefore, woman occupied a more central position in national than in religious thought and sentiment. Further,

democracy tended to expand the circle of those who enjoyed at least formally the right to share in determining the nation's destiny. The natural democratic ideal is to concede this right to all reasonable beings. It is comprehensible, therefore, that communities with whom nationalism rather than religion is the dominating and guiding conception should accord to their women a new and different social position.

The years between 1908 and 1914 were devoted to the progressive march of enlightenment and secularisation against clerical influence and the orthodox reverence for tradition still prevailing among the masses. Theological reviews were founded to preach an enlightened and liberal Islamic doctrine. A bi-monthly entitled *Islam Mejmovassi* strove to interpret Islam in the spirit of Turkish nationalism. "They say that the Turkish people cannot interpret the Koran as, for instance, the Arabs can, and base their theory upon the principle contained in the Koran: *We-emr bil'urf* (and act in accordance with your own customs). If this were so, national custom would be the judge of good and evil, or, to put it better, the soul of the people. But not only are the Turkish and Arabic peoples' souls not identical, they are widely different, so that their interpretations of the Islamic religion cannot be the same." The Koran was translated into Turkish, three such translations appearing before the outbreak of the war. The Khutba, the Friday prayer in the mosques in which the Caliph was named, was even read in Turkish in certain places, instead of in Arabic as hitherto. At the same time the curriculum in the high schools and colleges was changed, and the rudiments of modern knowledge were introduced into studies hitherto purely theological and scholastic. A further step was the subordination of the ecclesiastical courts to the Ministry of Justice instead of the Sheikh ul-Islam as hitherto.

Women played an active part in the work of the Committee of Union and Progress from the very outset at the time of the secret conspiracies in 1908. The revolutionary enthusiasm of that year brought Turkish women to attend meetings and appear in public for the first time. The strict seclusion of harem life was broken down at the same time as other mediæval fetters were burst in Turkey. But these were only the first steps. The strict regulations still persisted in the harems, and their breach might even lead to police intervention. It

was a great event when a woman, like Halide Edib Hanum for instance, spoke to an audience of men alone, and she had to cover her face while speaking with the traditional veil. But the propaganda of the *Türk Ojagi* carried the doctrine of women's emancipation into the ranks of the people. Halide Hanum founded a society entitled "The Society for the elevation of those who wear the veil" (the very name is characteristic), which held educative lectures and opened a school to give women elementary instruction. The "Osmanli Women's Society" pursued kindred aims; in 1913 it opened the first of the girls' schools that it was planning in a suburb of Constantinople. The Committee for the Defence of Turkish Women's Rights published a journal entitled *Kadınlar Dünyası* (The Woman's World) with the motto: The defence of women's rights on the basis of the principles embodied in the Koran and the chief books of the Sacred Law, and of woman's natural position as the guardian of the home and educator of children." There were in addition a number of other women's journals, largely written and produced by women. The Islamic Society for the Promotion of Women's Work strove to bring women into industry. In February, 1914, special courses for women were started at the University of Stambul, with two hundred and fifty students enrolled. The subjects taught were hygiene, domestic science, and the rights and duties of women. In the academic year 1920-21 there were thirty-eight women students in the philosophical faculty of Constantinople University, as compared with a hundred and fifty-one men; in the faculty of science there were sixty-one and sixty-two respectively, in the faculty of law eight women out of three hundred and twenty-four students. In September, 1921, women were admitted for the first time to the study of medicine.

The Young Turks likewise endeavoured to reform education. True, the ministerial programme of 1902 "to impart general knowledge in all schools" provided a good system in theory, but in practice the matter was altogether neglected. Even after the Revolution there was little change. Programmes were published with far-reaching aims, but there was neither time, money, nor organisation to put them into effect. Primary schools were neglected in favour of higher education. The party programme of the Liberal Union

demanding that more consideration should be devoted to technical and practical training, the spirit of individual energy and initiative should be roused, Oriental indolence and the love of an official career should be combated, the young should be educated to lead independent lives and achieve economic progress. People recognised the necessity of such reforms, but their practical realisation had to be left over to the future. In 1913 school attendance was made compulsory and free. In the year 1913-14 there were 200,776 boys and 41,293 girls attending the public primary schools; there were 1,518 students at the teachers' training colleges; the 69 intermediate schools had 10,671 pupils and the 11 secondary schools 6,202. In addition to these State schools there were a number of private schools established by foreigners, especially by missions. The World War offered a much desired opportunity to the Turkish Government to place these schools, too, under national State control. Two laws of December, 1914, and September, 1915, placed the foreign schools, institutions, and hospitals in Turkey under State control. The Turkish language was made obligatory and was to be as thoroughly taught as in the State schools, and the teachers were required to pass State examinations. The pupils at such schools were not to be subjected to any religious influence. No new foreign schools and institutions were to be founded.

During this phase of nationalism the Turks wavered between East and West. Threatened by European Imperialism, they looked towards Asia, towards Turan. But at the same time they made efforts to Europeanise the State. In the new phase of Turkish nationalism which was to follow the World War, they still wavered. Anatolian nationalism sought the sympathy and support of Russia and Asia in its struggle against Europe. But there was a simultaneous tendency to Europeanise Turkey completely and cut her off from Asiatic influence. When victory was achieved the result was to strengthen this latter tendency. Turkey adopted more resolute measures than any other Eastern State in her eagerness to belong wholly to the new era of the national, democratic State and religious enlightenment. Moreover, that new era meant a break with the Pan-Turanian idea and its Asiatic orientation, as also with the earlier idea of Pan-

Islamism. Turkey presents herself to the post-war world as a modern national State, with all the intolerance, the narrow-mindedness, and other failings of the new European national States; she is resolved to sever as far as may be all the ties which bind an active, forward-looking country with its Ottoman and Islamic past, whether they concern dress and the exterior or the inner soul. This changed policy was facilitated for the Turks by the fact that the World War had finally destroyed the Ottoman Empire and left only the Turkish Republic, a national and almost homogeneous State, which thus gained in inward strength what it lost in outward extent. Allied Imperialism, displayed particularly in the secret treaties of March, 1915, and in the Pact of London signed on April 26th of the same year, together with the secret agreements of the spring of 1916 and April, 1917, forced the Turks after years of warfare and what seemed like complete exhaustion to gather all their strength for a last decisive struggle; the outcome was a new Turkey wholly independent for the first time in a century and a half, on a footing of absolute equality with European States; it was the first example since the rise of Japan of an Eastern people winning such equality.

In the last year of the War Sultan Mohammed V died and Prince Wahid ed Din succeeded him as Mohammed VI. In consequence of Turkey's military collapse, leading to the armistice of Mudros on October 30th, 1918, the Young Turk leaders Enver, Jemal, and Talaat, who had been in power till then, took flight. They remained faithful to their past policy with its German and Asiatic orientation. Enver betook himself to Turkistan, to the Turan that had been the goal of his political dreams, and there he fell in battle; Jemal went to Afghanistan and organised the army there; whilst Talaat in Berlin endeavoured to keep in his hands the threads of a Russo-German and Turco-Western Asiatic understanding, and fell a victim to assassination. The three were replaced in Constantinople by men of pro-English sympathies and liberal-conservative tendencies. In March, 1919, Damad Ferid Pasha became Grand Vizier. The Armistice conditions involved neither the disarming of the Turkish army nor any interference in the country's internal affairs. In the spring of 1919 Mustafa Kemal Pasha was sent to Anatolia by the

Turkish Government as an army inspector. He came of a Mohammedan family in Salonika which had Albanian and Jewish blood in its veins. At a relatively early age he had distinguished himself in the World War both as a soldier and an organiser, but he was subsequently led to retire by his personal antagonism to the Young Turk triumvirate. It is a strange example of the irony of fate that the Constantinople Government should have sent Mustafa Kemal to Anatolia with the consent of the British Government.

It was the clash with Greek nationalism which directly caused Turkish nationalism to flare up again. The Greeks were the first nation in South-Eastern Europe whose national vitality was awakened and renewed by the memory of a great past. True, the Greek kingdom in the hundred years of its existence had nowise fulfilled the hopes which were held to be justified by its Hellenic heritage from the past; nevertheless, Greek irredentism made it the basis of endeavours to unite with the national kingdom other Turkish provinces inhabited by Greeks, Crete and the Ægean Islands. But Pan-Hellenism went further still: in former days Asia Minor and the coasts of the Sea of Marmora had been colonised by Greeks, and the chief centres of Greek culture had been situated in Greater Greece; and so Byzantium and Ionia were to become Greek once more. Veniselos, the Greek national leader, a Cretan barrister, saw in the outcome of the World War a favourable opportunity for realising these plans. He obtained the support of the English Cabinet, in which Winston Churchill, Lord Birkenhead, and Lloyd George bore the responsibility of an Eastern policy directed towards the creation of a great Middle Eastern Empire, a single vast block of territory from Egypt on one side and Constantinople on the other stretching across Arabia and Persia to India. This policy of Churchill's likewise determined the fate of Arabia and the Iranian States in the post-war years. But it was peculiarly disastrous in its effect upon Turkey.

In 1918 it seemed that England's two strongest rivals for the dominant power in Western Asia had been eliminated: Russia, with whom the British Empire had been disputing the control of Central Asia and the roads to India for nearly a century, and Germany whose Baghdad railway in the years immediately preceding the war had meant a thrust at India

and the important oil wells of Persia and Mesopotamia. It now seemed possible for British policy to exploit this success with decisive effect and at the same time to consolidate it as a bulwark against a new Russian menace and further as a means of suppressing the social revolution which threatened Europe and Asia. Just as in Eastern Europe a *cordon sanitaire* was to protect European civilisation from the Russian contagion by the establishment of border States, so England and the Western Powers wished to establish a similar belt in the Caucasus. In 1918 and 1919 English troops occupied Baku, Northern Persia, and Transcaspia, with their important oil-fields. For the purpose of isolating and threatening Russia it was even more essential to hold Constantinople and to command the entrance to the Black Sea. From this new Gibraltar England would have dominated Russia, the Danube States, the Caucasus, and particularly Batum where the oil pipe-line from Baku ends. Behind the bulwarks of Constantinople and the Caucasus the great expanse of territory under British influence was to be held together by a railway connecting Cairo through Transjordan and Baghdad with India, with air and motor services running parallel. Haifa and Basra, the seaport bases for this railway and for the transport of oil from the Persian and Mesopotamian wells, were already in British hands, and were protected by the possession of Cyprus, which also covered Alexandretta and Aleppo and thereby the flank of the great railway and the Persian Gulf.

These efforts to secure a position of political domination, which led England to ally herself with Greece and seek to use her as a tool of British policy in Asia Minor, were seconded by finance and heavy industry in league to promote their common interests. For the past hundred and fifty years the great Greek merchant dynasties, the Rallis, Rhodokanakis, Mavrogordatos, Petrokokinos, Argentinis, and others had made immense fortunes by dominating the westward bound corn trade through Odessa and the flow of cotton goods sold to the East from Manchester. They owned the greater part of the oil of the Caucasus and the mineral wealth of the Donetz basin. They were established in Manchester and Marseilles, in Alexandria and Athens. For decades they had financed the Greek liberation movement, and they naturally regarded

Russian Bolshevism as their enemy. They had shares in the great British metallurgical and munition-making firm of Vickers, which opened a branch in Greece about this time and, like other large English firms, had obtained important concessions in that country. Sir Basil Zaharoff in Paris acted as mediator between Greek finance and Lloyd George, who had inherited the anti-Turkish propensities of the Liberal statesmen of Gladstone's day. Alike the Greek firms and the British Government and financiers were interested in the British Shell and Royal Dutch oil company, which was at grips with the American Standard Oil Trust for the control of the world's oil-fields. Even during the World War the supposedly rich oil-fields of Mosul were a bone of contention between the two groups.

This was the general political background against which Greek nationalism made its attack upon Turkey. On May 9th, 1919, the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople, who was the spiritual head and in the Ottoman Empire also the political chief of Ottoman subjects attached to the Greek Church, declared that Greeks resident in Turkey no longer acknowledged their obligations as Turkish subjects; and he severed relations with the Porte. On May 15th Greek troops landed in Smyrna and began to occupy the surrounding territory in Asia Minor. The response was a determination on the part of the Turks never to give up those provinces of the Empire which even Lloyd George had acknowledged to be Turkish in his great speech on war aims of January 5th, 1918: "Nor are we fighting . . . to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race."¹ A national rising was organised in the inaccessible parts of Asia Minor under Mustafa Kemal's leadership. The movement was only reinforced by the excesses of the Greeks in the Smyrna district, by their full preparations for undisguised annexation, and their preliminary steps towards the foundation of a Greek Pontus Republic in the north of Anatolia. From July 18th to August 7th a National Congress sat at Erzerum under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal, and was followed in September by a second at Sivas. There the "League for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and

¹ *Times*, January 7.

Rumelia" was formed. The Congress of September 9th declared among other things: "In view of the external and internal dangers which threaten our country, the national conscience is aroused and has brought this Congress into being, which has resolved as follows: The whole of Turkish territory within the frontiers determined by agreement between the Ottoman Government and the Allies on October 30th, 1918, which is inhabited by an overwhelming majority of Turks, shall form a single and indivisible whole. In order to assure the inviolability of our territory and our national independence, as also the maintenance of the Sultanate and Caliphate, it is essential to rouse the nation's energies and the people's will to achievement. We are absolutely resolved to resist any occupation of any portion of Ottoman territory, and more especially every attempt to form an independent Armenia or an independent Greece at the cost of our mother country." The declaration went on to protest vigorously against the capitulations; it demanded the summoning of a national Parliament to whose judgment the Government in Constantinople should submit all its actions, and announced readiness to accept the economic and scientific assistance of any Great Power which pursued no Imperialist aims and recognised Turkey's national rights.

In October the Ministry of Damad Ferid in Constantinople had resigned, and Ali Riza became Vizier with instructions to hold elections for Parliament. The new Parliament met on January 11th, 1920. On January 28th it signed the Turkish National Pact in accord with the leaders and principles of the Anatolian nationalist movement which had transferred its headquarters to Angora. But this Parliament was short-lived. In February Lord Balfour's confidential memorandum to the French Government of April, 1917, was published, concerning the ultimate partitioning of Asia Minor. In March, at the request of Veniselos, the English Government refused to allow the publication of the report of the Allied Commission of Inquiry on the Greek occupation of Smyrna. In March, 1920, Allied troops occupied Constantinople and the English arrested a number of leading Turkish politicians and journalists and sent them to Malta as prisoners. Damad Ferid became Premier, and in April Mustafa Kemal and the Anatolians were proclaimed to be rebels and Parliament was

dissolved. The majority of the deputies escaped to Angora, where Parliament resumed its session on April 23rd. The English Press referred to Mustafa Kemal and the Angora Turks as bandits. It was hoped to crush the movement in a brief space.

Meanwhile the negotiations between the Allied statesmen at San Remo in April, 1920, had at last led to agreement on the terms of peace to be offered to Turkey, and these were embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres as the basis of the Turkey of the future. The treaty showed not the slightest consideration for Turkish desires, and surpassed the worst expectations of even moderate Turks. Of European Turkey only Constantinople was to be left to them, and in Asia an Armenian and a Kurdish State were to be created. Part even of what remained was ceded to Greece and part was divided into English, French, and Italian spheres of influence. Turkey was to be disarmed and her internal freedom of action was to be reduced to nothing by the Powers' control of her finances, her home administration, and her judicial system. The Conference of San Remo was also of importance on account of the agreement reached between France and England regarding their mutual oil interests, by which France was to receive a quarter of the oil from Mosul.

Even the Constantinople Government refused to sign the Treaty of Sèvres, and consequently the Greek troops, at the request of Veniselos, were commissioned by the Allied Powers to occupy Thrace with Adrianople, and additional territory in Asia Minor with Brusa, both accounted sacred cities by the Turks by reason of their history and the fact that Sultans lay buried there. This task the Greeks proceeded to carry out. The Constantinople Government then signed the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10th.

But meanwhile resistance had already been organised in Angora. Europe, indeed, and especially England could not yet believe that the Government in Constantinople no longer represented Turkey. New elections had been hastily carried out in all the Turkish provinces in Asia Minor. On April 23rd, 1920, two hundred and seventy deputies met in Angora as the Turkish Parliament, with the addition of eighty fugitives from Constantinople, members of the Parliament assembled in January. In his opening speech Mustafa Kemal demanded


1914
20,000,000

of whom 11,000,000 were Turks	
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1926
13,000,000

of whom 11,500,000 were Turks	
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XI.—THE TERRITORIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE.



MAP XII.—THE GRÆCO-TURKISH THEATRE OF WAR.

the transference of all authority to Parliament, but without deposing the Sultan. Mustafa Kemal was elected President of the National Assembly. Instead of a Ministry an Executive Council of eleven was chosen from among the deputies. This Cabinet had no chairman, but the President of the National Assembly was also chairman of the Ministry. The ancient Turkish officers of Grand Vizier and Sheikh ul-Islam ceased to exist. The Angora National Assembly did not recognise the Constantinople Government and pronounced null and void all its acts since the occupation of Constantinople by the Allies on March 16th, 1920. The signature of the Treaty of Sèvres had, therefore, no binding force for the Turkish people. By an Act of September 5th, 1920, the National Assembly declared itself in permanent session until its purpose was achieved—the liberty and independence of the Caliphate and Sultanate, the fatherland and the nation. In January, 1921, a new constitution was adopted which declared: "Authority in the State is an absolute and unconditional attribute of the nation. The administrative system shall be based upon the principle that the people themselves do in fact control their own destinies. Executive power and the right of legislation are invested in the Grand National Assembly, the sole and true representative of the nation. The Turkish Empire shall be governed by the Grand National Assembly." These principles involved the proclamation of a completely democratic Republic, in which the representatives of the popular will created and united all forms of authority. At the same time the Angora National Assembly confirmed the Turkish National Pact adopted by the Parliament in Constantinople the previous year. Izzet Pasha, who had been sent to Angora that month from Constantinople in order to conduct negotiations, went over to the National Assembly.

In 1921 the diplomatic position of the new Government in Angora was strengthened. Its troops had been victorious in Armenia and Cilicia. Their struggle had roused the enthusiasm of other Mohammedan peoples, especially of the Indian Mussulmans. The East began to look to them as a bulwark against the advance of European Imperialism. Only England and Greece failed to realise what was happening. In February, 1921, a conference summoned by the Allied

Powers met in London in which delegates from Constantinople took part, and also for the first time from Angora and Greece. The Angoran delegate, Bekir Sami, spoke for Turkey; he put forward an exceedingly moderate programme and expressed willingness to give up Adrianople and grant a wide measure of autonomy to Smyrna under a Christian governor, with international control. But the Greeks were inflexible. With England's support they resumed the struggle.

Angora, however, had found allies in the West and the East. France showed a disposition to come to an understanding with Turkey. This change of front was caused in part by the political revolution in Greece, where the pro-German King Constantine had replaced Veniselos in December, 1920, in part by the increased influence of the American Standard Oil Company in France; in its struggle against the British Shell Company's hold on the Paris banks and Press, Standard Oil had gained the support of large banks such as Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and dailies like *Le Matin*, and so was in a position to exercise a decisive influence. It was in the interests of the American oil trust to support Turkey, for she controlled a section of the Baghdad railway and laid claim to the Mosul district. Thus it was that in March, 1921, and later on October 20th of the same year, a Franco-Turkish agreement came about by which France recognised the Angora Government, restored Cilicia to it, and promised a special administrative service with Turkish as the official language for the Alexandretta district which she retained.

Still more important were the treaties concluded by the Angora Government on its eastern frontiers with the Governments of Russia and the Caucasian Republics, with Persia and Afghanistan. On March 1st, 1921, a treaty of friendship and alliance was concluded in Moscow between Turkey and Afghanistan, by which each recognised the other's absolute independence and each was to be represented by an ambassador in the other's capital. It was agreed that regular and rapid postal communications should be established, and that Turkey should send teachers and officers to Afghanistan. Article 2 of the Treaty declares: "The contracting parties recognise the emancipation of the nations of the East and confirm the fact of their unrestricted freedom, their right to

be independent and to govern themselves in whatever manner they themselves may choose." Article 3: "The great State of Afghanistan takes this opportunity to declare and testify that for centuries Turkey has guided Islam, has fulfilled a great mission, and has held high the banner of the Caliphate; she has taken the lead by force of example." On March 16th there followed the treaty of alliance between the Russian Republic and Turkey, drawn up in accordance with the principles of Russian revolutionary policy in the East and taking the Turkish National Pact as its basis in determining Turkey's frontiers. This treaty gave Turkey a generous measure of Russian support in arms and munitions of war. On October 13th ensued the Treaty of Kars between Turkey and the Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. On June 26th, 1922, the Turco-Persian agreement crowned the edifice.

Meanwhile the Græco-Turkish War continued. The Greeks pushed forward victoriously in the summer of 1921, but the battle on the Sakharía River, one of the most momentous in the struggle between East and West, checked their advance. All the efforts of the Angora Government to secure peace were frustrated by Greek and English opposition. Yussuf Kemal Pasha's peace mission to London in February, 1922, was a failure. At the end of July the Greeks wanted to occupy Constantinople, but this the Allied Powers refused to allow. The British High Commissioner at Smyrna, however, proclaimed the autonomy of the district under Greek military protection. Lloyd George's confidence in the Greeks was utterly blind. As late as August 4th, in his speech on the adjournment in the House of Commons, the English Prime Minister declared his firm conviction that a decisive Greek victory was imminent. In that same month the Turks made one more final effort to secure peace without bloodshed. Fethi Bey came to London as an envoy from his Government. On Angora's behalf he offered the complete demilitarisation and neutralisation of four zones on both sides of the two Straits and an undertaking that no armed force whatever, Turkey's included, should enter these zones. The League of Nations was to exercise full powers of control. These guarantees freely offered by Angora went beyond the publicly avowed aims of the Western Powers. But no English Minister

received Fethi Bey, the English public was kept in ignorance of his offer, and a Press campaign of lies was launched. Fethi Bey left London without having accomplished his mission. The following week the Turkish army began its offensive, within ten days the Greek army was utterly destroyed, and on September 8th Mustafa Kemal entered Smyrna.

Once again it seemed as though a great clearing of the issues between Europe and the East were imminent. Lloyd George and Churchill, in a mood of panic over the collapse of their Eastern policy, did everything in their power to bring about an Anglo-Turkish war. On September 16th Lloyd George published his call to arms to the British Dominions; in the statements issuing from Downing Street war was represented as inevitable, and instructions were sent to the British General Harrington, in command at the Straits, which were intended to lead to a clash. Thanks to Harrington and to a large section of English public opinion, these schemes were not realised. The Lloyd George-Churchill Government resigned and the East had scored its first decisive victory in the struggle with Europe. On September 23rd the Allied Powers issued an official invitation to peace negotiations to "the Government of the Grand National Assembly at Angora." This was tantamount to the annulment of the Treaty of Sèvres. The first link was snapped in the chain with which the white race had sought to fetter the rising national and democratic movements in the East after the victorious issue of the World War. On October 11th the armistice of Mudania was signed, and on October 19th the Government of Angora assumed authority in Constantinople.

On November 1st, 1922, the Republic was first officially proclaimed in Turkey. Article 1 of the new law reads: "Whereas the Turkish people have resolved in their constitution that their rights of sovereignty and dominion are directly embodied in and actually exercised by the Turkish Grand National Assembly as a legal person, which truly represents them, and that they can be neither surrendered nor divided nor assigned; and whereas the Turkish people have resolved to acknowledge no authority and no corporate body that does not rest upon the national will; they therefore refuse to acknowledge any form of government other than the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly within the

limits of the National Pact. The Turkish people therefore regard the form of government existing in Constantinople, based upon the sovereignty of a single individual, as relegated for ever to the historic past, dating from March 16th, 1920." By this act the sovereignty of the people was proclaimed and the bond was severed which for centuries had bound Turkey to the dynasty and had created the Empire and the nation. The Turkish people felt their youth renewed and left their past behind them. The Revolution was accomplished. The Caliphate remained as a feeble link with the past and the Islamic religious world, for according to the law it appertained to the house of Osman. The Grand National Assembly was to elect as Caliph the most eminent member of the dynasty for the time being, judged by the standards of learning and character. It was proclaimed that the Caliphate rested upon the support of the Turkish State.

On November 5th the Commissary of the National Assembly in Constantinople declared that the Constantinople Government had ceased to exist. The archives of the Sublime Porte were transferred to Angora. On November 17th Sultan Mohammed VI, who was accused of high treason, fled to Malta on a British man-of-war. On November 19th Abdül Mejid was elected Caliph. At his coronation the prayers were read in Turkish instead of Arabic for the first time. After prolonged negotiations at Lausanne a Peace Treaty between Turkey and the Allied Powers was signed on July 24th, 1923. It gave the Turks everything for which they had struggled. The new Turkey occupied a position incomparably stronger than the Ottoman Empire, for the capitulations were abolished and Turkey enjoyed absolute equality with the European Powers in her internal and external liberties.

Ever since the Republic was proclaimed Turkey has celebrated November 1st as a national holiday. This was the decisive step in the process of westernisation. And it was westernisation at which Mustafa Kemal and his party aimed. Universal education in the light of modern knowledge, the separation of Church and State, secularisation throughout the whole sphere of public and social activity, and the emancipation of women: these were the guiding principles of the statesmen whose aim it was to lead Turkey once and for all out of the Middle Ages and into the new era. Directly after

his triumphant entry into Smyrna Mustafa Kemal summoned a popular assembly in Brusa. There he addressed the women and said: "We have won a great and decisive victory, but it will be meaningless unless you come to our aid. Win the victory of education for us, and you will have done more for your country than we have been able to do." And addressing the men: "Unless henceforward women take part in the social life of the nation, unless we change our customs fundamentally, we shall never develop to our full capacity. We shall inevitably remain behind, unable to meet the civilisations of the West on an equal footing." And addressing them all: "All this will be fruitless unless you will march resolutely forward into modern life, all will be fruitless if you repudiate the responsibilities laid upon you by modern life."

Hamdulla Subdi, one of the Angoran leaders, said in 1921: "As regards the philosophical outlook of our movement, our eyes are turned westwards. We shall transplant Western institutions to Asiatic soil. We shall transform our schools on the Western model. No more Pan-Islamism, but nationalism, Asia's new watchword. First and foremost we aspire to our inviolable and complete national individuality. We wish to be a modern nation with our minds open to admit current ideas, and yet to remain ourselves. We do not wish to be regarded as an Asiatic people, anxious to remain isolated behind moral barriers. Our education and culture is a direct channel of communication with all civilised countries. . . . To-day a new school of poetry has arisen. It really does embody the country's innermost self, it is one of our vital forces, perhaps *the* motive power behind our actions. It seeks a return to the primeval sources; it addresses itself to the people, the masses; it aspires to simplify speech so as to become the great leader of those who are fighting for independence. Turkish soil and the Turkish people provide the subject matter for poems and novels and stories. It turns away from the teachers and masters of yesterday, reproaching them with morbid pessimism. The poet of to-day is Mehmed Emin." Mehmed Emin is the typical patriotic poet. His aim is to educate the people, to appeal to them and rouse them. He teaches love of home, of the native soil and the fatherland, he sings the praises of agriculture and conscientious labour. His warlike *Turkish Songs* dating from the

year 1898, and his ballads, are the mainstay of patriotic school readers. His poem *Awaken, Turk* was the most effective patriotic composition at the beginning of the World War; in it he traced the proud history of the Turks and their decay in recent centuries, and prophesied the future rise of a new and powerful Turkish Empire. But what was more important than this primitive nationalism of the wars of liberation was the programme of European reforms which Mustafa Kemal's iron will forced upon Turkey just as Abdul Hamid had forced an Asiatic orientation upon her.

In the matter of women's emancipation Mustafa Kemal and his wife Latife Hanum themselves set an example. Latife Hanum always went about unveiled, accompanied her husband everywhere, and led the movement for women's emancipation. The Society for the Defence of Women's Rights also fought for women's professional liberties and for a change in the marriage law and the customary marriage ceremony.

Like progress was achieved in the direction of political westernisation. Any opposition to the abolition of the Sultanate and the secularisation of the State was denounced as high treason. New elections were held for the National Assembly, and the People's Party, led by Mustafa Kemal, scored an overwhelming victory. In October the new Parliament proclaimed Angora to be the capital in order to sever all geographical ties with the past. On October 29th, 1923, Turkey was officially declared to be a Republic. The office of President of the Republic was created, to be filled by the Grand National Assembly electing one of its own members; Mustafa Kemal was elected the first President. He was assisted by a Ministry which he chose from among the deputies, but which required confirmation by the Chamber. The President of the Republic is entitled, if he chooses, to preside at the meetings of the National Assembly and of the Council of Ministers. Only five months later the Caliphate was abolished and the royal house banished. Further, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Pious Foundations was abolished and all educational institutions were placed under the control of the Ministry of Education. The next day, March 4th, 1924, the last Caliph of the Osmanli dynasty left Constantinople. A modern parliamentary dictatorship took the place of a religious monarchy, and this was ratified

in the Turkish constitution of April 20th, 1924. By that constitution Turkey is a Republic; her national religion is Islam, her official language Turkish, her capital Angora. Constitutional authority rests absolutely and unconditionally in the hands of the nation, represented solely and truly by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which exercises constitutional authority in the name of the nation. This National Assembly, for which every male Turk above eighteen years of age enjoys the active suffrage, unites legislative and executive functions. On June 15th, 1925, a conference of various committees met in Constantinople under the chairmanship of the Minister of Justice in order to reconstruct the whole Turkish judicial system according to the most modern principles. The Premier explained to the conference that these reforms were essential and that radical measures must be adopted. In his opening speech the Minister of Justice stressed the separation of the State from religion, which was a sacred concern of the individual conscience. "We desire to draft our laws in accordance with the methods and principles of civilised Western peoples. Mediæval principles must give way to secular laws. We are creating a modern, civilised nation, and we desire to meet contemporary needs. We have the will to live, and nobody can prevent us."

In the economic sphere efforts were made to found industrial associations and societies in order to organise social activities and to raise Eastern industry to the European level. In February, 1923, an industrial congress was held in Smyrna; an industrial pact was concluded extolling Turkish progressive sympathies and love of hard work. Purely Turkish banks were encouraged, such as the Agricultural Bank, controlled by the Government, or the *Credit National Ottoman*, which has enjoyed since 1925 the sole right to issue paper currency. It was realised that foreign capital and expert assistance were essential, but they were to be strictly controlled by the new national State. For instance, a German firm, the *Türkische Werke* acquired a concession for the establishment of three factories to manufacture locomotives, railway material, and agricultural machinery. The concessions were granted for a period of thirty years, after which the factories and machinery were to pass automatically into the hands of the Turkish State. At the end of five years

the entire staff of the company is to be Turkish, and the Board of nine directors must include four Turks nominated by the Government. The spirit of industrial enterprise was to be encouraged by every means. Like Soviet Russia, the new Turkish Government tried to introduce European business principles and punctuality in place of Oriental bureaucratic dilatory habits. Hitherto the Turk had been an official or a peasant; he was to be trained as a man of business. This is the more essential because the Greeks and Armenians who formerly constituted the merchant class have left Turkey. The agreement of January, 1923, between Greece and Turkey, providing for an exchange of the Greek population in Turkey against the Turkish population in Greece, crowned the triumph of the principle of the national State. As a solution of the problem of minorities in the modern national State the principle of *cujus regio illius natio* could hardly be surpassed in intolerance; it was the counterpart of the principle inspiring the Peace of Westphalia, *cujus regio illius religio*, the coping-stone and culmination of an epoch in which religion was the dominating political principle in Europe. At the same time Turkey deprived the Greek Patriarch of the position that he had held in the former Ottoman Empire.

The spirit of enterprise was further encouraged in the Turkish people by the new organisation of provincial administration. At the head of each province or vilayet is still, as formerly, the Vali or representative of the Grand National Assembly. But the vilayet has an elected Council which chooses from its own members a President and an Executive Committee. This Executive enjoys legislative powers and also executive powers within the vilayet. The Vali only intervenes in case of a conflict between the central authority and the local administration. The communes enjoy autonomy of a similar kind.

In many circles this new tendency in Turkish public life met with opposition which, however, seldom assumed an organised form. The Government retorted by restricting personal liberties and the freedom of the Press, by establishing special Tribunals of Independence, and by suppressing all movements of this kind as high treason. In December, 1923, the editors of three of the largest newspapers in Constantinople were arrested and their papers were prohibited because they

had published an open letter by two leading Indian Mohammedans, Amir Ali and Agha Khan, pleading with the Turkish Government to consider the effect of their action upon Mohammedan public opinion before proceeding further against the Caliphate. In the autumn of 1924 an opposition to the People's Party, hitherto exercising exclusive power, began to make itself felt in the Grand National Assembly. The new party called itself Progressive Republican, but it opposed too rapid measures of westernisation and the destruction of the Islamic tradition among the people. In December, 1924, for instance, General Nureddin Pasha was elected deputy at Brusa; he was the stepson of the most revered Turkish dervish and an orthodox Mohammedan. The Government quashed the election, but Nureddin was re-elected.

In the spring of 1925 this opposition assumed the form of an armed organisation. It combined a Kurdish national movement with the orthodox religious aims of the Turkish clergy and the powerful orders of dervishes. It was directed against Angora's nationalist republicanism, with its centralising and free-thinking tendencies. Bedr Khan was the first to stir up a nationalist movement among the freedom-loving tribes of Kurdistan. His son Midhat Bey had edited the first Kurdish newspaper in Egypt in 1902, which was later published in Geneva and after 1908 in Constantinople, until the Young Turks suppressed it. In the same year the first political association, "Kurdistan," was founded and the first Kurdish primary schools were opened. But the Young Turks soon succeeded in crushing the movement. An attempt to win Kurdish independence made by two grandsons of Bedr Khan in 1919 came to as rapid an end. But now the Kurds united with the forces of clericalism in Turkey. The Government took severe measures, part of the army was mobilised, and martial law was proclaimed in the eastern provinces. Fethi Bey's conciliatory Government resigned, and the new Ministry under Ismet Pasha took the opportunity to suppress the opposition ruthlessly and promulgate the so-called Pacification Laws, which forbade all religious activities and placed the Press completely under Government control. After a bitter struggle the Kurdish rising was crushed and its leaders were executed.

But these events only made Mustafa Kemal the more determined, and he proceeded further in the separation of Church and State. On September 3rd, 1925, the Cabinet resolved that all the numerous Mohammedan monasteries (*tekkes*) in Turkey should be closed and all titles of sheikhs and dervishes abolished. Precise regulations laid down the number and the activities of those who might wear religious garb, and even the nature and appearance of their dress was prescribed. The tombs and mausoleums of the Sultans, where the people had been accustomed to pay homage, were closed to the public. All State officials were ordered to wear European dress in future. A reform in the order of divine service was considered. The fasts in the month of Ramazan were to be abolished, as being incompatible with modern economic conditions, the practice of prostrating oneself and taking off one's shoes in the mosques was no longer permitted, and efforts were made to arrange the prayers better and to find a more dignified and modern form of worship. Certain rites were to be abolished, as being contrary to the dictates of modern hygiene. The weekly day of rest was to be changed to Sunday, and the Gregorian calendar was to be made statutory. The Koran was to be read in Turkish as well as the prayers; the names of preachers, their subjects—which were to be adapted to the requirements of modern life—and the time of the sermon were to be announced beforehand. Only persons authorised by the State might preach or exercise clerical functions. The fez and the turban, outward symbols of the Ottoman Empire and the religion of Islam, were abolished and forbidden, and were replaced by hats.

Further evidence of the new spirit may be found in the decision, taken for the first time in the summer of 1925, to erect statues to the President of the Republic. The severe monotheism of the Koran forbids pictures or monuments representing human beings, as a temptation to idolatry. When the Sultan's head was first portrayed on postage stamps in 1914 there was great excitement in Mohammedan circles, and it was only partially allayed by confining the sovereign's portrait to one stamp in the series, that of the highest value, which was of course very seldom used. When Abdul Mejid was elected Caliph by the Grand National Assembly, the orthodox showed signs of great perturbation because it was

known that this prince had formerly taken pleasure in painting portraits of his friends. He was also required to wear a beard thenceforward, for shaving was regarded as an alien innovation of the unbelievers. The decision to commission a Viennese sculptor to make a statue of Mustafa Kemal and to erect it publicly in Constantinople was as much a revolutionary act as the decree issued in the same month forbidding Turkish gendarmes to wear beards. The Turkish army, too, was given a new head-dress, and officers and civil servants are required to take off their hats in European fashion.

So it was that at least outwardly Turkish life was completely westernised and Europeanised with unexpected rapidity. The rising generation is to be educated altogether in the new spirit. The Turks themselves point to the similarity of the process and of their people with Japan; both, they consider, are active, martial races, with a gift for domination, and without any inclination for metaphysical speculation, or meditation, or art. In the western extreme of Asia as well as the eastern extreme a rigidly national State is to rise up with a keen patriotic sense and military discipline, resolved to adopt European mechanical science and European reforms in order to assert its independence of Europe and to serve in this respect as a model to Asia. The only difference is that Turkey, having set out on this road sixty years later than Japan, is following it more unreservedly. But Japan had time to gather her forces and allow them to mature. It is doubtful whether the European Powers will grant Turkey the same opportunity.

Only a few decades ago Turkey was regarded as the home of Oriental Conservatism. Within the last year or so the Swiss Civil Code has been introduced, and henceforward it regulates even the individual status and relations of Turkish Mohammedans. This means that polygamy is abolished, and the outward conditions of women's lives have been Europeanised with staggering rapidity. In April, 1928, the Grand National Assembly resolved upon the complete secularisation of the Turkish Republic, which was a despotic theocracy only twenty years ago, and the abolition of Islam as the State religion. Islamic law was deprived of all authority. The President's oath of loyalty to the constitution is no longer sworn in Allah's name, but on his own

honour. Religion in Turkey has become exclusively a matter for the individual conscience; all connection with State, territory, and political allegiance has been dissolved. Nationalism has taken the place of religion as it did in Europe, and with like pernicious result. A further remarkable expression of this tendency was the introduction of the Latin alphabet in writing Turkish in place of the Arabic characters hitherto employed.

It is easy to understand that the radical measures of the dominating party, which under Turkey's present social system consists mainly of middle-class officers, would meet with resistance amongst a large section of the population at a time when the uniting bond of an external menace was no longer present. The opposition leaders were men who had been eminent among Angora's leaders in the years of war between Angora and Greece; such were Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, Refet Pasha, and Hussein Rauf Bey. But the Government was unrelenting in the pursuit of its aims. All opposition was crushed. This is equally true of the years 1920 and 1921, when attempts were made to stir up Socialism or Communism in Turkey. Whilst the Angora Government concluded a pact of friendship with Russia, it persecuted all attempts at socialist propaganda within its own borders. The conservative Turkish peasantry made little response to the initiative of Mustafa Subhi Bey, the son of a Vali of Janina who founded a paper entitled *Yeni Dünya* (The New World), or of Nazim Yoldach, who established the Communist People's party in Turkey at the end of 1921 with its journal *Yeni Hayat* (New Life). But Mustafa Kemal had as little sympathy with Socialism as Zaghlul in Egypt or the Japanese Government. Mustafa Kemal's care was to strengthen Turkish nationalism and to create a Turkish middle class, whose industrial and administrative activities were to be the backbone of the new national State. Like Zaghlul, he was profoundly impressed by the organisation and power of middle-class, nationalist Europe, and both were resolved to enable their peoples to take their place in the social and political order dominating Europe; they should be henceforward the hammer and no longer the anvil. Turkish nationalism in its most recent form exhibits those terrorist, Fascist qualities which characterised the counter-

Reformation when nearing its end, and which also distinguish the most recent phase of European nationalism. Actually, though not formally, it breaks loose from its parliamentary and democratic foundation, which is now felt as a check on the forces that have been released. Turkey marches in step with European national States. Neither Turkey nor Egypt have an inkling of the deep currents running counter to all this in India and China and resisting the attempt to force their peoples into an alien and imperfect world. These flow from a native civilisation, ancient and yet still active and vital, which neither possesses. The source of their opposition and resistance is not a wholly different civilisation, but rather the final impulse of mediævalism before it makes way for the modern era. Mediævalism, however, in Europe as in the East, was a complete and unified outlook on life, embracing everything—God and man and the world—in which everything had its definite, appointed place and mutual harmony was maintained. That unified cosmos has been shattered; even the peoples of the Near East are seized with unrest and a spirit of unquiet exploration. New forces have burst into an isolated world, distant prospects have opened out. No return to the past is possible, and the future is uncertain. And so these peoples are beginning to share in the searching unrest of the Occident; more and more peoples enter the domain of Western civilisation.

CHAPTER IX

THE NEW ARABIA

FROM the outset the nationalist movement in Arabia assumed forms different from those of nationalism in Turkey or Egypt. It evolved among two separate sections of the population, on the one hand the Bedouins and inhabitants of Central Arabia, on the other the townspeople on the Mediterranean coast who were exposed to European influence. Arabian history is full of the hostility between the dwellers in the desert and the settled Arabs. Except for the fertile Yemen and Oman districts, the great Arabian peninsula consists of sandy deserts, steppes, and infertile mountains, with only scattered oases and belts of oases. The Bedouins are nomad shepherds who lead the same primitive life as in the days of Mohanuned. But whenever opportunity offers they show a readiness to take to agriculture and the more highly developed forms of social life in towns. From the dawn of history they have invaded the fertile provinces of Syria and Mesopotamia again and again. Impelled by the early Islamic religious nationalism which first superseded their purely primitive tribe organisation, they finally conquered Syria and Mesopotamia and made them Arabian lands. It was in the towns, with their ancient civilisation and relatively advanced civic organisation, that the idea of an Arab renaissance and Arab nationalism first emerged, partly under the influence of European thought, partly as a reaction to the pressure of Turkish nationalism. The fact that Syria bordered the Mediterranean and faced towards Europe, and that the missions there were exceedingly active, developed an earlier and more vigorous Syrian nationalism—especially in the large towns such as Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Haifa—than in Mesopotamia. Here nationalism assumed the modern form familiar to sociologists in nineteenth-century Europe; it ousted the once dominant religious sentiment which had erected seemingly insurmountable barriers between

the various Christian sects, the Mohammedans and Druzes in Syria, the Sunnites and Shiites in Mesopotamia.

The nationalist movement which, like Mohammedanism, arose amongst the Wahabi Bedouins of Central Arabia was of different origin; under its present leader it was revived through the Ahvan or fraternity movement and struck deeper roots into the religious and national consciousness of the people. Of less importance to the Arabian nationalist movement were the numerous risings in the Turkish provinces of the Arabian peninsula, by which the people resisted the attempt to assimilate them to the Ottomans. Even before the World War Richard Hartmann wrote of the various aims of the Arabian princes and parties: "The very fact that the Arabian national idea was selected as the most useful pretext (to justify sectional aims) proves that there is a widespread Arab national sentiment capable of uniting people across religious barriers." For the Arabian Orient, too, the era of strong national consciousness has dawned, and this not only in the more advanced districts, but throughout all the lands where Arabic is spoken. That even the autocratic princes of Northern Arabia should be considering the idea of a union of Arab provinces, possibly in the form of a federal State, proves that the conception of an Arab nation is already penetrating into the peninsula itself." Only the provinces and States on the southern coast of Arabia remained and still remain beyond the reach of this Arab sentiment of unity, which the peninsula had lost altogether since the days of the early Caliphs. But already the seeds of this new national consciousness were sprouting everywhere, and the World War quickly matured them; in the romantic and dynastic nationalism of the Sherif of Mecca they ripened into a first attempt to unite the two currents of Arab nationalism, that of the Bedouins and that of the frontier townsmen. The ancient glory of the Arabian Caliphate was to be revived. But the rising tide of nationalism among its true Bedouin exponents, the Wahabis, put an end for the time being to an enterprise undertaken by mistaken methods. The task of discovering a bond of union between the two currents of Arab nationalism remains for future accomplishment.

The first Arab country to feel the influence of the new nationalist ideas was Syria. Only a hundred years ago it

was completely isolated and mediæval, a country inaccessible to Europeans, where the several tribes and princes carried on perpetual feuds, where Turkey was the nominal sovereign, where each religion and each sect despised and hated all the others, and where all were equally untouched by modern education and enlightenment. It was Mohammed Ali, the great reformer of Egyptian administration, and his son Ibrahim, who rescued the country from mediæval feudalism during the nine years when the Pasha of Egypt also ruled Syria; they laid the foundations of a modern administrative system which then became a model for other provinces of the Turkish Empire. The power of the feudal lords and the individual tribes was broken, communications were established between the separate districts and valleys, and the soil was provided in which a sentiment of Syrian unity could grow up. The land was opened to Europeans, and thenceforward foreign missionaries, especially French Catholics and American Protestants, began their labours. But the old religious antagonisms remained. The Mohammedans, though they were themselves split up in sects, looked down upon the Christians as their subjects. The Christians, both Orthodox and Catholics, were as ignorant and primitive as the Mohammedans. But with the help of foreign missions they made some progress towards a more enlightened and better organised existence; another factor making for progress and enlightenment amongst the Christians was emigration to America and Europe, whence they often returned with some experience of Western life and with what was in their circumstances considerable wealth. The Christians, therefore, began to look down contemptuously upon the Mohammedans and their retrograde condition. Early in the nineteen-sixties violent hostilities broke out in Lebanon between the Catholic Maronites, who enjoyed French protection, and the Druzes, who were favoured by England. This war, the result of feuds dragged out for decades, led to the establishment of an autonomous province of Lebanon under a Turkish Christian Governor.

In those years, moreover, the Syrian mind first awakened to the idea of nationalism in its modern form; characteristically, this happened among the Maronites, who were most readily exposed to the influence of new European ideas on

account of their contact with the West and their long-standing ties with the Vatican. In 1868 the American Protestant missionaries, led by Eli Smith and Cornelius van Dyck, founded a medical faculty at Beirut with Arabic as the language of instruction. They brought to Syria the modern democratic ideas upon which the earliest American tradition is based, and there sought to spread them amongst the liberal-minded youths who flocked to their college. Equally important was the fact that they chose Arabic as the language of instruction in the college, for it thus became for the first time a medium of communication for modern scientific knowledge and modern thought. Here, too, a new terminology had to be worked out. In 1875 French Jesuits founded the University of St. Joseph at Beirut, and by establishing a great Arabic printing press and publishing papers, helped to awaken national consciousness and revive a national literature, though the spirit in which the University was managed was alien to modern thought and aimed at assisting French propaganda. These and similar colleges were attended almost exclusively by Syrian Christians. It was not till 1895 that Sheikh Ahmed Abbas, a disciple of the theological reformers at El Azhar, founded the Osmanic College for Mohammedans, which maintained the basic principles of Mohammedanism and was yet accessible to modern ideas and led a section of the rising generation of Mohammedans to a Western view of life by teaching the French language and by imparting European knowledge and methods and political ideas.

Like European nationalism, Arab Syrian national consciousness had its origin in a literary renaissance. The ancient, classical language and the poetical and philosophical works written in it were studied; new life and a spirit of romance were breathed into the old, traditional subjects; the speech which for decades had only been current among the people or used for theological disquisitions was raised once more to the dignity of a modern literary language by the creation of a new terminology; foreign classics were translated, and finally the new knowledge was sifted and collected in great encyclopædias and dictionaries. The first to stimulate these activities was the learned Maronite, Butros el Bustani, who was later converted to Protestantism and

worked with the American Mission in Beirut. There, too, in 1860 he began to publish a paper entitled *Nafir Suriya* (The Syrian Trumpet), and three years later started a national college to foster the Arabic language. To him is due in the first instance the rebirth of Arab national sentiment in Syria, and the renaissance of an Arabic literature. Following the foundation of the college and the newspaper came the issue in 1870 of a political, literary, and scientific journal *El Jenan* (The Shield) with the motto: Love of our country is an article of faith. Later a daily was published by Suleiman el Bustani, a cousin of Butros, who also translated Homer into Arabic and subsequently, in 1908, was elected deputy in the Ottoman Parliament. In 1875 Butros began to edit a great Arabic encyclopædia of all the sciences; he himself prepared six volumes before his death in 1883, and the work was carried on by his son and his brothers. He was especially an advocate of popular education, including that of women, and it was his influence which gave rise to the liberal and reforming tendencies in Syria which Midhat Pasha encountered when he came there as governor in 1879. In the first Turkish Parliament of 1876 Syria was represented by a Liberal, Khalil Ganem, who afterwards went to Western Europe as an exile, when the constitution was suspended.

Other Maronites besides Butros exercised influence, including Nasif el Yasiji, a scholar of the Arabic classics who breathed new life into them, and Yussuf el Debs, subsequently Archbishop of the Maronites, who founded the Collège de la Sagesse and sought to develop it into an Arabic Academy; he also wrote a history of Syria in nine volumes, prophesying a great united Syria in the future to carry on the glorious traditions of the past.

Pre-eminent among the young men who were inspired at that time by the idea of national rebirth was Adib Ishak, who edited the newspaper *Al Takaddom* (Progress) in 1874. Afterwards he went to Egypt and came under the influence of Jemal ud-Din, the Afghan; thence he proceeded to Paris and edited another paper. He was in sympathy with Arabi Pasha's movement. He died at an early age in 1885, having attained a reputation as a poet and dramatist, and as a leader of the romantic school in the new Arabic literature.

Women, too, began to play a part in the modern movement

in Syria, especially in the Press. In 1893 Hind Naufel founded the first woman's paper, and others soon followed until, in 1910, they numbered fifteen. At the same time the daily *Nasir* in Beirut had a woman editor, whilst the journal *Fatal el Shark* (The Young Maid of the East), edited by Labibe Hashem, attained great influence.

This penetration of modern liberal thought into Syria came about under French influence, not, indeed, as at first, through the medium of French Catholicism, but through the transmission of the ideas which inspired the French Revolution and the views of Left wing, radical French politicians. A number of Freemason's Lodges were established on the French model. But this cultural French influence did not lead to a conscious national assimilation to the French type, as some French propagandists had expected. In 1908 an anonymous pamphlet appeared in Beirut entitled *La Question Sociale et Scolaire en Syrie*, opposing assimilation to Turkey and all other foreign influence, especially French influence, and demanding the development of a native culture. "We love France," wrote the author, "but our affection cannot go so far as to forget ourselves. It is essential in the interests alike of Syria and of France that our countrymen should preserve their national character and their own individuality, whilst deriving inspiration from French ideas. We give preference to French culture, for it harmonises better than any other with our mentality and our aspirations. But we will never allow our own national culture to die. We will toil and slave, we will exhaust every atom of our strength and energy, our youth and our spirit, we will sacrifice our very lifeblood if necessary, but our own culture will not die, and the sun's fair and burning rays will never shine upon the mighty ruins of our Syrian fatherland."

The year 1908 made as deep a mark in the history of modern Arabia as in that of Turkey, but even before that Syria had evolved modern national consciousness, confined, it is true, to a narrow circle, and a literature had made its appearance based upon modern, national, secularist, and social ideas. Both among Christians and Mohammedans progressive youth took up the cudgels against religious fanaticism and against schisms and sects which impeded Syrian unity. "I am convinced," wrote G. Malouf at that

time, "that progress consists in transforming all governments into lay and secular bodies. It is illogical to deduce everything from religion, as is done in the East. It means turning our backs upon progress and blocking the path of our country's future from the outset. All the misfortunes of the East have their origin in religions, and prophets are a scourge." The bond of unity that was beginning to bring the various religions and races of Syria together was their common Arabic speech, revived through the medium of a new literature, and further the consciousness of a heritage of glorious traditions and the conviction that religious and social progress was essential. Young Arab writers were swept away by the intoxication of nineteenth-century progress. Farach Antun wrote in his novel *Urshalaim al Jadida* (The New Jerusalem): "Looking into the future, we await the day when science will transport mankind from the misery in which they groan to joy and bliss; I see men swift as birds carrying the products of industry and agriculture across land and sea and through the air to distant peoples. I see men conversing from continent to continent as if they were living in the same house. I see the masses attaining the same standards as their leaders and masters, and so bridging the gulf that divides them. I see poor workers ruling world empires through the universal suffrage. I see the reign of true equality approaching." Farach Antun in his novel attacked the social injustice from which mankind suffers.

Another novel of the new Arabian literature of this period, *Al Arvah al Mutamarrada*, by Khalil Jubran, is the story of a rich man's wife who leaves her husband in order to obey the call of her heart and live with the man she loves. The very subject of the book implies a revolutionary attitude towards Eastern tradition, and the heroine proclaims in impassioned words her longing for a new life. She bursts the trammels by which the past has fettered her in the vital matter of love and family life; but she yearns for something more, for a new freedom in all the paths of life. "There are palaces in which I would no longer dwell and tombs in which I would no longer bury my life. I have cast off the yoke of those who mate with their bodies and hate with their souls, whose sole excuse is their brutish nature. I pity rather than hate them, and what I loathe in them is their hypocrisy. . . . This society

from which I have escaped condemns me because I have preferred to lose its respect rather than my own soul, and because I have turned from its gloomy ways and looked towards the light. It is only great souls that men condemn, souls that revolt against injustice and oppression. Those who do not choose exile rather than slavery know nothing of true freedom."

Emin Rikhani in his speeches and articles gives expression to the same idea of a struggle to attain new life and a new democracy. In his collected speeches (*Ar Rikhania*) we find this passage: "If you are a monk or a priest, do not speak to your congregation of the theological problems which occupied Thomas Aquinas or St. Augustine all their lives and left them to die perplexed. If you are a nobleman, throw your patent of nobility into the fire and reflect that we all spring from the same root and that we have certain affinities with four-footed beasts." Rikhani's *Book of Khalid* is the story of an Arabian boy who goes to America at the age of ten and grows up there; he shows that the truly civilised man is neither the European nor the Oriental, but he who looks for what is best in both, for the true strength alike of the European genius and the Asiatic prophet. "Whilst scientific research endeavours by means of new discoveries to make men's bodies purer and healthier, stronger and happier, the inspiration of the East leads their souls by way of its ancient beauties and through the realms of the spirit to the peace and rest for which they yearn." Even socialist ideas met with some response in Syria, though a feeble one. On May 1st, 1907, that is before the Turkish Revolution, a group of young people attempted to celebrate the 1st of May.

And so we come to 1908, the year of the Young Turk Revolution and the introduction of a constitutional parliamentary régime in the Ottoman Empire. Revolutionary activities were already being carried on, partly by the many Syrians living in North America, Egypt, Argentina, Brazil, Chili, and other countries, who numbered several hundred thousands and had a highly organised Press of their own, partly by political refugees from Turkey in Western Europe and Egypt. Nagib Azoury, who had studied in France and afterwards became assistant to the Governor of Jerusalem, was obliged to leave Turkey in 1904. He went to Paris,

where he published his *Reveil de la Nation Arabe dans l'Asie Turque* in 1905, and edited a journal entitled *L'Indépendance Arabe* from April, 1907, to September, 1908. In the last issue of this journal, in September, 1908, the editor made this response to the Young Turk Revolution: "In view of what is now happening we feel it to be our duty to fulfil the promises that we have always made to our friends the Young Turks, to lay down our arms and co-operate with them in restoring the youth of the Ottoman Empire as soon as our common efforts should have forced Sultan Abdul Hamid to grant the constitution. With this intention we have consulted with Ahmed Riza (the leader of the Young Turks in Paris) and Prince Sabah ed Din (the leader of the Turkish advocates of decentralisation) and have agreed that now our programme is indistinguishable from theirs. Later, when Parliament has given evidence of its vitality and its enlightened liberalism, we shall abandon our present activities in order to work by constitutional means to establish administrative autonomy in our country."

The Syrians who had remained in their own country felt the same. The Revolution brought new life to Syria. Just as in Constantinople, Christians and Mohammedans fraternised, and in the large cities of Syria, in Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem, there was universal rejoicing. People looked to the future with perfect confidence.

But rooted in political nationalism is the fatal tendency to erect strong national States, and this prevented the Young Turks, just as it had prevented the Germans in Austria, from setting about their task in the right spirit and saving the Empire through a policy of decentralisation which would have met the demands of cultural nationalism; with such a policy the Empire might have stood, rejuvenated, strengthened, and united, as a firm bulwark to block the advance of Western Imperialism. The nineteenth century was dominated by the tendency to identify the State and the nation, a tendency which has yet to run its fateful course through succeeding decades before men come to realise that the function of the State is to regulate economic activities and make provision for the peace and prosperity of all its inhabitants, whilst the nationality of the various groups of inhabitants no more concerns it than their religious faith, for it is

the duty of the national community, not of the State, to foster national culture and speech.

The efforts begun after 1908 to assimilate the Arabian provinces of the Empire to Turkish customs, and to suppress Arabic even in the schools, inevitably reinforced Arab national sentiment, and roused it even in Mesopotamia, which was less advanced than Syria. The Revolution had released new forces and brought new leaders to the fore. George Nicholas Baz worked for social service and modern education, Daud Mujaès raised his voice to plead for better conditions for the peasantry, Jamil Bey Maluf wrote a book on *Turkey and the Rights of Humanity*. Selim Bey Ammun, a doctor with European education, became President of the Lebanese Council and effected a number of important reforms during the single year which elapsed before his early death. Syria's first representatives in the new Parliament were Emir Mohammed Arslan, a Druze from Lebanon who was killed in the counter-revolution of April 13th, 1909; Suleiman Bustani Effendi of Beirut, who had translated the Iliad into Arabic and afterwards became a Senator; and Zehravi Effendi, a Mohammedan from Hama.

The initial loyalty of the Arabs to the Government in Constantinople soon changed its character. The opposition was first organised in Cairo, where a number of Syrians were living and controlled a section of the Press. Nejib Azoury founded a Freemason's Lodge in Cairo with the same purpose as that of the Italian Carbonari: national liberation. From this centre the Lodge spread through the Arabian provinces. With the help of Ibrahim S. Naggiar, Arab officers founded a club called *Al Ahd* to prepare for a national rising. The Committee for Decentralisation, with its headquarters in Cairo, had seventy-five branches in Syria and Palestine. The Syrian Arabs themselves declared that they wished to remain within the Turkish Empire, but that they insisted on the following demands: Arabic was to be recognised as the official language in the provincial administration and courts of law, whilst correspondence with Constantinople should be conducted in Turkish. Civil servants were to know Arabic and not to be appointed without the consent of the local authorities. Provincial Diets were to enjoy a wide measure of autonomy, excluding questions of foreign policy and

defence. European experts were to be employed to re-organise the administration; they were to sign a fifteen-year contract and to know either Arabic or Turkish. A committee was formed in Beirut consisting of forty-two Mohammedans, forty-two Christians, and two Jews, to work out a programme of reform. The programme provided for a General Provincial Council consisting of thirty deputies, half Christians and half Mohammedans. In April, 1913, the Government dissolved the Reform Club in Beirut led by two of the principal city notables, Abdullah Baihum, a Mohammedan, and Yussuf Sursok, a Christian. Next day all the newspapers appeared absolutely blank except for the decree of dissolution on the front page edged with black. A two days' strike of the business houses followed, and the notables of Haifa and Jerusalem supported the movement.

The first Arab Syrian Congress met in Paris on June 18th, 1913. It was summoned by pro-French Syrians resident in Paris, Shekri Ganem and the Mutran brothers. This Congress endeavoured to reach an understanding with the Turks on the basis of certain reforms in Syria. But the Press in Syria continued to conduct an energetic campaign against the Turkish assimilation of the country. Pre-eminent among the Syrian papers was *Muktabas*, edited by Mohammed Kurd Ali in Damascus, which appeared first as a monthly and later as a daily as well. The Syrian movement was also supported by the Arabic Press in North and South America, with its great daily *Al Hoda*, established in 1898.

At the same time the nationalist movement began to assume a more definite form among the Arab princes of the peninsula. At that time there did not seem to be any certainty that the Wahabis would become the centre of the new movement, as had happened a century earlier. But the Wahabi movement had in fact stepped into the heritage of Mohammed in its monotheistic Puritanism and its national aspiration to unify and elevate the Arabian people; it soon proved to be inspired by a resolute determination, and possess the power to override tribal interests and establish unity in the Arabian peninsula.

There were two principalities in Central Arabia during the second half of the nineteenth century, both risen from the collapse of the first era of Wahabi greatness; these were

the Emirate of Nejd, where the original Wahabi dynasty of the Ibn Sauds ruled in the capital of Riyadh, and further north, the Emirate of Jebel Shammar with its capital of Hail ruled by the house of Ibn Reshid. These two principalities and their rulers were perpetually at war, and towards the end of the nineteenth century the Emirs of Jebel Shammar had gained the upper hand. Mohammed Ibn Reshid had succeeded in securing the hegemony of all Central Arabia, and the Ibn Saud dynasty was forced to live in exile in Kuwait. At the beginning of the twentieth century Abdul Asis ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Feisal Es Saud, a scion of a younger branch of the former Wahabi dynasty, succeeded in capturing the city of Riyadh by a bold surprise attack. That is the starting-point of the history of the new Wahabi movement, involving at the same time that of Arab nationalism in the peninsula. Abdul Asis III, commonly called simply Ibn Saud, who was quite young at the beginning of his reign, made war upon Ibn Reshid and continually extended his realm. In 1910 he founded the Ahvan or Brotherhood movement, which was inspired by religious zeal and stood for a rebirth of the original Wahabi movement; it aimed at reforming every department of Arabian life, awakening the consciousness of Arab unity, stamping out the old tribal feuds, and uniting the nomads in a higher form of State organisation, whilst attempting to induce them to settle. For a short time the Ahvan movement made remarkable progress and gave a loftier sanction to the wars of the Emir of Nejd. In May, 1913, Ibn Saud conquered the Turkish province of El Hasa on the Persian Gulf and secured direct access to the sea. In this way he came into closer touch with British policy, which had long ago brought the various Arab princes on the Persian Gulf into alliance with Great Britain or under her protection. Ibn Saud gained control of the trade routes from the coast to the interior and secured a regular revenue from harbour dues. A. Musil has depicted the new leader as follows: "Abdul Asis Ibn Saud, who rules in the name of his father, Abdul Rahman, born in 1850, is nearly fifty, fairly well educated, very well read, exceptionally honest in his intentions, energetic, pious, and a lover of freedom. He is very modest in his demeanour, unassuming, genial, and very generous to others. He is the strongest

character in the peninsula to-day. He came back to Riyadh from exile with a handful of trusty followers; he had only to stamp his foot and whole bands of warriors sprang from the earth; he has already captured land fifteen hundred kilometres in length, established order and peace, and so won the confidence and even the affection of his subjects. Happy are his friends, but woe to his enemies, say the Arabs."

But the determination to win independence stirred in other parts of Arabia besides Nejd. There was perpetual fighting in Yemen and Assir, nominally under Turkish sovereignty, and the Sherif of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali, began about this time to dream of the possibility of independence. The construction of the Hejaz railway, which had been carried as far as Medīna, seemed to bind all these Arab tribes and principalities, hitherto semi-independent, more closely to the Turkish Empire. In 1913 the leaders of Syrian nationalism entered into negotiations with the Sherif, who sent envoys to Lord Kitchener in Egypt to treat for British support; but Great Britain's relations with Turkey were then friendly, and the discussions were fruitless. That same year preparations were made for a congress of Arab princes and tribes at Kuwait in the autumn of 1914. Talib Bey from Basra had originated the idea. The Emirs and Sheikhs of Nejd, Jebel Shammar, Kuwait, and Mohammerah were to take part in the congress, besides others including representatives of the great South Mesopotamian federation of Muntafik tribes.

From the outset Arab nationalism aimed at uniting all the tribes of Arabia. The first proclamation of the Arab National Committee in 1905 declared: "The Turks dominate the Arab, only by dividing them on insignificant questions of ceremonial and religion; but the Arabs have recovered consciousness of their national, historical, and racial unity and desire to detach themselves from the worm-eaten tree of Othman and to unite as an independent State. This new Arabia will extend as far as its natural frontiers, from the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates to the Straits of Suez, from the Mediterranean Sea to Oman. It will be a constitutional, liberal monarchy under an Arab Sultan. The present vilayet of Hejaz will form an independent State with the Medina district, and its ruler will likewise be the religious Caliph of all Mohammedans. . . . Our land is the richest and fairest on

all the earth, yet now it is a barren desert. When we were free we subdued the East and the West in less than a hundred years, we carried learning and culture and the arts to all lands and dominated the world's civilisation for several centuries. But to-day every one of us may see how cheap and contemptible the glorious and far-famed name of Arab is held by the Turks and all foreign peoples. Under the yoke of barbarians we have fallen to such depths of misery and ignorance, as all may see. . . ."

The Arabs' national programme, therefore, was drawn up a whole decade before the World War; it comprised a federal union of Arab countries, the return of the Caliphate to the land of its origin, and the romantic restoration of Damascus and Baghdad to their ancient glory. The World War was to bring these aspirations within sight of realisation. At the same time Arabia became the centre of interest in world politics. It had always been important as a land of transit for the traffic between India and the Mediterranean countries. It still retains that character. It is the extreme outpost covering the road from Europe to India by sea and land and air. That is why the British Empire strove to draw Arabia into its sphere of influence in the nineteenth century. A British route from Egypt through Arabia to the Persian Gulf was to provide quick communication with India, and to be safe from Russian or German attack on the north on account of its southerly position. The route was protected on the flank by the island of Cyprus at the point where attacks from the north were most likely to threaten it.

During the past decade there have been two schools of British policy in Arabia, the Anglo-Indian and the Anglo-Egyptian. The Anglo-Indian school was represented by Indian civil servants and aimed at penetrating Arabia from the Persian Gulf and Aden. Aden and the British protectorate on the Persian Gulf have always fallen within the competence of the Indian Government, not of London directly. This school has always regarded the occupation of at least Southern Mesopotamia with Basra as completing the conquest of the Persian Gulf, and as a means of affording better protection to the rich Persian oil-fields which belonged to an English concern. During the war the Anglo-Indian school in Central Arabia supported the Wahabi Emir as their candidate. The

British representative in Kuwait, Captain Shakespeare, fell beside Ibn Saud in 1915 fighting the Emir of Jebel Shammar, who sided with the Turks in the World War. The British Resident on the Persian Gulf, Sir Percy Cox, concluded a treaty of friendship with Ibn Saud in 1916. The following year Philby was instructed by the British Government to visit Ibn Saud in his capital. Later he endeavoured, though without success, to bring about a reconciliation and understanding between Ibn Saud and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, who meanwhile had entered into negotiations with the Anglo-Egyptian school of British-Arabian policy and had also become England's ally.

The Anglo-Egyptian school conducted operations from Egypt and adopted the aim of all Egyptian Governments from the earliest times, that of making the Red Sea an Egyptian inland sea—which in this case meant an English sea—and conquering Syria. In this way Islam's three most sacred places, Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, would come into English possession. Hence the Anglo-Egyptian school had been in communication with Hussein since 1915. Most active in this direction was Thomas E. Lawrence, who had been attached to the Arabian Bureau in Cairo since 1916; when Winston Churchill became Colonial Secretary in March, 1921, Lawrence was appointed Adviser on Middle Eastern questions. Churchill planned the creation of a great Middle Eastern Empire, stretching from Egypt across Arabia and Persia to India, which was to be made secure by the occupation of Constantinople and the subjection of Turkey, and was likewise to form a bulwark against revolutionary Russia. At the same time matters affecting the British sphere of influence on the Persian Gulf and the district of Aden were to be placed under the political control of the Middle Eastern Department of the Colonial Office in London and withdrawn from that of the Indian Government. A tendency arose to draw upon the Sudan Civil Service for officials in these territories. When the Sherif dynasty fell in 1924-25 the reconciliation already effected between the Anglo-Indian and Anglo-Egyptian schools became fully operative.

The war and the ideals of national self-determination and the liberation of small nations proclaimed by the Allied Powers exercised great influence in Arabia. On all sides



MAP XIII.—THE STATES OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA.

others were made a vain interference. A number of leading Turkish notables were arrested by the Turks in Syria and in Baghdad. At the same time the Allies began to formulate plans about their intention of securing Arabian territories, and attempts were made to set limits to their real claims in these regions. For Great Britain it was important to hold the line of communication between Egypt, which she had now captured, through E. Syria to Kuwait, with Haifa as a Mediterranean port, or Cyprus to possess Syria, which was recognized by the Allies as French propaganda as long as the French occupation, in particular by the *Correspondance Orientale*, edited by Georges Sauton and Shékri Ganem. A letter from an inhabitant of Beirut which appeared in the *Journal de Paris* in August 1914, points to the development of Arab national sentiment in Syria. "There is no frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia, nor any distinction of race, there is only one Arab people. Religious beliefs may vary, but without the permission of Turkish Governors they shall never give rise to conflicts. The Arab people have groaned for centuries under the Turkish yoke. Numbers of our children have died abroad so as to live in freedom, but they have cherished in their hearts the love of their country and the wish to see it emancipated. The situation that you are going to see changed our minds and defined our hopes. What we have heard from you we have presented afresh in our new Arab movement. A people great in virtue of its just hopes to be so greater in the future. Since the war broke out we have said that its object is to make all peoples independent. We dreamed with you. We hoped that we might see, might win freedom. But how bitter has been our awakening. We are France, for so we stand for freedom. We shall nurse her as we nurse Turkey, if she helps to assist us once more, and her yoke will be harder for us to bear than Turkey's for we shall no longer form a single whole under one master, we shall become an Asiatic Frank. As the years go by the French schools will raise our national and intellectual standards and we shall become increasingly conscious of our position. Some day we shall see, supported by the might of our shamblering on the upland plateau of Lebanon, dawn the longed-for day when the Arabian Empire shall awake."

Meanwhile negotiations were proceeding between Great Britain and the Grand Sherif of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali. Even in 1915 British airmen had scattered proclamations upon Jidda telling the inhabitants of the Arab provinces that the English Government would include in the terms of peace the provision that the Arabian peninsula and the Holy Places within its bounds should be independent, and that not a hand's breadth of those provinces should be added to the possessions of Britain or any other Power. During the negotiations Hussein was offered the prospect of constituting a united Arab kingdom. In June, 1916, he declared war on the Turks and had himself proclaimed King of Arabia. In a proclamation of June 9th, 1916, addressed to all Mohammedans, he sought to explain the reasons for his revolt against the Sultan-Caliph by the fact that the real rulers in Turkey were the atheistic and anti-Mohammedan leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. "Our countrymen have made it their aim and their guiding principle to serve Islam and to spare no efforts to raise the prestige of Mohammedans, basing their actions upon the Sacred Law; nevertheless, the country is ready for modern development of every kind that accords with the principles and laws of religion." In spite of this the general opinion in the Islamic world was that Hussein's revolt, by weakening Turkey, betrayed the cause of Islam. The English regarded Hussein as a suitable ally. He sprang from the house of Kuraish, to which Mohammed had also belonged and to which in the opinion of most Mohammedan theologians, the Caliph ought to belong. For centuries Mecca had been in possession of his dynasty; Mecca was the most sacred of all cities, and the office of Caliph is inextricably bound up with its possession and protection. Hussein was a romanticist, a scholar of classic Arabic and its literature, a writer himself, and actual editor of his official organ *Al Kibla*. He dreamed of an Arab kingdom restored to life under an Arab Caliph who would likewise be the central figure of the whole Mohammedan world. His sons had for the most part been educated in Constantinople and had come in contact with modern European thought. He himself was a patriarchal autocrat who tried to rule his country in accordance with traditional Eastern custom, and this was one of the principal causes of his subsequent fall. Another was his

tendency to overrate his own personality and power, which brought him into open conflict with Ibn Saud. Not only did Ibn Saud, following the Wahabi tradition, regard Mecca as just such a centre of profanation as Rome was to the early Protestants, but he also regarded Hussein as a rival for the hegemony of Arabia. Hussein sent one of his sons to Nejd to seek an agreement, but the effort failed.

On November 4th, 1916, Hussein had himself crowned King of Arabia. His official organ reported: "This day is a great festival for the Arabs, who have succeeded in restoring their ancient fame and their ancient kingdom. We now see at the head of the Arab kingdom the oldest reigning house in the whole world, acknowledging no superior but God and no banner but the Arabian flag." At this ceremony Syrians were represented under the leadership of Sami el Bakris. France, too, recognised the new King; a deputation of Mohammedan leaders from French Northern Africa came to salute him, and *L'Orient Arabe*, edited in Paris by Ibrahim S. Naggiar, supported his interests. The new King, in addressing himself to the Arabian people, emphasised the bond of nationality which united the whole people in spite of all religious differences: "This deed of ours has pointed the way to our Christian and Mohammedan fellow-countrymen. In our home policy we shall follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, at the same time deriving inspiration from European institutions and modern Western civilisation, and from everything calculated to raise us to the intellectual level of modern nations. Herein we need the help of all Arabs. Neither our religion nor our traditions forbid us to enlist the services of our non-Mohammedan brothers, who enjoy equal rights with ourselves in our new Government. All are equal before the law." But in December, 1916, Hussein found himself compelled to assume the title of King of the Hejaz instead of King of the Arabs. At this juncture he had made himself ruler of the whole area of the Hejaz except Medina. Arab divisions led by his son Feisal fought with the Allied armies which were pushing forward into Palestine under General Allenby.

The year 1917 determined the fortunes of war in Turkey's Arab provinces. In March, 1917, the English captured Baghdad. The commanding British General issued a procla-

mation after the capture of the town, saying: "But you people of Baghdad . . . are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realised and that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish, enjoying their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. . . . It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the great Powers allied to Great Britain that the noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the hope and desire of the British people and the nations in alliance with them that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown among the peoples of the earth, and that it shall bind itself together to this end in unity and concord."¹ The proclamation ended by inviting the Arabs of Baghdad to organise their government in collaboration with England's political representative and to accomplish their union with those of their own kin, thus fulfilling the aspirations of the race. On December 9th, 1917, General Allenby entered Jerusalem. The Crusaders' goal was attained: Jerusalem was once again in the possession of Christian Powers. Baghdad, and even Mecca, were under British influence. And whilst this was happening the Allies' promises were holding out to the Arabs the prospect of a new and independent future. Even in 1918, on November 8th, the Anglo-French declaration expressly promised "the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national Governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations." And yet the agreement concluded in 1916 between Sir Mark Sykes on behalf of England and Picot on behalf of France was still binding, and provided that Mesopotamia from Basra to a line north of Baghdad and Haifa was to come under direct British administration, and Lebanon with the Syrian coast and Cilicia under direct French administration, whilst the country between Palestine and Mesopotamia on one side and Syria with Damascus and Aleppo on the other,

¹ *The King of the Hedjaz and Arab Independence.* Hayman, Christy, and Lilly, London, 1907, p. 14.

was to be occupied by independent Arab States under British or French influence. Palestine itself was to be placed under international control. In November, 1917, the British Government promised in a memorandum of the Foreign Secretary, Balfour, that a national home for the Jews should be established in Palestine, without prejudice to the civic and religious rights of the non-Jewish population. The other Allied Governments announced their acceptance of this declaration.

All these contradictory aspirations and tendencies had to be adjusted after the end of the World War. It was only in Damascus that an attempt was made to establish a modern, independent Arab State. On October 1st, 1918, Feisal entered Damascus at the head of his Arab troops. One of his generals, Shukri Pasha el Ayubi, tried to hold Beirut also, but failed, and was compelled by the French to withdraw, as were also the Shereefian officials already exercising authority in Alexandretta. The head of Feisal's Government was a former Turkish general, Ali Riza Pasha Rikabi, who was also President of the *Nadi el Arab*, a society that aimed at the independence of all lands inhabited by Arabs.

Feisal, the son of the King of the Hejaz, came from a country where the Bedouins predominate and where there is no contact with European thought or modern ways; and now he was to rule the most advanced part of Arabia. It seemed that King Hussein's plans for the union of all Arabia under his dynasty were well on the way to their accomplishment, and that English promises to Hussein were to be fulfilled. Feisal knew the Syrians well, for at the beginning of the war he had lived in Damascus as an officer of Jemal Pasha's staff. He understood how to win the sympathies of the influential families by promising them complete Syrian independence. "In most Islamic countries public opinion is formed exclusively by the heads of powerful families, whose sole endeavour is to protect their own interests through the officials or those who wish to become officials," writes Philippe David. These great families still exercise almost unrestricted power in Syria and Mesopotamia. In Egypt Zaghlul Pasha's struggle and that of the rising class which he led strove to break the power of this oligarchy; later in Syria General Sarraïl made the first, unsuccessful efforts in that direction; in Palestine the peasantry and the small towns

formed the Peasants' Party and the National Party, influenced to some extent by the democratic ideas which the Jewish immigrants brought with them, and tried to destroy the domination of the great families in Jerusalem who alone had represented the people hitherto. Feisal adopted the wise policy of appointing only Syrian civil servants and officers and succeeded in winning the population to his support; they regarded him as the liberator of an oppressed people. A Ministry, a State Council, and a Supreme Court were constituted of Syrian personnel. Feisal issued a decree on the administration of the country on November 6th, 1918, by which the Governor-General was to be appointed by the Sherif of Mecca or his deputy, Feisal, and a State Council of fifteen was to be established.

In February, 1919, Feisal was received by the Council of Ten at Versailles as the representative of the Hejaz. In accordance with the agreement between his father and Great Britain, he advocated a federation of all Arab territories. The Paris Comité Central Syrien, led by Shekri Ganem and Georges Samné, however, demanded the total separation of Syria from the Hejaz, and French protection for the new State. At this juncture the people of Damascus resolved in a great meeting to declare for Feisal, and they telegraphed to him: "The inhabitants of the territories which you, with the help of the Allies, have freed from enslavement, appoint you as their plenipotentiary at the Peace Conference, in order that you may make known their desire and hope for absolute independence." Christian delegations from Lebanon which made their appearance at Versailles at the same time advocated a French mandate. The Peace Conference thereupon decided to send a commission to Syria to discover the wishes of the population. But the English and French promptly refused to be represented on it, so that in the end it was a purely American commission, headed by Crane and King, that went to Syria.

Early in May, 1919, Feisal returned to Syria in order to assuage Syrian fears of a too close administrative union with the Hejaz. He declared in a speech: "Although Syria, the Hejaz, and Iraq are Arab countries, there can be no question of welding them together in a unitary State controlled by a centralised government. These countries have not all attained

the same standard of civilisation. Syria and Iraq, therefore, must be independent." As regards the possibility of a mandate, he said: "We shall never barter our independence. The Syrian nation will pay the full price for the European help that we shall need at first." At the same time he announced the calling of a Syrian National Congress to work out a constitution. Elections were announced, but they were not permitted in Lebanon, the coastal strip occupied by the French, or in Palestine, which the English occupied. The election was conducted according to the Turkish electoral law, and in such a way that only the second-grade voters of the last Turkish election in 1913 exercised the franchise. On June 20th, 1919, the Congress met in Damascus and proclaimed itself as the legally accredited representative body for all Syria. Its first session lasted five months. On July 2nd it presented a statement to the American Commission of Inquiry regarding Syria's wishes, which declared: "We, the undersigned members of the General Syrian Congress . . . provided with credentials and authorisations by the inhabitants of our various districts, Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have agreed upon the following statement of the desires of the people of the country who have elected us to present them to the American Section of the International Commission. . . . (1) We ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria within these boundaries: The Taurus System on the north; Rafeh and a line running from Al-Juf to the south of the Syrian and the Hejazian line to Akaba on the south; the Euphrates and Kabur rivers and a line extending east of Abu Kamal to the east of Al-Juf on the east; and the Mediterranean on the West. (2) We ask that the Government of this Syrian country should be a democratic civil constitutional Monarchy on broad decentralisation principles, safeguarding the rights of minorities, and that the King be the Emir Feisal, who carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation and merited our full confidence and entire reliance. (3) Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the Syrian area are not naturally less gifted than other more advanced races and that they are by no means less developed than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Roumanians at the beginning of their independence, we protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,

placing us among the nations in their middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory power. (4) In the event of the rejection by the Peace Conference of this just protest for certain considerations that we may not understand, we, relying on the declarations of President Wilson that his object in waging war was to put an end to the ambition of conquest and colonisation, can only regard the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our complete independence. And desiring that our country should not fall a prey to colonisation and believing that the American nation is farthest from any thought of colonisation, and has no political ambition in our country, we will seek the technical and economic assistance from the United States of America, provided that such assistance does not exceed twenty years. (5) In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our desire for assistance, we will seek this assistance from Great Britain, also provided that such assistance does not infringe the complete independence and unity of our country, and that the duration of such assistance does not exceed that mentioned in the previous article. (6) We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government in any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist us or have a hand in our country under any circumstances and in any place. (7) We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish Commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title, but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities. (8) We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, nor of the littoral western zone, which includes Lebanon, from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be guaranteed. . . . (9) We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia and that there should be no economical barriers between the two countries."¹

¹ *First Publication of King-Crane Report on the Near East.* Editor and Publisher. New York, December 2nd, 1922, p. 7.

When Feisal returned to Europe in the autumn he appointed his brother Said to represent him. He himself had meanwhile gained a clearer insight into the realities of European politics, and he deplored the intransigent attitude of the Congress and the Syrians. He recognised the necessity of an agreement with the French and therefore adjourned the Congress on December 1st, 1919. At that time Damascus was in actual fact independent. After the Lloyd George-Clemenceau treaty of September 15th, 1919, the British troops had been withdrawn from Syria, and the coastal regions were occupied by the French, the interior exclusively by the Arabs. In December, 1919, universal military service was introduced there, and in January Feisal enlarged his Council of Ministers, and appointed himself President with his brother as deputy. After his return in the winter of 1920 the Syrians turned against him indignantly for his compliant attitude towards the Allies' demands. The Committee of National Defence in particular urged Feisal with increasing vehemence to adopt a bluntly negative attitude towards France and to preserve the full independence of the Syrians.

On March 6th the Syrian Congress was reopened under the presidency of Abdul Rahman el Yussuf. All speakers demanded complete independence and the establishment of a kingdom. On March 8th Feisal I assumed the title of King of Syria. The military administration was abolished and a Ministry appointed under Ali Ridha Rikabi. The Congress proceeded to draft a constitution, which was promulgated on July 3rd. This constitution was in accord with the most modern democratic principles; it consisted of 148 articles, once more proclaimed the land to be an indivisible whole, and postponed the drawing of frontiers of the separate federal States for subsequent agreement. The capital of the Syro-Arab Kingdom, as it is officially named, is Damascus, the State religion is Islam, the official language is Arabic. The King must belong to the house of Hussein. The supreme legislative authority, which is superior even to the King according to the whole constitution, is a Parliament consisting of two Chambers. If a law is twice passed by Parliament, the King cannot refuse his consent to it. In case of a conflict between the two Chambers, the Lower House prevails if its decision is reached by a two-thirds majority. Two-thirds of

the Senators are elected for nine years, a third of them being re-elected every three years. The Lower House is elected for four years by indirect suffrage, and every citizen over twenty enjoys the active suffrage in the first ballot. In the second, electors must be twenty-five, and able to read and write. The Ministry is responsible to the Lower House. Every province has also its own Parliament.

This constitution was never put into effect. Shortly after its promulgation the Kingdom of Damascus ceased to exist. At the Allied Conference of San Remo in April, 1920, France was accorded the mandate for all Syria with the exception of Palestine. In July the French High Commissioner, General Gouraud, presented an ultimatum demanding Feisal's recognition of the mandate. Feisal was ready to consent. But the Congress refused, and the French troops took aggressive action. On July 25th Damascus was occupied and King Feisal took flight.

This meant that a French occupation of the whole of Syria was a *fait accompli*. According to the statement of the American Commission the whole population of Syria except some of the Lebanese Christians had openly declared against a French mandate, and gave preference, if a mandate were inevitable, to the United States or Great Britain. Similar declarations were made by the Beirut Town Council, the Lebanese Mohammedans, the Syrian Protestants, and the notables of Jerusalem. The methods adopted by the French administration were not calculated to lessen the popular opposition to the mandatory Power; in consequence Syria was the first of the three mandated territories in the north and east of the Arabian peninsula where popular discontent broke out in an armed struggle of long duration.

The error of the French Government was that of all autocracies: it failed to take into account the changes in Syrian popular mentality. Before the war the French could boast that their vigorous school propaganda and consular activities in Syria gave them an accurate knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, but after the war, when the long cherished desire was fulfilled to transform cultural into political dependence, they made the mistake of ignoring the change produced by a new epoch in the outlook of the various Syrian sects and religions, hitherto rigidly divided from one another.

Almost up to the outbreak of the war each sect and each religion had regarded the rest with hostility; they had formed political groups with jealously guarded autonomy, and been wholly insensible to the common interests of the several groups living in the same country, speaking the same language and for the most part of the same race. Religion was the basis of political divisions. The rise of Syrian national consciousness in recent years was a fact which the French sometimes ignored and sometimes combated. They tried to colonise Syria as they had colonised Algeria or Tunis. They played the various religions off one against another, tried to break up Syrian unity by administrative partitions, and hoped by these methods to destroy Syrian nationalism.

The two first French High Commissioners, General Gouraud and General Weygand, were clerical reactionaries and sought support in the Catholics of Lebanon, ignoring the fact that Christians form only one-fifth of the Syrian population. But the petty military administration failed even to satisfy the Lebanese, who repeatedly declared their desire for independence and in part their agreement with Damascus. Even Georges Samné, who had always advocated a French occupation of Syria and to whom the whole idea of Syrian nationalism was utterly alien, wrote early in 1920 of the French administration in Lebanon: "Unhappily the régime under the French occupation has departed somewhat from the principles (proclaimed by France, of freedom, etc.). The idea of collaboration between the occupying authorities and the Syrians has not yet assumed practical form. At the moment when France's adversary Feisal has learned to take the utmost advantage of Syrian nationalism, the Republic seems to pursue the policy of neglecting these moral forces; yet without them nothing stable and secure can be established in Syria. In spite of themselves, the Syrians (he means the Lebanese) compare the English methods which they feared, with French policy, which they see before their eyes. The apparent hostility of Damascus (to France) is the result of what they observe. That great city looks to Beirut (where the French are) and to Jerusalem (occupied by the English). In Palestine the English have organised a system of collaboration; we know that we cannot trust it very far, but after all, the results are before our eyes. Already collaboration

between the protecting Power and the native population has become a practical fact in daily life, and the inhabitants feel that they are treated as genuine citizens. Moreover, the British Government has given a vigorous impetus to economic organisation. . . . In the policy of the French Government there is an element of error that it is important to mark: France thinks herself a realist, but she is not and cannot be, for she forgets the soul. She influences the body, not the mind, and she does not attach enough importance to imponderabilia. England and Feisal, like France, appear in arms, but they seek support primarily in moral forces. . . ."

The Conseil Administratif of Lebanon, which had twice asked for a French mandate, passed a resolution in November, 1919, after General Gouraud's arrival, vigorously demanding redress from the arbitrary French military administration and pointing out that Lebanon had enjoyed more freedom under the Turks. On July 10th, 1920, seven of the twelve members of the Conseil Administratif demanded complete independence for Lebanon and an alliance between Lebanon and the rest of Syria. They were about to seek out Feisal in Damascus when the French arrested and banished them, dissolved the Conseil Administratif, and replaced it by a Council appointed by General Gouraud. On September 1st, 1920, the "State" of Great Lebanon was created, embracing, in addition to the original Lebanon that had been autonomous under the Turks, the coastal districts of Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli, besides Beqa and Baalbek, fertile regions inhabited principally by Mohammedans.

A French officer was made Governor, and French advisers were attached to the Lebanese officials and retained in their own hands the whole power of initiative. Four additional States were created in Syria: Damascus, Aleppo, Jebel ed Druz in Hauran, and the State of the Alawis by the sea north of Lebanon. In all these territories a show was made of installing native officials, but only in so far as they submitted willingly to the French administration.

Syria remained in this condition, in spite of sectional revolts of the inhabitants, till near the end of 1924. The French were obliged to maintain a large military force in the country. One of the most serious grounds of opposition to

the French mandate was the fact that the mandatory Government did nothing to increase the prosperity of the country, but rather showed bias in promoting French trade interests and capturing its trade. An additional factor making for an economic crisis in Syria was the introduction of depreciated French paper money; it is significant that this was one of the conditions contained in the French ultimatum to Feisal. The French made no serious efforts to promote native trade and manufactures; on the contrary, the tendencies which dominate all French colonial policy became more and more marked: to assimilate the native peoples to French civilisation and to make French the sole official language. No respect was paid to the people's wishes for self-government, a constitution, and the appointment of Syrians to the higher Government posts. One of the differences between French and English methods of colonisation is that, whilst Great Britain as a rule sends her ablest and most competent men to the colonies, gifted Frenchmen prefer to stay at home; hence the quality of French colonial administrators and officers is not high.

All these causes united to produce the Syrian national rising in 1925. At the end of 1924 General Weygand had been replaced by General Sarrail as High Commissioner. Sarrail's liberal and anti-clerical policy differed sharply from that of his predecessors, but he, too, made the mistake of treating Syria as a French colony, like Algeria, and forgetting that in the intervening years the East had undergone a great and decisive transformation. Sarrail tried to conciliate the Mohammedans; the States of Damascus and Aleppo were united in one Syrian State, but there was no extension of internal autonomy. A general political amnesty was declared. At the same time Sarrail made it his aim to prepare for a further development of democracy by attempting to break the power of the great families. But such an attempt was doomed to failure, because of his over-hasty methods which paid too little heed to the psychology of the inhabitants. Carbillet, the Governor of Jebel ed Druz in Hauran, tried to break the power of the great families in his province where life still wore a wholly feudal aspect and the Druzes, numbering some sixty thousand, gladly submitted to the guidance of these families, especially the Atrash. He pursued his

aim by methods that he had learnt in the colonial administration of Central Africa, and so offended not only the Atrash but also the proud and freedom-loving Druzes. By the treaty of 1921 the Governor of Jebel ed Druz was to be a Druze chosen once in four years by the people. After the death of the first Governor, an Atrash, this arrangement was not adhered to and a French officer was appointed Governor. Sarrail refused to receive a delegation of Druze notables which desired to complain to him of Carbillet and demand the appointment of a Druze Governor; the members of the deputation were threatened with arrest. Thereupon the Druzes in Hauran rose in revolt in the summer of 1925, led by Sultan Pasha el Atrash.

Druze risings were not uncommon. They had managed even under the Turks to insist upon what practically amounted to self-government and immunity from military service. They had no sentiment of solidarity with other Syrians. They regarded Mohammedans and Christians with equal aloofness. Yet now it was the Druzes of all others who started the Syrian national revolt. No other fact bears such striking witness to the change taking place in the Hither East and the growing consciousness of Syrian unity. In spite of French efforts to represent the rising as a local revolt of the primitive and always turbulent Hauran Druzes, it is clear that, both in the intention of the Druze leaders and in the minds of the other inhabitants of Syria, this rebellion was to be the first step in a national rising embracing the whole people, with an independent Syrian national State as its goal. Sultan Pasha and his brother Said who commanded the Syrian national army in the south which made the attack on Lebanon, announced the national aim of the struggle in a series of proclamations. They met with support among the intelligentsia and the notables of the larger Mohammedan towns and the villages, so that the local rebellion soon swelled to the dimensions of a serious war. For months French propaganda endeavoured to conceal the national character of the struggle, referring to local gangs of bandits. They even went a step further; they armed the Christians of Lebanon and the neighbouring districts and called upon them to fight against the Mohammedans and the Druzes. They played the ancient and dangerous game of reviving the

religious hatred and hostility which national sentiment had only just appeased.

At the end of six months' fighting, the whole of Syria except Lebanon was in the rebels' hands. Even the large towns were repeatedly threatened. Damascus was occupied by the rebels for three days in November, 1925. The French only recovered the town after bombarding it for days and partially destroying it. It is worthy of note that it was the Mohammedan notables who protected and saved the Christian quarter, which the French abandoned during the bombardment. The methods adopted by the French in their efforts to suppress the rising, and their acts of pillage, drove more and more of the people to form armies of national liberation led by notables of Damascus and former Turkish officers of high rank. The People's Party in Damascus, whose leader, Dr. Abdul Rahman Shahbender, had taken refuge with the Druzes, openly supported the rebel aims. In December, 1925, General Sarraill was recalled and a new High Commissioner, de Jouvenal, was sent to conclude peace and make concessions to the nationalist demands. A group of Damascus notables of all parties and religious confessions was formed to negotiate with de Jouvenal; they offered to take office as a Syrian Government and to conclude peace on condition that a National Constituent Assembly should be summoned, that full autonomy under a Syrian Ministry should be conceded, and that their relation to France and the League of Nations should be the same as that of Iraq to Great Britain. The Nationalists further demanded the inclusion of the State of the Alawis in the Syrian State, the return of certain parts of Great Lebanon so as to give access to the sea, and the introduction of a gold currency.

Jouvenal, like his predecessors, failed to conciliate the Syrians and was replaced by Ponsot as High Commissioner. In May, 1926, the State of Great Lebanon was proclaimed a republic, with a President, Ministry, and Parliament; but behind this facade French influence remained unimpaired. This tiny State was inhabited by Maronites, Greek Orthodox believers, Greek Catholics, Sunnites, Shiites, and Druzes; all expected consideration in the apportionment of offices, and the State was too small to develop prosperously. Its non-Christian inhabitants demanded union with the rest of

Syria. There the revolt had died down in the summer of 1927 in consequence of the numerical and technical superiority of the French troops and the people's economic exhaustion. The French mandatory Government thus found itself faced with the task of respecting Syrian national sentiment and solving the problem of Lebanon and Syria.

Palestine stands quite alone among the surrounding countries both in international law and in its historic destiny. Its peculiar character is both national and religious. Palestine is *the* Holy Land of Judaism and Christianity, and one of the Holy Lands of Islam. Every inch of it is filled with historic memories that appeal to the principal traditions of the peoples of Europe, America, and Hither Asia. It is the homeland of the Jewish people, and in its confines they passed the most historically important creative period of their development. Through all the centuries of the Diaspora the Jews have felt their national life to be indissolubly bound up with Palestine. The historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine has never been severed. It has always remained an inseparable part of their spiritual treasure. Jews have always settled in Palestine and have felt it to be a national and religious duty. Under the influence of European nineteenth-century nationalism, their age-long yearning assumed the form of a modern political nationalist movement. Its history is part of the history of European nationalism. Perhaps wrongly, it has been called the youngest child of European nationalism.

Long before the World War groups of Jews began to return to their ancient homeland and to settle in the villages and towns they built there. The Zionist movement marks a new epoch in the many thousand years of Jewish history. It attained external form and organisation in 1897 under the leadership of Theodor Herzl. At the first Zionist Congress in Basle its aim was declared to be to create for "the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law." For the first time in two thousand years Jewry was united in a single great enterprise; the many sections of a scattered people exerted their energies together towards a uniform goal. The Jewish question was propounded to civilised public opinion in all lands as a world problem. The Zionist movement is of far wider importance than what was built up in Palestine

under its influence. During the past thirty years all sections and classes of the Jewish people have entered into a new relation with Judaism, and what seemed long dead has risen to new life. A new Jewish literature has sprung up, not only in Hebrew and Yiddish, which have received an immense impetus in recent decades, but in almost every language spoken by any section of the Jewish people. Jewish plastic art and Jewish music have a distinctive character to-day, different from the generality of man's creative work.

The influence of Zionism upon the development of nationalism in the East and upon the destiny of that Eastern country with which Jewry feels itself indissolubly united properly belongs to the subject of this book. The Zionist movement directed its activities towards Palestine as the ancient homeland of the Jews, which alone could offer security for the evolution of Jewish culture. In 1917, twenty years after the first Basle Congress, the British Government, in accord with the programme put forward in 1897, declared that it "viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." Zionist aspirations received public recognition in the special form given to the League mandate for Palestine. It is distinguished from the other mandates by its twofold aim. Like all other mandates under Article 22 of the League Covenant, it is to train the people of Palestine, now predominantly Arab, for complete self-government. But in addition, perhaps primarily, it is to serve the purpose of establishing a national home for the Jews, whose historic association with Palestine is recognised in the mandate, but of whom the great majority still live outside the confines of Palestine. The mandatory Power in Palestine, therefore, exercises the mandate not only in the interest of the inhabitants, as in all other cases, but as representative of a people who cannot live an independent life because of their unique condition of geographical dispersion, and who must, therefore, acquire a national centre. The conception of a national home is new in international law. The term was first used in the Balfour Declaration made by the British Government in 1917, but no more precise definition of a national home was given. A more accurate interpretation is laid down in the British White Book of June 3rd, 1922. The passage runs as follows:

“Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become ‘as Jewish as England is English.’ His Majesty’s Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language, or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to (the Balfour Declaration) do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine.”

“When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not of sufferance.”

This statement is of decisive importance, not only as the interpretation adopted by the British Government, but primarily because the Zionist Organisation, as the representative of the Jewish people, has officially declared its intention of basing its activities upon these principles; “the activities of the Zionist Organisation will be conducted in conformity with the policy therein set forth.”

This interpretation, as it affects the Jewish people, rests on the principle that the Jewish national home is to be built up side by side with the national home of the Arabs dwelling in Palestine. But what differentiates the Jewish population from the Arabs in Palestine, though both enjoy equal rights, is the fact that the whole Jewish people, and not only the existing Jewish community in the country, are to enjoy full opportunities of establishing the national home in Palestine;

thus Palestine is the national home of Jewry as a whole, not only of those Jews who live in the country, whilst for the Arabs it is the home of those alone who actually live there. When the Balfour Declaration was drafted the formula chosen was "a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine," and not, as some proposed, "the re-establishment of Palestine as a national home of the Jewish people"; and the words actually chosen are in accordance with the Zionist Basle programme. The policy pursued in Palestine is based upon this principle, and it is along these lines that the twofold mission of the mandate is to be accomplished.

Dr. Stoyanovsky, a Zionist student of the mandate for Palestine and its international implications, has written of the ultimate goal of Palestine's political development: "No more is it possible to foresee the ultimate form of independence, in which the Palestine mandate will result; but in so far as inference may be drawn from the general tendency of the development which is actually taking place, Palestine seems to be growing into a bi-national State, with the Arab and Jewish communities as its two national elements. Some doubts have been—and to a certain extent still are—entertained as to whether this was the original intention of the authors of the mandate. Thus it has been maintained that the Mandatory's obligation is to make Palestine into a State with only one national element and—as a concession to the facts of the situation on the one hand and to new international ideas on the other—a 'minority' whose protection should be internationally guaranteed. Opinions as to what part of the population of Palestine should constitute the national element of the State and what part the protected minority not unnaturally depend on the national or racial allegiance and sympathies of those who adopt this view. The Mandatory's interpretation of the ultimate purpose of the mandate, however, seems to be quite different, and in this he has the full support of the Permanent Mandates Commission, whose beneficial and moderating influence, although not always apparent, is nevertheless largely determining."

The actual facts, moreover, point to the likelihood of Palestine becoming a community in which two peoples will live side by side, enjoying absolutely equal rights. To-day both peoples are far from fully recognising this trend of

development, but there is hope that both will become convinced of it, for an understanding between them on that basis is vital and essential to both and to the country's progress. The establishment of such a community on the borderland of East and West, with a national movement originating in Europe working hand in hand with one belonging to the East, would be of great assistance in the endeavour to reach an understanding between East and West, and would influence profoundly the development of nationalist thought and the political and cultural significance of nationalism. Palestine, therefore, might pave the way to a promising solution of the whole complex problem of East and West, through co-operation between the Jewish population, who would assume the rôle of leaders, and the Arabs.

Already a section of the Zionist movement has adopted this point of view whole-heartedly. Dr. Arthur Ruppin, who was for seventeen years director of Zionist settlement in Palestine, formulated the political principles upon which he bases that aim at the fourteenth Zionist Congress in the summer of 1925 in the following words: "Palestine will be a State comprising two nationalities. Each people will consider not only its own vital needs, but those of the other. We have the opportunity of creating a community in which both peoples will work for the good of the country in the enjoyment of absolutely equal rights, without the dominance of one or the oppression of the other."

Palestine, then, will be a bi-racial State, both peoples enjoying completely equal rights, both being factors of equal strength in determining the country's fate, regardless of which race is in the majority. As the rights justly acquired by the Arabs should not be diminished by a hair's breadth, so should recognition be given to the Jews' right to develop unchecked their own national life in the ancient homeland, and to admit the greatest possible number of fellow-Jews to participate in that development. Through the Bible and the Prophets the Jews made Palestine a source of world civilisation, and through all the long ages of dispersion they have never ceased to yearn for Palestine, praying daily for return. Millions of Jews set all their hopes for the future of their people on the establishment of a Jewish national centre in Palestine. It will become a reality only if the Jewish

population in Palestine develops numerically to such an extent that its cultural achievements reach a standard worthy of respect. But the growth of the Jewish population, whether it becomes a majority or not, must never lead to a change in the constitutional position. Both races must enjoy equal rights to all eternity, neither must be master, neither servant.

Jewish immigration into Palestine has brought European economic methods into a country hitherto quite Oriental, and has influenced deeply the economic, social, and political education of the Arab population. It may be regarded as a cultural force powerful to promote the national development of the Palestinian Arabs through the medium of ideas on nationality, democracy, and culture. The economic and social standards of the Arab population have been raised by the application of modern methods in every province of industry and social welfare, and by the formation of workers' associations and trade unions on the best European models. Agricultural colonies form the basis of the Zionist policy of settlement. There can be no possibility of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine, unless it is rooted in the solid groundwork of a peasantry and a class of manual workers. But there are great obstacles to the attainment of such a goal. In the Diaspora the majority of the Jewish people are merchants or professional men, whilst peasants and industrial workers form a tiny minority. In Palestine these are to form the majority, on whose shoulders rests the task of construction. The Zionist Organisation found itself faced with the difficult problem of a complete revolution in the people's occupations. Not only had the immigrants to accustom themselves to a strange country, a strange climate, and unfamiliar customs, not only must they and their children make themselves at home in a new language, but townsmen were to be turned into peasants, and traditions inherited for many generations were to be replaced by training and toil. The task was successfully accomplished, and at the same time every effort was made to respect the principles of social justice throughout. A large number of the new Zionist settlements are on land acquired by the Jewish National Fund as the inalienable property of the whole Jewish people. Parallel with successful agricultural colonisation, urban settlement developed. Jewish immigration has made


Palestine one of the few Oriental countries in which industry has already begun to develop on a considerable scale. The trade union and co-operative movements have attained heights seldom reached even in Europe, especially co-operative-producers' groups, both in agriculture and industry. Thanks to the efforts of the Zionist organisation, public health services and education have been developed to a point unknown elsewhere in the East. Malaria, trachoma, and infant mortality have been successfully combated. Amongst the Palestinian Jews universal schooling has become a fact, whilst it remains an aspiration in other Eastern countries. These Jewish schools are conducted by the most modern methods. Hebrew is the universal language in them, and has grown within a few decades from a theological, literary language to a living, colloquial tongue. The change corresponds to similar processes accompanying the nationalist movements of other Oriental peoples. Hebrew is the language of the Palestinian Jews, not only in the schools, but in all manifestations of cultural and social activity, in theatre, Press, and assemblies. The widespread Jewish school system in Palestine was supplemented in 1925 by the founding of a Hebrew University. It is a model among Eastern Universities, both in the spirit inspiring it and in its organisation. Thanks to the constructive labours of the Zionist Organisation, Palestine may claim to-day to be the most progressive country in the Hither East in every province of life.

There has been a corresponding upward movement in recent years in the social and cultural life of the Palestinian Arabs. The old land-owning aristocracy is beginning to give place to the urban middle-class intelligentsia as the political leaders of the people. More regard is paid to the people's social and cultural elevation and to the problem of opening up the country economically.

The Palestinian Arabs formed Mohammedan-Christian associations to organise the protection of their national rights. These societies repeatedly convened an Arab Congress in Palestine, which elected an Executive Committee to represent the Arabs in their negotiations with the Government both in London and Geneva. One section of the Palestinian Arabs demanded union with Syria when there was still a prospect of creating an independent Syrian Arab

kingdom; another section demanded the inclusion of Palestine in an Arab Federation under the dynasty of the King of the Hejaz. The Arabs were agreed in their demand for the withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration. They likewise refused to take part in the elections for a Legislative Council or in forming any other representative bodies. In this matter, as in all others, Arab policy was guided by the great and influential families, but quite recently the position has slightly changed. For instance, at its session in June, 1922, the Executive Committee of the Arab Congress deposed its President, Arif Pasha Aldashani, who, like the President of the Arab Delegation in London, Musa Kasim el Husseini, had been chosen on account of his rank, not of his personal merits; in his place they elected Omar el Beitar, a Jaffa merchant belonging to none of the great families. Such a choice would have been impossible in Palestine a little time before. The opposition to the exclusive leadership of the old, patrician families found expression likewise in the formation of new parties, such as the National Party and the Peasant Party, and in the contests at the election of the Supreme Muslim Council at the beginning of 1926. About this date there was evidence of increased readiness even among Palestinian Arabs to co-operate with the mandatory Power and come to an understanding with the Jews, thanks partly to the wise statesmanship and prudent democratic impartiality of the British High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, who was chief of the Government of Palestine from 1920 to 1925. The seventh Arab National Congress, held in June, 1928, demanded a democratic representative assembly in Palestine, and thus recognised the mandate as such, though not in set terms. Sir Herbert Samuel's policy was always directed towards negotiation and understanding and always searching out new ways to achieve those ends. Thanks to it, the mandatory Government in Palestine ran a much more successful course than that of Syria.

In the spheres of industry, public health, and education, which was imparted in the Government schools entirely in Arabic, the British mandatory administration in Palestine was far more successful in practice than the mandatory Governments of Syria or Mesopotamia. On the other hand, the forms assumed by the British mandate in Trans-Jordan



MAP XIV.—SYRIA AND PALESTINE.

and Mesopotamia were of greater political interest as developments of the mandatory system.

The territory east of Jordan had formed part of King Feisal's Arab Syrian State. After his fall Great Britain as mandatory Power took over the administration of the country, which was inhabited by some two hundred thousand Bedouins, for the most part very primitive; she installed the Emir Abdullah, Feisal's elder brother, as ruler there in March, 1921. In September, 1922, Trans-Jordan was proclaimed a separate Arab principality under British mandate, independent of the Palestine Government, with the express stipulation that the intention of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine should not apply to Trans-Jordan. England is represented in the capital, Amman, by a Political Officer, who is subordinate to the High Commissioner of Palestine. On April 25th, 1923, the High Commissioner of Palestine announced the recognition of an independent State in Trans-Jordan ruled by the Emir Abdullah, on condition that the Government should assume constitutional forms and that a treaty should be concluded between the Governments of Britain and Trans-Jordan regarding England's obligations as mandatory. Negotiations proceeded in 1923 about this treaty. An Arab administration was appointed, and in May, 1924, Feisal's former Prime Minister, Ali Ridha Pasha Rikabi, was placed at the head of it. Abdullah's rule was not successful. There was no question of constitutional reforms, in spite of the opposition of a few notables, including Sultan el Advan, to the Emir's autocratic and extravagant ways. Abdullah seems to have inherited his father's tyrannical disposition. After a struggle with the Emir, Rikabi resigned in 1926, and an administration was formed in which Palestinians preponderated.

For British policy in the Hither East Trans-Jordan is of great importance. It protects Palestine from attack by nomads. The road from the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia and India crosses Trans-Jordan, with Amman as an important halting-place for air communications. At the end of May, 1925, Trans-Jordan took over the strategically important district of Maan on the Hejaz railway, and Aqaba, the Red Sea port that had hitherto belonged to the Hejaz. This provided additional security for British mandated territory

in the future development of communications between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. It has given Trans-Jordan access to the Red Sea. In 1928 a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Trans-Jordan, and subsequently the country was endowed with a constitution and Parliament.

The aim of linking Arab national aspirations with the interests of the British Empire in Trans-Jordan could be pursued on a grander scale in Mesopotamia and Iraq. Until 1920 Mesopotamia, like Palestine, was under a military administration which was felt as a heavy burden economically by the masses and morally by the intelligentsia, who aspired to national independence. The national aspirations of the Mesopotamian people found a refuge at that time in Damascus, where Feisal had established an Arab national State employing a number of Mesopotamians as officers and civil servants. There they founded the society *Ahd el Iraqi*, which convened a Mesopotamian Congress in Damascus in March, 1920, at the same time as the Syrian Congress was proclaiming an independent kingdom. It was resolved to declare Mesopotamia a kingdom likewise and to offer the crown to Feisal's elder brother, Abdullah, afterwards Emir of Trans-Jordan. Shortly after this, serious and bloody disturbances broke out in Mesopotamia. On May 3rd it had been announced that Great Britain would accept the mandate for Iraq, as determined at San Remo. British officials were busy in Baghdad laying down the new form of government. A committee of Baghdad notables protested against this arrangement and against the mandate, and demanded a National Constituent Assembly based on the Turkish electoral law. The British Government tried to change its course, but meanwhile the revolution had gained a wide footing in the country, and fighting continued for six months. It is worthy of note that Sunnites and Shiites, hitherto divided by religious enmity, worked together and stood shoulder to shoulder.

In October, 1920, Sir Percy Cox arrived in Mesopotamia as head of the civil administration that was to be introduced. He appointed an Arab Ministry with the aged Naqib of Baghdad at its head, the most highly respected man in the city. The Naqibs in Baghdad and Basra are the hereditary

marshals of the city, the chief of those who trace their descent to the Prophet and are entitled to wear the green turban. In Turkish days their influence was greater than that of the Governor. In this Government the Minister of the Interior was Talib Pasha, the son of the Naqib of Basra and a former Turkish deputy, and the Minister of War was Jafar Pasha el Askari, formerly Governor of Aleppo under Feisal. Like all subsequent Ministries, it represented the high nobility and the influential families. Foreign affairs and military questions were reserved for the High Commissioner's sole authority, who, moreover, had the right of veto in the concerns of all other departments; and a British adviser was attached to each Minister. Each administrative province had a British adviser attached to the Arab chief official.

But these arrangements did not satisfy nationalist aspirations. The people desired an independent kingdom. The most promising indigenous candidate for the throne was Talib Pasha. He was a modern-minded and enlightened man, and altogether well disposed towards the English. He himself had learned English, his two sons were studying in England, and during the disturbances of 1920 he had rendered considerable service to the British administration. But he stood in the way of Feisal, the candidate chosen by England, the son of the King of the Hejaz. At Easter of 1921 Churchill, then British Colonial Secretary, had summoned a conference in Cairo at which the future destinies of the Hither East were to be determined in a sense favourable to the Middle Eastern Empire of Churchill's dreams, and also in accordance with the advice of Thomas E. Lawrence, a friend to the Sherif of Mecca, and of Miss Gertrude Lowthian Bell. At this conference it was resolved among other things to maintain the English Protectorate in Egypt, to instal the Emir Abdullah in Trans-Jordan, and also to send Feisal to Baghdad as King of Mesopotamia. Sir Percy Cox was instructed accordingly. It was quite overlooked that the installation of Abdullah and Feisal as rulers of Trans-Jordan and Iraq would mean that the most powerful prince in Central Arabia, Ibn Saud, who regarded the Sherifides as his deadly enemies, was surrounded on all sides by Sherifide kingdoms, and that this must inevitably lead to a life and death struggle. It was these very ambitions which most seriously menaced the

achievement of an Arab Federation, led by the dynasty of the King of the Hejaz.

But first Talib Pasha had to be disposed of. He was invited to a tea-party by Lady Cox, and when he was about to leave was arrested and conveyed to Ceylon. At the end of June Feisal arrived in Basra and Baghdad, travelling from Jidda on a British man-of-war. The British administration announced that it would not permit republican institutions in the future Mesopotamian State, and that it regarded Feisal as the most suitable candidate for the throne. The Ministry also declared for Feisal's election as King, in a circular dated July 11th, sent to each administrative district. A hasty pretence of a referendum was carried through, and as it gave an overwhelming majority for Feisal he was proclaimed King of Iraq on August 23rd, 1921. That same day his bitterest enemy, Ibn Saud, the Emir of Nejd, assumed the title of Sultan.

These proceedings had not stabilised Mesopotamia internally. Negotiations dragged on for a British-Iraqian treaty to regulate future relations. Alike the King, the Naqib, and the Ministry demanded the complete withdrawal of the mandate. The higher ranks of the Shiite clergy in Karbala and Najaf, the Holy Places of the Shiites, began a violent agitation against the British Government, in which Shiites and Sunnites once more united. The intelligentsia and the Press of Baghdad openly opposed the mandate. Under British pressure the Council of Ministers accepted the draft treaty in June, 1922, but added the express stipulation that the treaty must be ratified by an elected National Assembly which was also to adopt a constitution and an electoral law. Nor could they be persuaded to waive this stipulation, in spite of the High Commissioner's representations. The British administration now took severe measures to suppress nationalist ambitions. Arab officials in the provinces who displayed individual initiative or nationalist tendencies were dismissed and British advisers acted for them. Freedom of the Press and of assembly was suspended; two political parties, the *Hisb el Watani* or patriotic party, led by Jafar Abu Timman, and the *Hisb el Nahdhah*, or the party of National Awakening, led by Mohammed Sadr, were placed under supervision, and only the pro-English and moderate freedom party, the

Hisb el Hurr, led by the Naqib's son, was encouraged. The Naqib's Cabinet resigned, and the two Opposition parties issued a joint manifesto on August 21st, protesting against British interference with Mesopotamian administration; on August 23rd, the anniversary of Feisal's accession, there was a demonstration in the royal palace against the High Commissioner and the mandate. Thereupon the pretence of Mesopotamian autonomy hitherto observed was withdrawn, the High Commissioner and the English officials assumed direct administrative authority, the newspapers were forbidden to appear, the two Opposition parties were dissolved, and their leaders were banished. Under these conditions the British-Iraqian treaty of October 10th, 1922, was signed, and at the same time England declared officially that the British Government would endeavour at the earliest possible moment to secure the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, and that then the British mandate would automatically come to an end.

By this treaty Great Britain engages so long as it is in force to support the new State with advice and assistance at the desire of the King of Iraq, without prejudice to the country's national sovereignty. No foreigners other than Englishmen are to be appointed as officials in Mesopotamia. The King of Iraq engages to lay before the National Constituent Assembly a constitution, which shall not conflict with any provision of the treaty and shall ensure complete equality between all inhabitants of Iraq without distinction of race, religion, or language. So long as the treaty is in force the British Government retains authority in all questions of finance and international policy. The treaty is to run for twenty years, unless the League of Nations agrees to an earlier termination. By Article 6 Great Britain promises her good offices to secure Iraq's admission to membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible. By Article 16 she binds herself, in so far as her international engagements permit, not to obstruct Iraq's association with neighbouring Arab States for tariff and other purposes.

The conclusion of this treaty was greeted with vehement protest throughout the country. The successes obtained by Turkey at that time served as an example and incitement and caused many Mesopotamians to turn their eyes towards

Angora. The Kurdish districts led by Sheikh Mahmud rose in arms again, as they had done in 1919. For some time an independent Kurdish Government was established in Sulaimaniya. The elections for the National Constituent Assembly, which should have begun in October, 1922, were universally boycotted. The intended ratification of the treaty by the National Constituent Assembly seemed out of the question. This induced the English to make a further concession. A treaty was concluded between Sir Percy Cox and the Mesopotamian Ministry in April, 1923, which was described as a protocol to the original treaty, by which the duration of the mandate, at first laid down as twenty years, was to be reduced to four years after the ratification of the Peace Treaty with Turkey. Nevertheless, the mandate might cease automatically even sooner by Iraq's entry into the League of Nations. The agreement regarding lawsuits against foreigners was only to remain in force for the duration of the mandate, but for four years at most; this agreement gave the right to foreigners to demand that proceedings taken against them should be conducted by British judges in the service of the King of Mesopotamia. Further, the agreement on co-operation between the British army in Mesopotamia and the army of the Iraqi State, and on the employment of British officials responsible to the Mesopotamian Government and not to the British High Commissioner, was to cease with the cessation of the mandate. The very important English official report on the administration of Iraq at that time says of the protocol: "It is true that the more far-sighted people feared that the period (of four years) was too short to enable Iraq to stand upon her own feet. . . . But the politicians of Baghdad and Mosul, whose influence upon the country people is far more powerful than is generally admitted (previous English official reports had always denied their influence), welcomed it with great enthusiasm, and even King Feisal and his Ministers . . . were undisguisedly delighted that a near term had been put to authoritative control by Great Britain of their affairs."¹ But as it turned out, not even for this greatly reduced period of mandatory government could Mesopotamian consent be obtained.

¹ *Report on the Administration of Iraq for the period April, 1923, to December, 1924.* Colonial No. 13, 1925, p. 7.

When the protocol was signed Sir Percy Cox retired from the position, of High Commissioner, and Sir Henry Dobbs succeeded him. Once again it was not found possible to hold undisturbed elections for a National Constituent Assembly to ratify the treaty and protocol. Again the Shiite religious leaders one and all issued fetwas forbidding participation in the elections. It is significant that on April 12th the three principal Shiite Mujtahids of Mesopotamia issued a fetwa in the great mosque of Kadhimain forbidding the faithful to take part in the defence of Mesopotamia against the Sunnite Turks, known for their irreligious attitude, who were then threatening the Mosul vilayet from the north. So strong was the national sentiment of common Oriental interests even among these divines, who were thorough-going reactionaries in religion and formerly animated by an unbounded hostility to the Sunnites. The consequence was that the leader of these Mujtahids was banished; a number of others followed voluntarily as a protest.

The elections for the National Constituent Assembly dragged on through the summer and autumn; on March 27th, 1924, Parliament was opened by the King. Shortly before, at the Festival of Awakening, the *Id al Nahdhah*, celebrated yearly in memory of the Arab rising in the Hejaz under Hussein in 1916, the King had opened the Theological College and at the same time laid the foundation stone of the Ahl al Bait University.

But there were a hundred members of the National Constituent Assembly, and only eighty-five were present at the opening. In the speech from the throne the King referred to the great services rendered by Mesopotamia to human culture in the past, to its former wealth, and its loss of wealth during the period of subjection. He reminded the Assembly that Islamic law was based upon negotiation and discussion, and that the Koran commanded men to take counsel together. The new Parliament, therefore, was now to discuss and decide three important questions: in the province of foreign affairs, the British-Iraqian treaty; in home affairs the constitution and the electoral law for Iraq.

Parliament proved less submissive than had been expected. In the very first session the Government was sharply criticised for having laid down parliamentary rules of procedure auto-

cratically in advance. When the protocol and the agreement were published, a violent agitation was started against the ratification of the treaty confirming the mandate. The whole population was at one in this matter. The *Times* correspondent reported a widespread fear that in spite of the protocol Great Britain would not evacuate the country at the end of four years, but would remain much longer, just as she had failed to keep similar promises in Egypt. And so the negotiations continued for months. They were only brought to a conclusion by MacDonald's threat—he was head of the British Government at the time—that if the treaty of July 11th were not accepted, England would withdraw it and exercise the mandate without any treaty or any limitation. Late on the evening of June 10th, therefore, the Premier and the President of the Assembly collected such members as they could easily reach, without previous notification. Of the hundred members only sixty-nine assembled, and of these thirty-seven voted for ratification and twenty-four against. During the month of July the constitution and the electoral law were also passed, and the Assembly was then dissolved. The new Mesopotamian Parliament met on November 1st, 1925. It consisted of eighty-five deputies. The formation of two definite parties may be recorded as a step forward in the country's parliamentary development; the Progressive Party, with fifty-two members, supported the Government, and the National Party constituted the Opposition.

But the centre of interest in 1925 was the question of the assignment of Mosul, mainly inhabited by Kurds, to Turkey or Iraq. After long and embittered negotiations the vilayet was assigned to Iraq by decision of the League of Nations on December 17th. This, indeed, was conditional upon the prolongation of the British mandate over Mesopotamia for another five-and-twenty years. The possession of Mosul is primarily of strategic importance; it strengthens England's position in relation to Turkey, Persia, the Caucasus, and Russia, and protects the route from the Mediterranean to Southern Persia and India leading through Mesopotamia. On the same day as the League of Nations reached its decision the two Powers menaced by it, Turkey and Russia, concluded a treaty of alliance in Paris. Great Britain retorted

by negotiating with Italy. Mussolini's declarations concerning imperial Italy had pointed to an extension of Italy's colonial empire in the eastern Mediterranean, where she occupied a strong strategic position through the hold on Rhodes and the Dodecanese. A few weeks earlier England and France, whose Hither Eastern policies had hitherto frequently clashed, reached a complete understanding concerning the Syrian war and thus faced the Eastern peoples and Soviet Russia with a European united front.

At the end of 1927 a treaty was concluded between Iraq and Great Britain, anticipating the abolition of mandatory status and the entry of Mesopotamia into the League of Nations in 1932. Mesopotamia, therefore, is progressing towards independence in accordance with the spirit of the mandate and the League.

Meanwhile, the contest for supremacy in Central Arabia had been decided. King Hussein's dynastic and romantic nationalism had attempted to create an Arab Federation. In 1924 Hussein seemed to be at the zenith of his power. One of his sons was King of Mesopotamia, another was Emir of Trans-Jordan, whilst he himself was King of the Hejaz. He negotiated with the English with a view to an Arab Federation embracing all these lands. In the spring of 1924 he visited his son Abdullah in Trans-Jordan. There the news reached him that the Turkish National Assembly had deposed the Caliph Abdul Mejid, and his long-cherished dream of an Arabian Caliphate seemed to be realised. On March 14th he assumed the title of Caliph. He was recognised in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and partially in Syria. But his influence extended no further. In Egypt the leading Mohammedan teachers resolved to convene a Mohammedan Congress in Cairo in March, 1925, to decide the question of the Caliphate. The former Caliph, Abdul Mejid, addressed a similar proclamation to the faithful.

But Hussein's brief days of glory were destined to be cut short by his old enemy Ibn Saud and the Wahabis. Ibn Saud had steadily pursued his aim. Even in 1919 war had broken out between him and Hussein over the possession of a few frontier villages; the Wahabis had defeated the Hejaz forces decisively and had killed nearly 4,500 of Hussein's soldiers in the vicinity of Taif. On that occasion British

intervention prevented Ibn Saud from exploiting his victory. On the other hand, he succeeded in bringing more and more of Central Arabia under his control, in particular the important oasis of Kasim and the great cities of Aneisa and Boreida. In August, 1921, he attained at last one of the two aims that he had set before himself: he destroyed the dynasty of Ibn Rashid, captured Hail, and incorporated the Jebel Shammar in his own realm. The surviving members of Ibn Rashid's family were conveyed to Riyadh, and Ibn Saud and his relatives connected themselves by marriage with the dominant families in Hail. Here, as later in the Hejaz, Ibn Saud pursued a wise policy of conciliating the subjected provinces. In July, 1922, he extended his realm northwards and captured the important oasis of Jauf on the caravan route from Damascus to Hail, which was in the hands of the great Ruvalla tribe. This brought his frontier right up to that of French Syria, and his territory drove a wedge between Trans-Jordan and Mesopotamia. The Wahabis now frequently harassed and invaded the border districts of the two kingdoms ruled by Hussein's sons; an unsuccessful attempt was made at a conference in Kuwait in the spring of 1924 to establish a lasting peace and a settled frontier-line between the countries.

With the autumn of 1924 came the decisive struggle in which Ibn Saud was to achieve his second aim, a Wahabi occupation of the Hejaz. Even in July, 1922, Arthur Moore had written in *The Times*: "It is a fact that since the British Cabinet set up Abdulla beyond the Jordan and Feisal in Irak, nothing much stands between the ravaging of Mecca and Medina by Ibn Saud's Wahabite followers except the £60,000 per annum which the British taxpayer pays Ibn Saud to avert this calamity. That the charm will work permanently is improbable."¹ In addition to this yearly subvention, the British Government had given Ibn Saud 35,000 rifles; it also paid a yearly subvention to King Hussein. In March, 1924, both grants were withdrawn. King Hussein was compelled to levy taxes on the cities of Mecca and Medina, which had been tax-free in Turkish days, so that the growing dissatisfaction of the inhabitants with his rule is easy to understand. In September, 1924, the

¹ *Times*, July 10th, 1922.

Wahabis crossed the Hejaz frontier. On November 9th they captured Taif, where, in accordance with the old-established Wahabi custom, they massacred all the inhabitants as idolaters. But thenceforward Ibn Saud had his fanatical soldiers well in hand, and all subsequent developments gave proof of his wise statesmanship and his unprejudiced and far-seeing attitude of mind. On October 5th Hussein was compelled to abdicate, and Ali, by far the ablest of his sons, became King of the Hejaz without carrying on his father's title of Caliph. On October 13th the Wahabis marched into Mecca under Khalid Ibn Luvai, on December 5th Abdul Asis III Ibn Saud held his solemn entry into the Holy City, rather more than a hundred and twenty years after the entry of his ancestor, Abdul Asis II Ibn Saud. Once more the Holy City of Islam had fallen into the hands of the Wahabis, and these fanatical children of the desert, who knew themselves to embody the pure religion of Mohammed, ruled in a place that had been, as they held, the scene of great abominations. But Ibn Saud performed the sacred rites prescribed for pilgrims and protected most of the holy relics from destruction or desecration. Ali's rule was now confined to Jidda, the Red Sea harbour of Mecca, and Medina. At the end of 1925 these two cities fell into Ibn Saud's hands, and in January, 1926, he was proclaimed King of the Hejaz, having previously granted a complete amnesty to the inhabitants and connected himself by marriage with the nobility.

In the spring of 1927 Ibn Saud assumed the title of King of Nejd. He sought contact with other Islamic countries and with the community of civilised States. With the latter purpose in view he sent his sons to Egypt and Europe in 1926; this was the first occasion on which a Wahabi prince had set foot on infidel soil. With the former purpose in view he convened a Pan-Islamic Conference in Mecca in June, 1926, to determine the rights and obligations of the Hejaz in the matter of the pilgrimage; in fact, it was intended to test what prospect there might be of Ibn Saud's election as Caliph. A month earlier the Caliphate Congress in Cairo, planned in 1925 and postponed for a year, had ended in failure. The Conference at Mecca was to be the first of a series of annual gatherings, but it, too, proved a failure.

Thereupon Ibn Saud turned his attention to the internal organisation of his realm, which was now threatened by a new rival for the hegemony of Arabia, the Imam Yehya of Yemen. The pilgrimage of 1927 was a complete success, and a new treaty of amity between Ibn Saud and Great Britain consolidated the position of the King of Hejaz and Nejd.

Thus the national life of the Arabs has developed in various movements, sometimes hardly connected with one another at all. The cultured cities of Syria and Mesopotamia aspire to create modern States on the European model. Turkey and Egypt set the standard for them. The religious tie is losing its significance more and more. Very different is the Wahabi movement, primitive and firmly bound by religious commandments, which controls the whole of Central Arabia to-day from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. The Sherif of Mecca failed in his attempt to unite the Bedouins of Central Arabia with the Europeanised towns of the north and east frontier regions, and to raise in all these lands the Arabian banner with its three horizontal stripes of black, green, and yellow, the colours of the Alides, the Abbassides, and the Ommiades, in memory of Arabia's past glory.

For the time being Ibn Saud is undoubtedly the strongest personality in Arabia. The vast majority of Mohammedans regard him as a Wahabi heretic, but the fact that the Indian Mohammedans are in sympathy with him proves how slight is the effect to-day of such religious considerations. What makes co-operation difficult is the exceedingly primitive state of the Wahabis in every respect, for it sets a wide gulf between them and the Arabian town-dwellers on the Mediterranean coast. But Ibn Saud has proved himself a far-seeing realist in statecraft. His action in sparing and paying homage to objects which Mohammedans in general regard as sacred was in sharp contrast to the religious intransigence formerly displayed by the Wahabis. Moreover, he has set about systematically learning from and making use of the better cultural and economic organisation to be found even in a town like Mecca. In November, 1924, he encouraged the establishment of an unofficial newspaper, *Barid el Hejaz* (The Hejaz Post), and a little later on he authorised the publication of a weekly, *Umm al Qura* (The Mother of the

Villages, a name for Mecca). Ibn Saud knows, moreover, that years of laborious reorganisation in his realm and sound finances will be required before he can set himself a further goal. This was doubtless his motive in concluding a treaty of amity with Great Britain in November, 1925. That treaty delimited the frontiers of Ibn Saud's kingdom with Trans-Jordan and Mesopotamia; the two British mandated territories recovered their common frontier, so that an air route and motor road, beside which a railway may perhaps run in future, pass through exclusively British spheres of influence from Palestine and Trans-Jordan to Mesopotamia and Southern Persia.

At the present time Arabia is an example of nationalism still partially in the primitive phase, but destined to advance to full self-realisation and to become completely permeated with the spirit of modern, capitalist industry. Very similar is the state of the nationalist movement in Persia and Afghanistan.

CHAPTER X

CHANGES IN PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN

EVEN more inaccessible than Arabia in their mediæval seclusion are the countries on the upland plateau of Iran. On its frontiers Persia is surrounded by high mountain ranges, whilst the interior is largely desert. Even to-day the country has neither railways nor roads, with the exception of a few military roads serving foreign strategic interests. Even to-day the government, the industries, and the social institutions of Afghanistan are altogether mediæval, as they were in Persia until quite recent years. The spirit of rationalism, and democracy, and capitalism has hardly touched these countries and their populations.

It was Napoleon's schemes for the conquest of India that first brought Persia, like Egypt, into the glare of modern European politics. French military missions visited the country, English and Russian missions soon followed, and even after France had been excluded from Central Asian politics, Persia continued to be a constant bone of contention between Russia and Great Britain, for the former was endeavouring to push forward to India through the Caucasus and Turkistan, whilst the latter regarded Persia and Afghanistan as border provinces of her Indian Empire.

Individual Persian statesmen had been influenced by Europe as early as the mid-nineteenth century, such, for instance, as Abbas Mirza, the Governor of Tabriz, who engaged French and English provincial administrators, sent young men to study in Europe, and had printers apprenticed in Moscow and St. Petersburg. He established a printing press and published in Persian biographies of Napoleon, Peter the Great, and Alexander the Great, and Voltaire's *History of Charles XII*. Mirza Taghi Khan Emir-i-Nizam, who was Minister to the young Shah Nasir u-Din from 1848 to 1851, carried on Abbas Mirza's work, and in 1850 he established the first Persian newspaper in Tehran, *Iran*.

At this period the Babist movement was beginning to shake Persia out of her intellectual and political torpor. The intellectuals gathered round its standard. But within a few years Nasir u-Din had crushed the rising movement, at least so far as Persian public life was concerned. Thenceforward during his long reign the most disastrous obscurantism reigned supreme. Authority was shared between an uncontrolled Oriental despotism bound by no law, and the utterly ignorant and corrupt clergy. There was absolute chaos in the administration, in the distant provinces that were difficult of access, and in the finances of the realm. The State revenue and the prince's private fortune were not separated. All official positions, whether of the most exalted governors or the smallest local despots, were obtainable by bribery and could be obtained by no other means. The price was recouped a hundred times over by oppressive taxes and the sale of subordinate offices. By these methods the upper classes enriched themselves, and the burdensome taxes all fell upon the common people.

This Shah was the first Persian sovereign to travel in Europe, and in the latter years of his reign the constantly increasing extravagance of the court and the resulting shortage of money drove him to borrow from European Powers at excessive rates of interest, which involved repeated concessions and the growing influence of foreigners. All the nation's resources and opportunities were sold cheap to foreign companies. In those days there was not a trace of modern, nor even ordered, education, administration, or justice.

Nevertheless there were two men whose influence, largely exercised from abroad, kept alive, at least in a small, select circle, the idea of a Persian awakening and liberal reforms. One was the great inspiring genius of all Mohammedan countries, Jemal ud-Din el Afghani. He was born in Afghanistan about 1838, and in the first forty years of his life he travelled in most Islamic countries, and exercised a profound influence upon the rising generation, especially in Egypt. European influence secured his banishment from Egypt in September, 1879, and he went to India, but was obliged to leave it in 1882 when the English occupied Egypt. He passed the next seven years in London, Paris, and

St. Petersburg. He co-operated with Mohammed Abdu, afterwards Grand Mufti of Egypt, in editing an Arabic weekly in Paris, with the French sub-title *Le Lien indissoluble*. In 1889 he was invited by Shah Nasir u-Din to come to Persia. During the two years of his stay he succeeded in winning a number of adherents to his idea of a rebirth and new life in the Mohammedan East. But he soon came in conflict with the Shah and was obliged to leave the country. He then met the second Persian reformer, Malcolm Khan, in London. The last five years of his life, until his death in 1897, he passed in Constantinople, where Sultan Abdul Hamid granted him a pension in recognition of his services to Pan-Islamism. But the Turkish despot was suspicious of his liberal tendencies. Many believe that he was one of the many victims of Abdul Hamid's poison. So ended the life of a restless wanderer and powerful orator whose profound learning, fervent convictions, and unwearying devotion, made him the first harbinger of the new Orient. Junji Saidan, in his biographical volume *Mashahiru-sh-Shark* (Celebrities of the East) published in Cairo in 1903, concludes his Life of Jemal ud-Din with the words: "The goal towards which all his actions tended and the pole around which all his hopes revolved was the unity of Islam and the union of all Mohammedans in all parts of the earth in a single Islamic Empire under the protection of the Supreme Caliph. To this ideal he devoted all his energy, to this goal he sacrificed all his worldly ambitions, and renounced wives and domestic comfort and all material possessions. He died without leaving a written record of his ideas and aims, except for his essay on the *Refutation of the Materialists* and various separate letters and pamphlets on a number of questions. But in the hearts of his friends and disciples he awakened a living spirit, he kindled their energy and gave point to their pens, and the East profited greatly, and will continue to profit, by their labours."

Malcolm Khan, an Armenian from Isfahan, influenced Persia by different methods but in the same direction. He had first been a teacher in Tehran and was then Ambassador in London. Whilst there he proposed a number of reforms to the Shah, tending towards the introduction of a legally controlled system of administration and justice in Persia.

When his advice was ignored he resigned his position, and in 1890 he established a Persian newspaper entitled *Kanun* (The Law) in London as the organ of his reform policy; he smuggled it into Persia where it exercised great influence. In its columns he attacked the backwardness of the Persian State and clergy. "The number of the Prophets," wrote *Kanun*, "was completed with the appearance of Mohammed, but it is obvious that what was ended was the succession of individuals, not the spirit of the prophet's calling. The prophetic spirit lives on in the aspirations of pious and gifted men, in patriotic endeavours to ennoble the people and promote the general welfare. . . . Undoubtedly the men who invented the telegraph and the steam-engine have performed works more pleasing to God than the fakirs who torture and disfigure their bodies from a mistaken idea of piety." Thus *Kanun* became the vehicle by which a spirit of cautious liberal and rationalist enlightenment penetrated into Persia. Through its influence the first two Persian Freemasons' Lodges were founded, the "House of Oblivion" and the "League of Humanity."

Certain individuals even among the Mujtahids, so utterly obscurantist in a general way, were stirred by the spirit that had once lived in Persian Sufism. For instance, Haji Sheikh Hadi Najm Abadi, one of the most famous ulemas in Tehran, was an enlightened man who paved the way for the coming reforms and rendered services to the cause of freedom in Persia almost as great as Jemal ud-Din, for he was one of the foremost Mujtahids in the land and enjoyed the confidence of rich and poor. He was absolutely incorruptible, a rare exception in nineteenth-century Persia. He was without material wants and never accepted presents or remuneration. Every afternoon it was his custom to sit on the ground before his house and receive people of all classes and religions, statesmen and scholars, princes and merchants, Shiites and Sunnites, Babis, Armenians, and Jews; with all he discussed the greatest variety of questions absolutely freely. He was a free-thinker at heart, whence it was his habit to inspire those who sought his advice with doubts regarding many traditional superstitious ideas; in this way he furthered the "awakening" of many who later became the leaders of the Persian Revolution. He recognised no

distinction between rich and poor, and he forced his sons and disciples to earn their living by lowly and strenuous labour.

And so a new generation of youthful Persians grew up around Jemal ud-Din, some in Persia, some in Constantinople. In 1896 the Shah Nasir u-Din was killed by a revolutionary named Mirza Reza, who stated subsequently that he had acted under the influence of Jemal ud-Din, with whom he had stayed for a time in Constantinople. The Persian Government demanded Jemal's extradition, but only three of his friends were extradited and executed, whilst Jemal himself died during the lengthy negotiations. One of the men to be executed was Mirza Aga Khan, a scholar who had advocated Pan-Islamism in his writings, and especially the union of Shiites and Sunnites. Another friend of Jemal ud-Din's who was executed wore a signet-ring bearing the words: "I am a defender of Islam's unity, Ahmed Rukhi is my name."

The new Shah, Muzaffer ud-Din, was more good-natured and weaker than his predecessor. Under his rule the corruption and chaos steadily grew worse and foreign influence grew stronger. But the liberal agitation and the demand for reform also increased. The process of selling up the country, begun under the preceding sovereign, took its course. But the Persian people were no longer indifferent spectators. Once already the people had forced the cancellation of a concession—the tobacco concession, granted to an English company in 1890 and involving all rights of production, sale, and export of tobacco in Persia for fifty years. This concession was particularly advantageous to the foreign company, which expected to make a net profit of more than 50 per cent. per annum on a capital of £650,000. But it interfered too seriously with the daily life of the Persian people. Both merchants and clergy protested vehemently, and there were actual risings in Tabriz and other towns. In December, 1891, a boycott was declared at the command of a celebrated Mujtahid, and strictly carried out all over the country, although it was by no means easy for the people to give up their accustomed luxury. By this means the Shah was forced to withdraw the concession, and not till then was smoking allowed again in Persia. The Government had to pay the concessionaire an indemnity of £500,000,

which it was obliged to borrow at a high rate of interest, but the people had scored a triumph and had discovered that by united and vigorous action they could compel attention to their wishes.

Russia was first and foremost in securing perpetual fresh concessions in Persia under the new Shah and exercising more and more sovereign rights. For instance, Russia at once secured all railway concessions in Persia for many years, though she did not proceed to put them into operation. She had managed to bind Persia to raise the foreign loans that were continually needed to keep the State from financial ruin, not from the Imperial Bank of Persia which was in the hands of British capital, but from the Russian Banque d'Escompte de Perse. The Belgian officials who collected and supervised the taxes in Persia proved amenable to Russian influence. About the beginning of the twentieth century rivalry increased between England and the northern Empire that was pushing southwards towards India with more and more conscious aim. Russia supported all the reactionary influences in the country, a course in harmony with her home policy and based on the knowledge that it was precisely the corruption and incompetence of the old régime that would offer the most favourable opportunities to penetrate and occupy the land; England, on the contrary, originally showed sympathy with the efforts of liberal Persians. Some of the leading statesmen who favoured liberal reforms had been educated in England, whilst on the other hand education and inclination directed the reactionary politicians of Persia to seek support in Russia. Russian influence won a predominant place in spite of endeavours, especially those of Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India, to consolidate British ascendancy in Persia and the lands adjoining the Persian Gulf. But in 1905 a profounder influence was to emanate from Russia: the first Russian Revolution, directed against Tsarist tyranny, served as an example to liberal Persia. The Tsarist régime managed to crush the Revolution at home and to perpetuate its own existence for twelve years with the help of a sham constitution; it did all in its power to crush the Persian Revolution likewise, and it was not till the second Russian Revolution that the Persian people won the chance of freer development.

The Revolution in Persia began with a strange religious act, the *bast* or flight to a particular place, generally a mosque, which the fugitive will not leave until his wishes have been fulfilled. In token of their protest against court misrule and their demand for constitutional reform, leading merchants and religious teachers left Tehran in December, 1905, and took refuge in Qum, south of the capital. Their leaders were Mujtahids, like Syid Abdullah Bahbahani, and Syid Moham-med Tabatabai, and popular orators, like Aga Syid Jemal ud-Din, who later became champions of the Revolution. At that period Sheikh Fazl-ullah was also with them, though he afterwards played an important part in the counter-revolution. The chief demand of the protestors was the dismissal of the Premier, Ain ud-Dawla. It was the custom in Persia that distinguished men should be known not by their own names, but by a title of honour conferred by the State and transmitted to other statesmen after their death. The Shah promised to dismiss Ain ud-Dawla, and the merchants and doctors of the law returned to Tehran; but it soon turned out that the Shah had no intention of keeping his word. In consequence, disturbances broke out repeatedly during the spring, and several people were killed in hostile encounters between the soldiery and the crown.

Again in July, 1906, leading teachers of the law and students took refuge in Qum for a *bast*, the Tehran bazaars were closed, and when Ain ud-Dawla commanded that they should be reopened and threatened that the soldiers should sack them, the merchants withdrew into the garden of the British Legation for a *bast*, in a company which soon exceeded twelve thousand. They demanded the promulgation of a written legal code and later a constitution, the recall of the divines from Qum, and the dismissal of Ain ud-Dawla. On August 5th the Shah promised to fulfil their demands. An eye-witness writes of these events: "The Russian Revolution has had a most astounding effect here. Events in Russia have been watched with great attention, and a new spirit would seem to have come over the people. They are tired of their rulers, and, taking example of Russia, have come to think that it is possible to have another and better form of government. . . . They are, of course, absolutely ignorant of the principles of government, with the exception, perhaps,

of a few of their chiefs. When I was in the Tehran Legation, they used to come and ask me how our constitution was worked and would show a *naïveté* which was almost pathetic. They see clearly the object in view, but they are very hazy as to the means of attaining it. Undoubtedly it will be many years before this Parliament can become really effective. But many of the chiefs, amongst whom is a celebrated Babi, have really a very clear conception of what is needed. If only they will remain united, and not let the Government sow dissensions amongst them, they should carry the day."¹

On August 19th the convening of the Mejliss-i-milli or Parliament was proclaimed. It was to consist of a hundred and fifty-six deputies, sixty elected by the capital; men between thirty and seventy years of age were eligible, if they could read and write. The first Persian Parliament was opened on October 7th, 1906. For the time being only the deputies for Tehran were present; it had not been possible to carry through the elections quickly enough, especially in the distant provinces.

Characteristically, the Government's first proposal to the National Assembly was for a new loan. Parliament refused to consent and thus proved its determination to check Persia's financial progress along the same fatal road that Egypt had followed under Ismail. In spite of the vehement opposition of the party of reaction, Parliament drafted a constitution signed by the Shah on December 30th, a few days before his death, which took place on January 8th, 1907. And so Persia joined the ranks of constitutional States. The Shah was no longer absolute lord of the lives and property of all his subjects. The State budget was separated from the sovereign's private purse, freedom of speech and of the Press were conceded, and the Ministers were made responsible to Parliament.

Moreover, in the year 1906 the Persian Press entered upon its first period of rapid development. A number of new papers came out and a characteristic journalistic style developed. The Persian National Assembly resolved to found a special National Bank, but the plan was frustrated by the opposition of the existing English and Russian banks.

¹ *The Persian Revolution*. By Edward G. Browne, Cambridge University Press, 1910, pp. 120-122.



MAP XV.—POLITICAL SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN PERSIA.

The new Shah Mohammed Ali, who came to the throne in the early days of 1907, was hostile to liberal reform from the outset. He was altogether under Russian influence. Friction soon arose between him and Parliament. The deputies had now arrived from the provinces, and Parliament was endeavouring to secure the dismissal of the autocratic provincial governors, the *Istibdadis*, who tried to prevent the elections from being held in their districts and refused to allow the abolition of the abuses hitherto connected with the collection of taxes. Parliament likewise demanded the dismissal of the Belgian customs officials, and partially gained its point in the spring of 1907. But it failed to sweep away the numerous pensions paid by the Shah to almost all the nobility and the officials of the court and the State who rendered no services in return.

The deputies from Tabriz in North-West Persia formed the backbone of the Assembly. They had been most fully exposed to European influence, and they demanded progressive and modern reforms in actual practice. Their leader was Taki-Sada. Besides this Reform Party there was the National Party led by Syid Abdullah Bahbahani and Syid Mohammed Tabatabai. It stood for full national independence and opposed submission to foreign intervention in Persian affairs, but at the same time it was hostile to any thorough-going modernisation of Persia and wished to retain the accepted religious law, the Sharia, as the basis of her life and to maintain her position as a Shiite Islamic State. The reactionary Court Party consisted partly of followers of the *Istibdad*, the autocracy of provincial governors, and partly of dependents of the *Dawlat*, the court; its leader was Sheikh Fazl-ullah, who stigmatised the constitutionalists as free-thinkers and Babis. A Persian acquainted with Europe wrote of this first Parliament: "I believe in the Mejliss. Its members are daily gaining experience, and both the tone of the debates and the method of procedure are improving noticeably. The people are aroused, and are slowly learning. The most remarkable expression of this awakening is the great increase in the number of newspapers, which are longer no written in the old, stilted journalese, but in a popular and relatively simple style. Everybody seems to read a paper nowadays. In many coffee-houses professional

newspaper-readers are employed who present their clients with political news instead of reciting the fairy-tales of the *Shah-nama*."

Whilst Persia was endeavouring to consolidate her new position as a constitutional State, a series of revolts broke out in the provinces, partly due to the relaxation of the central authority, partly to the instigation of the reactionaries and of Russia in particular. In spite of the National Assembly's efforts to reduce the financial chaos to order, the shortage of funds was felt in every department, and even the army was in a state of demoralisation.

On August 31st, 1907, the detested Premier, Ali Askar Khan Amin-es-Sultan, was murdered by a young Nationalist from Tabriz. The assassin, who committed suicide himself, was universally acclaimed as a hero and patriot. On the same day the Anglo-Russian treaty was published which was to end the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia in Asia and was at last to bring about a peaceful division of Hither Asia, especially Persia and Afghanistan, between the two Powers. Persia was divided into three zones: in the northern zone, by far the largest and most important, Russia was to enjoy the sole right to all concessions and was to exercise what amounted to a protectorate; the south-eastern zone was to be a British sphere of influence, and the south-western to remain neutral. This treaty did, indeed, strengthen India's western frontier, but it conceded preponderating advantages to Russia. Henceforward the fate of the Persian constitution was in Russia's hands. The British Liberal Government had sacrificed it to a European alliance with Tsarism.

The publication of the Anglo-Russian Treaty spurred on the constitutional party of freedom to fresh efforts. A hundred thousand people solemnly celebrated the fortieth day after the death of Amin-es-Sultan's murderer, assembling at his graveside. Dissensions between Parliament and the sovereign became more and more frequent. Popular feeling was so menacing that the Shah was obliged to give his consent to additional constitutional laws in October, 1907, and to take an oath of loyalty to the constitution in Parliament. But by the end of November he had presented the Mejliss with an ultimatum, demanding in particular the dissolution

of the *Anjumans* or political secret societies. The societies retorted by demanding the banishment of Emir Bahadur and Saad ed Dowla, the leaders of the Court Party, and summoning a mass meeting for December 14th, for which the Government gave permission. The Shah thereupon resorted to a *coup d'état*; he had the Prime Minister, Nasir ul Mulk, arrested. The Premier, however, was enabled by the intervention of the British Legation to escape to Europe. At the same time mobs recruited by the Court Party and inflamed by reactionary mullahs were let loose upon the city and destroyed the Parliament House. But the youthful revolution was not so easily crushed. Parliament assembled in the Sipah Salar mosque with a thousand armed supporters of the Progressive Party, and telegrams arrived from the provinces, especially Tabriz, protesting against the Shah's action and announcing the despatch of auxiliary troops to defend the constitution. The Shah was obliged to yield, to take a fresh oath on the constitution, and to make concessions.

But suspicion remained and grew in intensity after an unsuccessful attempt on the Shah's life in the spring of 1908. The Shah sought Russian support for a second *coup d'état*, which he hoped might succeed better, and it was readily accorded. On June 2nd the Russian and English Ministers saw the Persian Foreign Secretary and told him that the two Powers could not tolerate the harassing of the Shah by the *Anjumans* and their desire even to depose him; they threatened intervention if this continued. Both Powers helped to undermine Persia's incipient constitutional régime and the reorganisation of the State. On June 3rd the Shah fled from the city with the Persian Cossack brigade, commanded by Russian officers, and established an armed camp in the vicinity with the help of a Russian loan; thence he proclaimed martial law and prepared for military action. He demanded the banishment of the national leaders, the dissolution of the *Anjumans*, and the introduction of a Press censorship, and declared that the Persian throne had been won by the sword and would be held by the sword.

On June 23rd came the *coup d'état*. The Russian colonel of the Cossack brigade, Liakhov, was appointed military governor, and the Cossacks made a surprise attack upon Parliament. The fight lasted for hours, and many prominent

leaders of the Progressive Party were killed. The Houses of Parliament, "which had for the best part of two years been the centre of the nation's hopes, and the focus of the new spirit which had stirred the dry bones of a seemingly dead people to new life . . . were reduced to ruins, and the defenders either slain, taken captive, or put to flight."¹ The Press was subjected once more to the censorship and constitutional liberties were abrogated. Reaction triumphed, with the assistance of the European Powers. On June 25th the London *Times* declared that that the Parliament had "furnished a signal example of the inability of Orientals to assimilate the principles of self-government." But Parliament had been faced with the task of making good in a few months the boundless mismanagement of long centuries, and the triumph of the old disorder over the attempted new order was due less to the incompetence of the latter than to the intervention of European colonial Powers. The Russian officers subjected Tehran to a reign of terror.

Fighting continued in the provinces, although Tehran was in the hands of the Shah and his Russian advisers, amongst whom Shapshal Khan was pre-eminent, a Karaite Jew from the Crimea and former tutor to the Shah. Led by Baqir Khan and Sattar Khan the *Anjumans* of Tabriz, the most progressive town in the kingdom, carried on the fight for ten months, only not against the Shah's soldiers but against Russian troops as well, who saw their opportunity and occupied the whole of Northern Persia, never leaving it until the second Russian Revolution.

The success of the Turkish Revolution fired and encouraged the Persians. In the south the Bakhtiaris rose round Isfahan, led by Samsam us Sultana and Sardar-i-Asad, and in the north revolutionary troops gathered in Resht under Nasrus-Sultana. On July 13th, 1909, the Nationalist troops recaptured Tehran. The Shah and the reactionary leaders took refuge in the Russian Legation. On July 16th the Mejliss proclaimed the deposition of the Shah, and his son Ahmad, a boy of eleven, succeeded him. The ex-Shah left the country. The Russian and British Ministers obtained

¹ *A Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia.* By Edward G. Browne, Luzac, 1909, p. 47.

a large annual pension for him. The correspondent of the London *Times*, always hostile to the Persian constitution, now took a more favourable view of the situation. "The present performances (of the Nationalists), however, throw the past vacillation into the shade, and we are concerned to-day with a situation which promises more hopefully for Persia than any that could ever have been brought about by foreign advice or agency. The shadow of intervention has long been spreading over the Persian sky, and the day seemed nigh when the shadow must have been followed by something which would cripple Persian independence. Nothing but Persian activity could save the situation. At the psychological moment that activity successfully asserted itself . . . Persia's future henceforth rests with the Persians. They have effected a brilliant *coup*, they have behaved with wisdom and moderation at an intoxicating moment, and they have a clear run to the goal of their ambition. The reactionary power is broken, and must remain in the dust while the Nationalists are firm and careful. Everybody in Persia who takes any interest in politics is with them, and it would seem as if they can have no enemies but those of their own making. Tact and magnanimity have distinguished their actions since their moment of triumph."¹ The Press revived and showed new vitality. Except for the execution of Sheikh Fazl-ullah and five more leaders of the counter-revolution, no retaliatory measures were taken.

On November 15th, 1909, the second Persian Parliament was ceremoniously opened. The King's speech declared: "In the name of God, the giver of all liberties, and through the secret vigilance of the Holy Imam of the age, the National Consultative Assembly has been auspiciously opened. In silence and steadfastness the Persian realm has survived many centuries, and especially these recent critical times, until at last the nation's intellectual progress and development brought it to a point when it had no choice but to face a period of revolution." Persia's problem, like that of all Eastern States, was to subordinate the personal sentiments and interests and aspirations of her abler men to the common good. This she might doubtless achieve in moments of unanimous revolutionary exaltation, but the

¹ *Times*, July 22nd, 1909.

time that had elapsed since despotic rule had disappeared was too short for it to continue when the daily round began once more. Mismanagement, corruption, and financial stringency persisted and were furthered by the unceasing intervention of the European Powers and the shortly ensuing chaos of the World War.

The Russian troops stayed on in Northern Persia. The Government intended to raise a loan of £500,000 sterling. It did not consider the conditions imposed by England and Russia acceptable, and when the Persian Government succeeded in obtaining the desired sum from a private banking house in England, both European Governments forbade the conclusion of the loan agreement. In October, 1910, England made representations concerning the badness and insecurity of the roads in Southern Persia and demanded the appointment of English officers in that area. The Persian Foreign Secretary, Hussain Kuli Khan, a member of the Progressive Party, had drawn attention to the banished Shah's machinations, and he was forced by the intervention of the British and Russian Legations to resign. The democratic Finance Minister Sani ud Dawla was shot by two Russian subjects, who, at the demand of the Russian Legation, were sent to Russia and escaped punishment.

Meanwhile the ex-Shah had quitted Odessa and visited the European capitals, making preparations to invade Persia. In July, 1911, he invaded Northern Persia with Russian assistance. Tehran was dismayed, for it had no army at its disposal, except the trustworthy troops of the Governor, Ephraim Khan, an Armenian. The Bakhtiari leader, Samsam us Sultana, undertook to form a new Ministry. Early in September the Shah was defeated, but at the request of the Russian and British Legations he continued to receive his pension.

In order to improve the country's financial position Parliament had appointed an American, Morgan Shuster, as controller of finance in May, 1911. He demanded of the Mejliss full and unrestricted authority, which was conceded, and he began his struggle against the corrupt practices of the principal officials and Ministers, and set about modernising the methods of budgeting and audit. Just as the new Finance Minister was about to balance the Persian budget, in spite

of the Shah's invasion and the consequent disorders, Russia intervened. She prevented the enforcement of the new taxation and protected the magnates who desired to evade the taxes, as they had done hitherto. On November 29th, 1911, the Russian Government presented an ultimatum demanding the dismissal of Shuster and his assistants and the Persian Government's promise not to appoint any foreigner in the Persian State service without the previous consent of the Russian and British Legations. Parliament rejected the ultimatum on the motion of the Democrats, led by the Suleman Mirza; the session was a lively one and the vote was given by roll-call. It was a day of great and significant events. A number of Persian women took part in the preparations for resistance, supporting the Democratic Party. Russia sent reinforcements, and on December 24th, 1911, she engineered a fresh *coup d'état*. Parliament was dissolved and adjourned, a new and docile Ministry was formed and promptly conceded Russia's demands. In January, 1912, Morgan Shuster left Persia. In Tabriz, Resht, and Enzeli the Russian troops organised a massacre of the Persian Democrats.

So ended the second Persian Parliament, once more through European intervention. Its majority consisted of the moderate and conservative Progressive Party led by Nasir ul Mulk, a man of European education who had studied in Oxford and whom Parliament chose for Regent, but who proved weak as a leader. At his instance parties had been formed in Parliament on the European model; their seats were placed in the amphitheatre-like Chamber according to their political position. The moderate Progressive Party was frequently in violent conflict with the democratic and radical progressive groups. The Left wing in Parliament included representatives of the Armenian and Georgian Socialist parties. In spite of its rather conservative composition, the Mejliss stood firmly by Morgan Shuster's reforms and supported him in the struggle to introduce order into Persia's national finances.

At the beginning of 1912 the constitution was temporarily suspended, Parliament was no longer summoned, the liberal leaders were imprisoned or exiled abroad, and the political clubs were dissolved. Persia's actual rulers were the two

European Powers that had influenced her destiny so disastrously in recent years, especially Russia. Shuster was replaced by the Belgian Mornard, a man devoted to Russia's interests and exceedingly unpopular in Persia. The educational reforms initiated by the Persian Parliament were not carried on; such were the sending of students abroad and the establishment of the first girls' schools (by the end of 1911 Tehran had fifty-four girls' and forty-six boys' schools). There was a perpetual change of Ministers, and the most important Ministries were often vacant for months together. In the middle of 1912 Nasir ul Mulk left the country. Russian troops continued systematically to occupy Northern Persia. It was not till July 21st, 1914, a few days before the World War broke out, that the third Persian Parliament was convened, being essential for the Shah's coronation. During the World War a defenceless Persia was occupied by Russian, English, and Turkish troops.

The third Persian Parliament, which was in session till November, 1915, contained a majority of the democratic parties, particularly among representatives of the provinces; Tehran sent principally representatives of the Moderate Party to the National Assembly. The Democratic Party favoured Turkey and Germany. When the Russian army advanced almost to Tehran in the autumn of 1915, the Democrats took flight, the parliamentary régime came to a sudden end, and henceforward chaos reigned unchecked in Persia. The North-West became a theatre of war between the Russians and Turks, the North-East was in Russian hands, and the South was soon occupied by the English. At first the British army had been content to guard the pipe-lines conveying oil from the oil-wells of Southern Persia to Basra, but in 1916 Sir Percy Sykes began to organise the South Persian Rifles, eleven thousand strong, who were to form a counterpart to the Russo-Persian Cossack Brigade in the North. In 1917, moreover, the English took control of the only independent military force in Persia, the gendarmerie trained by Swedish officers. When the Russian army collapsed in consequence of the Revolution, the English took occasion to occupy Northern Persia as well at the beginning of 1918 under General Dunsterville, and thence to repulse the advance of the German army and the Russian Revolution towards the

Caucasus and Turkistan. A patriotic Persian fraternity which called itself the *Ihtahad ul Islam* (Unity of Islam), and fought with the watchword "Persia for the Persians," resisted the British in Northern Persia under the leadership of Kuchik Khan. Kuchik Khan, with his *Jangalis* or Woodmen, was regarded in 1918 as a hero of Persian freedom. That spring the Persian Government declared that the South Persian Rifles constituted an alien military force and a menace to Persian independence. A Note was despatched expressing the hope that the British Government would withdraw its troops and so enable Persia to initiate the necessary administrative reforms. Throughout 1918 the British forces in Southern Persia met with armed resistance from the inhabitants of the country. At the same time an English division led by Sir Wilfrid Malleon was advancing through Eastern Persia to Trans-Caspia in order to support the counter-revolution there.

In 1919 Sir Percy Cox came to Tehran as British Minister. He succeeded in concluding the Anglo-Persian Treaty with the Persian Government, headed by Wossugh ed Dawlah. Under this treaty England was to obtain full control of Persia; the whole administration and army were placed under British direction. But it proved impossible to induce Parliament to ratify the treaty, which had only been concluded between Sir Percy Cox and one section of the Government. In June, 1920, the Government fell, and subsequent Ministries, which followed in rapid succession, did not dare to sign the treaty with England.

On February 21st, 1921, the Cossack Brigade led by Riza Khan carried out a *coup d'état*, and Riza Khan became War Minister. A liberal publicist, Sia ed Din, accepted the Premiership. He favoured radical reforms and in particular attempted to nationalise the large estates and distribute nationally owned land among the peasants. He arrested a number of aristocrats in order to force them to hand over a portion of their wealth to the State as an act of penance for their past refusal to pay taxes and their self-enrichment at the cost of the State. But in May Sia ed Din was obliged to take flight and thenceforward Riza Khan was the real ruler of Persia, though he contented himself with the position of War Minister.

In May, 1920, moreover, Soviet Russian troops began a steady advance against the British troops in Northern Persia. In October, 1920, the Persian ambassador in Turkey went to Moscow to negotiate a treaty with Russia, which was concluded on February 26th, 1921, a few days after Sia ed Din's *coup d'état* in Persia and the consequent final denunciation of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919. At the end of April the new Russian ambassador, Rothstein, arrived in Tehran, and the following month the British troops withdrew from Northern Persia; thereupon the Russian army also retreated to Baku. On June 22nd, 1921, the fourth Persian Parliament was opened. The Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 was not ratified and was declared null and void. The English officers and military and financial advisers were dismissed, the South Persian Rifles disbanded, and in the autumn of 1921 the last of the English troops and officers quitted Persian soil. Persia had won a degree of independence unknown to her for many years. Parliament ratified the Russo-Persian Treaty of which the most important stipulations are: "The Russian Soviet Government declares, pursuant to its previous declarations made in 1918 and 1919, that it finally renounces the oppressive policy pursued by the Imperial Russian Government towards Persia. In token of its honest desire to see the Persian nation independent, happy, and in free possession of its own wealth, the Russian Soviet Government declares null and void all treaties, agreements, and understandings concluded in derogation of the rights of the Persian people between the Tsarist and Persian Governments. The Russian Soviet Government discounts and abominates the former policy of the Tsarist Government, by which it made treaties with European Powers touching Asiatic countries against the will of the Eastern peoples concerned and under the pretext of guaranteeing their independence, treaties which led to the seizure of the country to which they referred. The Russian Soviet Government has forever renounced this criminal policy, which meant the destruction of the integrity of Asiatic countries and more and more made the living nations of the East a prey to the insatiable greed of the exploiting European nations. Accordingly, the Russian Soviet Government formally refuses to take part in any political enterprise tending to enfeeble

Persia or violate her national sovereign rights. It further declares null and void all treaties and agreements between the former Russian Government and any third party injurious to Persia." Russia restored to Persia the islands and territories which Persia ceded to Russia in 1893. If an alien Power should occupy Persian territory, Russia is entitled to send troops to Persia. Russia cancelled all Persia's debts and handed over to her the Russian Banque d'Escompte with all its balances and branches. So also Russia handed over to the Persian State without compensation all roads, telegraphs, and harbours that she had constructed on Persian soil. Persia recovered her right to maintain a fleet in the Caspian Sea. On condition that Persia would not make them over to third a Power or confer them elsewhere, but would exploit them for the benefit of the whole Persian nation, Russia renounced all concessions to individual Russians in Persia, and likewise made a present to the nation of the Orthodox Russian Missions and their property. The buildings were to be used by the Persian Government for State schools. Russia also renounced all privileges arising from the capitulations and consular jurisdiction in Persia.

This treaty meant the beginning of a new epoch for Persia, akin to that which was dawning in Turkey about the same time. There were no longer any foreign troops or officials on Persian soil. In consequence of the treaty with Russia the Persian Government announced that it no longer recognised the remaining capitulations and special privileges of Legations and consuls; it set Persian troops to guard the Legations. Foreign missions and other schools were placed under the control of the Persian Ministry of Education. Henceforward foreigners, too, were subject to taxation. The Russo-Persian Treaty was supplemented in November, 1921, by a Turco-Persian Treaty. In the changed circumstances, Parliament declared null and void the extension to Northern Persia of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession. In 1901 an Australian had obtained a concession to develop the oil-wells of Southern Persia, and this was subsequently exploited by the Burma Oil Company. In 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded with an initial capital of £2 millions. In 1914 the British Government invested a

further £2 millions in the Company, whose capital was raised in 1919 to £20 millions; of this the British Government took up £5 millions. In 1920, when the whole of Persia was under British influence, the North Persian Oil Company was founded as a daughter company to the Anglo-Persian, but the Persian Parliament would not recognise the extension of the English concession to Northern Persia.

The leader in this effort to assert Persia's national independence and to reorganise the State was Riza Khan. He had formerly been an ordinary Cossack in the Persian Cossack Brigade, but since the *coup d'état* of 1921 he bore the title Serdar-i-Sipah and filled the post of War Minister. In October, 1923, a plot against Riza Khan was hatched by the Court Party, led by Gawam-es-Saltaneh, a former Premier, but ended in failure. Thereupon Riza Khan himself assumed the Premiership and the Shah was compelled to go abroad. Riza Khan was now dictator in Persia. His aim was to make it a Republic with himself as President. The army officers were with him, and the fact that the Shah was far from popular seemed to favour his scheme. But Persia was not yet ripe for a Republic. In March, 1924, when the Persian Parliament assembled again, some of the populace led by the mullahs demonstrated against the creation of a Republic. A few days later Riza Khan visited the chief Mujtahids in Qum, and declared publicly after his return that to abolish the monarchy would be dangerous to Persia. Thus Riza Khan's effort to follow the example of Mustafa Kemal failed. The principal opponents of any such modern developments in Persia are the religious teachers and judges, who still wield great authority in the land and who fear any such process of westernisation as Turkey has undergone in recent years, lest it should have repercussions menacing to their own position and to the scope of religious authority in public life. In spite of the prolific growth of the Press, public life and administration in Persia, the position of women and even industrial organisation have undergone no process of westernisation in recent years. But Riza Khan has succeeded in attaining the goal towards which the first Persian Parliament strove; he has won Persian independence, consolidated domestic unity, reduced the State finances to order, and created a modern army. In November, 1922, an

American expert with far-reaching powers undertook the direction of Persian finances at the invitation of Parliament, and he soon succeeded in presenting a budget with no deficit, for the first time in the recent history of Persia. He scored this triumph in spite of the fact that at the same time Persia's first modern and reliable army was being created by her own efforts, comprising artillery, aircraft, and tanks. Garrisons of the newly organised army were sent to all the large towns, and the northern and central area of upland plateau of Iran was subjected to strong Government control.

It remained for Riza Khan to subdue the south to obedience to the central Government. The Sheikh of Mohammerah, who had hitherto enjoyed British protection and whose possessions on the Persian Gulf in the neighbourhood of the oil-fields were of great importance, was reduced to subjection. Persian Government troops were sent as garrisons to the larger towns of the south-west. From Southern Persia Riza Khan made a pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of the Shiites, Karbala and Najaf, and so conciliated the clergy. His return journey to Tehran became a triumphal progress. He was acclaimed as the restorer of Persian unity and the saviour of his country. On October 31st, 1925, Parliament declared by eighty votes to five that the existing Kajar dynasty had forfeited the crown, and deposed the Shah, who was abroad. Riza Khan was elected as Chief of State, and shortly afterwards he ascended the throne as Shah Pehlevi I. His name recalls the days of Persia's ancient greatness and the splendour of Zoroastrian literature. Alike in administration, transport, and all departments of life, Persia is becoming rapidly modernised. A modern, centralised, national State on the European model is in process of formation; finance, the army, transport, and administration are being transformed accordingly, the influence of religion is checked, whilst the abolition of the capitulations and the subjection of the feudal lords mark the country's progress towards full national sovereignty. Outward forms are affecting the people's inner life and modifying their customs and conventions. The future will show whether the new national ruler will succeed in effecting a profound reform of Persian public life and so ensuring the country's full independence, and whether the new nationalism, which as yet has gained hold only of a

small upper class, can find in memories of the past the inspiration of a new cultural springtide.

Afghanistan even at the beginning of the twentieth century was still more shut off than Persia, and far less accessible to Western influence. But even this wholly primitive and mediæval country has taken the first steps on the road to westernisation in recent years, particularly under the influence of the Russian Revolution. The Afghan tribes, warlike and barbarous, have always been animated by a spirit of primitive nationalism and independence.

In Afghanistan, likewise, it was Napoleon's scheme of an advance towards India which first brought the country into the public arena of European policy. The nineteenth century was a period of disorder and chaos in Afghanistan, which remained a buffer State between British India and Russian Asia.

In 1880 Abdur Rahman became Emir of Afghanistan. He found it a feudal State almost without central authority, where tribal particularism and the chieftains' feuds made all orderly government impossible. With ruthless ferocity Abdur Rahman created a unitary State and gave it a strong central Government and army. He proved a good lawgiver and endeavoured to establish a modern administrative machine of incorruptible officials; nevertheless, the ruler's despotism, the ferocity and arbitrariness of the criminal code, and the economic system remained altogether mediæval in character.

In its domestic affairs Afghanistan was independent, but in its foreign relations it was under British protection; all its communications with foreign Powers were made through the Indian Government, nor was the Emir of Afghanistan allowed to send ambassadors abroad or to receive the envoys of foreign Governments in his own country. Abdur Rahman's son, Habib Ullah, who succeeded him in 1901, tried to achieve his father's aim and win complete independence for his country. Although the British Government conceded the title of Majesty to him in 1905, Afghanistan's foreign relations remained under a virtual British protectorate. During the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the World War, the Emir tried to effect a number of modern technical reforms, modelled on what he had seen on a visit to British India. The telegraph and telephone were introduced, roads were

constructed, factories and schools opened, and the army reorganised under the direction of Turkish officers. Pan-Islamic propaganda achieved great success in Afghanistan. On the occasion of the Turkish war against Italy, and later against the Balkan States, the Afghan people testified in various practical ways to their fellow-feeling with the Mohammedan Empire, and during the World War the mood of the people as a whole was favourable to a declaration of war on the side of Turkey. But the Emir preserved his country's strict neutrality. Perhaps it was in consequence of this that he was murdered in February, 1919. Under his successor, Aman Ullah Khan, a period of reforms imposed from above began in Afghanistan, similar to what Peter the Great attempted in Russia and the Turks in their country. The object of these reforms was to enable a land that had hitherto excluded all foreign influence, and even all foreign visitors, a land deep in the heart of an undeveloped continent and far from any great lines of communication, to take its place in the ranks of the independent nations of the modern world. The process of modernisation and westernisation has not yet penetrated deeply; it has affected only the Court Party, the officers, and the minute but growing class of intellectuals. And Afghanistan has learnt from revolutionary Russia far more than from British India. In the neighbouring province of Turkistan, inhabited by a population just as persistently mediæval and Oriental as the Afghans, Mohammedan national People's Republics have been established which entered the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and this has rendered possible an exemplary interpenetration of West and East. "The country is developing, new possibilities open out daily as a result of its labours, but it is not being Europeanised. We are spared the wretched spectacle of a bastard colonial civilisation in Western Turkistan. The reason is that Soviet Russia has grasped the value of the tribal community and has made it the basis of the constitution. The division of the country into separate republics was based not upon ethical considerations alone, it did not merely imply a realisation of the ideal of the self-determination of the peoples—being, therefore, exceedingly unpleasant to the Western Powers—but it was also an extremely astute political move, and therefore still more unpleasant to them. The

right of sovereignty was given up in exchange for security; subjects who might sooner or later become untrustworthy were turned into devoted friends, and an example was thus held up before all Islamic peoples. That Russia should liberate her own Islamic peoples was the most impressive form of propaganda. She went further. At first the new frontiers followed the old, historic line based upon dynastic considerations. Now State frontiers follow tribal boundaries. This ensured internal stability. The percentage of Islamic administrative officials is very high. The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries—that is, the President of the State—is Feisulla Khojayevev, a young, clever, and energetic Bukharan with legal training. But the people were almost entirely unprepared for their new responsibilities, and the fact that the administration works on the whole as well as it does argues an extremely versatile mind. We still hear in many an out-of-the-way corner the meaningless gabble of the Koran schools, formerly the only instruction imparted to the young. To-day the number of primary schools has been increased more than tenfold, a Workers' College has been established where suitable proletarians are prepared for the University, the University of Tashkent maintains its high standard, and other colleges train teachers for the village schools—in the vernacular, of course. These vernacular tongues are coming into general use and beginning to oust Russian as official languages. There is of course an entire Islamic literature and Press, for nowhere in the whole world is there probably such a rage for reading as in Russia to-day. Foreign literature is welcomed. The hardest task is to carry education and enlightenment to the women, for they live in absolute seclusion in their homes. The doctor meets with even stronger resistance than the teacher. But everywhere there are at least provisional itinerant hospitals and doctors who have been trained in Leningrad or Moscow at the expense of the State and are required to place themselves at the Government's disposal for some years. Graphic posters specially designed for the illiterate carry propaganda to the remotest village, especially on the subject of infant care; they are also an effective medium of instruction for the small peasantry, who have hitherto tilled their land by quite primitive methods, so that it yielded only a minimum of

absolute necessities. The area under cultivation is rapidly increasing, and there is talk everywhere of great schemes, of engineering expeditions to initiate large irrigation works in deserts, steppes, and marshland. What strikes the observer immediately is the great development of communications. A regular air service has been started from Bukhara to the hardly accessible districts on the Afghan frontier and to Khiva."¹ This picture of conditions in 1925 is proof enough to anyone who first visited Turkistan ten years earlier of the progress possible within a few years if it is uninterrupted and properly directed.

Afghanistan is advancing along similar lines. In April, 1919, Aman Ullah proclaimed Afghanistan's full independence, internal and external. That same month, in defiance of the existing system under which foreign relations were conducted exclusively through the Indian Government, he sent a mission to Moscow headed by Vali Mohammed Khan in order to enter into diplomatic relations with Russia. Reports of the action of the British Government in the Punjab in the spring of 1919 helped to inflame anti-British feeling in Afghanistan to the point of declaring a Jihad or holy war. In the short war which broke out the Afghans were repulsed after initial successes. In the Peace of Rawal Pindi of August 8th, 1919, England conceded formally and fully to the independent kingdom of Afghanistan freedom and self-determination in internal and foreign affairs. In the following year long-drawn-out negotiations took place between Afghan and English missions under Mahmud Tarzi and Sir Henry Dobbs respectively. Mahmud Tarzi had long been the leader of the Reform Party in Afghanistan. For years he had lived in Turkey, and then started editing a paper in Afghanistan, *Tiraj el Akbar*, which advocated national independence and opposed British influence, whilst at the same time it demanded reforms in internal administration and urged that the country should admit and absorb knowledge and enlightenment from across the frontiers. This was during Habib Ullah's reign, a weak ruler addicted to the delights of the harem. At first he looked with favour upon the establishment of schools, even including a secondary school with Indian teachers, but later he closed the schools and imprisoned the teachers,

¹ *Berliner Tageblatt*, January 22nd, 1926.

fearing a demand for constitutional reforms. The new Emir, however, made serious efforts to introduce reforms, and Mahmud Tarzi was his chief adviser. On November 22nd, 1921, the Anglo-Afghan treaty was concluded at Kabul. It satisfied all the ambitions of Afghanistan. For the first time the country was recognised as an absolutely independent sovereign State, no longer subject to British control in its foreign relations. Afghanistan had attained what Turkey and Persia attained about the same time.

A period of reform ensued, which received a special impetus from the negotiations with Russia. That country had recognised Afghanistan's full independence from the outset, sent an ambassador to Kabul, and immediately consented to the establishment of an Afghan consulate in Tashkent. On February 28th, 1921, the Russo-Afghan Treaty was signed in Moscow, by which the two States mutually recognised their full independence and agreed to enter into diplomatic relations. Russia obtained the right to establish five consulates in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan seven in Russia. Neither party was to conclude with third parties treaties which might be detrimental to the other. Article 7 reads: "The High Contracting Parties are in agreement respecting the liberation of the peoples of the East, in which matter the principle of independence must rest upon the general desires of each nation." In Article 9 Russia declared her readiness, in accordance with the general principles on which she based her policy, to return to Afghanistan those frontier territories that she had been forced to cede to Russia and Bukhara during the nineteenth century; in every case a plebiscite was to be taken. Russia likewise promised all manner of financial and technical assistance to Afghanistan. On March 1st, 1921, the Afghan Mission in Moscow concluded a Turco-Afghan Treaty with the Turkish Ambassador; the two Mohammedan peoples, both struggling for freedom, entered into an alliance and each engaged to support the other in case an imperialist Power, desiring to exploit the East, should attack either contracting party. The Afghan Mission then set out from Moscow to visit the countries of Europe and the United States of North America.

Afghanistan was now endeavouring to escape from its former seclusion and take part in the intercourse of the nations.

In 1920 a mission was despatched to Persia, where it was cordially received, and in October, 1920, treaties of alliance were concluded with China, France, and Italy. All these countries established embassies in Kabul, whilst Afghan ambassadors were sent to the capitals of Europe and the East. Russian, Turkish, French, and Italian officers, engineers, and teachers received appointments in Afghanistan. Assistance was given to develop the Press; in 1923 nine newspapers and journals were published in Kabul, and all higher officials were required to subscribe to two papers. In 1922 a constitution was promulgated which established a State Council and a Legislative Assembly to assist the Emir, and created Ministries in all departments. All over the country primary and secondary schools were opened, primary education was made compulsory, and admission to all the schools was made free. Special attention was to be paid to technical and educational training. Before long two colleges were opened, one with French teachers, the other with German. The sons of the royal house and a number of young men of the Afghan nobility were sent to study in France. Reforms were effected in taxation and administration, and in 1922 the first regular budget was drawn up. The legal system still rests upon Islamic religious law, the Sharia, but already the first steps have been taken in modern codification. Religious liberty was proclaimed for Hindus and Shiites, and on one or two occasions the Emir has himself attended their religious services. But the modern spirit of religious tolerance is a very new growth. Repeatedly in 1924 and 1925 members of the Ahmadiya sect were stoned for apostasy from Islam.

It is mainly with Russian assistance that Afghanistan is being developed technically and industrially. Ikbāl Ali Shah, a vehement opponent of revolutionary Russia, wrote in 1921 that it would be foolish to declare that the Bolsheviks had accomplished nothing useful in the Central Asiatic Emirates. Improvements had recently been introduced in the mines of Badakshan, where Russian engineers and mining experts were employed. Electric power had been installed in Paghmentale and the River Kunar was being used for its production. An extensive network of roads suitable for motor traffic was under construction, connecting Herat with Ferah

and Washir with Kandahar, and motor lorries were beginning to take the place of baggage animals. The roads were opening up districts hitherto regarded as too dangerous for the passage of merchants and caravans.

There can be no question of Marxian principles prevailing, but Russia's attitude is such that Afghanistan is likely to seek support in an increasing degree from the league of nationalities united in the Soviet Union. "The actual military menace of Bolshevism in India is a myth; the danger of revolutionary secret intrigue ranks hardly above the category of a nuisance, but Russian economic dominance, followed inevitably by political preponderance over the whole of Afghanistan, is, whether it be regarded as disastrous or the reverse, a possible development which cannot be disregarded."¹

The reform movement received a fresh impetus when the Afghan King and his consort visited Europe. The King's principal endeavour was to overcome Islamic prejudices and to modernise the position of women. But his too hasty attempts at reform roused opposition in conservative circles and obliged him to abdicate.

Even Afghanistan, therefore, is undergoing the transformation now proceeding in the East, as also is Mongolia, and as Tibet and Nepal may be perhaps within measurable time. The all-embracing history of the human race tends more and more to shed its light upon the most remote and hidden States, which are now taking their place in a world inseparably linked and a civilisation which, in spite of differences, is becoming more and more an indivisible unit. The process may continue for years, for decades; nevertheless, its pace is more rapid than often appears. In Turkey, in Persia, in Afghanistan, in all the States that have recently won their full independence, a new generation is arising under the authoritative guidance of leading statesmen, strong personalities with a clear vision of the goal before them. The horizon is broadening to an extent hardly imaginable a few years ago. People are absorbing the traditions of European civilisation as well as the experience yielded by the newly evolving political organisation in Russia, and are blending these with their hereditary Eastern culture,

¹ *Times*, May 24th, 1924.

whilst the outward forms assumed by that culture are themselves undergoing a transformation.

Nor is it only new peoples that are entering the orbit of this newborn human consciousness, but also new social classes and the popular masses. Education forms the foundation upon which the new Russia is built, and, in the opinion of the London *Times*, the Afghan Government is moving in the same direction. The progress made in education, it declares, can hardly be described as other than astonishing. Only a few years ago not a single boy was attending school in Afghanistan, and now the number runs into thousands, in addition to the two hundred students receiving their education in Europe; at the same time the problem of women's education—a thorny one in a country so reactionary and priest-ridden—is being tackled. Colleges have been established, and already young men are leaving them who are destined to provide the foundation of a new and better civil service and judiciary. Everything points to a realisation on the part of the authorities of the importance of education on a sound basis.

CHAPTER XI

INDIA'S AWAKENING

INDIA with its three hundred million inhabitants constitutes a geographical unit with clearly defined boundaries. On the north-east and north-west it is bounded by high mountains, on all other sides by the sea. For many thousands of years India has been one, not merely in a geographical sense, but in religion, civilisation, and customs. She has always felt herself to be an integral whole from the Himalayan heights to Ceylon. Her sentiment of unity has found expression in ancient songs and traditions. It already existed at the time of the Rigveda, and the Rishis of those days knew that all the lands watered by India's many rivers were one. Her most important places of pilgrimage are scattered over the whole country, and these have always been meeting-places where men from all over India gathered together on the roads and in the woods, and where they learned at the feet of their great teachers. True, India was not a national unit in the modern sense; that she only became through European influence in the nineteenth century. But she was one in the sense in which Catholic Europe was one in the thirteenth century. She was a unit without a history in the deeper sense and without the binding link of historical tradition. Modern Europe first taught her to recall romantic memories of past achievements and to believe, in defiance of history, in her connection with a past from which many generations now separate her. But a truer basis of unity than modern national sentiment was to be found in a common intellectual heritage, persisting through an unbroken tradition and moulding and permeating India's whole social life to the minutest detail, and in the peculiar contemplative piety which lies at the root of all the various forms of Hinduism.

The inhabitants of this sharply defined geographical unit are Hindus. They completely dominate India. Buddhism,

which broke away from the parent stem of Hinduism, never struck root and no longer survives in India. The sects of the Jains and Sikhs are numerically insignificant and are separated from the great Hindu community whence they sprang by artificial barriers rather than by essential characteristics. Hinduism, which is rather a way of life than a religion, has formed the indestructible basis of Indian unity for three thousand years. There are still savage and primitive tribes belonging to the childhood of the race and living in inaccessible parts that are beyond its pale; but the country is so vast, and they are so unconcerned with all that the country has created, that they do not count.

India has always been conscious of her oneness. She did not aspire to unity in the modern nationalist sense; no such conception existed formerly nor any model, and India lacked the prerequisite of political union. Twice she was united politically, once under the Maurya dynasty in the third century before the Christian era, and once in the Gupta empire in the fourth century after Christ. Certain kings of these dynasties, of whom we hear from Greek and later from Chinese sources, exhibited a talent for government rare in world history; among them was Asoka, king and sage, unequalled except, perhaps, by Akbar, a later Indian emperor. But Indians are deficient in the historical sense, and little is known of these dynasties except through foreign observers; the Greek Megasthenes describes the contemporary political and social life of India and is filled with admiration for the exalted civilisation of this alien people. But political activities meant little to the Hindu; dynasties came into power and fell from power, empires arose and broke up, yet history leaves them unrecorded and they never affected India's real life and her profounder unity.

India, moreover, had no single language. Even her modern nationalism was not built upon a common vernacular like that of Germany or Italy. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, arguing in favour of German nationalism, started from the vitality of the German language. Jakob Grimm, at the end of the introduction to his German Dictionary, could say with truth: "German fellow-countrymen, whatever your political allegiance, whatever your religious faith, enter the portals of your ancient hereditary language that stand open

to you all, learn it and hold it sacred and cleave to it; your national vigour and survival depend upon it." True, India possessed a common classical sacred language, but at the present time a number of languages are spoken, some twelve of which are important on account of the numerical strength and the position of the populations that use them. But the sentiment of unity has no more been checked by this linguistic variety than it was in Catholic Europe of the Middle Ages. When, however, European domination in the nineteenth century roused India to modern, political, national consciousness, it not only united those who were animated by the new nationalism in a single political organisation, but likewise supplied the unifying language.

Into this united Hindu India Islam burst in the twelfth century of the Christian era. Doubtless it influenced Hinduism as Hellenism had done fifteen hundred years earlier. But Hinduism remained untouched in its essence. Islam was no alien element in India. The invading Mohammedans remained and became Indians. They established powerful Indian kingdoms. Their rulers united India and gave her a history. The greatest of them, Akbar, recognised no distinction between Mohammedans and Hindus; he married Indian princesses, and attracted Hindus to his court and into his army equally with Mohammedans. Religious differences vanished in the presence of his enlightened humanism, as did racial differences at the touch of his brilliant statesmanship. He founded a new religion which was to unite eclectically Hinduism and Islam.

Some of the Mohammedans in India are the descendants of alien races, but a large number are Hindus converted to Islam. They have retained their old customs and habits, and Islam in India is largely Hindu in character. The majority of Indian Mohammedans speak Urdu, a dialect of Hindustani written with Arabic characters. There is no difference of language between Hindus and Mohammedans. They mingle politically, moreover. In Kashmir, an Indian Mohammedan State, the royal house is Hindu. Hyderabad, the largest Indian State ruled by a native prince, has a preponderance of Hindu inhabitants, whilst the ruler and the nobility are Mohammedan and the Premier is a Hindu. Jaipur, with a Hindu population and ruler, has a Moham-

medan Premier; and in Baroda, the largest Hindu State, the Chief Justice is a Mohammedan. Ancient India was always tolerant. Sir Valentine Chirol observes that the dissolution of the Christian and Jewish communities in Southern India does not appear to have begun until the first Portuguese interlopers arrived from Europe, and that their invasion destroyed the peace and toleration enjoyed by Christians and Jews in the days of undisturbed Hindu rule. To-day there are some seventy million Mohammedans in India, as against two hundred and twenty million Hindus.

Both sections of this strange uniform Indian world, the Hindu and the Islamic, were in a state of decadence in the eighteenth century when they came in contact with a new force that was to affect their future destiny more decisively than their earlier contacts with Hellenism and with Islam. "It has been observed that whenever the life of people grew stagnant in this country owing to the prevalence of stereotyped customs for long ages, influences have come from outside to turn topsy-turvy our long-standing conventions and awaken our intellectual consciousness to the realisation of truths of an opposite nature, completely lost sight of, in our zeal to follow the footprints of our forefathers."¹ India came in contact with modern Europe, and, moreover, with the nation that typified modern Europe earliest and most perfectly, with England. India was the first Eastern country in which this connection led to something more than mere outward, mechanical assimilation. She was the first Eastern country to come in contact with European education and European customs, as well as European diplomacy. At the same time European influences did not descend, as in Turkey and Egypt, upon a people without a past, or at least without a still vital and active past; contemplative speculation was still a living force in India, and had done more to mould the three thousand years of Indian history than any outward events. The encounter of the Anglo-European world with the Indo-Oriental was an event of importance to the Mohammedans of Western Asia, who soon saw that the Indian Mohammedans were the most advanced in Islam; it was of importance, too, to the whole

¹ *Bengali Prose Style*. By Rai Sahib Dinesh Chandra Sen, Calcutta, 1921.

of Buddhist Eastern Asia, where European influence, principally Anglo-Saxon, penetrating at a much later date, came upon an intellectual tradition and discipline akin to India's, especially in China.

The encounter of England and India had, in addition to its significance in the region of the mind, a further political significance. The most far-reaching enterprise of modern Imperialism and the most magnificent achievement of statesmanship developed in this vast country inhabited by one-fifth of the human race. The Romans possessed in their Empire a coherent whole, which ceased to be when Roman civilisation dissolved in a blend of Hellenistic - Oriental cultures. But India is separated from Great Britain by lands and seas, and the English character has remained absolutely unaffected by Indian customs. On the other hand, India has exercised a decisive influence on England's foreign policy in the past century and a half. Lord Curzon, who as Viceroy of India had always directed British Imperial policy towards a secure hold on India, was right when he said in 1909, in the course of a lecture in Edinburgh: "Consider in the first place what a part India has played in the shaping of British policy and the expansion of the British dominion. It has been the determining influence in every considerable movement of British power to the east and south of the Mediterranean. The Eastern question of the Middle Ages was merely the recovery of the Holy Places from infidel hands. But once we had planted ourselves in India, the Eastern question, though it revolved round Constantinople, was in reality directed by considerations of the security of our Indian possessions. But for India, Lord Beaconsfield would not have bought the shares in the Suez Canal; and but for the Suez Canal, we should not now be in Egypt. The historic rivalry and struggles with Russia for nearly a century sprang from the supposed necessity of keeping her far away from the frontiers of India. Had it not been for India, we should never have seized the Cape nor begun that career of South African expansion that has lately entered upon so remarkable and pregnant a phase."¹ For India's sake England strove to retain command of the seas, for India's sake she

¹ *The Place of India in the Empire.* By Lord Curzon of Kedleston. Murray, 1909, p. 9.

fought Napoleon, Russia, and Germany. Her conquests in Africa and Asia served to protect the routes to India by sea and land and air.

But in the things of the mind it was India alone that received and England that gave. British rule marked a new epoch in Indian history, and educated Indians attained to a new political consciousness. Yet England was represented in India by the merest handful of her people, who lived in towns of their own, retained the customs that they brought from home, and came in contact with the millions of India only in their capacity of controlling bureaucracy. Like every bureaucracy, the Anglo-Indian rulers were filled with a sense of their consummate patriarchal merits and their unchanging vocation to direct a politically immature and incompetent people for their own good. For this reason the English civil servants in India were opposed on principle to any form of parliamentary government or democracy. For parliamentary government means discussion; but to discuss with the Indians what was required for their well-being was a step to which the bureaucracy could not make up its mind, for it believed exclusively in government by command. Herein the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy resembled all bureaucracies in the whole world. "Naturally the bureaucrats were the most impassioned opponents of the parliamentary system. The best of them regarded the people as children whose interests they, as guardians, had to protect. When the people clamoured for parliamentary representation, and when their elected representatives took upon themselves the leadership in public affairs, it seemed to these bureaucrats half madness, half an infringement of sacred rights. The struggle for full parliamentary government is a struggle between the bureaucracy and the people's representatives, far more than between the Crown and the people."¹ It was not through the English bureaucracy that British political ideas made progress in India, but in its teeth. The medium through which they reached the Indian people was the education in the English methods, which the English Government introduced about the middle of the nineteenth century. This measure, initiated primarily by Lord Macaulay, originated in a misunderstanding and under-

¹ M. J. Bonn.

valuation of the Indian character; it led to the neglect of the indigenous languages and checked the natural development of an education founded on inherited culture; nevertheless, it was of unique and decisive importance in drawing the East closer to Europe and bringing a new epoch to birth in Asia.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century English education in India was conducted by English missionaries, usually in the teeth of opposition by the Anglo-Indian Government. In 1817 David Hare, an Englishman who had made India his home, together with Ram Mohun Ray, the first apostle of enlightenment in India, founded the Hindu College in Calcutta, with the object of educating the sons of distinguished Hindus in the English and Indian languages and the literature and science of Asia and Europe. It was a free-thinking school where particular attention was devoted to the training of the critical faculty. In addition there was the Serampore College founded by Carey and two other Baptist missionaries in 1818, and a College founded in 1830 by Alexander Duff, a Scotchman, with the support of Ram Mohun Ray; both of the latter were concerned to make themselves a medium of Christian teaching. These schools were conducted in English, for at that time the vernacular dialects had not become living literary tongues, nor had they been so far developed as to be a possible medium of scientific instruction. The languages of culture were still the classical tongues, Sanskrit among the Hindus and Persian at the Mohammedan courts. It was actually English scholars and Christian missionaries who gave the impetus by which the native vernacular dialects were developed into modern literary languages. They translated European books into the native tongues, created new forms of expression, and compiled dictionaries. The vernacular literature hitherto had comprised nothing but stilted verses; these men introduced a simple and natural prose style and the forms familiar in Western literature. It was John Gilchrist, Principal of the Fort William College in Calcutta, who initiated this process in Hindustani and Urdu literature, with the help of a staff of European assistants. And it was the printing press attached to his College that first printed books in the vernacular. Bengali literature underwent a similar develop-

ment. The rebirth of these popular tongues was akin to the process through which other Eastern European and Oriental languages passed. The traditional style was overburdened, packed with allegories and metaphors. Slowly it recovered its simplicity, and the languages of popular speech and of literature began to merge and unite. With the introduction of printing a vernacular press developed; it made rapid advance in India as early as 1860, considerably earlier than in other Eastern countries.

The principal modern lyric poet in Urdu was Syed Altaf Husain Hali, a supporter of Sir Ahmed Khan's reform movement, who broke away from the conventional forms of traditional versification under Western influence. His poem *Ebb and Flow in Islam* exercised an extraordinary influence, spreading progressive ideas amongst the Mohammedans of India. He pointed to Islam's past greatness, the sources of its power, and its present decadence. He was severe in his criticism of his fellow-countrymen's backwardness, and advocated reforms and education. A few years later, writing of his own activities, he said that if the movement had begun fifteen years earlier, it would probably have borne no fruit, for at that period Urdu poets thought that fanciful love-songs and exaggeration were an essential element in poetry, whilst the portrayal of real life and fact was incompatible with true poetry. These men knew nothing of Western poetry, which might have taught them something. Modern Urdu poetry had its birth at the moment when the spirit of the West entered into the Urdu language. A number of books and essays had been translated from English and many others were in process of translation. Slowly the people came to accept Western literary style. In 1872 Sir Syed Ahmed Khan had begun to issue his paper *Tahzib ul Ahlaq* (The Refinement of Customs), which had brought about a rapid change in the ideas of Mohammedans with literary interests. They had come to regard the earlier Urdu and Persian styles as unnatural and contemptible, and had begun to despise the poetic art. There had been at that time no good Urdu imitations of Western poetry. But sometimes a small impetus sufficed. Faint as was the melody coming from the West, it had yet been enough to inspire the seekers after new ways and stir their enthusiasm.

At first the old metres were retained and only given a new content, but later experiments were tried in the adaptation of new measures. There were even attempts to write drama in blank verse. But the greatest change was in prose style. Until European influence made itself felt there had been no imaginative prose literature. The first Urdu novel in the European style appeared in 1879, and a native drama soon evolved which for the most part remodelled European themes transplanted to Eastern soil. At the turning of the century there was a change, too, in the subject-matter of poetry. Rationalist tendencies gave way to nationalism: the greatest living Urdu poet, Iqbal, is a bard of Pan-Islamism.

Bengali literature received a like impetus. In 1845, at a memorial service for David Hare, a speech was made for the first time in Bengali, and the next speaker approved the innovation, combated his companions' prejudice against their mother tongue, and stressed the necessity and importance of cultivating the Bengali language, the language of their country, of their childhood, in which their earliest thoughts and ideas had been couched. Bengali literature, newly evolved under English influence, turned much earlier than Urdu literature along the paths of modern patriotism. The language took a new lease of life and became a flexible medium. The first classic writers, such as Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Bengali's greatest novelist, and Dina Bandha Mitra, the father of Bengali drama, were gathered together in the service of journals and periodicals. In 1872 Bankim Chandra Chatterjee founded a review, *Banga Darsan*, in which the great literature of Bengal appeared, whilst the editor severely criticised the poverty of the literature formerly produced. Tagore in his *Reminiscences* says of this journal that it was bad enough to be obliged to wait till the next monthly instalment appeared, but to wait still longer till one's elder brothers had read it was simply unbearable. The editor of this journal was also the author of the most popular Bengali novel, *Ananda Math*, which became the Bible of modern Bengali patriotism. Its plot dealt with a revolt against Moghul rule in the seventeen-seventies. The rebels in the story are called children of the mother country, identified with the great, mysterious goddess Kali, whose temple is

near Calcutta. Ananda Math is the monastery where the monks declare that they know no mother but their mother country, where they sing to guests the *Bande Mataram*, which was later to become the national anthem of the Indian nationalist movement. The hero vows at the end to devote himself to the service of the Mother. The Indian revolutionary patriotic associations, which first sprang up in Bengal, regarded this book as their Bible and its hero as their model. The oath sworn by the hero of the book in Ananda Math was repeated by many a young Bengali. The new Bengali literature proved a powerful force in arousing modern Indian nationalist sentiment.

Thus the influence of English education and culture permeated the small upper class to which it came direct; but thence it penetrated the vernacular and affected wider circles. There was yet another European source from which India derived inspiration as she awoke to the consciousness of her past. It was European, principally English, scholars who studied the languages and culture of ancient India and rediscovered past wisdom not only for Europeans, but for the Indians themselves. They themselves came to know and value their ancient culture anew through the labours and appreciation of these scholars. By a like process Western European scholars recalled to life the ancient works of the Greek intellect without any co-operation from the Greek people themselves, until Karaïs, who lived in Paris and studied under Western scholars, restored their ancient classics to the Greeks and so created the principal groundwork of modern Hellenistic romanticism among the Greek people, which certainly led to Pan-Hellenic Imperialism, but culturally was something of an illusion.

The first attempt to clothe colonial Imperialism and dominance as such with a profounder meaning and a moral justification, in theory at least, was the fruit of British rule in India. Towards the close of the eighteenth century men such as Fox and Burke were already raising the question of the nature and justification of colonial rule in the English Parliament, and it came to be realised that, as Burke claimed, "all political power which is set over men ought to be some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit." Already authority was defined as a "trust," a relation based on

confidence, protection regarded as a duty, like the relation of guardian and ward. "It is of the very essence of every trust to be rendered accountable. . . . To whom then would I make the East India Company accountable? Why, to Parliament to be sure; to Parliament, which alone is capable of comprehending the magnitude of its object, and its abuse; and alone capable of an effective legislative remedy."¹

In modern Europe England is the home of the spirit of enlightenment and humanity, though it may actually inspire only a minority of the English people. We have seen how a hundred and fifty years ago that spirit established the principles upon which the League of Nations' mandatory ideal ought to be founded, attenuated though they may there appear, and too little regarded as a serious reality.

At first India was ruled by the East India Company, but after 1784 the Company was subjected to the absolute control of the English Parliament, which actually exercised its authority in many cases. The Indian Mutiny of 1857 was the cause of India's transition to direct administration under the British Crown. The bloody rising of 1857, which developed into a war waged with great cruelty on either side, was regarded by the English as a military mutiny. In truth it was a nationalist war fought to secure independence, and though it was confined to particular parts of India it nevertheless provided the spectacle of Hindus and Mohammedans in willing co-operation. When the Mutiny had been suppressed with mediæval ferocity it left much bitterness on both sides. True, the proclamation announcing that the English Government was undertaking the direct administration of India reiterated the principles of English Liberalism and acknowledged the duty of leading India towards the goal of national self-determination with English help and guidance. But there were no signs of an Indian nationalist movement in the succeeding years. The Anglo-Indian bureaucracy ruled two-thirds of India more despotically than in the days of the East India Company's control through the British Parliament, whilst one-third remained under Indian princes. The princes were the allies of the Anglo-Indian Government, the conduct of their foreign policy passed altogether to its

¹ Burke's speech of December 1st, 1783, on Mr. Fox's East India Bill.

control, whilst in domestic affairs the princes retained a varying degree of independence.

It was not till after 1870 that Indian nationalism entered a new phase of development. The Press, the theatre, and the secret revolutionary societies were especially active in Bengal in forwarding nationalist aims. The lives of Garibaldi and Mazzini were translated, whilst the goal of national liberation was proclaimed in such works as *The History of India gained in a Dream*, and in romantic political songs and tales. Vernacular newspapers, like *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, edited by Sisir Kumar Ghose, adopted a sharper tone in criticising the Government, so that a special Press Law was promulgated in 1879 under Lord Lytton. About this time India's ancient religions began to awaken to new life.

But side by side with romantic and religious nationalism, another type gave evidence of far greater vigour; it was guided by men who regarded Western influence and British rule as a benefit to India, who worked zealously on behalf of liberal and enlightened social reforms, and made it their aim to secure by peaceful means the increasing participation of Indians in the government of their country, and to blend Western, European culture with the traditional Indian character. This movement had its origin among men who had enjoyed an English education and had come in contact with European civilisation, so that India's mediævalism struck them as backward and barbaric. Their liberal nationalism received a stimulus when a Liberal Government succeeded the Conservatives in 1880 and the Marquis of Ripon was sent to India to take Lord Lytton's place, with the object of initiating a more liberal régime in India. He introduced a Bill known as the Ilbert Bill with the object of putting Europeans and Indians on an equality in criminal proceedings. The Bill was greeted enthusiastically by the Indians, but the English residents in India opposed it vehemently; it was the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy and the Anglo-Indian Press that defeated Lord Ripon's good intentions and the Ilbert Bill, evoking the bitterest racial hostility by their manner of discussing and opposing it. The English threatened to use force to prevent the Ilbert Bill from becoming law, and attacked the Viceroy's Liberalism far more

furiously than their Indian opponents. Since those days the racial hostility and hatred of the English in India towards the Indians has never varied, and has always managed to frustrate the liberal intentions of English Governments. But when Lord Ripon left the country the Indians gave him an ovation such as they have given no Viceroy before or since. The newspaper *Tut e Hind* of Meerut wrote on the occasion: "Ever since he set foot on Indian soil he has done his best to raise India from servitude and to confer upon her that freedom which all other countries throughout the world enjoy. Though his intentions have not been carried out in their entirety, for certain reasons, it is nevertheless clear that he has pushed open a door which future rulers will be able to use." And the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of Calcutta wrote: "India is a land where it is impossible for men like Lord Ripon to remain. The atmosphere is stifling to his lofty soul. It is true that Lord Ripon has been able to do little for India, but he has done much for the English people and for those who rule India. He has proved beyond all question that even an Englishman can be selfless and can genuinely love the people of a conquered country. He has proved that even a Governor-General of India can be fully sensible of the intolerably oppressive spirit of Anglo-Indian society."

What happened under Lord Ripon's rule was characteristic of the changed attitude of the Indian Civil Service. Sir Henry J. Cotton, in commenting on this period, emphasises the fact that formerly Anglo-Indian officials had been proud of their racial impartiality and of defending native rights against white merchants and colonies. As late as 1875 Lord Salisbury, in an address to the candidates for the Indian Civil Service, said that no system of government could be lasting if rulers and ruled were divided by a feeling of inferiority and humiliation. He had nothing more urgent to say to those who were going out to rule India than that, if they so elected, they would themselves be the only enemies whom England need fear. They it was, if they so elected, who could deal the deadliest blow to England's future rule. John Stuart Mill, in the remarkable eighteenth chapter of his *Representative Government*, which first appeared in 1861, rightly stressed the fact that the Europeans in the

colonies are the greatest obstacle in the path of a Government which endeavours to rule in the liberal spirit demanded by the Government or by public opinion at home. About this time racial sentiment had become so strong in India that civil servants and merchants felt themselves united in opposition to native claims and interests.

Meanwhile, under the influence of European education a generation had grown up in the Indian upper classes, especially among the Hindus, which thought in terms of English ideas, was proud of its Western education, and earnestly desired to lead India gradually towards European enlightenment and European customs. True, only a tiny fraction of the upper classes were thus westernised, and Indian life as a whole remained unaffected. The leaders of the English speaking and English taught classes, comprising the wealthier middle classes, the lawyers, and the merchants rather than the landed aristocracy, founded the Indian National Congress in the eighties to represent their views, inspired and helped by a few English Liberals. The Congress first met in Bombay on December 28th, 1885. Its aim was not to oppose British rule in India, for that was readily accepted and its benefits approved, but rather to secure a share in the administration of the British Empire for educated Indians who had become in a sense an integral part of British civilisation, and to promote the well-being of India and the British Empire through mutual understanding by tendering constant advice to the British overlords. The negative and suspicious attitude of the Anglo-Indians towards the Indian National Congress and its aspirations forced the Congress into the position of an opposition, making perpetual demands and criticisms, but even so what it opposed was not the principle of British rule in India, but the despotism of the bureaucracy. It was very much like the struggle of the westernised Liberals in Russia about the middle of the nineteenth century against Tsarism and autocracy. But the liberal opposition in Russia had no representative assembly and no common mouthpiece, whilst in India the opposition had the Congress as a rostrum for its attacks upon the bureaucracy. In the Congress Indian claims were voiced and a political nationalist public opinion was moulded which, through all the vicissitudes of the forty years that have since elapsed, nevertheless

traces its origin to that same Congress born of English influence and English education.

The Congress was the first all-Indian demonstration of nationalist sentiment. Here, for the first time in her history, was an assembly which, at least in theory, represented the whole of India, and that alone was an important step in awakening Indian national consciousness. At the same time the Congress, in theory at least once more, was a democratic assembly representing the nation and therefore a cornerstone of India's education in Western political thought. Though the vast majority of the members of the Congress were Hindus, there were nevertheless representatives of Mohammedans, Englishmen, and Parsees. Between 1885 and 1914 three Mohammedans, four Englishmen, and one Parsee occupied the chair, one Englishman twice, and the Parsee three times. And to be Chairman of the Congress was to receive the highest political honour that modern India could confer.

At that time several Indians had already developed the idea of an Indian National Congress. In 1883 Tara Pada Banerjee had proposed establishing a National Congress and a National Fund to finance its policies and enable it to maintain a permanent representative in London and political emissaries in all parts of India, and to promote national education, industry, and trade by means of newspapers, books, lectures, and other methods. But the actual creator of the Indian National Congress was an Englishman, Allan Octavian Hume, the son of the well-known English Radical Joseph Hume. Allan Hume had belonged to the Indian Civil Service and had done much to spread radical Liberalism among the Indian people. The schemes that he had in mind in founding the Congress he elaborated three years later in a speech at Allahabad; Congress was to merge in one national whole all the different and hitherto hostile elements that make up the population of India; it was to direct the process of rebirth of the nation so evolved, intellectually, morally, socially, and politically, and to strengthen the tie that binds England and India by changing whatever is unjust or injurious to India. This he described as a far-reaching and lofty ideal which might seem Utopian and unpractical. The aim of Congress was to bring all India's leaders in touch

with one another, and so strengthen their sentiment of unity and train them politically.

At the first Congress in Bombay in 1885 only seventy-two delegates appeared, mainly lawyers, teachers, or journalists. Only two were Mohammedans. The invitation to attend the Congress declared: "Indirectly this Conference will form the germ of a Native Parliament, and, if properly conducted, will constitute in a few years an unanswerable reply to the assertion that India is still wholly unfit for any form of representative institutions." The President in his speech said that the aim of the Congress was "the eradication by direct friendly personal intercourse of all possible race, creed, or provincial prejudices amongst all lovers of their country, and the fuller development and consolidation of those sentiments of national unity that had their origin in their beloved Lord Ripon's ever memorable reign." England had given the Indians order, railways, mechanical improvements, and "above all . . . the inestimable blessing of Western education. But . . . the more progress the people made in education and material prosperity, the greater would be their insight into political matters and the keener their desire for political advancement."¹ Subramania Ayar of Madras, one of the chief pillars of moderate Liberalism in India, said at this Congress: "By a merciful dispensation of Providence, India, which was for centuries the victim of external aggression and plunder, of internecine wars and general confusion, has been brought under the dominion of the great English power. Gentlemen, I need not tell you how that event introduced a great change in the destiny of her people, how the inestimable good that has flown from it had been appreciated by them." (More than forty years later, as an old man, the same speaker addressed a letter to Wilson full of the bitterest reproaches and accusations against the English Government in India.)

At the second Congress, which met in Calcutta in 1886, 440 delegates appeared, including thirty-three Mohammedans. The President, Dadabhai Naoroji, said in his opening speech: "Let us speak out like men and proclaim that we are loyal to the backbone; that we understand the benefits English rule has conferred upon us; that we thoroughly appreciate

¹ *The Indian National Congress*. Madras, 1909.

the education that has been given us, the new light which had been poured upon us, turning us from darkness into light and teaching us the new lesson that kings are made for the people, not peoples for their kings; and this new lesson we have learned amid the darkness of Asiatic despotism only by the light of free English civilisation.”¹ This idea prevailed in Congress till the early years of the twentieth century. The Assembly increased its influence and became an important factor in Indian political life, but there was little change in its fundamental outlook. The Mohammedan landed nobility, men of conservative views, continued to hold aloof. A speech made by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in December, 1887, is characteristic of their attitude. Speaking at a meeting of Mohammedan notables at Lucknow whilst the All-Indian National Congress was in session, he said: “Let me briefly describe the methods of rule adopted by our Government . . . to keep in its own hands all questions of foreign policy and all matters affecting the army. I hope that we, who are subjects of the Empire, will not seek to interfere in those matters which Government has set apart as its own. If Government fight Afghanistan or conquer Burma, it is no business of ours to criticise its policy. . . . But we are concerned with matters affecting internal policy. . . . Government has made a Council for making laws affecting the lives, property, and comfort of the people. For this Council she selects from all Provinces those officials who are best acquainted with the administration and the condition of the people, and also some *Raïses* who, on account of their high social position, are worthy of a seat in that assembly. Some people may ask—why should they be chosen on account of social position instead of ability? . . . I ask you—Would our aristocracy like that a man of low caste or insignificant origin, though he be a B.A. or M.A., and have the requisite ability, should be in a position of authority above them and have power in making the laws that affect their lives and property? Never! . . . None but a man of good breeding can the Viceroy take as his colleague, treat as his brother, and invite to entertainments at which he may have to dine with Dukes and Earls. . . . Can we say that the Government, in the method it has adopted

¹ *The Indian National Congress*. Madras, 1909.

for legislation, acts without regard to the opinions of the people? Can we say that we have no share in the making of the laws? Most certainly not.”¹ This was the attitude of a leading Mohammedan, a man of some enlightenment, towards the aspirations and claims of the Indian National Congress. He also supported the English on the ground that their Government was better for the Mohammedans than a Hindû Government. If the English were to leave India, a civil war would be inevitable to decide who should be the next ruler. His speech gave evidence of the Mohammedan contempt for the unwarlike Bengalis, who were the main support of the Congress. England, he declared, had conquered India, and must remain in India in the interests of peace. No victorious nation had ever granted self-determination and political freedom to subjected peoples. Such a thing ought not, therefore, to be demanded of the English. God had sent the English to India and established them as rulers. They must, therefore, be obeyed. This was the attitude of the Indian feudal nobility as well as the Mohammedan aristocracy, for the feudal lords began to assume the defensive at the prospect of a new national and democratic régime dominated by the educated middle class.

And it was in the middle class that the Indian Congress movement found its supporters, children of the nineteenth century who believed in the force of technical and social progress and in Europe, wealthy middle-class Liberals who shared the views of the English Mid-Victorians. Their teachers were Mill, Comte, Spencer, and Macaulay. Their leaders were clear-seeing, clear-thinking men, children of the rationalist movement, many of them distinguished and benevolent aristocrats. First among them was Ram Mohun Ray. In a sense they were *déracinés* whose home was Europe rather than India. They regarded Indian traditions and civilisation with a certain mistrust. Nevertheless, they were the creators of modern political India and helped to conciliate the antagonisms that blocked her path. They laid the foundation of a new India, looking out upon the whole world, reading, travelling, and observing much, translating much, and admitting the newest European theories and

¹ *Sir Syed Ahmed on the Present State of Indian Politics*. Allahabad, 1888.

tendencies. Hem Chandra Banerjee's words, written in 1886, give characteristic expression to the new consciousness of free world citizenship. Ride the waves of the sea, he said, climb to the summits of the mountains, steal the stars from the sky, and with both hands grasp the storm, the meteor, and the thunder-flash: then only dare to approach the labour of life. India's ancient bonds were beginning to snap. A new world was opening out.

The leaders of this generation, young men for the most part at that time, later became the exponents of so-called Indian Liberalism, the moderate, constitutional opposition. Among them were men like the Parsee Dadabhai Naoroji. Though they numbered barely a hundred thousand, the Parsees were an active community, pre-eminent as wholesale merchants, having their principal centre at Bombay. Naoroji had been a professor of mathematics and later a journalist, had played a leading part in the Indian National Congress movement, and had represented a London constituency as a Liberal in the English House of Commons. He died in 1917, an old man of ninety-two. Even the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, which does not look with favour upon the most moderate of Indian politicians, is compelled to say of him that the secret of his unique position as India's "Grand Old Man" and of the love cherished for him by his compatriots of all classes, lies in his moral strength, springing from a pure and simple life, and in his selfless devotion to his patriotic aim. Of his generation and of like character were Sir Pherose Shah Mehta, a Parsee, Sir C. Sankaran Nair, and Lord Sinha. Subsequently Lord Sinha made his peace completely with the Anglo-Indian administration. He was a successful barrister, and became legislative member in the Executive Council in 1909 and was the first Indian member of the Indian Government. During the war he was a member of the British Imperial War Cabinet, and in 1919 was raised to the peerage and appointed Under-Secretary for India in London. At the end of 1920 he became Governor of the Indian Province of Bihar and Orissa, and was the first Indian to fill such an office.

But the principal leaders of that generation were Surendra Nath Banerjee and Gokhale. Banerjee was the greatest orator of his generation, the Indian Gladstone as he was

called. In 1876 he founded the Indian Association in Calcutta, meaning that it should spread and embrace the whole country in its political organisation. Three years later he became editor of the *Bengali*, a paper round which the early nationalist movement rallied in Bengal. In 1890 he declared in a speech made in England: "We believe in our cause, we believe that persistency in constitutional agitation will culminate in the triumph of that cause, and above all we believe in the sense of justice and the sense of liberty of the English people. We shall, therefore, continue this agitation, and with your help and under God's Providence we are bound to win in the noblest contest that has ever warmed the hearts or inspired the energies of men."¹ (A declaration by the same speaker twenty-six years later at the Indian National Congress in Lucknow is illuminating as marking how times and ideas had changed. He was moving the resolution demanding self-government for India, and declared that they desired self-government for the loftiest purposes of national existence, for the moral elevation of the people. Political servitude caused moral degradation. The spirit, the mentality, of a free man were not those of a slave. A nation of slaves could never have produced a Patanjali, a Buddha, or a Valmiki. They demanded self-government in order to wash away the stain of political inferiority and to hold their heads high among the peoples of the earth, and in order to fulfil the great destiny appointed for them under the blessing of divine Providence. They desired self-government, not only in their own interest, but for the sake of mankind. Here we find, intermingled with a mode of expression still characteristically Victorian, all the conceptions of modern romantic nationalism adopted by India round about 1890. Nevertheless, the speaker remained true to his constitutional ideas, and in 1919 he became leader of the moderate Liberals in Bengal.) Like many others in his generation, Banerjee gave much thought to education. Early in the eighties he founded the Ripon College, independent of the Government; it began in a small way, but within a few years it had fifteen hundred scholars. Even in his later years, when he was a political orator and journalist (he died at a great age as

¹ *Speeches and Writings of Hon. Surendra Nath Banerjee*. Madras, p. 385.

editor of the *Bengali*, after filling a ministerial post in Bengal for a short time), he devoted much time and thought to the school. Subsequently he presented it to the Indian people with all its equipment and endowments.

Even more important as an educationalist was Gopal Krishna Gokhale. He was attached for eighteen years to Fergusson College in Poona, first as a teacher of history and economics, later as Principal. The teachers in this centre of national education undertook to teach there on a voluntary basis for twenty years. Gokhale's policy was moderate and constitutional, and to his mind it was a loftier mission to educate the people morally and guide them to intellectual maturity than to gain the substance and symbols of outward freedom. His incorruptible honesty won him the confidence of all classes. He was a champion of compulsory education in India. In 1905 he founded a society known as the Servants of India, which still continues under Srinivasa Sastri's leadership. Its task was to be to "train men prepared to devote their lives to the cause of the country," and to "promote, by all constitutional means, the national interests of the Indian people." According to the Society's programme, this could be attained only through "years of earnest and patient effort and sacrifices worthy of the cause. Much of the work must be directed toward building up in the country a higher type of character and capacity than is generally available at present." Only people of high standing and good education were admitted, but the Society opened its doors to all the creeds and races of India. It pursued the further aim of bringing together Hindus and Mohammedans. Young Hindus were sent to live among Mohammedans and render them loving social service. The Society's programme declared: "For some time past the conviction has been forcing itself on many earnest and thoughtful minds that a stage has been reached in the work of nation-building in India when, for further progress, the devoted labours of a specially trained agency, applying itself to the task in a true missionary spirit, are required. The growth during the last fifty years of a feeling of common nationality, based upon common traditions, common hopes and aspirations, and even common disabilities, has been most striking. The fact that we are Indians first, and Hindus, Mohammedans,

Parsees, or Christians afterwards, is being realised in a steadily increasing measure, and the idea of a united and renovated India . . . is no longer a mere idle dream of a few imaginative minds, but is the definitely accepted creed of those who form the brain of the community: the educated classes of the country. . . . But . . . the situation demands on the part of workers devotion and sacrifices proportionate to the magnitude of the task. . . . The goal . . . cannot be attained without years of earnest and patient effort. . . . Bitter disappointments will repeatedly try the faith of those who have put their hand to the work. But the weary toil can have but one end, if only the workers grow not faint-hearted on the way. One essential condition of success in this work is that a sufficient number of our countrymen must now come forward to devote themselves to the cause in the spirit in which religious work is undertaken. Public life must be spiritualised. Love of country must so fill the heart that all else shall appear as of little moment by its side."¹

Gokhale gathered disciples around him who were required to spend five years as learners before they were sent out to serve India in social and national labours of love. During these years they had to spend four months in the common home, six at work, and two alone. They were not required to renounce marriage, but they tended to lead a monastic life. Every member was required on admittance to renounce all self-interest, to lead a pure life, and to regard all Indians as brothers. He had to engage not to earn money but to live on the salary paid him by the Society—it amounted to £4 a month before the war—and to recognise no caste distinctions. The duties undertaken included popular and female education, assistance to the co-operative movement among peasants and workers, conducting classes to train secretaries for co-operatives, founding associations of social workers, and caring for the pilgrims at the great Indian festivals. Thus the self-sacrifice and asceticism of the East was linked with Western practical notions of social betterment in the spirit of a free, humanist religion.

But at the beginning of the eighteen-nineties there were signs of change in the character of Indian nationalism. The

¹ *The Servants of India Society*. Poona.

era of Liberalism under European influence came to an end; its leaders still represented the national movement in the eyes of the world; indeed the leadership in the Indian National Congress remained in their hands till on into the World War. But a new and younger generation arose that turned away from those leaders and their doctrines and attacked the positions they defended. As European nationalism struck deeper roots and grew more radical at the end of the nineteenth century, so Indian nationalism underwent a simultaneous and kindred change. The religious movements inspired by Dayananda, Ram Krishna, and Vivekananda roused the people's pride in ancient Indian civilisation and faith in its unique mission; they exhorted the people to steep their souls in the inherited wealth of Indian thought and urged them to compare it with present-day Europe, disparaging the shallowness and materialism of which modern Europe was held guilty. The younger generation looked with anger and scorn upon their elders' European habits of life and thought, impeached such a process of assimilation, as a betrayal of India's most sacred treasure, and attributed to it the decay of her greatness and her art. This rising generation likewise constituted a tiny minority of the people, the intellectual cream. English education and a knowledge of Europe had come to them as a matter of course, and not as the fruit of laborious struggle by which the preceding generation had won them. They turned away from the clarity and lucidity of the older leaders and from their circumspect habit of leaving things to mature. These younger men were all for storm and assault, they turned their faces towards the darkness and the instinctive forces which seemed to reach out hands to them from the country's primeval culture and which had invaded Europe in the philosophy of Schopenhauer and his disciples, Wagner and Nietzsche, and were now being voiced anew in Bergson's European philosophy. The ancient gods were called upon once more and entreated to drive out the alien powers which were sapping India's very marrow. Youth was as bitter against English rule as against the older generation. European national wars of liberation were studied and their example followed, Italy and Ireland were taken as models, and the biographies of Parnell, Garibaldi, and Kossuth were trans-

lated. Secret societies were formed as in revolutionary Russia and Ireland and Italy, and did not shrink from terrorist methods. People were no longer content with the speeches and protests of the older generation, they demanded deeds. Theirs was a romantic nationalism, with all the burning ardour of religious experience. The students were the heart and soul of the movement in India, as in all similar cases in Europe or Asia. But the leader of this new movement, the central figure of Indian nationalism, was Bal Gandagar Tilak.

Tilak was ten years older than Gokhale. Both came from the neighbourhood of Poona, in Central Western India, both were of the same caste, the Chitpavan Brahmans, who had been for decades the real rulers of the Maratha Empire founded by Sivaji in the seventeenth century in his struggle against the Mohammedans; he had dominated the whole west and a large part of the centre of the Indian peninsula. The real rulers in this Empire had been the Chitpavan Brahmans; from amongst their number the Peshwa or Minister was chosen, who had himself founded an hereditary dynasty of governing Ministers in Poona. Their possessions included the early English settlement of Bombay. It was not till the nineteenth century that the power of the Marathas was broken by the English.

Tilak's father had been a school inspector in Poona, and he gave his son a thorough grounding at an early age in Sanskrit and the Marathi language, spoken by some twenty million Indians. At the age of twenty, in 1879, Tilak completed his studies at the University with distinction. He had devoted himself principally to mathematics; three years later he completed his legal studies. He was particularly interested in the history of the Marathas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and their great and warlike past. He took a leading part in establishing secondary schools under Indian direction, and the celebrated Fergusson College, where Gokhale too was a teacher, was the fruit of his efforts. He taught jurisprudence there till 1890. He united with a number of friends to start a weekly journal, *Kesari* (The Lion), in Marathi. At the end of three years the paper had a circulation of four thousand, a very high figure for those days. He also started an English weekly, *Mahratta*.

These papers were established in 1880; ten years later Tilak was the sole proprietor and editor. They became the organ of his struggle against English rule, and particularly for the preservation of orthodox Hindu customs in the teeth of European influence. He was a jealous guardian of the ancient Brahman traditions and rights.

Ranade, one of the leaders of the older generation and pre-eminent as a champion of social reform on European lines, had related the history of this first national Hindu Empire in his *History of the Rise of the Maratha Empire*, telling how it had successfully resisted the Mohammedans and reviving the memory of Sivaji. In the first period of Tilak's activity, which was confined to the Maratha country and did not yet embrace all India, he laboured on behalf of popular education in a national spirit. The school which he founded in 1880, and which counted 858 pupils only four years later, served the ideal of inexpensive education accessible to all, as did the college founded a little later. Speaking of the aim of the school, he said that he had undertaken the task of popular education in the firm conviction and assurance that of all the motive forces of civilisation education alone brings material, moral, and religious regeneration to fallen peoples, and has power to raise them by a slow and peaceful revolution to the level of the most advanced nations. But strife arose in the school between Tilak and some of the teachers. The teachers were paid £2 a month, and when some of them tried to earn something more by subsidiary occupations, Tilak demanded that the money so earned should go into the common school funds. Tilak turned his back on education and devoted himself to politics.

And here he broke with all the traditions of previous Indian politicians. He opposed assimilation to Europe and social reforms. He regarded them as superficial patchwork. He adopted Vivekananda's thesis: I do not believe in reform, I believe in growth. To try to remedy minor abuses seemed to him a mistaken policy. Even Europe, set up as an example, was full of abuses. India's first duty was to consolidate her position and secure her national freedom, which was the preliminary condition of all social well-being. The greatest danger for a conquered nation was to disparage everything indigenous and admire everything alien. Former

political leaders in India, Tilak thought, had made this mistake. They had thought to inculcate independence and ability in India by adopting English views on manners and customs, the remarriage of widows, the education of women, and the abolition of caste, and so to substitute native for English rule. Tilak believed that all necessary reforms must be the spontaneous fruit of the Indian spirit and evolve gradually in a process of organic growth.

So Tilak brought about the breach. Hitherto Europe and England had been teachers and exemplars, destined to point the way to India out of mediæval darkness into the clear, bright air of modern enlightenment; now they become enemies threatening to stifle India's natural growth rooted in her own traditions and her ancient wisdom. The cheerful, liberal belief in progress is thrust aside, and instead men turn their faces to the past for inspiration and encouragement. The Middle Ages are seen illumined by a romantic glow, organic and ordered, whilst the modern era has nothing but disruption and chaos to offer. It is not so much the English that are objects of hatred and scorn as the older generation. For they have submitted to assimilation of the most dangerous kind, the assimilation of values, accepting alien standards. The previous generation had seen with English eyes, had felt Indian customs and culture to be barbarian, had been ashamed of them. To the rising generation the civilisation of their fathers appeared glorified and transfigured; not only were they proud of it, they exaggerated its significance. They read a new meaning into ancient religions and paid homage once more to the ancient gods. The unillumined masses were to them the source of power. The nation's intelligentsia had hitherto been estranged from the people; their European education and ideas had made a deep gulf, dividing them from their predecessors and from the masses; now they turned to the people again, just as the Narodniki had sought to do in Russia. Western tendencies were ousted by a romantic cult of Asia, like the Slavophilism of the Russians. Tilak led this movement. The rising generation looked to him as their teacher. Impelled by the spirit of the age and bound by the laws of an inevitable process of social evolution, laws whose action we can trace throughout the history of nineteenth-century nationalism, Tilak moulded

the new India and changed his fellow-countrymen's outlook profoundly. A far-reaching revolution took place in a quarter of a century. Social reforms acquired a new meaning. Indian nationalism learned a new speech. The Shastris and Pandits of to-day approve what would have wounded their susceptibilities profoundly a generation ago. The Asiatic cult has assumed new forms, corresponding to Europe's expressionist tendencies, her reaching out towards the mythical and primitive; the roots of nationalism struck deeper, men meditated upon its spiritual value, as is seen in the writings of Coomaraswamy and his contemporaries. And all this reached its climax in Gandhi's agitation. But simultaneously the process of assimilation to Europe continued unceasingly. In this way Indian nationalism became subject to an inconsistent and confused eclecticism, such as dominates European thinking to-day.

Tilak first entered the political arena in 1891. A Government Bill was under discussion, fixing a minimum age for marriage and introduced under pressure from the Indian social reformers. The Age of Consent Bill sought to fix twelve years as the minimum. Early marriages were customary in India, as everywhere in the East, and were injurious alike to social well-being and to health. Indian orthodoxy and the popular masses were hostile to the new Bill, which seemed calculated to shake the very foundations of existing religious customs. Tilak led this opposition. For the first time orthodox reaction had found a leader from among the intellectuals with European education. He opposed the introduction of reforms through the laws of an alien bureaucracy; he was confident that life itself and its actual needs would lead gradually to the results which the law sought to establish. They ought not, he said, merely to consider what reforms were needed, but also whether and by what means they could be made practicable and popular. For if they desired to reform society they must be careful not to create a gulf between the people on the one hand and the reformers on the other. They must always have public opinion behind them, and that could only be if, as one condition, they secured the sanction of religion for their reforms.

As a journalist Tilak endeavoured to teach manliness to the people and to stir in them the spirit of resistance and

self-help. He wrote a great poem depicting how Sivaji, the Maratha hero, rises from the sleep of death and finds his country, which he had won and freed and endowed with Swaraj, self-government, oppressed and exploited by foreigners. Sivaji festivals were introduced as national festivals, and gymnastic clubs endeavoured to rouse the ancient martial spirit in the country's youth. In 1896 there was famine in Bombay and Poona. Tilak attacked the Government, saying that it was not taking adequate steps; he tried to explain to the people that at such times they were entitled to refuse to pay taxes. A year later plague broke out in the Province, and the Government wished to check its ravages by strict measures of sanitary control involving serious encroachments upon the people's religious and social customs and wounding to their sensibilities. They were enforced by certain European officials who failed to win popular approval of drastic measures by proceeding tactfully. On June 22nd, 1897, the official in charge of public health organisation was murdered by two young Hindu students also belonging to the Chitpavan-Brahman caste. In August of the same year in Bombay Tilak was condemned to eighteen months' imprisonment for incitement to rioting, but was released at the end of a year. As a former member of the Bombay Legislative Council Tilak bore the title of *Rajamanya*, Honourable, One Honoured by Princes. His followers now called him *Lokamanya*, Honoured by the People.

In prison Tilak pursued his study of the Vedas. His two most important works, *The Orion, or Researches into the Antiquity of the Vedas* and *The Arctic Home in the Vedas*, champion a theory of Tilak's own concerning the origin and age of the Indian Aryan race. At bottom, his inclination was towards scientific research, and he remained a logician and mathematician even as orator and leader. He was no orator in the demagogic sense, but always appealed to the intellect rather than the emotions. His power over the masses was chiefly due to his grasp of the orthodox position and his pure and exemplary life. But he understood the power of symbolism. The veneration of Sivaji was something that the simplest villager could understand. Sivaji's name was a symbol of unity, patriotic self-sacrifice, political liberation.

Tilak stirred the people's nationalist instincts by Sivaji festivals; he gave them a message stripped of the confusing terminology of Western democracy, that went straight to the heart of the multitude. Until 1905 Tilak's political activities were confined to his own province. In those days he was not an Indian, but a Maratha and Hindu. It was some years later that his nationalism came to embrace all India, including the Mohammedans against whom Sivaji had fought, founding the great Empire of his race and caste in the struggle. Tilak's entry into all-India politics coincides with the beginning of a new era in the history of Indian nationalism.

Two external political events make 1905 the landmark of a new period in Indian history. One was the Russo-Japanese War. Even Italy's defeat by little Abyssinia in 1894 had attracted attention in Asia. But Italy was only an insignificant European State and the affair was far distant. The Russo-Japanese War was very different. Russia was regarded as the greatest military Power in Europe and the enemy that inspired Great Britain with fear for her Indian possessions. And now a young Asiatic people that had only assimilated European technical science a few decades ago had defeated this most powerful European adversary. It was an event which gave food for reflection to thousands of young Indians. C. F. Andrews cites an example from the life of a young Hindu student. He had been educated at a mission school where he came under strong Christian influence, and he was passionately devoted to modern Western science. But until he reached the age of twenty he led a selfish and worldly life. His thoughts and ambitions centred in his family and his caste. He had hardly ever looked beyond that narrow circle and regarded India as an integral unit. Then came the Russo-Japanese War, and made him reflect. His outlook became broader. Day after day news of fresh victories arrived from the Far East. Finally he read of the total destruction of the Russian fleet in the Straits of Tsushima. That night he could not sleep. He had a vision of his country standing before him in visible form. She appeared like a sad, despairing mother yearning for his love. Her face was beautiful but indescribably sad. The vision was so real to him that months

later he could shut his eyes and recall it to mind as vividly as when it first appeared. His experience was akin to what is called conversion in the phraseology of religion. With overwhelming power he received the call to sacrifice himself for his mother country. He could think of nothing else. Day and night the vision was before his eyes. He resolved to test himself, and the nature of the test was significant. He as a Hindu began to seek the friendship of Mohammedans and to inspire them with his new ideal. For he grasped at once the essential fact that a united India required the union of the two principal sections of the population. Again and again he was repulsed, but he persisted and gained his point. Then new difficulties arose. With all the authority with which an Eastern father is clothed, his father insisted on his marrying and establishing a home. A suitable bride was found for him, and an agreeable position assured, with a generous dowry. But he resisted and chose to be banished from his father's house and to accept poverty rather than to be false to the call he had received. Subsequently he joined the Arya Samaj and took part in famine relief work. Later still he worked in plague-stricken camps.

In the new epoch, therefore, nationalism became a religion to the youth of India. Enthusiasm and mystic fervour took the place of serenity and clarity of vision, the patient process of evolution was thrust aside by the demand for irresistible and impulsive action. The religious epic *Bhagavadgita*, which a few decades earlier had been quite unknown and was read by hardly anyone, became the Bible of the rising generation and was issued in many hundreds of cheap editions with new annotations and interpretations. It was the partition of the Province of Bengal, decreed by Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India, which set a match to the blaze of revolutionary passions in these young people. Of all the Indian provinces Bengal was the most advanced intellectually and the most conscious of its national and political individuality. A single language was spoken throughout the province and had just entered upon a new springtide of literary creation. Partition was to establish a new régime, with a predominantly Mohammedan Eastern Bengal as a counterpoise to the Hindus in the province. Already Lord Curzon had excited the indignation of the intelligentsia of Bengal by his uncompre-

hending and insulting demeanour. On July 20th, 1905, the partition of Bengal was proclaimed, whilst a great meeting of protest in the Calcutta Town Hall retorted by proclaiming the initiation of the Swadeshi movement, the boycott of foreign in favour of native wares.

At the end of 1905 there was a change of Government in England. The Conservatives were replaced by a Liberal Ministry under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, with John Morley as Secretary of State for India. Morley had always been well-known for his anti-imperialist and Radical views, and had once stood out strongly for Irish Home Rule. Indian politicians, therefore, had high hopes of him. They were disappointed when Morley approved the steps taken by the Indian Government for the suppression of the nationalist agitation. For two years the Indian bureaucracy in Calcutta and the English Government in London conducted ceaseless negotiations in absolute secrecy, without taking the Indian leaders into their confidence, and finally introduced political reforms in India. But by that time it was too late. The older generation had been educated to believe in English Liberal principles. "That half-hearted manner in which the Liberal Government is too apt to protest against conclusions which must ensue from the conscientious application of its professed principles"¹ undermined confidence in English Liberalism, like the identical attitude of MacDonald's Government eighteen years later, when the Labour Party undertook to form a British Government.

The revolutionary movement which blazed up at the end of 1905 and during 1906 in India was the work of the younger intellectuals, particularly the students. Although it affected the Punjab and other provinces as well, its principal centre was Bengal. Its leaders were Krishnavarma, a friend and disciple of Dayananda who edited *The Indian Sociologist* in London, Bepin Chandra Pal, editor of *The New India* in Calcutta, Bhupendra Nath Dutt, a brother of Swami Vivekananda, and Aravinda Ghose. The last-named came of a completely anglicised family. His maternal grandfather, Narain Bose, had been a colleague of Debendranath Tagore in the leadership of the Brahma Samaj. Aravinda had been educated at an English public school, had studied

¹ Sir Henry Cotton.

classics at Cambridge, and passed the examination for the Indian Civil Service. In India he was won over to the new nationalism, inspired by the idea of a people relying upon its own efforts, conscious of its individuality and beginning to achieve a life of its own. He gave up a brilliant position and took poorly paid work on behalf of the new scheme of national education. Subsequently he became editor of the *Bande Mataram*. His brother Barendra Kumar Ghose joined with Bhupendra Nath Dutt in 1906 to start a revolutionary journal, *Yugantar*, which was suppressed in June, 1908. The founder was condemned to death for manufacturing explosives, but was afterwards reprieved.

A number of secret societies were formed, the members being required to swear solemnly that they would serve their country and keep silence regarding their activities. Similar societies sprang up abroad, and smuggled literature and arms into India. The London correspondent of the Indian revolutionary *Kal*, Vinayak Savarkar, translated Mazzini's autobiography and wrote a history of the Indian War of Independence of 1857. The novel *Ananda Math* and the *Bhagavadgita* provided models of revolutionary societies. The secret appeals that were circulated began with the phrase: "*Om Bande Mataram.*" "Come, sons of India, cast aside your craving for pleasure, riches and worldly enjoyment, and step forth to offer yourselves to the Mother's service." The oaths sworn at the altar of the goddess Kali ended: "If I deviate from the solemn oath or violate it in any way, let the curse of God, of the Mother, and of the mighty sages destroy me straightway." The black goddess Kali, Siva's wife, the goddess of destruction and death, became the idol of the revolution. Even in the last century human sacrifices were offered to please her and men served her by mutilating and wounding their own bodies. Her image is girded with snakes, her face and breasts are smeared with blood, a tongue dripping with blood is thrust out between her tusk-like teeth, her earrings are corpses, her necklace a chain of death's heads. She was worshipped under a variety of names, such as Bhawani, and others. In a Bengali revolutionary publication, *Bhawani Mandir*, the goddess was lauded as the symbol of infinite creative force, the mother of all things, many-shaped and eternal. Bhawani is her

manifestation in the present era, the manifestation of force. The Indians have all gifts: knowledge, love, inspiration; what they lack is force and energy. This the goddess can give them. India has a great mission to fulfil. "India cannot be destroyed, our race can never die out, for the most brilliant destiny, the most vital to the future of mankind, is reserved for India amongst all the peoples. India must give birth to the future religion of the whole world, the eternal religion, that shall harmonise all religions and sciences and philosophies and shall unite all in the bond of our common humanity." Therefore a temple must be erected to Bhawani where men may dedicate themselves to the service of the Mother on the basis of knowledge, the knowledge of the Veda. Then Bhawani, the manifestation of force, says to her sons: "You shall help to create a nation, to spiritualise an epoch, to Aryanise a world. And that nation is your own, that epoch belongs to you and your children, and that world is no mere tract of land, shut in by seas and mountains, but the whole earth with its teeming millions."

The Indian revolutionary movement took the Russian Revolution as its model and equated the Anglo-Indian with the Tsarist bureaucracy. The position in the two cases was similar: an autocratic Government, an ignorant people numbering many millions, and the youthful, middle-class intellectuals resorting to terrorist methods. In both cases, also, a like success was achieved: constitutional reforms were introduced which made no essential change in the character of the autocracy but yet provided a forum where the numerically small class of intellectuals could put forward their demands but where, likewise, the Government found support in the representatives of the conservative owners of large estates.

The Government's retort to the revolutionary disturbances was repressive legislation. Besides exceptional decrees forbidding the use of explosives and controlling public meetings and the Press, special mention should be made of an order first issued in 1818 and now revived, by which persons could be imprisoned or exiled for an indefinite period without any sort of trial and without notification of the cause; further, a Criminal Prosecutions Bill which empowered the authorities to dispense with a jury and to conduct preliminary investiga-

tions *in camera*. The young revolutionaries fought the Government with all the ardour of religious devotion. In August, 1909, a student named Dhingra, who had murdered Sir Curzon Wylie, was executed in London. Before his death he confessed that he had sought to shed English blood as a poor revenge for the inhuman executions and deportations of patriotic Indians. He had consulted none but his own conscience. He had conspired with none, and had only done his duty. He held that a nation kept under by foreign bayonets was permanently at war. Open battle was impossible for a disarmed people. He as a Hindu felt that a wrong done to his homeland was sacrilege against the godhead. The cause of the homeland was the cause of Sri-Ram, her service the service of Sri Krishna. A son who, like himself, was poor in material goods and intellectual gifts had nothing but his lifeblood to offer to his mother, and so he had sacrificed that upon her altar. All that Indians had now to learn was how to die, and the only way to learn it was to die themselves. Therefore he would die and glory in his martyrdom. His only prayer to God was that he might be born again of the same mother and might die again for the same sacred cause, till at last she should triumph and be free, for the good of mankind and to the glory of God. *Bande Mataram*.

So it was that the first decade of the twentieth century witnessed a remarkable blending of religion and nationalism. The mother country is identified with the Divinity. Bipin Chandra Pal wrote in 1909 that their mother country was a symbol of the national idea, the divine idea, the Logos, which had revealed itself through the whole course of their past history and was, indeed, its very soul. This divine idea or Logos was the divinity whom they saluted with the words *Bande Mataram*. In truth, the mother country was a synthesis of all the gods that had been worshipped and still were worshipped by the Hindus.

But the struggle was not confined to the revolutionary terrorism of the young; it was carried on in the Indian National Assembly, hitherto entirely dominated by the older generation. In 1905 the new party, led by Tilak, tried to win over the Congress. The contest continued for three years. Those were the great years of Tilak's life.

Hitherto he had confined his activities to his native province. Now he became an All-Indian leader. He had been the first educated Indian to realise that public life must be brought into direct and vital contact with the inner life of the masses, their ideals, and their ceremonies and festivals, if it was to be a motive force in the history and evolution of modern India. He devoted himself, therefore, to educating the people in the manner to which they were accustomed through their graphic traditional rites. During these years his house became a place of pilgrimage for all India. He was accessible to everyone, irrespective of class or caste. He exercised a great influence over people by his pure and kindly nature. But the struggle before him was a hard one. The established politicians controlled all the large organisations and had behind them a record of decades of indefatigable labour in the people's service. They were highly cultured and experienced men whose place the younger generation could not easily fill, even when led by a Tilak.

The first clash came at the twenty-first All-India National Congress at Benares in December, 1905. The partition of Bengal had given rise to widespread discontent, and the excitement was intensified by Japan's victory and the reports of the Russian Revolution. At this Congress an aggressive mood found voice for the first time. The partition, said one speaker, had filled the cup of national indignation to overflowing, for it was deliberately decreed in order to break the political power and influence of educated opinion in Bengal. Gokhale was President of the Congress. Speaking of the difference of opinion between Gokhale and the new party led by himself, Tilak said at this juncture that Gokhale believed in sacrifice. He called the people to action. He even approved passive resistance as a constitutional weapon. He admitted that the bureaucracy in India was heartless and the democracy in England indifferent. He conceded that hitherto their efforts had borne too little fruit. He pronounced the situation to be critical. On all these points he was in agreement with the new party. But when the question of action arose he would say: "Friends, let us wait a little longer. It is useless to mock at the Government. It will crush us." The position, therefore, was that in theory Gokhale's place was with the new party, but in practice

with the old. But even Gokhale demanded in his speech from the chair more rapid progress with constitutional reforms, and placed his hopes in Morley, who had just become Secretary of State for India.

In 1906 the Swadeshi movement achieved great success. In June of that year Tilak was proposed by Bepin Chandra Pal as President of the next Congress, but the Moderate Party led by Sir Pherose Shah Mehta and Gokhale appealed to the Grand Old Man of the Congress, the Parsee Dadabhai Naoroji, to come from London and attend the meeting, and it was he who presided at the Calcutta Congress in December, 1906. The new party scored a success at the Congress itself. The programme of the Swadeshi movement was adopted, and for the first time complete Dominion self-government within the British Empire was proclaimed as an aim to be pursued. But in March, 1907, the Viceroy, Lord Minto, announced that he was discussing constitutional reforms with Lord Morley, and the old Moderate Party tried to recover all its former influence. At the Surat Congress in 1907 the new party tried to secure the election of Lala Lajpat Rai as President, but a representative of the Moderates, Rash Behari Ghose, obtained a majority. This Congress ended in a great uproar. The new Nationalist Party seceded from the Congress, and the Moderates, who dominated it thenceforward without check, adopted a programme declaring that the ultimate goal of the Indian National Congress was the attainment of self-government, such as the other members of the British Commonwealth had secured. The Congress desired to approach that goal by strictly constitutional methods through a gradual uninterrupted reform of the existing régime.

Thenceforward until 1915 the yearly sessions of the Indian National Congress proceeded without disturbance. Under the new reformed system the Moderate leaders accepted Government offices, and by so doing lost their influence as supporters of the Indian Opposition demands. Tilak himself and his party were busy in 1908 establishing national schools, devoting themselves to social work among the new industrial proletariat of Bombay, and combating the drink evil. On June 24th, 1908, Tilak was arrested and condemned to deportation for six years.

In 1909 the Indian Councils Act, embodying the so-called Morley-Minto reforms, was promulgated. This Act enlarged the existing Provincial Councils and the Indian Council of State and increased the number of elected members. Everywhere in the Provincial Councils there was a small majority of elected members, but in the Council of State the official majority was retained by Morley's desire. But none of these Councils had any real power in their relation with the Executive; their powers were merely advisory, and some subjects remained entirely outside their competence. With regard to the budget, they could only give an advisory opinion on certain of the estimates. The elected members of the Councils were not chosen by direct ballot in territorial constituencies, but as representatives of the towns, Chambers of Commerce, Universities, and other similar bodies. The Mohammedans and the large landowners were particularly well represented. When these reforms were announced it was Morley first and foremost who repudiated the interpretation of them as a first step to the introduction of further reforms, leading ultimately to parliamentary government. Although the Moderates raised certain objections, they nevertheless accepted these reforms as a first step towards their goal. The visit of the English King in 1911 helped to relieve the tension in India. The King was crowned Emperor of India in Delhi, the former capital of the Moghul Empire, and Delhi was proclaimed as the new seat of the Indian Government in order to conciliate nationalist sentiment, especially that of the Indian Mohammedans. The Hindus were won by repealing the partition of Bengal.

About 1910, therefore, the Indian nationalist movement underwent a process of pacification and clarification. But a few years earlier the movement had existed only in embryo. The politicians and the rising generation saw no further than the provincial boundaries. Now at last they surveyed India as a whole. But the most important factor was the awakening of the Mohammedans and their gradual adhesion to the Indian nationalist movement. True, the older generation still held aloof. In 1906 the Moslem League was founded under the leadership of Aga Khan as a counterpoise to the Indian National Congress, with its almost exclusively Hindu membership. The Mohammedans declared themselves abso-

lutely loyal to the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy and asked for no reforms, so that they were given a larger representation in the new Provincial Councils and Council of State than they were entitled to by their numbers. But the Revolution in Turkey and Persia made a deep impression upon the younger Mohammedans in India. The Turco-Italian War in 1911, the Balkan War, and the course pursued by England and Russia in Persia, revolutionised the mood of the Mohammedans. In 1913 the Congress of the Moslem League in Lucknow adopted as its aim the achievement of self-government in a form suited to India. Aga Khan resigned the presidency, and it passed into the hands of younger and more radical leaders.

So India acquired modern national consciousness. Even Tilak had been an opponent of the Mohammedans in his earlier activities, desiring that the Hindus should rule in India as being the true masters of the land. But the younger generation grasped the fact that political unity could be achieved in India only by the co-operation of Hindus and Mohammedans. The Mohammedans, too, came to realise this truth. Hitherto they had held aloof from all Hindu political agitation. They came of families belonging to the military or propertied landed nobility, intrinsically conservative and averse to intellectual activity. Moreover, they had repelled the penetration of Western thought and European education. Their *volte face* was due to a realisation of the fact that the European Powers were attacking Islam and that for the Eastern peoples united defence was an urgent necessity. To them Japan's victory over Russia meant first and foremost the defeat of the hereditary enemy of Islam, Turkey, and Persia. The most moderate of the Indian Mohammedan leaders, Aga Khan, wrote in 1914: "There were thus (formerly) few points of contact between Mohammedan and Hindu, and, in the stage of political development which India had reached, much less ground for and possibility of unity of effort than now. Take any typical young Mohammedan of the upper middle classes to-day, and it will be found that, apart from the traditional religion of his family inculcated by his mother, his education has been entirely on the lines of a Hindu of the same class. Even in the case of a student from a Moslem institution like



MAP XVI.—THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

the Aligarh College, the course of studies, the training of the teachers and their outlook, and the probable profession of the student in the future, are the same as in a Government or a Hindu college." This educational similarity is, of course, even more noticeable in those students, both Hindu and Mohammedan, who study at English Universities and lead the same lives there. "The men brought up under the new system are coming to the front, and have influenced the increasing approximation of political views and sentiments among educated men of the different communities. This unity is a measure of the growth of Indian nationhood."¹

As the outcome of these reflections Aga Khan advised the Government a few months before the outbreak of the World War to abandon the policy of separating Hindus from Mohammedans and to rally the moderate of both creeds in a common camp so as to provide a counterpoise to the radical nationalist tendencies of young India, which also embraced both Hindus and Mohammedans.

Vambéry, than whom none has a better knowledge of the East, wrote in 1906: "In Asia the separation caused by religious difference can never be bridged over, for in the East religion is life, history, character, patriotism—in fact, everything. . . . Can anyone expect them (Moslems and Hindus) to become reconciled and to work together towards one common end? . . . A reconciliation or an understanding between Moslems and Hindus is an absolute impossibility."² Less than ten years later this reconciliation had begun, and a common nationalist sentiment had overcome religious antagonism. Nor does this apply only to ancient Eastern religions. Lord Bryce wrote only a few years ago that in the East religion, alike as a bond of unity and as a barrier, was far more powerful than in Western Europe, largely taking the place of national sentiment which was generally lacking among Eastern peoples. A native Christian had more in common with his European rulers than with his compatriots of the same race and colour as himself. In the short interval that has elapsed since this was written Chinese and Indian Christians have determined to found their own

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, January, 1914, pp. 8 and 9.

² *Western Culture in Eastern Lands*. By Arminius Vambéry, Murray, 1906, pp. 237-38.

national Churches with a liturgy in their own language, and at the beginning of 1926 even the Church of England had to consent to the establishment for its Indian members of an absolutely autonomous Church of India which has cut loose from the mother Church for national reasons.

The primary importance of this growing friendliness between the Hindus and Mohammedans was political. As late as 1910 Sir Valentine Chirol wrote, after an exhaustive study of Indian conditions: "It may be confidently asserted that never before have the Mohammedans of India as a whole identified their interests and their aspirations so closely as at the present day with the consolidation and permanence of British rule."¹ The welding of the Indian nation into political unity in the World War came, therefore, as a surprise to the English, though it was the fruit of the European education and ideas that England had brought to the East. But the process is even more profoundly significant in the realm of thought than in the political sphere. The European conception of nationalism had gained a hold upon the intellectual and social outlook of educated India. But ancient intellectual traditions and India's own culture, revived by contact with Europe and conflicting with modern influences, were an obstacle to the adoption of nationalism in its European forms. The peoples of Hither Asia lacked cultural traditions and were therefore able to adopt Western institutions in their entirety, whilst India reflected that outward freedom as a political Power could not be her true goal if her very soul were to be subject to Europe.

The succeeding decade was devoted to an examination of the inner meaning of Indian nationalism. Gandhi, the central personality of that decade, was the embodiment of absolute moral principle inspiring Indian culture, essentially religious in character, in revolt against the principle of a relative morality based on political force which Gandhi erroneously held to be innate in the European soul, but which is, in fact, innate only in the European State and in modern nationalism. It is not surprising that Gandhi became the leader of the Indian masses, a saint universally revered. For it is characteristic of Eastern civilisation before modern nationalism had permeated it to follow a saint. "Asiatics

¹ *Indian Unrest*. By Valentine Chirol, Macmillan, 1910, p. 8.

have in fact an extraordinary faculty both of detecting and following a great man, sometimes under circumstances when differences of origin, creed, and even colour seem to make such recognition and obedience scarcely possible."¹ But the power of Gandhi's gospel extended to progressive Indians who had enjoyed a Western education, proving that India's political struggle, though apparently dominated by the principle of national political power, can only be an outward husk concealing deeper determining factors; forces are at work pushing towards the supersession of modern nationalism and its constitutional and social manifestations, which evolved in the nineteenth century and reached their culminating point in the World War, and this at the very moment when they are overstepping the boundaries of Europe and seeking to dominate the whole spiritual and social life of humanity in its entirety.

¹ *Asia and Europe*. By Meredith Townsend, Constable, 1901, p. 11.

CHAPTER XII

INDIAN NATIONALISM

LIKE the contemporary nationalist movements of Europe Indian nationalism had acquired a more spiritual character in the years immediately preceding the World War. Men searched for the moral basis of nationalism, and found it the fostering and developing of national character handed down and moulded through the centuries. This realisation of national powers, however, was not a service rendered to self alone, but to all mankind, a duty to civilisation as a whole, which has need of each people's talents, in order to develop its full potentialities. Each nation began to indulge in the romantic glorification of its own character, a tendency favourable to Messianic dreams. The individual faded away before the dark and mystic power of the generations.

But this seemingly spiritual nationalism was quickly transformed into an instrument in the hands of those whose policy was one of lust for power and territorial greed. Linked as it was by half ethical, half religious motives of duty with a distant past and future, it was all the more dangerous in its influence upon men's instincts and sentiments and enthusiasms because it was beyond the reach of reasoned criticism by the individual. In order to illustrate the similarity of national aspirations in all countries, an Indian writer reproduced the following appeal by the Irish Gaelic League, merely substituting the word "Indian" for "Irishman": "Indians we are all, and therefore our only possible perfection consists in the development of the Indian nature we have inherited from our forefathers. Centuries of real development, of civilisation, of noble fidelity to all the highest ideals men can worship, have fixed for ever the national character of India; and if we be not true to that character, if we be not genuine Indians, we can never be perfect men, full and strong men, able to do a true man's part for God and motherland. Our forefathers are our best models and patterns;

they alone can show us what our common Indian nature can and ought to be. We must copy their greatness and their goodness. . . . Look to your forefathers, read of them, speak of them; not in unworthy mendicant eloquence, nor yet in vulgar boasting about our ancient glories while we squat down in disgraceful content with our present degeneracy, nor least of all in miserable petty controversy with the hireling liars who calumniate our dear India. No ! but to learn from them what you ought to be, what God destined Indians to be.”¹ “We believe in India for the Indians,” wrote Coomeraswamy. “But if we do so, it is not merely because we want our own India for ourselves, but because we believe that every nation has its own part to play in the long tale of human progress, and that nations which are not free to develop their own individuality and own character are also unable to make the contribution to the sum of human culture which the world has a right to expect of them. . . . We are not merely striving for a right, but accepting a duty that is binding on us, that of self-realisation to the utmost for the sake of others. . . . There is yet work for (India) to do, which, if not done by her, will remain for ever undone. . . . It is for us to show that industrial production can be organised on socialistic lines without converting the whole world into groups of State-owned factories. It is for us to show that great and lovely cities can be built again, and things of beauty made in them, without the pollution of the air by smoke or the poisoning of the river by chemicals; for us to show that man can be the master, not the slave of the mechanism he himself has created.”² Coomeraswamy, therefore, attacks European materialism, which India is to overcome, and English, Western education, which starves the Indian people’s true qualities and capacities. “The true Nationalist is an idealist; and for him that deeper cause of the unrest is the longing for self-realisation. He realises that Nationalism is a duty even more than a right; and that the duty of upholding the national Dharma (destiny) is incompatible with intellectual slavery, and therefore he seeks to free himself, and through others like himself, his country.”³ Foreign education has paralysed the living

¹ *Essays in National Idealism*. By Ananda K. Coomeraswamy, Probsthain, London, 1909, p. vii.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. ii.

moral forces of the people by relieving them of responsibility. India, therefore, is in a state of disintegration. "How many have come to India, reverencing her past, ready to learn of her still, and have been sent empty away ! The student of social economy finds a highly organised society in a state of disintegration without any of the serious and constructive effort required for its reorganisation under changed conditions; the student of architecture finds a tradition living still, but scorned by a people devoted to the imitation of their rulers, building copies of English palaces and French villas in the very presence of men who still know how to build, and under the shadow of buildings as noble as any that the world has seen. The student of fine art is shown inferior imitations of the latest European "styles," where he should find some new and living revelation; the decorative artist sees the traditional craftsmen of India thrown out of employment by the mechanical vulgarities of Birmingham and Manchester, without the least effort made to preserve for future generations the accumulated skill and cunning of centuries of the manufacture of materials and wares which have commanded the admiration of the world. The musician of other lands hears little but the gramophone or the harmonium in India. . . . The lover of freedom beholds a people who can be imprisoned or deported for indefinite periods without trial, and too divided among themselves to offer adequate resistance to this lawlessness; in a word, every man seeking to widen his own outlook, sees but his own face distorted in an Indian mirror."¹

Bepin Chandra Pal thought and wrote in the same strain shortly before the World War: "I have also endeavoured always to teach that India's future must be a matter of national development. We do not wish Parliamentary or any other institutions to be imposed upon us from without; we wish to evolve our own institutions in harmony with our national history and our national characteristics. . . . What I want in India is the growth of a great spiritual revival among the people. This has already begun. India's power lies in the realm of thought rather than in the realm of matter. The more our people can be infused and enthused with the ideas of the great teachers who have moulded the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

thought and life of successive generations of Indian people, the more potent will be their influence on outside nations, the more close their internal union in spiritual brotherhood."¹ For history, he held, is to the patriot what the Holy Scriptures are to the believer. Indian history is a record of God's dealings with the Indian people. Patriotism that is not nourished by history is like a religion that despises the support of Scripture, it is without root, fantastic, unreal. His own and his colleagues' aim could only be to build up an Indian nation. India's national life must be essentially Indian, neither British nor Japanese. But it must necessarily be very different in future from what it had been in the past. New forces had begun to act upon them from all sides, new conditions had arisen, new ideas had been absorbed, new ideals revealed. They could not, even if they would, and should not, even if they could, bring their national life and thought to a standstill at the point it had then reached, or turn back the hands of the clock. The new Indian nationalism must not lose its foothold in the past, but neither must it lose its vision of the future. The builders of India must not, therefore, be mere revivers of the past, though they must acknowledge thankfully and use wisely all the lasting treasures of India's ancient and mediæval life and thought which her popular revivalists had restored to prominence; on the other hand, they must not be radical reformers.

Such was the intellectual condition of Indian nationalism at the outbreak of the World War, after more than fifty years of growth. Hitherto Western thought had influenced only a relatively narrow circle in the upper classes; in the decade following the outbreak of war its influence began to spread outwards and downwards. Hitherto education had been for the children of the professional classes only; now, in fulfilment of a demand urged for years, especially by Gokhale, it was to become popular; free and compulsory primary education was to be introduced. The position of women in public life underwent a gradual change; special attention was devoted to female education, and a modern women's movement came into being. The industrialisation of India proceeded rapidly; a town-dwelling industrial pro-

¹ *The Soul of India*. By Bepin Chandra Pal, Calcutta, 1911, pp. iv. ff.

letariat appeared, and for the first time the labour question arose in India. Still inarticulate, the new class nevertheless made itself heard and raised its demands in opposition to the native middle class.

These changes resulted first and foremost in making the masses politically conscious, and they were not confined to British India. They made their appearance likewise in the semi-independent native principalities which had been regarded hitherto as a bulwark against the penetration of European influences. Certain of the native principalities moved forwards more rapidly than British India in popular education and the emancipation of women. Baroda, for instance, promulgated a law in 1905 establishing free and compulsory education, and in 1910 it was decreed wherever there were fifteen children a school should be opened. But before long Mysore and Travancore outstripped Baroda. In 1920 Mysore announced constitutional reforms, and the task of drafting was entrusted to a Commission under the chairmanship of the Rector of Mysore University. Its report was issued in March, 1923; the aim was to draft a modern constitution which should nevertheless be based upon Indian ideas and conceptions. Legislation was divided into three grades. Proposed laws were to be initiated in a popular assembly with two hundred and fifty members, which was to give expression to the spontaneous and genuine wishes of the people. The proposals were then to be examined scientifically and technically by a professional committee of experts, whose duty it would be to draft the Bills. The final discussion and decision was to be in the hands of a Council of fifty cultured and experienced men embodying the people's collective wisdom and virtue. The principle of ministerial responsibility to the popular representative body was not adopted in the Commission's report.

The World War, into which India like the whole Orient was drawn, hastened the pace of development in all departments of Indian public life, in popular education, the position of women, and the process of industrialisation, as well as politics. In 1915 Gokhale and Sir Pherose Shah Mehta died. Tilak had been released in July, 1914. Annie Besant, one of those English women who have made India the home of their choice, entered Indian politics as an active leader when

she was nearly seventy, and worked in co-operation with Tilak. She had once been a propagandist of free-thought and Radicalism in Great Britain, and later became President of the Theosophical Society in Benares. In December, 1915, the All-India National Congress and the Moslem League met simultaneously in Bombay. The President of the Congress, the future Lord Sinha, declared in his opening speech that, though India was not yet ripe for self-government, she must nevertheless make democracy her goal, government of the people by the people, for even the best of Governments—and that the British undoubtedly was—could not be a substitute for self-government. The goal of full self-government was, therefore, enunciated by a representative of the class most loyal to British rule, conflicting with the declaration of Lord Crewe, the Liberal Secretary of State for India, made in the British Parliament in July, 1912. He warned those Indian politicians who looked forward to a measure of autonomy approximate to that enjoyed by the British Dominions, that India must look for no future in that direction. The experiment of extending such a measure of autonomy to a non-European race as to make them in effect free of English parliamentary control could not be tried, and no such policy could possibly be put into practice. “There is nothing whatever in the teachings of history, so far as I know them, which makes the realisation of such a dream even remotely probable.”¹ In the opening speech at the Moslem League Assembly the Turco-British War was deplored, and the League, like the National Congress, resolved to appoint a Commission to examine the scheme drawn up by Annie Besant for the introduction of Home Rule.

The year 1916 witnessed an intensified agitation. Exceptional legislation, based on the exigencies of wartime, had been passed in the Indian Council of State by the votes of the official majority only, and under its ægis a number of revolutionaries, who had resumed their activities once more, were arrested in Bengal. The Indian Mohammedans were indignant at the Sherif of Mecca’s revolt, which was known to be supported by England, and adhered loyally to the Turkish Caliph. Tilak and Mrs. Besant travelled all over

¹ *Hansard*. House of Lords, July 29th, 1912, col. 744.

the country calling a Home Rule League into existence, which was founded in September, 1916. In October of that year nineteen elected members of the Indian Council of State submitted a memorandum to the Government on the necessity of constitutional reform. When the All-India National Congress met in Lucknow in December, the candidate put forward by the Liberal Party for the chairmanship was elected by a majority, but Mrs. Besant managed to secure a large number of votes. At this Congress the Moderates and the radical Nationalists united once more. Both the Congress and the Moslem League adopted the Home Rule scheme. Tilak was received with a storm of applause, and the President of the Moslem League, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, demanded co-operation between Hindus and Mohammedans.

Dadabhai Naoroji, one of the founders of the Indian National Congress, died in 1917. In that same year the Secretary of State for India, Edwin S. Montagu, announced in the House of Commons his intention of visiting India in order to discuss with the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, the reforms necessary in order to make India by a gradual process a self-governing unit within the British Empire. In his statement Montagu emphasised his view that the British Government must reserve its sole right to determine the method and rapidity of this process, which must depend primarily upon willing Indian co-operation. The Indian National Congress met in Calcutta at the end of 1917 under the presidency of Mrs. Besant. Jointly with the Moslem League it submitted a draft constitution, but this was rejected by Montagu and Chelmsford. The proposals for reform were published in May, 1918, but were felt in India to be inadequate. The Indian politicians, however, were no longer united. The Moderate Party, meeting in Bombay in November, 1918, declared themselves ready in principle to accept the reforms, though they protested against a number of important stipulations. The Indian National Congress, on the other hand, rejected the reforms at the end of 1918, and especially opposed the conclusions reached by the so-called Rowlatt Commission which was set up to inquire into revolutionary machinations in India, and to propose means of combating them when the special wartime legislation

expired. An overwhelming majority of Indian public opinion opposed the draft Rowlatt Bills, which enabled the Government to set aside the regular legal procedure and abolish personal liberties as they saw fit. In 1919 every one of the Indian non-official members of the Council of State voted against the Bills. At the same time there was growing irritation among the Mohammedans on account of their anxiety over Turkey's fate.

The succeeding years were varied and eventful. Tilak was the only man who might have united the different sections by virtue of his political skill, his cultured mind, and his lofty integrity, and he died in 1920. Mrs. Besant lost her hold on the radical wing and joined the moderate Liberals. The leadership of the Nationalists passed to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. The few years in which he led the Indian Nationalist movement were of peculiar significance. He was no political leader; he was something more and something less. Less, for he lacked Tilak's perspicuity, astuteness, and culture; more, for he was at once the first to weld India to a united whole, the awakener of the masses, and a holy man. The masses had held aloof from the agitation carried on by the educated classes, but in Gandhi they found a leader whom they could understand; a saint, the example of whose private life and the sincerity of whose religious conviction swayed them with the power of a divinity. Within a few months he had become the master of India, and by his instrumentality Mohammedans and Hindus were reconciled, Brahmans and outcastes, and the mass of the people in the remotest and sleepiest villages had been stirred to life. For two whole years his will was the will of three hundred millions.

Gandhi was born on October 2nd, 1869, in a small Indian State in the neighbourhood of Bombay. His family did not belong to the Brahman caste. His father and grandfather had been Ministers in small Indian States. His mother's influence was predominant in moulding his character; she was of a deeply religious nature and zealously observed the severe fasts prescribed by her faith. Gandhi was married at the age of twelve. His education was typical of the period. His knowledge of Indian subjects was slight, and he never mastered Sanskrit or the great philosophical literature of

antiquity. He came to England as a fairly young man and passed his examinations for admission to the Bar. Before he left India his mother had made him swear to drink no wine, to eat no meat, and to abstain from intercourse with women. Soon after his return to India he was employed by an Indian firm to go to South Africa as their legal representative in a lawsuit. This determined the future course of his life. In South Africa, especially in Natal, there was a relatively large population of Indian immigrants, the majority of whom had been brought there by the colonists as cheap labour. Like the merchants who followed them, and others besides, they had risen to a certain degree of prosperity by their thrift and industry and sobriety. But their social position was lamentable, akin to that of the negroes in North America. During his sojourn in South Africa, Gandhi learned that a number of laws were in contemplation aimed at depriving the Indians of their political rights and aggravating the hardships under which they lived. He responded to the appeal of his Indian compatriots and resolved to remain in Natal and assume the leadership of the South African Indians. He became a barrister at the Supreme Court of Natal and devoted himself in the first instance to uniting and organising his compatriots. Instead, therefore, of staying only a few months, as he had originally intended, he remained well over twenty years. The young barrister whom a great future seemed to await in his native land resolved to plead the cause of his race in a foreign country, where he was exposed to constant humiliations of all kinds. And so it always was in Gandhi's life. Tilak gives us the impression of having devoted himself from the outset to the service of the nation, and his many years of activity were clearly the fruit of conscious volition. But Gandhi's course was always more readily deflected by chance and outward circumstances; feeling himself a tool in the hands of God, he accepted the dispensation and guidance of his appointed fate and of the circumstances that he encountered as he went on his way.

During the years of his residence in South Africa, Gandhi became the acknowledged leader of the Indian settlers. In this period, too, his own doctrine took shape and stood the test of practical life. He was gentle and pious, but from the

outset he was also an unwearying fighter and politician. As with all religious people, the force that carries him along is will power. What he sees to be right he carries through, unwavering and uncompromising. His teaching and life are altogether in harmony with Indian tradition, and that is why they appealed so strongly to the mass of the Indian people. His severity towards himself is without parallel; he is an ascetic without needs and absolute master of his own body. Even in South Africa he renounced the European manner of life, and wealth, and cultured environment. He dresses like his humblest compatriots, walks barefoot, sleeps on a hard couch, and has the appearance of an ascetic. He eats no meat and makes a rule of practising the utmost abstemiousness. He is influenced equally by ancient Indian tradition, especially the *Bhagavadgita*, and by the teaching of Jesus, by Tolstoi and Ruskin and Thoreau. In South Africa he founded the Phoenix Settlement near Durban, where the settlers were to follow his ideal of the simple life close to nature, and find an Ashram, a home of sanctity and peace. All the members were to form a brotherhood without distinction of rank. All were to work on the land, and their work was to be a privilege and a delight. With equal self-devotion Gandhi led Indian ambulance detachments both during the Zulu campaign of 1906 and during the Boer War, and gave himself up to nursing the wounded in person. Shortly after the Zulu War he was to have his first great opportunity of putting his doctrine of passive resistance into practice. Passive resistance does not mean passivity; on the contrary, it means intense activity, the exertion of will-power, unflinching resolution. It means that a man refuses submission to a regulation or law which his conscience repudiates as unjust, that he, the master of his own destiny, obeys his conscience with utter disregard of outward loss. A man who practises passive resistance does not use arms or physical force, but the force of his will and personality, the truth and justice of the doctrine he stands for. Suffering fearlessly, he proves himself stronger in the long run than the violent aggressor. Gandhi was convinced that if passive resistance became general, it was a force that would transform the human race, destroy all servitude and tyranny, and overcome the ever-expanding militarism that weighs so

heavily upon the Western nations and threatens to subdue the nations of the East as well.

Under Gandhi's leadership the Indians of South Africa adopted passive resistance, in the first instance against a decree obliging them to be registered by means of fingerprints. They refused to be registered, and thousands of Indians, including Gandhi himself, underwent terms of imprisonment. The struggle lasted for years and undermined the whole economic and civic life of the Indians. They succeeded, however, in calling the attention of people in India and in England to the state of affairs in South Africa and securing the repeal of the legislation they were combating. But the struggle was even more important in its educative effect on the Indians themselves, for they gained confidence in their own strength and the wisdom of the attitude they had adopted. In 1910 Tolstoi, hearing of what was happening in South Africa, wrote to Gandhi that his (Gandhi's) labours in the Transvaal appeared to those who lived on the other side of the world as the most important work then going on in any land; their fruits would be shared by all peoples, Christians and non-Christians alike. In 1914 Gandhi returned to India, believing that there an approach to human perfection was most readily possible.

He devoted himself in the first years after his return to a study of Indian conditions. He loves India with religious ardour, he believes in her mission, but higher still to his mind are the moral precepts which it is precisely India's mission to realise in practical life. An India that did not fulfil her mission could not stand in the sight of God. The adversary on whom his eyes are fixed is not the English race, not Europe, but modern civilisation to which Europe has succumbed and which she is now trying to graft upon India. If India were to adopt this modern civilisation and to win her outward freedom in a war with Europe, as Japan did, she would be faithless to her mission. Morality requires, not that India should follow Europe's example, but that Europe should free herself from the spirit of modern civilisation. East and West must meet, no insuperable barriers divide them. But if they meet in such a way that the East adopts the doctrines and customs of the West, the implication is that the two stand opposed as rivals in the struggle

for world power and will live in hell, either openly at war or in an illusory armed peace. If, on the contrary, the West adopts the doctrines of the East, that may be the genesis of a peaceable and brotherly human race. Material progress does not by any means proceed hand in hand with the growth of the moral sense and the soul. India's salvation consists in forgetting all that she has learnt in the past century. Gandhi mistrusts and opposes modern civilisation from the depths of his soul; it has not promoted men's happiness, he holds, nor made for greatness of soul, but has destroyed their very foundation. He looks for salvation in a return to the past. The ancient Indian economic system, with its golden mean and its ordering of men's lives, seems to him to ensure far more peace and contentment than the hurry and wearing struggle of modern Europe, and he believes that what is needed is that those who have realised these truths should lead the way here and now by their own personal example. The rest will follow. For India is sound at the core. The very fact that her people have remained so "uncivilised" is a merit. They have not ventured to change what the experience of thousands of years has shown to be good. The greatness and beauty of ancient India lay in her frugality, her self-control, and her severe discipline. Gandhi, therefore, depreciates attaching too great a value to the reforms, particularly to education. Knowledge acquired is a mere tool, which can be used well or ill. Education does not bring us nearer to the essential, it does not turn scholars into men, does not enable them to do their duty. It may be useful in its proper place. But it must not be made a fetish. Compulsory education does not heal the fundamental evil, but rather aggravates it. Education must be given in the vernacular, higher education should impart a knowledge of the Indian classics, and all over India Hindustani must be taught as an additional language, in order to serve as a common medium of communication between the various races; to make a European language the common medium of communication among the educated classes, as is done now, is to stunt the true spirit of India. "One effort is required, and that is to drive out Western civilisation. All else will follow."

It is in this spirit that Gandhi opposed in particular

the introduction of modern capitalism and industrialism. The last war especially demonstrated to his mind the Satanic character of the civilisation prevailing in Europe. In the name of a false virtue all the laws of morality are broken, and in the midst of these crimes stalks the spirit of crass materialism. Europe's God is Mammon and luxury. India must not tread that path. She has no need of machinery and railways and great cities. If Manchester goods must be bought, it is better that they should be manufactured in Manchester than in India. India may lose money thereby, but she retains her moral freedom. An Indian millionaire or capitalist is no better than an American. India may be poor and free, but if she grow rich by immoral means she will encounter difficulties, for rich men will have an interest in stable conditions and in English rule. Nothing makes men so helpless and enslaved as money. For if a man would achieve anything he must be strong in soul and able to concentrate on one thing. But to do that he must be able to renounce everything and escape from the grip of the machine.

In this religious warfare Gandhi used an economic weapon that was likewise a means of education and a cure for the indigence of the masses; this was the revival of Indian home industries, particularly spinning. To-day India is predominantly a poor agricultural country. That was not always the case. Only a little over a century ago, the products of her crafts and industry were sought after and valued. Handicrafts once flourished in India. European merchants exported from her shores not raw materials but her manufactured goods, the fame of which had spread to all lands. The artistic tradition and the skill of many generations lived in these home industries. But European manufacture undermined Indian production and left the people's artistic talents to starve. That meant the loss of prosperity to the people. Gandhi regards the reappearance of the spinning-wheel in every Indian household as the basis of an improvement in the people's economic condition; but he sees something more in it: a repudiation of machinery and European capitalism, a return to Nature, a reawakening of the people's artistic instincts, a resurrection of ancient India in her unique beauty and strength. And so the old Swadeshi movement was revived, the boycott of European products, but not this

time in order to produce the same in India, to injure European industry as a hostile rival; rather to destroy once and for all the spirit on which that industry is based, to prevent it from penetrating into India. It was precisely the leaders, the intellectuals, the élite, whom Gandhi expected to set the example, to sit down to the spinning-wheel and to lay aside European dress and fashion. The daily task of spinning by the old Indian method becomes for him something more than an economic act, it becomes a symbol of all that he aspires to achieve, of the overthrow of a Satanic civilisation.

Gandhi's weapons of war were the power of his soul and his own example. On the occasion of a strike of factory hands in Ahmadabad over a demand for increased wages to meet higher food prices, a board of arbitrators was appointed including Gandhi. The arbitrators succeeded in persuading the workers to accept a somewhat smaller increase than they had originally demanded, but the employers rejected this proposal of the mediators. Gandhi thereupon resolved to fast and refuse all food until agreement was reached. He believed that the workers were so hungry that they were prepared to give way and accept the employers' inferior offer, which the arbitrators acknowledged to be inadequate. He thought that the workers would be entitled to reproach him and his fellow-arbitrators if they advised them to hold out and continue the strike whilst they themselves had enough to eat. But the workers had already registered a solemn vow to continue the strike till the increase they demanded was obtained, and in order to strengthen their resolution, and save them from the temptation to break their vow, Gandhi himself resolved to go even hungrier than they and to influence both them and the masters by his fast. And he actually succeeded after a few days' fast in inducing the masters to accept the award. That year, too, he was active in his native Province of Gujerat, where the people were suffering from a bad harvest and the Government refused to remit taxes to the extent provided for by law. Gandhi investigated the situation and asked the Government to appoint a commission of inquiry. The Government refused and proceeded to collect the taxes forcibly. Thereupon Gandhi began to call upon the peasants to resort to passive resistance. He was not simply concerned with the

question of remitting the taxes. To his mind the affair went deeper, it was a spiritual and moral problem. The Government was in the wrong, and yet it had coolly disregarded the representations of the governed. The peasants must learn to assert their individuality and must shake off their fear of the authorities when the latter were in the wrong. They were to resist, not by means of violence and disorder, but by passive resistance, the weapon of strong souls. No power on earth can rob a man of that right. Gandhi called upon the peasants to withhold payment of the taxes and to suffer the penalty with a calm mind. Suffering seemed to him a mighty power, capable of destroying principalities and empires. After a long struggle the Government was persuaded to remit the taxes.

India's political history during the years immediately following the World War is dominated by two events: the English Government's introduction of constitutional reforms, with the object of gradually leading India to the position of a self-governing Dominion within the British Empire, and the conversion of the Indian National Congress under Gandhi's leadership to a radical demand for Swaraj or self-government. During this period India wavered strangely in her allegiance between nationalism and religion as the dominating factors in her public life. The religious leaders in both camps, Gandhi and the Ali brothers, are advocates of friendship between Hindus and Mohammedans and their fusion into a single nation. But at the same time religious and racial hatred were increasing between the two great sections of the Indian people, fear was at grips with political wisdom, suspicion with statesmanlike idealism. In the lives both of Hindus and Mohammedans religion, as inflexible and orthodox as ever, is frequently still the dominating power. When, early in 1925, Gandhi spoke out against the stoning of adherents of the Ahmadiya sect in Afghanistan for apostasy, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan answered in defence of the Afghans' action that to people blinded by modern scepticism, Islam's unrelenting attitude in the matter of apostasy might seem to be a challenge to the liberty of the human conscience. Such people, however, should reflect that Islam was not merely an institution for the guidance of those who professed it, but a State which must require loyalty of its subjects; just as a subject of the

British Indian State could be hanged for high treason, and could not escape his fate by pleading that he was free to throw off his allegiance to King George, so a Mohammedan who revolted against the authority of Islam might with equal justice be made to pay for the deed with his life.

The theory of the modern national State is thus confronted with that of the mediæval Church, and there is a startling resemblance between the two.

In 1919 Gandhi took a decisive step in bringing Hindus and Mohammedans together by making a non-Indian politico-religious interest of the Indian Mohammedans a common battle-cry of all Indians. At that time the Indian Mohammedans, led by the Ali brothers, were throwing themselves whole-heartedly into the struggle for the preservation of the Turkish Caliph's power. They regarded the action of Great Britain and the Allies as a menace to the position of Islam. All Mohammedans, Sunnites and Shiites alike, united in the agitation on behalf of the Caliphate. To the Shiites the Turkish Caliphate was a matter of no religious concern. The whole agitation was political, intended to strengthen Islamic racial sentiment and acting as a centrifugal force in India. It was Gandhi's most brilliant political achievement to grasp the situation and make the Caliphate demands the demands of all India; in this way he created a Hindu-Mohammedan fusion which remained for years the pivot of Indian politics. Gandhi's chief colleague in the struggle was Mohammed Ali, whose grandfather had rendered great services to the English during the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and who had himself studied at Aligarh and Oxford. In 1906 he had been one of the founders of the loyal, pro-British Moslem League, and in 1910 the reactionary English Governor of the Punjab, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, had offered him the Premiership of an Indian State. A few months' later Mohammed Ali began to advocate a rapprochement between Hindus and Mohammedans and to agitate for the establishment of an independent Mohammedan University. During the Balkan War he set about fitting out a medical mission to be sent to Turkey. During the World War he was interned, and in 1919 he headed the Caliphate movement.

Gandhi's second reason, besides the demands of the Mohammedans, for the agitation begun in 1919 was the

action of the Anglo-Indian authorities in the Punjab. Defying the opposition of a united public opinion, including even the moderate Liberals, the Government had determined to introduce special legislation known as the Rowlatt Acts, designed to prolong the special wartime administrative powers for combating dangerous agitation. The Indians believed that these measures were directed against their political aspirations, and held them to be particularly inopportune at the very moment when India was to gain new liberties and constitutional rights. Gandhi held the Rowlatt Acts to be unjust, and a menace to the Indian people's elementary rights. He declared that Indians would not obey them, but that in resisting they would follow the truth alone and would refrain from doing violence to life or limb or property. In token of protest hartals were to be proclaimed in 1919 for the beginning of the month of April. The hartal is a characteristic Indian custom; generally as a sign of mourning, shops and bazaars are closed and the normal life of the people is interrupted. The hartal is also a signal of popular excitement, for in India, as in most Eastern countries, the closing of the bazaars has been from time immemorial the first symptom of disturbance, the object being to save them from pillage. This agitation reached its high-water mark in March and April, 1919, when Hindus and Mohammedans fraternised and co-operated to an unparalleled extent. It was not only the leaders, who could be united by political aims, but the lower classes of both creeds seemed suddenly to have reconciled all their differences. A Hindu religious leader preached in the mosques. Hindus and Mohammedans drank water offered to them by adherents of the other faith, strict ceremonial and social laws seemed to have lost their binding force.

The hartal of April 6th, 1919, was rigidly observed over wide areas throughout India. There were hostile encounters of peculiar violence in the Punjab, where Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the reactionary Governor, proclaimed martial law and General Dyer was responsible for the tragedy of Jallianwalla-Bagh at Amritsar and the subsequent reign of terror. The Anglo-Indian Government was seized with panic and failed to review the position justly; in order to control it they resorted to methods which were bound to call forth vehement and

Indian representative bodies, both in the separate Provinces and for the two Chambers of the central legislature. The roll of electors is exceedingly limited in number. For the Lower Chamber, the Legislative Assembly, it amounts to some 900,000 persons throughout India, for the Upper House, the Council of State, no more than about 16,000. A somewhat larger number enjoy the franchise for the Provincial Legislative Councils; for instance, Bombay has some 500,000 electors, Bengal about a million. Notwithstanding the fact that all the electors belong to the upper classes, very few voted; in Bombay it was about 8 per cent., whilst the average was about 20 per cent. The Indian National Congress at Nagpur at the end of 1920 changed the first article of its constitution so that its object was no longer to attain Dominion status within the British Empire by gradual constitutional methods, but to attain Swaraj, self-government for the Indian people, by all justifiable and peaceful methods. At the same time the Congress devoted attention to building up its organisation, placing it upon a broad, democratic basis.

The year 1921 saw Gandhi at the zenith of his power. In December of that year the Indian National Congress at Ahmadabad made him supreme dictator. An organisation of national volunteers was created throughout the length and breadth of India, a national fund was collected in memory of Tilak and rapidly rose to a considerable amount. There were outbreaks all over India. The revolt of the fanatical Mohammedan Moplahs in the south was particularly violent, and in some cases they attacked Hindus.

That same year India's first Parliament was opened. Both the Provincial Legislative Councils and the central Parliament had a majority of elected members, and their rights had been enlarged, though the last word still rested with the Government, which is not responsible to the popular representative body. In the Provinces certain administrative departments were placed under the authority of the elected assembly, and Ministers were appointed from the ranks of the Provincial Legislatures and made responsible to them. This system, known as Dyarchy, did not prove a success, for the dividing line between the departments reserved for the Government and those handed over to the representative assembly was artificial and by no means

happily chosen. From the outset the Indian Liberals had demanded further reforms; they asked for complete provincial self-government and the transference of all departments to responsible Ministers, leaving the army, policy, and representation abroad subject to the control of the central Anglo-Indian Government.

Meanwhile Gandhi turned his attention to propaganda on behalf of national education, the introduction of the spinning-wheel in India as in the olden days, the exclusive use of homespun wearing apparel, and the boycott of English textiles. He succeeded in imposing his will on the Indian National Congress in this matter, too, and in making spinning a mark of Congress membership.

To the political and religious excitement among Hindus and Mohammedans that of the Sikhs was added in the same year. The orthodox Sikhs, the Akalis or Faithful of the Lord, protested against the corrupt management of the temples. The Akalis tried to obtain possession of the temples, but when the British Government protected the right of the priests to their possession, even the Sikhs, usually a warlike people who had always provided the best recruits for the English army in India, had recourse to the method of passive resistance. Every day processions of volunteers marched unarmed up to the temple, where they submitted unresting to such severe blows from the police that they were unable to rise from the ground.

Towards the end of 1921 and early in the following year matters came to a head between the Government and the Indian Nationalists. The two leaders of the Caliphate movement, the Ali brothers, called upon the Mohammedans to refuse military service to the Anglo-Indian Government, and were arrested in consequence in October, 1921, and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. They declared that they acknowledged no obligation arising from a law which conflicted with their religious convictions and duties. In November the Prince of Wales landed in India. Gandhi had ordained a hartal, which was everywhere strictly observed. The Prince drove through deserted streets. Only in Bombay was there any rioting, and this Gandhi condemned severely, as he did all violence, and underwent a fast because of it. He was preparing for a peaceful revolution in February,

1922, by means of mass refusal of obedience to the State in the Bardoli district and the Province of Bombay. But before the time for its realisation Gandhi himself revoked his command. He had been convinced by bloody outbreaks of violence in another district that the people were not yet ripe for a peaceful revolution. This step dismayed a large number of his followers, but Gandhi was incapable of allowing political considerations to override his moral principles. The people's expectations had been raised to the utmost pitch of intensity, and they had looked for Swaraj in the immediate future. Gandhi himself had depicted it as imminent, if the people were ripe for full and complete obedience to his doctrine of non-violence and self-sacrifice. Fully as the Indian people had recognised in Gandhi and his doctrine the embodiment of their own ideals, yet the time had been so short and the need for preparatory education and organisation so immense, that failure was inevitable from the outset. The Government seized its opportunity at a moment of inward hesitation in the movement, when the people were beginning to doubt the wisdom of the methods adopted; in March, 1922, they arrested Gandhi. His trial was conducted on both sides with the most extraordinary courtesy, but he was sentenced in Ahmadabad to six years' imprisonment, the same penalty formerly inflicted on Tilak.

Gandhi explained to the court how he had changed from a supporter, co-operating with the British Government, to an unqualified opponent. The Government's conduct and the attitude adopted by English public opinion after the incidents in the Punjab had convinced him that England did not wish to help India but only to enfeeble her. "I have no desire whatever to conceal from the Court the fact that to preach disaffection towards the existing system of Government has become almost a passion with me. . . . I knew that I was playing with fire. I ran the risk, and if I was set free I would still do the same, I would be failing in my duty if I did not do so. . . . I wanted to avoid violence. Non-violence is the first article of my faith. It is the last article of my faith. But I had to make my choice. I had either to submit to a system which I considered had done an irreparable harm to my country, or to incur the risk of the mad fury of my people bursting forth when they

understood the truth from my lips. I know that my people have sometimes gone mad. I am deeply sorry for it; and I am, therefore, here to submit, not to a light penalty, but to the highest penalty. . . . I do not plead any extenuating act. I am here, therefore, to invite and submit to the highest penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what, in law, is a deliberate crime, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen."¹

The movement led by Gandhi had been barren of results, and the revolutionary fire proved powerless against the Government's cool self-possession. Gandhi was released at the beginning of 1924 and devoted himself thenceforward to three great tasks, the accomplishment of which he saw to be a prerequisite of Indian freedom; he sought to promote a rapprochement and friendly relations between Hindus and Mohammedans; he combated the indescribable poverty of the masses by reviving home industries, especially spinning; and he attacked "untouchability," the exclusion of fifty million outcaste Hindus from all social intercourse. At the same time he carried on the struggle, begun in the time of the non-co-operation movement, against alcohol and the use of all narcotics, though this was only a secondary aim. Gandhi's fundamental teaching remained the same — a nationalist doctrine, ethical in character but narrow and seeking its inspiration in the past. Mankind, he well knows, is one; there are racial differences, but the higher a race the more its duties. His belief in the duties of the Indian people is based precisely on the unique character of their mission. For thousands of years, he said, India had remained unshakable and alone amidst the ceaseless vicissitudes of world empires. All the rest had passed away. But for thousands of years India had understood the art of commanding her own destiny and a life of wise happiness. Herein she had nothing to learn from others. She had not craved for machinery and great cities. The primeval plough, the spinning-wheel, her own ancient traditional education — these had ensured her wisdom and her happiness. Indians must return to their earlier simplicity, not, indeed, at once, but gradually, patiently, each one setting the example. The only way to do this is by example and education. India

¹ *The Trial of Mahatma Gandhi*. Edward S. Audley, London.

must revert to her own character, she must free herself of all European influence. In his native city of Ahmadabad Gandhi made himself an *ashram*, or place of retirement and meditation, according to ancient Indian custom. In Ahmadabad, too, he founded a National University where the teaching was to be based alike on Hindu and Islamic doctrine and where all the vernacular tongues of India were to be fostered. It was to produce a synthesis of all the cultural influences to which India had been subjected during the course of several thousand years. All the students were to be acquainted with all the religions and cultural systems of India. The study of Hindustani is compulsory, for that is spoken by the majority of Indians, whether Hindu or Mohammedan, and ancient Sanskrit survives in it in a modified form. The teachers in the *ashram* are required to take vows; they vow to be truthful, and are therefore forbidden to tell a lie even for their country's good, and are commanded to oppose even their parents and teachers in the name of truth; they vow to take no life, to refrain from marriage and master their sensual desires, and they vow to live simply and frugally and to use nothing superfluous. The teachers may not use manufactured goods from abroad, for they are the product of the exploitation of European workers; they must be strangers to fear, for they must be able to stand fearlessly in opposition to kings and governments, but also to their own families and their own people. The children in the *ashram* live for years wholly separated from their families, leading a life of exemplary simplicity and accustoming themselves to bodily labour. They are taught in their own vernacular, but they are obliged to learn Hindustani, one Dravidian dialect, and English, as well as the alphabets of all important Indian languages. In this way it is hoped to reach a synthesis of all India's cultural systems.

Only in India could Gandhi, the leader of a religio-ethical minority, a band of free and masterful spirits, have become the political leader of the broad mass of the people. He himself recognised that his strength lay in the leadership of minorities, in asserting and realising moral truths in the teeth of popular passions. A few days before his arrest, when control already seemed to be slipping from his hands,

he said himself that he had always been in the minority. In South Africa he had begun with unanimity and had been reduced to a minority of sixty-four, nay, even sixteen, and yet had recovered an immense majority. His best and surest work had been accomplished in the desert, in a minority. He feared majorities. The adoration of the unthinking mob reduced him to despair. If they would spit upon him, he would feel the ground firmer under his feet. He had made his friends in the National Congress understand that he was past cure. Whenever the people made mistakes, he would always confess them. The only tyrant to whom he bowed in this world was the still, small voice within a man. Even if he were faced with a minority of one, he would have the courage to adhere to that despairing minority. To his mind that was the only honest party.

Gandhi was one of the great teachers of Indian nationalism in recent years, and Rabindranath Tagore was the other. Tagore, it is true, never quitted his position as the leader of a tiny minority. The pair are divided by profound temperamental differences, and yet there is kinship and similarities between their teaching. To both, nationalism is not self-sufficient goal, but is subject to the rule of absolute right. Because of this, both have superseded European nineteenth-century nationalism, which treated the national well-being as the ultimate goal and highest standard of values. On this point Tagore is, perhaps, even more unequivocal than Gandhi. His nationalism is broader and more human. Like Gandhi, he sees Europe's errors and traces them precisely to the character of European nationalism, which connects nationality, the spiritual and cultural heritage and customs of human communities, with the State, that is political power and economic expansion and mastery. By this means what is spiritual turns material and mechanical, and the living spirit becomes the slave of immoral impulses and material interests. Through his speeches on nationalism and his novel *The Home and the World*, Tagore's influence has spread beyond the confines of India.

Tagore rightly distinguishes the people from the nation. He regards a people as a spiritual fact established by natural law and living in every human being as a heritage from his ancestors. But the nation is the union of a people with the

power of a State. The nation becomes an end in itself, its external freedom seems to be an absolute good, for the fact is overlooked that external freedom may be of very little consequence, and that external bondage, where the soul lives, may be vital and precious. Tagore contrasts cultural nationalism with this political nationalism. Here the nation is not an object of endeavour but an existing fact, a spiritual possession, and above it the spiritual norm of justice and truth is valid. What is a nation? asks Rabindranath Tagore. "It is the aspect of a whole people as an organised power. This organisation incessantly keeps up the insistence of the population on becoming strong and efficient. But this strenuous effort after strength and efficiency drains man's energy from his higher nature where he is self-sacrificing and creative. For thereby, man's power of sacrifice is diverted from his ultimate object, which is moral, to the maintenance of this organisation, which is mechanical. Yet in this he feels all the satisfaction of moral exaltation and therefore becomes supremely dangerous to humanity. He feels relieved of the urging of his conscience when he can transfer his responsibility to this machine which is the creation of his intellect and not of his complete moral personality."¹

India has a peculiar mission. It is a land where various races meet, and India's solution of the racial problem may be important to the human race. India must face her task and prove her value to mankind by finding a solution. Indian history tells of the continual social adjustment and adaptation of various races and civilisations, and not of defence and attack by organised force. In India the accounts of the rise and fall of kingdoms, battles, and political preponderance, are forgotten and despised. Her history tells a tale of social development and the realisation of religious ideals. She tried to solve the racial problem by means of the caste system, but that solution became rigid, and to-day it is crumbling, so that another must replace it. Tagore, like Gandhi, regards racial hostility and the untouchability of the outcastes as India's greatest problems. He, too, thinks that what she needs is creative activity, the fruit of her own spirit. But the nationalist movement in India simply adopted Europe's

¹ *Nationalism*. By Rabindranath Tagore, Macmillan, 1917, p. 110.

political nationalism, whereas in India the conditions requisite for its existence are lacking; India's own mission is on another plane; she is called upon to solve the racial problem, and that requires a consciousness of the unity of mankind, a sentiment of brotherly solidarity, such as India's great religious leaders have taught. "Even though from childhood I had been taught that idolatry of the nation is almost better than reverence for God and humanity, I believe I have outgrown that teaching, and it is my conviction that my countrymen will truly gain their India by fighting against the education which teaches them that a country is greater than the ideals of humanity. The educated Indian at present is trying to absorb some lessons from history contrary to the lessons of our ancestors. The East, in fact, is attempting to take unto itself a history which is not the outcome of its own living. Japan, for example, thinks she is getting powerful through adopting Western methods, but, after she has exhausted her inheritance, only the borrowed weapons of civilisation will remain to her. She will not have developed herself from within. Europe has her past. Europe's strength therefore lies in her history. We, in India, must make up our minds that we cannot borrow other people's history, and that if we stifle our own, we are committing suicide. When you borrow things that do not belong to your life, they only serve to crush your life. And, therefore, I believe that it does India no good to compete with Western civilization in its own field. But we shall be more than compensated if, in spite of the insults heaped upon us, we follow our own destiny."¹ Just because India accepted the doctrine of nationalism from the conquering European nation and felt herself to be a conquered country, propagandists urged that people should devote themselves whole-heartedly to the nation. Whatever was to benefit the nation was surrounded by a halo, and no standard of value was tolerated except the good of the nation. People's lives were ruled by emotional transports and they acknowledge nothing higher. Success justified all methods, service to the nation excused moral shortcomings and the violation of principles otherwise generally accepted. Both Gandhi and Tagore combated this point of view. And it is evidence of the religious nature

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

of the Indian people that they followed Gandhi because he was a saint. Tagore had clearer vision. He deplored the inevitable dissipation of Gandhi's moral force in political adventures. But he went further and feared the narrow-mindedness prevailing in the non-co-operation movement, its tendency to make India self-sufficient, its provincial exclusiveness, at the very moment when material frontiers are less and less dividing civilisation and every problem is becoming a general human problem affecting the whole race of mankind. Tagore fears Gandhi's absolutism, his belief that his goal can be quickly reached in a blaze of enthusiasm, and that the spinning-wheel is a means of universal salvation. He himself believes that slow and patient labour is necessary, he believes in free intelligence rather than blind obedience, and in the impossibility of turning one's back on the present altogether. India's awakening, he says, is linked with the awakening of the world. Every people that isolates itself to-day is working in opposition to the new spirit. In Europe, as in all countries, a community of free spirits is springing up, spirits who have outgrown nationalism in its narrow political form.

Rabindranath Tagore, too, looks upon education as the basis of all future constructive work, and he devoted his energies to a school of his own creation. His father, Debendranath Tagore, the Brahma Samaj leader, was in the habit of going to a particular spot in Western Bengal to meditate, and had built a temple there known as Shanti Niketan, the home of peace. Rabindranath went with his father to this place at the age of eleven. Thirty years later he established his school there with a small band of followers. There he found once more the conditions and the surroundings in which India's cultural greatness had grown up from the earliest times. The conditions were like those in Gandhi's school: life in the open and in the forests, a natural simple life in contrast to the artificial conditions prevailing under modern civilisation. The pupils were all dressed alike in old Indian fashion. They assembled in small classes, sitting upon the ground in a ring round their teacher. Man's instinctive sense of beauty was fostered, and the pupils practised the arts of music and painting. It was Tagore's cousins who created a revival of Indian painting and founded the

modern Bengali school. Sanskrit legends were illustrated in the style of the older schools, just as the romantic painters had done in Europe at the period of awakening nationalism. For the first time since the fall of the Moghul Empire a national school of painting had arisen in India, seeking its inspiration in the same sources as the revolutionary movement.

In 1921 Tagore added a University to his school, the Visva Bharati, with Indian and European professors and research workers. In the school itself domestic science and handicrafts are taught. The boys are inspired with a spirit of social service and render valuable service in the neighbouring villages. Though nothing theoretical is inculcated or forced upon the pupils, the whole life of the school tends towards the abolition of caste and of prejudices regarding untouchability. Not far from the school is an agricultural research station and a model farm, with schools of spinning and tanning where the inhabitants of the surrounding villages receive instructions and guidance.

Tagore's nationalism, therefore, like Gandhi's, rises superior to the Indian nationalist theories formed under European influence and cherished by the intelligentsia out of touch with the mass of the people. Tagore grasped the true significance of Gandhi's personality. Gandhi belonged to the people, he embodied their greatest spiritual qualities, dressed like them and lived like them. With him the Indian people took their place in a movement hitherto confined to the Europeanised intelligentsia. All India was flesh of his flesh, and the soul of India spoke through him. And when the power of truth and love that flowed from him touched India she opened wide her heart. Nor is Tagore's faith essentially different from Gandhi's. He proclaims his hope that the spirit of willing self-sacrifice, of passion, will grow and gain strength, for it is true freedom. Nothing is more precious, not even national independence. An unarmed people, he believed, would prove that moral strength was superior to brute strength. The day would come when a human creature, delicate and wholly unarmed, would prove that the meek inherited the earth. It was logical, therefore, that Mahatma Gandhi, weak and without material aids, should call forth the infinite power of the meek and lowly, which lay waiting,

hidden in the heart of India's humanity. However much they might deceive themselves with phrases learned from the West, Swaraj was not their aim. Their battle was one of the spirit. It was a battle fought on behalf of man. They must free man from the toils in which he had caught himself, from the organisation of national selfishness. Their language had no word corresponding to "nation." If they borrowed it from other peoples, they had no place for it. They must unite by the might of the spirit alone, and victory would give them nothing beyond victory, the conquest of God's kingdom. Then man would gain true Swaraj. They, the ragged beggars of the East, must win freedom for all mankind.

India's political development since 1922, the year of Gandhi's arrest, has been contrary to Gandhi's and Tagore's expectations. Nationalism in its European form dominates Indian politics. For two years the Indian National Congress had been altogether under Gandhi's influence. There followed a struggle between the party led by Dr. Ansari and Rajahgopalatshariar, which adhered to the programme of non-co-operation and still had a majority at the Gaya Congress in 1922, and a minority led by Chitta Ranjan Das, Moti Lal Nehru, and Hakim Ajmal Khan, which advocated participation in the elections for the Provincial Legislative Councils and the Central Parliament in order to prove to the public by means of opposition within the representative bodies how little representative they really were, being rather a farce designed to veil the Government's autocratic rule. The Caliphate Conference was held at the same time as the Gaya Congress. Ansari presided and stressed the need for a Pan-Asiatic movement, calling for the formation of an Asiatic Federation with delegates meeting annually at the same place as the All-India Congress. The Congress itself, under the chairmanship of Das, admitted the Indian Associations in South Africa and the Congress Committee of Kabul in Afghanistan to membership. The Congress rejected participation in the representative bodies, but early in 1923 Das and his friends formed a party of their own within its ranks, the so-called Swaraj Party, in order to win it over to their point of view. Das emphasised the fact that the new Swaraj Party would open its activities in the representative assemblies with a solemn declaration, proclaiming India's inherent

rights and demanding a constitution freely created by the Indian people for themselves. The struggle ended with the acceptance of this policy. Das did not demand the immediate realisation of his programme, but its acceptance in principle and a genuine beginning. But if his demand were rejected, the Swaraj Party intended to make it impossible for the representative assemblies to accomplish anything whatever. But the programme put forward by Das went much further than this. It contained socialistic features which appealed to the masses. Das rejected the dominance of the middle classes, characteristic of European nationalism. If the British Parliament were prepared to grant provincial autonomy then and there, and a responsible central government, he would protest against it, he said, for it would inevitably lead to a concentration of all power in the hands of the middle classes. What benefit would it be to India if, instead of the present white bureaucracy, she were ruled by an Indian middle-class bureaucracy? His ideal of Swaraj would never be realised unless the people joined in their efforts to attain it. All other endeavours would lead to a bourgeois government. To his mind the organisation of village life and the practical autonomy of small local centres was of greater importance than provincial autonomy or a responsible central government. The aim pursued by Das involved a maximum of autonomy for the communes and smaller representative bodies and a minimum of interference by higher authorities. Like Gandhi he opposed the spirit of European industrialism and centralisation, with its excessive organisation and its diversion of all energies to money-making. What he cared for was to strengthen the position of the Indian villages and to induce the peasants to learn handicrafts. He himself, like Moti Lal Nehru, had been one of the most distinguished and wealthy barristers in India, and like him had renounced, under Gandhi's influence, his position, his princely income, and his accustomed manner of life. His father had belonged to the Brahma Samaj. In his capacity of barrister Das had assisted the Indian revolutionaries ever since 1905 and had been indefatigable in promoting their interests, and after the war he became Gandhi's principal lieutenant. At the Congress of Nagpur in 1920 he had moved the resolution on non-co-operation. Later he had given away

the whole of his large fortune, mainly for purposes of girls' education. In 1921 he had been arrested and imprisoned for six months. His programme represented a further development of Gandhi's teaching. At the Conference of Faridpur in 1925 he said that, when he spoke of order, he meant something altogether different from the conception of discipline accepted in Europe. In Europe discipline was the basis of society and government, and the spirit of discipline was military to the core. The discipline that had made England what she was, was of the same military type. He was not called upon to raise his voice in protest against European civilisation. It was natural to the people of Europe, and they must express themselves in accordance with their nature; but Indian ways were not theirs, and India, too, must express herself according to her own nature.

From 1922 to 1925 Das was India's greatest leader. When he died relatively young in 1925, his funeral was on a vaster scale than any that Calcutta had ever witnessed. Gandhi, borne on the shoulders of the throng, was the chief mourner in the procession. The last message sent forth by Das as he lay dying bears witness to the bitterness of his spirit; he felt his limbs fettered, he said, and his body bound with heavy iron chains. This was the agony of servitude. All India was one great prison. What did it matter whether he lived or died?

The moderate Indian Nationalists had co-operated in the representative assemblies set up under the constitutional reforms and had founded the National Liberal Federation, but they were disappointed by the results of their co-operation with the Government. As early as September, 1921, the Indian Central Parliament had passed a resolution declaring that the existing reforms were inadequate, and demanding further rapid developments. In 1923 the Secretary of State for India in London replied with a rejection of their demand. Taxes refused by Parliament were nevertheless made law by the right reserved to the Viceroy of overruling the Legislature. The National Liberals met in conference at Delhi under the leadership of Mrs. Besant and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a former Minister of Justice in the Indian Central Government, in order to draft a constitution for India as a self-governing Dominion within the British Empire; this was to be based on full provincial autonomy and the responsibility

of the Central Government to the Indian Legislature in all internal and civilian affairs.

In 1923 the Swaraj Party succeeded in gaining the consent of the Indian National Congress for participation in the election of the representative assemblies, but the party which adhered to Gandhi and his programme was still exceedingly strong. In August, 1923, Mohammed Ali was released. He presided at the special Congress at Delhi in September, which gave permission to Congress members to enter the Indian Parliament. The Swaraj Party's prospects at the coming elections were not unfavourable. Even the Liberals doubted the possibility of securing India's rights by means of co-operation on the basis of the 1919 constitutional reforms. In addition to these two large parties there were a number of candidates standing as Independents, not directly associated with any clearly defined programme. On this occasion, too, only about 40 per cent. of the electors voted, and many adherents of Gandhi's non-co-operation policy held aloof. The Liberal Party no longer had the field to itself, as before, and it emerged from the struggle with reduced strength; the Swaraj Party scored a fairly striking success. When the Indian National Congress met at the end of 1923 at Cocanada in the Province of Madras, it gave its consent to both policies, that of participation in the elections and the boycott.

During 1924 the Swarajists and the Liberals in the Indian Parliament proved to be largely in agreement over their programme in spite of their different methods of reaching their common goal: the speediest possible change of the existing constitution in the direction of Dominion status. In the provinces the Swarajists were in a decisive majority and were able to paralyse the activities of the Provincial Legislative Councils and so to force the Governors to rule by methods of undisguised autocracy. In the Central Parliament the Swarajists were the strongest party, and by allying themselves with the Independents, who had united and called themselves the National Party, they commanded a considerable majority of the elected deputies. Indian opinion on the constitution was defined in a great debate on a motion put forward by Rangatschari, demanding full provincial autonomy and Dominion status for India within the British Empire. Moti Lal Nehru, one of the Swarajist leaders, moved a

supplementary resolution demanding a round table conference to consider the problems connected with the grant of responsible government. The scheme worked out by this conference was to be submitted to a newly elected Indian Parliament and then to the British Parliament for its final decision. The Swarajists declared that they were satisfied with these proposals, which did not go nearly so far as their original demands put forward during the electoral campaign, and promised the Government their willing co-operation if these were accepted. Every one of the elected members supported the resolutions. The Government replied to these unanimous Indian proposals with a brusque negative. The hopes which the Liberals in particular had set upon the coming into power of a Labour Government in England proved vain, as, indeed, was made clear by MacDonald's letter addressed to India in January, 1925, with its plain warning. In the House of Lords the Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, made a statement in which, in accord with the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy, he rejected the round table conference and merely offered the prospect of a Commission to examine the results of the constitutional régime to date, with the right to suggest minor reforms within the existing constitution.

The first meeting of the new Indian Parliament had demonstrated the unanimous resolve of all Indians, of whatever party, race, or creed, to pave the way for more rapid progress towards national independence. The leaders on both sides endeavoured to bridge the gulf between Hindus and Mohammedans, and various proposals were made for national pacts. Such differences as remained were no hindrance to the unanimous demand for speedy constitutional reforms. Gandhi had been released in February, 1924, in consequence of the pressure of Indian public opinion, but he remained that year in retirement, remote from the political arena, as his health had suffered during his imprisonment.

During the years following the World War Indian social and economic life had been rapidly Europeanised. Gandhi's influence had diverted public attention from these problems. Now once again they occupied the centre of the stage. India's industrialisation had brought a numerous proletariat into being, which is still largely migratory; the town labourer still feels himself linked with his native village. The pro-

India was no less poverty-stricken than the present is their wretchedness and degradation. The number of farmers and workers is still small. In 1925 there were six thousand factories including small agricultural concerns, with a million and a half workers. India's important industrialization, together with the railways, has introduced a certain modernity in her state economic and social life. Since the conclusion of the War, the industrial workers have begun to make trade unions though these are often of a very transitory character. Efforts are being made to improve the position of the workers by fixing the hours of labour, introducing health regulations and accident insurance, and regulating the trade unions. The worst in the new class is demonstrated by frequent strikes. Corporation has proved very important in India, saving the peasants from the oppression of moneylenders. It has made rapid strides in the past twenty years. In 1925 there were fifty-six thousand corporations with more than two million members.

Another change in Indian social life is in the position of women. Since the latter part of the World War, within the extraordinarily brief space of barely four years, a women's suffrage movement arose in India. It has won the sympathies of the whole country and of the political parties and has secured the political emancipation of women in two of the most progressive Indian provinces and in three Native States. As in Russia, women had always played their part in the revolutionary movement and had been members of the Indian National Congress. When Mr. Montagu visited India in order to work out the constitutional reforms, he received an all-India women's delegation in Madras, and the reformist constitution allowed the provinces to extend the franchise to women. Of this right Madras availed itself in 1921 and Burma in 1922. Of the three Indian States which did likewise, Cochin made women eligible themselves. Thus, the women of the lower classes still suffer from reactionary and degrading conditions. The truth of a daughter is regarded as a misfortune, and though the burning of widows has long been stopped by the intervention of the English, the prohibition of remarriage for widows is still enforced, and only in view of the very early marriages in India, is particularly ingenious. Indian social reformers have combated these

customs. The first woman to support their efforts was Ramabai Ranade, to whom the Indian women's movement owes its origin. She returned from a visit to England and founded a home for widows in Poona, with a school of handicrafts and a model training farm where widows could be taught some practical trade. During the war the first Indian women's University was founded, also in Poona. The first girls' secondary school had been established by American missionaries in Lucknow in 1883, at a time when girls' education was in its infancy even in Europe. In 1919 the All-India Conference of Mohammedan Ladies at Lahore pronounced against polygamy, and those present pledged themselves to marry only on a monogamous basis. In 1923 a Women's Indian Association with a number of branches was founded and opened a Children's Home in Madras. There are a number of women's journals which discuss the most up-to-date problems. In 1924 a Birth Control League was founded in Bombay, and the journal *Navayuga* (The New Age) placed itself at the service of this movement. Of the 6,000 members of the Indian National Conference at Belgaum in December, 1924, 1,000 were women, and in December, 1925, the President of the Congress was the great Indian poetess Sarojini Naidu, who has abandoned her literary work in order to devote herself entirely to the nationalist movement.

No less important than the emancipation of women in the modernisation of India is the spread of popular education. The number of illiterates is still large. Of the 247 million inhabitants of British India only 9 millions have hitherto received a school education. Throughout British India no more than 22 millions can read and write at all, and of these rather less than 3 millions are women. In the year 1919-20 there were 3,370 printing-presses in India; 941 newspapers and 2,152 periodicals were published in the various languages, and only 2,019 English books and 9,162 in indigenous languages.

Primary education was in the worst case, especially in the country. Since education was made over to the Provincial Governments and placed under the control of Indian Ministers there has been a slight improvement. But more considerable progress is obstructed because insufficient funds are put at the Ministers' disposal by the English administration. In

1923 the total public expenditure on education by the Provinces, Districts, and Communes in British India amounted to £8 million. Nevertheless, compulsory education has recently been introduced in a number of towns and districts.

Attendance at secondary schools and Universities on the other hand, is relatively widespread in India; but both suffer from bad organisation and from the fact that the teaching is in a foreign language, English, which adds to the pupils' difficulties in learning. Here, however, reform is slowly making its way. As Sir Rashbehary Ghose has pointed out, education must strike root deep in national sentiment and national traditions. The Indians are the heirs of an ancient civilisation, and the true aim of their education should be to stimulate the gradual and spontaneous growth of the ideals that have given definite shape to Indian civilisation and institutions. For that reason Sir Rashbehary Ghose held that Hindu ethics and metaphysics would occupy the most important place in the curriculum, and Western systems would only serve by way of contrast and illustration. Special attention would be paid to a knowledge of the Indian motherland, her literature and art, her philosophy and history.

A number of Hindu academies and schools were established. In Hyderabad the Osmania University was founded in 1918, where instruction was given in Urdu. At the same time an institute of translation was set up in order to translate the principal European scientific works and textbooks on all subjects into Urdu.

Following the changes in the position of women and in popular education, a gradual change has recently come about, chiefly thanks to Gandhi's efforts, in the condition of the outcastes, the pariahs. The untouchable, or, indeed, in some cases unapproachable classes of the population, numbering some 60 million souls, defile the Hindu by their mere proximity, or by touching a vessel or utensil. To overstep this sharp dividing line not only meant the breach of a religious law, but involved social boycott and exclusion from a man's own caste. The year before the World War the following characteristic incident occurred in Kohat. The two-year-old son of a wealthy Hindu fell into a fountain in the courtyard. The father was absent, and the mother stood screaming beside the fountain. A passing outcaste offered to save the boy.

The mother refused, preferring the death of her boy to the defilement of the fountain by an outcaste. As a result of this state of affairs, the outcastes often live under inhuman conditions, utterly ignorant and backward. Missionaries and the British Government have helped them and introduced schools and co-operatives among them. In addition individual Native States have done exemplary work. But it was the nationalist movement after the war that first began to effect a change in people's attitude towards the outcastes. Slowly they were granted permission to attend schools and use public roads, fountains, and temples hitherto closed to them. Under Gandhi's influence Brahmans and outcastes fraternised in many places. At the same time a new self-confidence and a spirit of self-help stirred among the outcastes. Like the women of India, the outcastes are waking from age-long slumber to a new consciousness.

In 1925 Indian nationalism took a further step in the direction of European methods and claims. In the autumn of 1924 Gandhi intervened once more in Indian politics, but his power was broken and the enthusiasm of the memorable years immediately following the war had ebbed away. On account of the disorders and violent conflicts between Hindus and Mohammedans, Gandhi announced in September that he was going to fast for three weeks. Thereupon a conference was summoned to conciliate and unite the opposing factions; it was attended by Hindus, Mohammedans, Parsees, Sikhs, and Christians, but it ended in failure. A few months later Gandhi approved the programme of the Swaraj Party, and at the end of 1924 the Indian National Congress at Belgaum resolved to put an end to non-co-operation, except for the prohibition of foreign clothing materials; it authorised the Swaraj Party to pursue its policy in the representative assemblies as part of the Congress policy. The programmes of the various Indian parties, therefore, were approximating more and more closely. The year 1925 witnessed complete unanimity on the principles of nationalist policy.

Meanwhile the Commission over which Sir Alexander Muddiman had presided in the previous year, to consider what reforms were desirable in the Indian constitution, had published its report. Five members, comprising three civil servants, an ex-civil servant, and a European capitalist,

expressed the view that the existing system had worked well in a general way and that only minor and unimportant reforms were needed. Four other members, all Indian and three of them civil servants, pronounced the reforms unworkable as they were, and demanded an immediate extension of Indian rights, as claimed by all the Indian parties. But this so-called Minority Report was rapidly converted into a majority opinion, for a civil servant who had signed the Majority Report declared as soon as he had retired from the service that he shared the minority view. The Government, however, only accepted the recommendations of the *soi-disant* Majority Report. But in September, 1925, the Indian Central Parliament resolved by 72 votes to 45 of Europeans or non-elected members to demand the following reforms as a minimum immediate extension of constitutional rights: the power of the Secretary of State for India in London should be no greater than that of the Secretary for the Dominions, except that expenditure on military requirements, foreign policy, and the national debt should remain for a fixed period of years under his control. All Indian representative bodies should consist of elected members only. In the Central Parliament the Government should bear responsibility for its actions, but the army and foreign policy should be excepted for a fixed period of years. The existing system of dyarchy was to be replaced by uniform responsibility of all departments to the Provincial Legislatures. Within a definite period the Indian Army was to become fully national. All the Indian parties were agreed in support of this programme. In addition the All-India Moslem League proposed, as a solution of the minorities problem and in order to avoid conflict between Hindus and Mohammedans, that no parliament or other representative body should have power to pass a law affecting any religious community (the decision to rest with the members of the said community in the representative body), if three-quarters of the members of the said community in the representative body in question opposed it.

Liberals and Swarajists, Hindus and Mohammedans, the aristocracy and the middle class, all are agreed that the reforms of 1919 are utterly inadequate and that the continuance of the Government's autocratic authority renders the power of the representative bodies in relation to it purely

illusory. A Commonwealth of India Bill was drafted in 1925 under the direction of Mrs. Besant and certain Liberals, but with the consent of other more radical parties, with the object of providing the basis for an Indian constitution on the lines of Dominion self-government. In May, 1925, shortly before his death, the Swaraj leader Das had announced his party's willingness to co-operate with the Government if it would meet the claims of the Indian people. When the re-election of the Chairman of the Indian Legislative Assembly fell due, the radical Swarajist Patel was elected in place of the retiring European chairman. But the Anglo-Indian Government showed no disposition to make concessions to India's wishes. Only on one point which the Indian politicians regarded as vital did the Government show consideration to their claims, and that was in the matter of fiscal autonomy and protective tariffs. It began to introduce customs duties designed to protect Indian industry, and abolished the excise duty on home manufactured cotton goods which the Indian industrialists had long opposed and which was to balance the duty on foreign imported cotton goods, especially from England. In recent years the Indian Nationalists' demand for protective duties, designed to develop and strengthen Indian industry, has been pressed with increasing urgency. It has been accompanied by the demand for a complete transformation of the army so as to make it exclusively Indian. The Indian National Congress, under the presidency of the poetess Sarojini Naidu, passed a resolution at the end of 1925 advocating universal military training, so that the Indian nation might become efficient and capable of self-defence.

In the last few years, therefore, Indian nationalism has deviated from Gandhi's teaching. Instead of the spinning-wheel, protective tariffs are to develop Indian industry, and military training has taken the place of the doctrine of non-resistance. Indian nationalism came to birth under European influence, and it is assuming the form of modern European State nationalism more and more plainly and markedly. But as in Russia so in India there are possibilities of new types of social organisation latent in the masses; for a few years these began to unfold under Gandhi's leadership, and they may attain fuller realisation at some later date.

CONCLUSION

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, than whom few have a fuller knowledge of the Hither East, has summed up the meaning of recent Oriental history as follows: "The recent history has been a *reductio ad absurdum* of the principle of nationality and has made the Western public begin to see that there are limits to the application of it. The historical interest of these limiting cases lies in the doubt which they cast back upon the fruitfulness of the principle. The historian is led to speculate whether the inoculation of the East with nationalism has not from the beginning brought in diminishing returns of happiness and prosperity. Given the previous breakdown of indigenous institutions and the irresistible ascendancy of the West, he must admit that it was inevitable. But he will possibly judge the movement to have been not so much a political advance as a necessary evil."

The same phenomena are making their appearance as the new era dawns in the East which formerly heralded it in Europe. It has two faces, one looking back to the past and finding there wisdom and inspiration, one gazing into the future and searching for new paths. The way has been prepared for this new era by religious movements and revivals, and they accompany its progress; they also face in two directions: some preach a return to the original Word, like the Wahabi movement, and the Arya Samaj; some proclaim a liberal, humanist gospel, like Bahaism and the Brahma Samaj. A new civilisation is in the making. Its motive forces are two, as was once the case in Europe. One is the rediscovery of ancient, forgotten history, the revival of a classic age irradiating later generations. The second is the discovery of new horizons, the influence of distant alien civilisations. And as in Europe natural science and technical inventions, the discovery of new continents and sea routes, have brought about industrial and cultural changes, leading in turn to changes in the structure of thought and social life, so to-day the Oriental is penetrating to new continents, discovering new lines of communication, and crossing

frontiers hitherto closed. And the importation of the products of modern science and machinery, at first a purely external process, is beginning to influence his thoughts and aspirations.

This new era is one of change and the shattering of existing institutions, a process of fermentation in which the germs of new institutions are taking shape, but it is also a period of uprooting and confusion. The Renaissance gave birth in Europe to an epoch in which men were constantly sighing for the Middle Ages, for the uniform, positive harmony and civilisation of Gothic times. But the Renaissance was the period of man's discovery of man, of liberated personality and freedom of thought. In like manner leaders in the East deplore the coming of the new era, and in the dim twilight of early dawn they sigh for the clear and radiant simplicity of past days, over which they cast a romantic glamour.

Once before the West conquered the East with its arms and its political principles. The Græco-Roman world drew the East within its ambit, but only a little later the East in return permeated the West with its religions and its philosophies of life. To-day the arena in which the struggle between East and West is being conducted is many times larger than it was then; there are no new lands to discover, no barbarian peoples live in the unknown. The social processes by which each side influences the other, the course of history with its succession and multiplicity of human lives all subject to the principle dominant for the time being—all this has become infinitely more complex. The principle of political nationalism is penetrating the East. There, as formerly in Europe, it brings a fresh impetus, a fuller consciousness of self, a richer sense of values. But in Europe it was speedily transformed into a destructive principle, bringing arrogance, hostility, and suspicion in its train and making its own ambitions the supreme standard of human conduct in the name of its *sacro egoismo*, and the infant nationalism of the East already gives evidence of all the weaknesses of its elder brother. The new national States in Asia, such as Turkey, are becoming oppressors of every alien nationality and every impulse of freedom, exactly like the newly created national States in Middle and Eastern Europe. At a moment when Europe's political nationalism is already losing its exclusive

authority as the creed of the age, it is entrenching itself in Asia. But this has created, for the first time in history, something approaching a uniform political and social outlook dominating the whole human race. Thence arises the possibility that all together may defeat present conditions and attain to a new humanism of which free souls in all nations, whether in the East or the West, have a presentiment to-day.

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